Pub Date : 2022-10-13DOI: 10.1332/204378921x16627216100877
Steffen Kallbekken
{"title":"The Paris Agreement has the potential to facilitate ambitious climate action: a reply to ‘Why do climate change negotiations stall? Scientific evidence and solutions for some structural problems’ by Ulrich J. Frey and Jazmin Burgess","authors":"Steffen Kallbekken","doi":"10.1332/204378921x16627216100877","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1332/204378921x16627216100877","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":37814,"journal":{"name":"Global Discourse","volume":"31 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-10-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85441987","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-28DOI: 10.1332/204378921x16613279625169
Sujata Ashwarya
During her tenure as prime minister of India, Indira Gandhi reaffirmed India’s commitment to three interconnected and overlapping factors that shaped the country’s early regional outreach: Muslims, Arabs and Pakistan. Decisions by the government on the Arab–Israeli conflict, the Palestinian issue and (non-)relationship with Israel were usually ‘path dependent’. Mrs Gandhi, well aware of the significance of the ‘Muslim vote’ to her electoral victories, reaffirmed India’s support for Arabs and the Palestinian cause against Israel, thereby appeasing her domestic Muslim constituency. The establishment of Pakistan as an avowedly Islamic state, combined with the Indo-Pakistani conflict over Kashmir, forced the two countries to compete for the support of Muslim Arab states. Indira Gandhi cultivated Arabs by diplomatically supporting them in their conflict with Israel, first by strongly condemning Israel during episodes of conflict between the two parties and then by unequivocally supporting Palestinian self-determination through diplomatic recognition of the Palestine Liberation Organization. Despite Mrs Gandhi’s pro-Arab statements, India did not receive the same level of diplomatic support from Arab countries, which favoured Pakistan in Indo-Pakistani subcontinental conflicts. In contrast, Israel provided India with both military and diplomatic assistance. Despite this, and despite repeated calls from the opposition, Mrs Gandhi refused to normalise relations with Israel, believing that a pro-Arab stance would be more beneficial to national interests. The attitude portrayed India as completely partisan, preventing it from acting as a mediator in the Arab–Israeli conflict, which was a stated goal of India’s West Asia policy.
{"title":"India’s policy towards the Arab–Israeli conflict, the Palestinian issue and Israel: the Indira Gandhi years","authors":"Sujata Ashwarya","doi":"10.1332/204378921x16613279625169","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1332/204378921x16613279625169","url":null,"abstract":"During her tenure as prime minister of India, Indira Gandhi reaffirmed India’s commitment to three interconnected and overlapping factors that shaped the country’s early regional outreach: Muslims, Arabs and Pakistan. Decisions by the government on the Arab–Israeli conflict, the Palestinian issue and (non-)relationship with Israel were usually ‘path dependent’. Mrs Gandhi, well aware of the significance of the ‘Muslim vote’ to her electoral victories, reaffirmed India’s support for Arabs and the Palestinian cause against Israel, thereby appeasing her domestic Muslim constituency. The establishment of Pakistan as an avowedly Islamic state, combined with the Indo-Pakistani conflict over Kashmir, forced the two countries to compete for the support of Muslim Arab states. Indira Gandhi cultivated Arabs by diplomatically supporting them in their conflict with Israel, first by strongly condemning Israel during episodes of conflict between the two parties and then by unequivocally supporting Palestinian self-determination through diplomatic recognition of the Palestine Liberation Organization. Despite Mrs Gandhi’s pro-Arab statements, India did not receive the same level of diplomatic support from Arab countries, which favoured Pakistan in Indo-Pakistani subcontinental conflicts. In contrast, Israel provided India with both military and diplomatic assistance. Despite this, and despite repeated calls from the opposition, Mrs Gandhi refused to normalise relations with Israel, believing that a pro-Arab stance would be more beneficial to national interests. The attitude portrayed India as completely partisan, preventing it from acting as a mediator in the Arab–Israeli conflict, which was a stated goal of India’s West Asia policy.","PeriodicalId":37814,"journal":{"name":"Global Discourse","volume":"61 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78879235","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-23DOI: 10.1332/204378921x16619755578527
Harro van Asselt
