Pub Date : 2018-05-04DOI: 10.1080/02681307.2018.1508972
J. Olsen
Security in Northern Europe is a follow-on to NATO and the North Atlantic: Revitalising Collective Defence, published in March 2017 as a RUSI Whitehall Paper. While the previous paper explored the renewed importance of the North Atlantic Ocean from the perspectives of the US, the UK and Norway in particular, this new study takes a broader approach by including the views of all members of Europe’s Northern Group, adjunct waters and countries in North America. Although the new security landscape is multi-faceted and complex, the resurgence of state-based aggression represents the dominant factor. With NATO’s Article 5 commitments now back at the forefront of the Alliance’s mission, certain regions, which until recently attracted little attention from Western states, have regained strategic relevance. One of the most important is Northern Europe. This Whitehall Paper identifies both individual and common challenges and suggests effective national and collective reactions. While the individual chapters can stand alone, they also complement and build on each other to construct a cohesive analysis. This, in turn, can help NATO members and key partners to offer a stronger response on the basis of better information regarding each country’s priorities, attitudes and institutional affiliations. The authors bring unique insight and knowledge to their geographically oriented case studies. They have worked on defence and security in various capacities and areas of responsibility and can account for the interplay among historical, cultural, economic, social and political factors that define a state. While their views carry authoritative weight, the opinions and conclusions in this volume are those of the authors and the editor; they do not represent the official position of any government or institution; indeed, scholarly independence has been encouraged. I am grateful to the authors for their contributions both to this volume and to an extensive outreach programme, which, like the previous study, includes conferences in several countries to encourage an informed debate. I am much obliged to Dr Robin Allers and Colonel Per Erik Solli who provided insightful critiques on the evolving manuscript, and am again in debt to Margaret S MacDonald for excellent editorial counsel. I am also thankful to RUSI and especially the Publications Editor, Dr Emma De Angelis, for first-rate cooperation from concept to publication.
北欧的安全是北约和北大西洋的后续:振兴集体防御，在2017年3月作为入寺白厅文件出版。上一篇论文主要从美国、英国和挪威的角度探讨了北大西洋的重要性，而这项新研究采用了更广泛的方法，包括了欧洲北方集团所有成员、北美附属水域和国家的观点。尽管新的安全格局是多方面的和复杂的，但以国家为基础的侵略的复苏是主要因素。随着北约第五条的承诺重新回到联盟使命的最前沿，某些直到最近还很少受到西方国家关注的地区重新获得了战略意义。其中最重要的是北欧。这份白厅文件确定了个人和共同的挑战，并建议了有效的国家和集体反应。虽然各个章节可以单独存在，但它们也可以相互补充和建立，以构建一个连贯的分析。反过来，这可以帮助北约成员国和主要伙伴在更好地了解每个国家的优先事项、态度和机构隶属关系的基础上，提供更强有力的回应。作者带来独特的见解和知识，他们的地理导向的案例研究。他们从事各种能力和责任领域的国防和安全工作，能够解释界定一个国家的历史、文化、经济、社会和政治因素之间的相互作用。虽然他们的观点具有权威的重量，意见和结论在本卷是作者和编辑的;它们不代表任何政府或机构的官方立场;事实上，学术独立得到了鼓励。我感谢作者对本卷和广泛的外联方案所作的贡献，该方案同前一项研究一样，包括在几个国家举行会议，鼓励进行知情的辩论。我非常感谢Robin Allers博士和Per Erik Solli上校，他们对不断发展的手稿提供了有见地的评论，我再次感谢Margaret S MacDonald出色的编辑顾问。我也感谢入寺，特别是出版编辑，博士艾玛德安吉利斯，为一流的合作，从概念到出版。
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Pub Date : 2018-05-04DOI: 10.1080/02681307.2018.1508943
J. Olsen
Transatlantic Unity NATO, the most successful military alliance in recent history, can only succeed if it appreciates and, to the extent possible, responds to the concerns of all its members. The principle of solidarity lies at the heart of NATO’s founding treaty. As enshrined in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, it remains the enduring principle that binds NATO’s members together, committing them to protect and help each other. At the Brussels Summit in July 2018, all 29 members re-emphasised this unwavering responsibility: ‘Any attack against one Ally will be regarded as an attack against us all’. That principle of solidarity also requires each member to take primary responsibility for its own territorial integrity and the security of its immediate region; Article 3 states that allies ‘will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack’. Article 3 underscores the principle of fair burden-sharing; investment in national defence is the basis for Article 5. This Whitehall Paper has focused on NATO’s northern region, arguing that Russia’s military build-up constitutes the most important politico-military challenge to the defence of Europe today and in the foreseeable future. Russia’s new order of battle – augmented by high commands optimised for short-notice readiness and prompt mobilisation – manifests itself in a theatre-scale warfare posture and an anti-access strategy that enables Russia to strike any location in Europe and project force far into the North Atlantic with precision and lethality. The authors of the chapters comprising this volume argue that Northern Europe can contain and counter Russia if the region stands together with its North American allies
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Pub Date : 2018-05-04DOI: 10.1080/02681307.2018.1508960
Svein Efjestad
The Nordic Region is peaceful and prosperous, with few internal or international conflicts. Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden have many similarities in culture, traditions and social structure. The five countries cooperate extensively in almost all sectors of private and public affairs. The Nordic Council, with its multiple committees and forums at the governmental, ministerial and even parliamentary levels, plays a significant role in promoting cohesion. Although defence is not explicitly a focus of the Nordic Council, the last few years have witnessed increased cooperation in the areas of operations, logistics and information sharing. The Nordic countries find cooperation valuable as an objective in itself, but especially as a means for strengthening defence within the larger Western security framework. Lately, both Finland and Sweden have deepened their ties with NATO, and the US specifically. Indeed, each of the Nordic countries have strengthened their bilateral relations with each other and other Western states since the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. Prospects for further Nordic cooperation are bright but have limitations in practice as neither Finland nor Sweden is likely to join NATO in the near future. Thus, cooperation will focus on common exercises and training, and on collaboration in international operations and crisis management, while agreements on procurement of military equipment will probably remain relatively rare. This chapter focuses on defence and security cooperation in the Nordic area, providing context, identifying challenges and suggesting possibilities for the way forward.
