Pub Date : 2020-10-15DOI: 10.1080/16161262.2020.1826814
Sebastian Rowe-Munday
Like Afghanistan, Northern Ireland has evolved into another conflict that never seems to definitively conclude. Continuing interest in new public enquiries, the prosecution of British army soldiers...
{"title":"Thatcher’s spy: my life as an MI5 agent inside Sinn Fein","authors":"Sebastian Rowe-Munday","doi":"10.1080/16161262.2020.1826814","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16161262.2020.1826814","url":null,"abstract":"Like Afghanistan, Northern Ireland has evolved into another conflict that never seems to definitively conclude. Continuing interest in new public enquiries, the prosecution of British army soldiers...","PeriodicalId":37890,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Intelligence History","volume":"20 1","pages":"103 - 106"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/16161262.2020.1826814","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46372049","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-15DOI: 10.1080/16161262.2020.1826806
F. Cacciatore
ABSTRACT Starting from 1948, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Office of Policy Coordination tried to harness and utilise the talents of recent émigrés from the Soviet Union, more specifically, to dispatch them in secret operations behind the Iron Curtain. The purpose of this article is to revise the commonly accepted narrative on two American-sponsored émigré operations, showing how they should be assessed as intelligence collection ventures rather than covert operations, and to demonstrate how these émigrés played a key role in providing intelligence on the Soviet target. The study will also investigate how this kind of covert action tied into US policy-making, and how the perceived needs of the US administration – chiefly creating an ‘early warning’ system for a Soviet attack on Europe and the need of information on the Soviet target – shaped intelligence collection in the early Cold War.
{"title":"Re-evaluating the émigrés: intelligence collection and policy-making in the early Cold War","authors":"F. Cacciatore","doi":"10.1080/16161262.2020.1826806","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16161262.2020.1826806","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Starting from 1948, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Office of Policy Coordination tried to harness and utilise the talents of recent émigrés from the Soviet Union, more specifically, to dispatch them in secret operations behind the Iron Curtain. The purpose of this article is to revise the commonly accepted narrative on two American-sponsored émigré operations, showing how they should be assessed as intelligence collection ventures rather than covert operations, and to demonstrate how these émigrés played a key role in providing intelligence on the Soviet target. The study will also investigate how this kind of covert action tied into US policy-making, and how the perceived needs of the US administration – chiefly creating an ‘early warning’ system for a Soviet attack on Europe and the need of information on the Soviet target – shaped intelligence collection in the early Cold War.","PeriodicalId":37890,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Intelligence History","volume":"20 1","pages":"126 - 145"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/16161262.2020.1826806","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42611206","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-09DOI: 10.1080/16161262.2020.1826812
John Lisle
ABSTRACT In the wake of World War II, scientific advancements seemed integral to national security. They also spelled the potential demise of national security if an adversarial country achieved those crucial advancements first. To keep abreast of these foreign developments, the United States government implemented a series of programs designed to send scientists abroad, or bring foreign scientists into the country, with the intention of eliciting secrets. Specifically, the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency co-opted the ostensibly international and collaborative nature of science for intelligence gains. This paper analyses and explains these Cold War programs to use scientists as intelligence gatherers.
{"title":"Stealing scientific secrets: American cold war efforts to use scientists as spies","authors":"John Lisle","doi":"10.1080/16161262.2020.1826812","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16161262.2020.1826812","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In the wake of World War II, scientific advancements seemed integral to national security. They also spelled the potential demise of national security if an adversarial country achieved those crucial advancements first. To keep abreast of these foreign developments, the United States government implemented a series of programs designed to send scientists abroad, or bring foreign scientists into the country, with the intention of eliciting secrets. Specifically, the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency co-opted the ostensibly international and collaborative nature of science for intelligence gains. This paper analyses and explains these Cold War programs to use scientists as intelligence gatherers.","PeriodicalId":37890,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Intelligence History","volume":"21 1","pages":"153 - 171"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/16161262.2020.1826812","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44296145","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-09DOI: 10.1080/16161262.2020.1826808
Jonathan N. Brown
ABSTRACT In June 1941, British intelligence agents claimed to have foiled a Nazi-orchestrated coup in South America by intercepting the so-called Belmonte letter from a German courier named Fritz Fenthol. Years later the letter and the coup plot were exposed as fabrications, and published accounts since then have cast Fritz Fenthol as an imaginary figure invented by British spies to better sell the lie. But Fenthol was a real person, and his alleged involvement in the Belmonte letter affair led to real consequences: namely, his arrest and internment in a Brazilian concentration camp from April 1942 until May 1945. This article tells the story of Fenthol’s entanglement in the Belmonte letter affair for the first time based on exhaustive research at 31 archives across seven countries. The mystery surrounding Fenthol, as it turns out, is as much a consequence of his own complexities as it is the contrivances of British spies. The Belmonte letter affair of 1941 was not Fenthol’s debut as an agent of fate, but rather a fitting denouement. He emerges, in the final analysis, as a casualty of deception doubly over, as his own subterfuge became fully intermingled with that of British and American officials in Latin America.