{"title":"Great expectations? A reply to ‘Why do climate change negotiations stall? Scientific evidence and solutions for some structural problems’ by Ulrich Frey and Jazmin Burgess","authors":"Harro van Asselt","doi":"10.1332/204378921x16619755578527","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1332/204378921x16619755578527","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":37814,"journal":{"name":"Global Discourse","volume":"45 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-09-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84284944","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-13DOI: 10.1332/204378921x16590842872507
Tarik Basbugoglu
Using discourse analysis as its methodology, this article demonstrates how the Turkish political elite sought to play a ‘Western nation role’ towards Afghanistan in order to appeal indirectly to the US political elite. In that sense, this article underlines how, under coalition (1999–2002) and the Justice and Development Party (2002–) rule, the Turkish governments used security and humanitarian narratives to underscore Turkey’s contributions to Western security after the 11 September 2001 attacks. Continuing on from those narratives, the article explains how a non-Western Muslim country could consider fellow Muslim nations as ‘others’ in order to present itself as a Western actor. This document also details how queer international relations theory and securitisation theory explain the Turkish elite’s decision-making during the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s presence in Afghanistan over the last two decades. To that end, this article highlights how the Justice and Development Party government continued the pro-Western narratives of its predecessor coalition government, which decided to send Turkish military forces into Afghanistan in order to appeal to the US political elite.
{"title":"Is Turkey a Western nation? How the Turkish political elite aimed to appeal to the US political elite during the Afghan conflict","authors":"Tarik Basbugoglu","doi":"10.1332/204378921x16590842872507","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1332/204378921x16590842872507","url":null,"abstract":"Using discourse analysis as its methodology, this article demonstrates how the Turkish political elite sought to play a ‘Western nation role’ towards Afghanistan in order to appeal indirectly to the US political elite. In that sense, this article underlines how, under coalition (1999–2002) and the Justice and Development Party (2002–) rule, the Turkish governments used security and humanitarian narratives to underscore Turkey’s contributions to Western security after the 11 September 2001 attacks. Continuing on from those narratives, the article explains how a non-Western Muslim country could consider fellow Muslim nations as ‘others’ in order to present itself as a Western actor. This document also details how queer international relations theory and securitisation theory explain the Turkish elite’s decision-making during the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s presence in Afghanistan over the last two decades. To that end, this article highlights how the Justice and Development Party government continued the pro-Western narratives of its predecessor coalition government, which decided to send Turkish military forces into Afghanistan in order to appeal to the US political elite.","PeriodicalId":37814,"journal":{"name":"Global Discourse","volume":"27 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80018300","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-05DOI: 10.1332/204378921x16588505305495
Simon Mabon, Saloni Kapur
Despite areas of synergy, international relations theory has typically considered South and West Asia as analytically distinct. Following the work of Barry Buzan, whose work on regional security complexes is formative in shaping the intellectual debate, the Gulf is considered a subregion of a larger Middle Eastern regional security complex, while South Asia is regarded as its own regional security complex. This article argues that the analytical distinction between these different (sub)regional security complexes has become blurred, reflecting the emergence of a supercomplex. We contend that strong patterns of amity, enmity and securitisation that link the two regional security complexes suggest a thinning boundary between them, with the potential for them to merge. We distinguish between a supercomplex and a merger using the concepts of amity, enmity and securitisation provided by regional security complex theory. We add the English School’s ideas of order, justice and regional society to enhance our understanding. We focus on three issues in which the two regions interact: the Abraham Accords; the Iran nuclear crisis, and Jammu and Kashmir. We argue that increasing relations between the two regional security complexes have resulted in a supercomplex, with powerful states in both regional security complexes seeking to project their power into the adjacent regional security complex. We further note the strengthening patterns of amity, enmity and securitisation connecting the two regions, leading to a thinning of the boundary separating South and West Asia. We contribute to the literature on regional security complex theory by clarifying the distinction between a supercomplex and a merger through the South-West Asian case.