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Pub Date : 2018-05-04DOI: 10.1080/02681307.2018.1508962
P. Roberts
Between late 2017 and early 2018, the UK prime minister, the secretary of state for defence, chief of the Defence Staff and chief of the General Staff all stated that Russia constitutes the primary security threat facing the UK. This signals a deliberate shift from the preoccupation with violent extremism and terrorism that has dominated UK views on defence for more than two decades. The UK’s armed forces have been increasingly engaged in actions designed to counter Russian aggression in continental Europe, the High North and the Atlantic Ocean. The participation of the RAF as part of the Baltic Air Policing mission on an annual rotation, the deployment of significant elements of the Royal Navy to the Baltic Sea, the redeployment of forces to Norway as part of NATO exercises, and the presence of British Army soldiers and weapons in Estonia as part of the NATO Enhanced Forward Presence mission are all clear indicators of the emphasis being placed on a military counter to Russian actions and growing influence. The armed forces have formed new military groupings, such as 77 Brigade, specifically to counter Russian activities. At the political level, since 2016 both formal reports by parliamentary bodies and more generic inquiries about threats facing the UK have highlighted Russian activities in the North Atlantic and
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Pub Date : 2018-05-04DOI: 10.1080/02681307.2018.1508966
M. Zaborowski
As Poland approaches its twentieth anniversary as a member of NATO, the sense of insecurity at the Alliance’s eastern flank is growing. When Poland joined the Alliance in 1999, the dominant perception was that NATO would provide Poland with full security guarantees. Over subsequent years, as NATO focused on out-of-area missions, Poland was determined to demonstrate to its Western allies that it could act as a security provider. However, since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Poland has led the argument in favour of boosting the Alliance’s presence on its eastern flank. Decisions taken at the NATO Warsaw Summit in 2016 went some way to meeting these expectations, but fell short of providing the eastern flank with adequate deterrence. The war in Ukraine has put Poland back into its historical geopolitical dilemma as a state in an unstable security environment and lacking meaningful natural borders to hamper a large-scale conventional invasion. Poland’s sovereign statehood, built around the principle of rejoining the West, may be directly threatened as the result of Russia’s actions in Ukraine, the expansion of Russian nuclear capabilities in the Kaliningrad exclave that directly borders Poland, and the increase in military incidents in the air and waters of Northern Europe. In essence, this means that Poland has again become a front line state, which certainly narrows its diplomatic options, although its relative importance for the West could grow. As Russia’s military build-up in Kaliningrad and its aggressive exercises (which include simulated nuclear attacks on Warsaw) intensify, Poland will naturally prioritise its own security and the security of its nearest allies, particularly in the Baltic. While over the last ten to fifteen years, Warsaw was expected to show its commitment to making a mark beyond its immediate neighbourhood –
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Pub Date : 2018-05-04DOI: 10.1080/02681307.2018.1508968
D. Perry
Canada’s post-war international policy has been deeply shaped by atlanticism – a multi-faceted connection to NATO. The Alliance has, of course, afforded Canada core protections and these considerations have driven much of Canada’s connection with NATO. However, Canada’s fondness for the Alliance goes beyond purely defensive concerns; other elements have sustained Canadian support for NATO even when hardsecurity concerns have waned and Canada’s views have diverged from those of its allies. Key among these softer ties, the Alliance also represents a ‘community of shared values’ created by transatlantic familial relations, cultural ties and trade with Europe – especially with the UK and France, Canada’s two foundational linguistic communities. Beyond this, NATO has offered Canada ‘a seat at the most important allied table in the world’ and a strong voice in the world’s foremost multilateral defence forum. In doing so, NATO has provided Canada with a European counterweight to US security interests, somewhat moderating the US’s otherwise dominant voice in Canadian defence and security discussions. Thus, while hard-security concerns drove Canada’s involvement in the creation of and continued participation in NATO during the Cold War, these other benefits helped sustain Canada’s strong
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Pub Date : 2018-05-04DOI: 10.1080/02681307.2018.1508963
K. Kamp