{"title":"The complexity of (super)complexes: Pakistan, India and West Asia","authors":"Simon Mabon, Saloni Kapur","doi":"10.1332/204378921x16588505305495","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1332/204378921x16588505305495","url":null,"abstract":"Despite areas of synergy, international relations theory has typically considered South and West Asia as analytically distinct. Following the work of Barry Buzan, whose work on regional security complexes is formative in shaping the intellectual debate, the Gulf is considered a subregion of a larger Middle Eastern regional security complex, while South Asia is regarded as its own regional security complex. This article argues that the analytical distinction between these different (sub)regional security complexes has become blurred, reflecting the emergence of a supercomplex. We contend that strong patterns of amity, enmity and securitisation that link the two regional security complexes suggest a thinning boundary between them, with the potential for them to merge. We distinguish between a supercomplex and a merger using the concepts of amity, enmity and securitisation provided by regional security complex theory. We add the English School’s ideas of order, justice and regional society to enhance our understanding. We focus on three issues in which the two regions interact: the Abraham Accords; the Iran nuclear crisis, and Jammu and Kashmir. We argue that increasing relations between the two regional security complexes have resulted in a supercomplex, with powerful states in both regional security complexes seeking to project their power into the adjacent regional security complex. We further note the strengthening patterns of amity, enmity and securitisation connecting the two regions, leading to a thinning of the boundary separating South and West Asia. We contribute to the literature on regional security complex theory by clarifying the distinction between a supercomplex and a merger through the South-West Asian case.","PeriodicalId":37814,"journal":{"name":"Global Discourse","volume":"321 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-09-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76100541","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-08-18DOI: 10.1332/204378921x16587379187471
Sumitha Narayanan Kutty
The withdrawal of US troops and the subsequent return of the Taliban to power have resulted in India and Iran aligning over Afghanistan’s future once again. India risks facing isolation and sees its relationship with Iran as essential to preventing Pakistani hegemony in their shared neighbourhood. Their renewed regional convergence overlaps with an otherwise widening strategic dissonance as the two countries drift further apart within the international order: India as a defence partner of the US embedded in the Indo-Pacific framework and Iran working with China and Russia to counter the US-led order. This often raises questions of reliability within the India–Iran partnership. The article engages with this perception and examines India’s strategic calculus vis-a-vis Iran in a changing global order characterised by declining US commitment. It argues that, notwithstanding the numerous structural and bilateral constraints between them, India will continue to engage an otherwise challenging partner like Iran, as its strategies are, on balance, benefitting from a world that is in flux.
{"title":"India–Iran relations and the US exit from Afghanistan: finding common ground?","authors":"Sumitha Narayanan Kutty","doi":"10.1332/204378921x16587379187471","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1332/204378921x16587379187471","url":null,"abstract":"The withdrawal of US troops and the subsequent return of the Taliban to power have resulted in India and Iran aligning over Afghanistan’s future once again. India risks facing isolation and sees its relationship with Iran as essential to preventing Pakistani hegemony in their shared neighbourhood. Their renewed regional convergence overlaps with an otherwise widening strategic dissonance as the two countries drift further apart within the international order: India as a defence partner of the US embedded in the Indo-Pacific framework and Iran working with China and Russia to counter the US-led order. This often raises questions of reliability within the India–Iran partnership. The article engages with this perception and examines India’s strategic calculus vis-a-vis Iran in a changing global order characterised by declining US commitment. It argues that, notwithstanding the numerous structural and bilateral constraints between them, India will continue to engage an otherwise challenging partner like Iran, as its strategies are, on balance, benefitting from a world that is in flux.","PeriodicalId":37814,"journal":{"name":"Global Discourse","volume":"93 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-08-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90544520","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-08-18DOI: 10.1332/204378921x16587970502347
P. Kumaraswamy
When Narendra Modi became prime minister in May 2014, Indo-Israeli relations were stable, progressing and expanding, though somewhat stagnant. Although military–security ties were a major component, active political intervention seemed necessary, as parties of the Left constantly demanded a ‘course correction’ vis-a-vis Israel from the decade-long United Progressive Alliance government under Manmohan Singh. While the Congress-led government withstood the pressure, relations with Israel were under stress, with little progress or visibility due to the stalled peace process. Under those circumstances, Modi became prime minister and ushered in dramatic changes in prioritising Israel in India’s foreign policy matrix. This shift was also helped by a host of domestic and external factors.
{"title":"Indo-Israeli relations: changes under Narendra Modi","authors":"P. Kumaraswamy","doi":"10.1332/204378921x16587970502347","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1332/204378921x16587970502347","url":null,"abstract":"When Narendra Modi became prime minister in May 2014, Indo-Israeli relations were stable, progressing and expanding, though somewhat stagnant. Although military–security ties were a major component, active political intervention seemed necessary, as parties of the Left constantly demanded a ‘course correction’ vis-a-vis Israel from the decade-long United Progressive Alliance government under Manmohan Singh. While the Congress-led government withstood the pressure, relations with Israel were under stress, with little progress or visibility due to the stalled peace process. Under those circumstances, Modi became prime minister and ushered in dramatic changes in prioritising Israel in India’s foreign policy matrix. This shift was also helped by a host of domestic and external factors.","PeriodicalId":37814,"journal":{"name":"Global Discourse","volume":"21 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-08-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82318157","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-08-12DOI: 10.1332/204378921x16585144068826
Umer Karim
The Pakistan–Iran relationship has been evolving over time. Ties between the two neighbours have been shaped by bilateral security concerns and strategic interests, as well as flux in the political identities of the two states. Pakistan and Iran were strong allies during the time of the Shah regime, as they had a harmonious political outlook and shared membership in the American-led political block during the Cold War. With the Islamic revolution, Iranian national identity underwent a radical change and gave birth to a political vision that was confrontational in essence. Diverging geopolitical interests and alignments in the region moved the two nations further apart. After the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, both sides backed different groups, and the bilateral relationship became further estranged owing to Pakistan’s support for the Taliban regime, which persecuted Afghan Shi’ites and was also involved in the killing of Iranian diplomats. The Iranian security accord with India, as well as Pakistan’s strong ties with Saudi Arabia, further contributed to making the relationship complex and uneasy. Burgeoning security threats across the border from anti-Pakistan insurgents of the Balochistan Liberation Army and anti-Iran insurgents of Jundullah and Jaish Al-Adl have complicated the relationship between the security establishments on both sides. Furthermore, attempts to politicise Pakistan’s Shi’ite community and instances of sectarian violence inside Pakistan have made both states wary of each other. These developments have been critical in impeding efforts to enhance ties in the economic and energy fields. Yet, these differences have not led both states to increasingly confront each other, as both sides fully realise the near-disastrous consequences of such a conflict. Nonetheless, they have also failed to develop a mechanism to address bilateral issues; thus, a tense competition epitomises the state of bilateral affairs. However, as the Pakistani institutions and government have started to change their strategic outlook towards the region, new opportunities are emerging for the improvement of the bilateral relationship.