In recent years, NATO has been confronted with a number of political and military game-changers that have demanded the most fundamental adjustment of its role and self-image since the end of the Cold War. Three developments are particularly striking. First, in 2014, Moscow shattered the European peace by using military force to aggressively assert its great-power ambitions. Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and its support for the rebels in Eastern Ukraine have forced NATO back into the world of Article 5, where the Alliance must back up its commitments with credible military forces. Second, at the same time, upheaval in the Middle East and North Africa has escalated into sustained violence by state and non-state actors. Countless groups, including Islamists – supported by various regional and external powers – are fighting each other with the utmost brutality. This has led to an export of religious violence beyond these regions and in 2015 sparked a huge flood of refugees into Europe, especially into economically strong EU states such as Germany. Never before have European societies been so directly and visibly affected by destabilising developments far from their national borders. Third, US President Donald Trump has already fundamentally altered the basics of transatlantic security relations and thereby affected the foundations of NATO. Through inexperience in foreign affairs, reliance on misleading information, and inconsistent reasoning, he has profoundly undermined the US as a moral authority and leader of the West – in other words, of the international community of liberal democracies. Moreover, he has weakened the US’s traditional role as the ‘benign hegemon’ within
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Pub Date : 2018-01-02DOI: 10.1080/02681307.2018.1499259
Jean-Loup Samaan
While the current intensification of Gulf–Asian relations shows an evolution over the last decade from mere trade exchanges to nascent security cooperation, the eventual outcome of this rapprochement remains uncertain. As the details of these ties mentioned in previous chapters indicate, the hedging approach of Gulf and Asian powers comes from a cautious position. Decision-makers on both sides have ensured that they do not challenge pre-existing security arrangements, nor do they explicitly target one country. They have refrained from interfering in the issues of the Gulf or the Asian security complexes, in order not to choose one side over the other. In other words, Gulf and Asian powers have tried to build a strategic framework to their relations without being trapped in the classic zero-sum game of alliances. But hedging without balancing or antagonising is a delicate game that can create confusion, requiring an ability to decouple cooperation with one state from the local power plays in which this state may be involved. This might work on an occasional basis and with a limited scope, but in the long term, strategic relations will inevitably reshape regional security complexes and induce realignments that neither Gulf states nor Asian states seem willing to trigger themselves. This is why there remain some unknowns at the core of new Gulf–Asia geopolitics. This chapter explores three specific conundrums Gulf and Asian countries may face in the near future, each of which would confront them with critical choices. The first case is India’s ‘Look West’ policy with the Arabian Peninsula, and how it will eventually put into question Gulf historical relations with Pakistan. The second case is Iran–Asia relations. Despite the intensification of their relations with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, countries such as China and India continue to cooperate with Iran in several fields, including energy security and the naval domain. Given the current level of enmity between Tehran and the GCC, any development on Asian–Gulf strategic cooperation will call for a clarification. The third unknown relates to the
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Pub Date : 2018-01-02DOI: 10.1080/02681307.2018.1499261
Jean-Loup Samaan
Over the past ten years, Gulf politics have significantly evolved. The uncertainties that surround US policy in the region have triggered a hedging strategy by GCC members. Hedging has been conducted in other places: some European countries have arguably followed a similar approach between the US and Russia, while small states in Asia have also attempted to avoid being trapped in the US–China competition by sustaining political and economic ties with both players. But, as underlined at the beginning of this paper, the politics of the Arabian Peninsula have been under the influence of Western partners for so long that the current emergence of hedging policies in the region may be historically more consequential than it has been for others. This trend should neither be ignored nor exaggerated. The erosion of US power in the Middle East logically urges local actors to revise their security arrangements, or at least to reconsider their priorities. At the same time, the economics of Gulf–Asian relations are likely to remain the driving force of the rapprochement, especially in the field of energy and infrastructure investment. However, many unknowns remain regarding the extent of these Gulf–Asian ties. Although countries have expressed a general interest in military cooperation, the operationalisation of this intent has been modest for the most part. Military-to-military ties have increased through the launch of diverse exercises and joint training activities, but initiatives that go beyond operational matters to include strategic dialogues and the signing of defence agreements have not yet materialised. If in the near future, Gulf and Asian countries were to give texture to the military dimension of their relations, it would eventually alter their regional security arrangements and stir sensitive issues such as Gulf relations towards Pakistan or Asian exchanges with Iran. The situation is made even more complex by the current state of Gulf politics. As the previous chapters argued, the Gulf ‘pivot’ towards Asia is a regional phenomenon, but not a regional policy. The Qatar crisis of June 2017 is a strong reminder of the fundamental disagreements among Gulf monarchies, and of the inability of the GCC to play an effective role as a
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