{"title":"The Pakistan–Iran relationship and the changing nature of regional and domestic security and strategic interests","authors":"Umer Karim","doi":"10.1332/204378921x16585144068826","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1332/204378921x16585144068826","url":null,"abstract":"The Pakistan–Iran relationship has been evolving over time. Ties between the two neighbours have been shaped by bilateral security concerns and strategic interests, as well as flux in the political identities of the two states. Pakistan and Iran were strong allies during the time of the Shah regime, as they had a harmonious political outlook and shared membership in the American-led political block during the Cold War. With the Islamic revolution, Iranian national identity underwent a radical change and gave birth to a political vision that was confrontational in essence. Diverging geopolitical interests and alignments in the region moved the two nations further apart. After the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, both sides backed different groups, and the bilateral relationship became further estranged owing to Pakistan’s support for the Taliban regime, which persecuted Afghan Shi’ites and was also involved in the killing of Iranian diplomats. The Iranian security accord with India, as well as Pakistan’s strong ties with Saudi Arabia, further contributed to making the relationship complex and uneasy. Burgeoning security threats across the border from anti-Pakistan insurgents of the Balochistan Liberation Army and anti-Iran insurgents of Jundullah and Jaish Al-Adl have complicated the relationship between the security establishments on both sides. Furthermore, attempts to politicise Pakistan’s Shi’ite community and instances of sectarian violence inside Pakistan have made both states wary of each other. These developments have been critical in impeding efforts to enhance ties in the economic and energy fields. Yet, these differences have not led both states to increasingly confront each other, as both sides fully realise the near-disastrous consequences of such a conflict. Nonetheless, they have also failed to develop a mechanism to address bilateral issues; thus, a tense competition epitomises the state of bilateral affairs. However, as the Pakistani institutions and government have started to change their strategic outlook towards the region, new opportunities are emerging for the improvement of the bilateral relationship.","PeriodicalId":37814,"journal":{"name":"Global Discourse","volume":"233 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81602358","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-26DOI: 10.1332/204378921x16564565200374
E. Johnson, D. Nettle
{"title":"Building on foundations of evidence and intuition: a reply to commentaries on ‘Fairness, generosity and conditionality in the welfare system: the case of UK disability benefits’ by Johnson and Nettle","authors":"E. Johnson, D. Nettle","doi":"10.1332/204378921x16564565200374","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1332/204378921x16564565200374","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":37814,"journal":{"name":"Global Discourse","volume":"23 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-07-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86660012","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.1332/204378921x16349692612474
J. Rogers
This article examines the absence of discussion about male circumcision in the first legal case against female circumcision in Australia, the Vaziri and Magennis case of 2015, 2018 and 2019, where the High Court of Australia prosecuted three people for practising female circumcision. It engages with the work of Rick Shweder on this case, arguing that what powerfully informs legal cases on this topic in Australia is less anthropological or medical evidence, than antifemale genital mutilation advocacy in the forms of literature and activism. These forms of anti-female genital mutilation discourse, the article argues, obscure the obvious comparison between male circumcision – as a ritual or ceremony that results in the production of a man as a man of God or of the nation – and female circumcision, which is understood as a mutilation. In lieu of the missed comparison, the result of this representation in legal and fictional texts is a rendering of the woman as unable to authorise her own agency, that is, as a remnant of mutilation, a rendering that is far from accurate.Key messagesLegal deliberations on female circumcision would benefit from comparison with the significance of male circumcision.Legal deliberations on female circumcision need to be informed by evidence from circumcised women and less by anti-female genital mutilation activism, which is curated for popular consumption.Positioning circumcised women as mutilated women denies the significant and informed voices of circumcised women who do not experience the practices as mutilation.
{"title":"Remnants of mutilation in anti-FGM law in Australia - a reply to ‘The prosecution of Dawoodi Bohra women’ by Richard Shweder","authors":"J. Rogers","doi":"10.1332/204378921x16349692612474","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1332/204378921x16349692612474","url":null,"abstract":"This article examines the absence of discussion about male circumcision in the first legal case against female circumcision in Australia, the Vaziri and Magennis case of 2015, 2018 and 2019, where the High Court of Australia prosecuted three people for practising female circumcision. It engages with the work of Rick Shweder on this case, arguing that what powerfully informs legal cases on this topic in Australia is less anthropological or medical evidence, than antifemale genital mutilation advocacy in the forms of literature and activism. These forms of anti-female genital mutilation discourse, the article argues, obscure the obvious comparison between male circumcision – as a ritual or ceremony that results in the production of a man as a man of God or of the nation – and female circumcision, which is understood as a mutilation. In lieu of the missed comparison, the result of this representation in legal and fictional texts is a rendering of the woman as unable to authorise her own agency, that is, as a remnant of mutilation, a rendering that is far from accurate.Key messagesLegal deliberations on female circumcision would benefit from comparison with the significance of male circumcision.Legal deliberations on female circumcision need to be informed by evidence from circumcised women and less by anti-female genital mutilation activism, which is curated for popular consumption.Positioning circumcised women as mutilated women denies the significant and informed voices of circumcised women who do not experience the practices as mutilation.","PeriodicalId":37814,"journal":{"name":"Global Discourse","volume":"16 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72372098","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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