{"title":"‘A valuable man in the right place’: the untold story of Fritz Fenthol and the Belmonte letter","authors":"Jonathan N. Brown","doi":"10.1080/16161262.2020.1826808","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16161262.2020.1826808","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In June 1941, British intelligence agents claimed to have foiled a Nazi-orchestrated coup in South America by intercepting the so-called Belmonte letter from a German courier named Fritz Fenthol. Years later the letter and the coup plot were exposed as fabrications, and published accounts since then have cast Fritz Fenthol as an imaginary figure invented by British spies to better sell the lie. But Fenthol was a real person, and his alleged involvement in the Belmonte letter affair led to real consequences: namely, his arrest and internment in a Brazilian concentration camp from April 1942 until May 1945. This article tells the story of Fenthol’s entanglement in the Belmonte letter affair for the first time based on exhaustive research at 31 archives across seven countries. The mystery surrounding Fenthol, as it turns out, is as much a consequence of his own complexities as it is the contrivances of British spies. The Belmonte letter affair of 1941 was not Fenthol’s debut as an agent of fate, but rather a fitting denouement. He emerges, in the final analysis, as a casualty of deception doubly over, as his own subterfuge became fully intermingled with that of British and American officials in Latin America.","PeriodicalId":37890,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Intelligence History","volume":"20 1","pages":"168 - 202"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/16161262.2020.1826808","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45841370","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-09DOI: 10.1080/16161262.2020.1826811
A. Yates
ABSTRACT There are few comprehensive histories of Arab military intelligence services, and almost nothing on those in the countries of the Arabian Peninsula. This paper begins to fill this gap by providing a detailed history of the early years of military intelligence within what is today probably the most capable Arab military – the Armed Forces of the United Arab Emirates (UAE). It describes military intelligence developments between 1965 and 1974 within the Abu Dhabi Defence Force, which was the direct predecessor of the present-day UAE Armed Forces. It concludes with the formation of the entity which is now known as the Directorate of Military Intelligence. The paper is based on archival documents and interviews with those who served in Abu Dhabi’s military intelligence.
{"title":"The formation of military intelligence in the United Arab Emirates: 1965–1974","authors":"A. Yates","doi":"10.1080/16161262.2020.1826811","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16161262.2020.1826811","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT There are few comprehensive histories of Arab military intelligence services, and almost nothing on those in the countries of the Arabian Peninsula. This paper begins to fill this gap by providing a detailed history of the early years of military intelligence within what is today probably the most capable Arab military – the Armed Forces of the United Arab Emirates (UAE). It describes military intelligence developments between 1965 and 1974 within the Abu Dhabi Defence Force, which was the direct predecessor of the present-day UAE Armed Forces. It concludes with the formation of the entity which is now known as the Directorate of Military Intelligence. The paper is based on archival documents and interviews with those who served in Abu Dhabi’s military intelligence.","PeriodicalId":37890,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Intelligence History","volume":"20 1","pages":"221 - 241"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/16161262.2020.1826811","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45304799","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-09DOI: 10.1080/16161262.2020.1826805
M. Becker
ABSTRACT A mythology has grown among scholars that during the early years of the Cold War the CIA was so preoccupied with a perceived Soviet threat that except for highly exceptional events such as the 1954 coup in Guatemala the agency largely ignored Latin America. In this narrative, it took the 1959 Cuban revolution to bring the region front and center in its imagination (but even then, still only as a pawn of the Soviet Union). A review of CIA documentation, however, indicates that from its beginnings the agency dedicated a significant amount of attention to the region. Not only does the material that the CIA’s case officers and their agents generated challenge our assumptions about the agency’s presumed priorities, it also highlights the value of a largely unexploited source to understand domestic developments in Latin America in the early post-World War Two period.
{"title":"The CIA on Latin America","authors":"M. Becker","doi":"10.1080/16161262.2020.1826805","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16161262.2020.1826805","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT A mythology has grown among scholars that during the early years of the Cold War the CIA was so preoccupied with a perceived Soviet threat that except for highly exceptional events such as the 1954 coup in Guatemala the agency largely ignored Latin America. In this narrative, it took the 1959 Cuban revolution to bring the region front and center in its imagination (but even then, still only as a pawn of the Soviet Union). A review of CIA documentation, however, indicates that from its beginnings the agency dedicated a significant amount of attention to the region. Not only does the material that the CIA’s case officers and their agents generated challenge our assumptions about the agency’s presumed priorities, it also highlights the value of a largely unexploited source to understand domestic developments in Latin America in the early post-World War Two period.","PeriodicalId":37890,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Intelligence History","volume":"20 1","pages":"146 - 167"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/16161262.2020.1826805","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44394148","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-09DOI: 10.1080/16161262.2020.1826807
Christopher Smith
ABSTRACT During the Second World War, Bletchley Park, the headquarters of the Government Code and Cypher School, was the epicentre of a vast scientific enterprise which succeeded in reading enciphered Axis wireless traffic on an industrialised scale. Typically, this important intelligence agency has been depicted as a collegiate organisation with a clear Senior Common Room culture. This article argues that Bletchley Park is better understood as major mechanised, military orientated scientific enterprise with vast numbers of employees, a considerable budget and was subject to careful and professionally managed wartime media control which extended for many years into the post-war period. Each of these facets respectively represents each of the five ‘M’s of ‘Big Science’. As such, the agency can in fact, be viewed and understood as an example of quasi-Big Science.
{"title":"Bletchley park and big science: industrialising the secret war, 1939-1945","authors":"Christopher Smith","doi":"10.1080/16161262.2020.1826807","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16161262.2020.1826807","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT During the Second World War, Bletchley Park, the headquarters of the Government Code and Cypher School, was the epicentre of a vast scientific enterprise which succeeded in reading enciphered Axis wireless traffic on an industrialised scale. Typically, this important intelligence agency has been depicted as a collegiate organisation with a clear Senior Common Room culture. This article argues that Bletchley Park is better understood as major mechanised, military orientated scientific enterprise with vast numbers of employees, a considerable budget and was subject to careful and professionally managed wartime media control which extended for many years into the post-war period. Each of these facets respectively represents each of the five ‘M’s of ‘Big Science’. As such, the agency can in fact, be viewed and understood as an example of quasi-Big Science.","PeriodicalId":37890,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Intelligence History","volume":"20 1","pages":"109 - 125"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/16161262.2020.1826807","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47191253","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-09DOI: 10.1080/16161262.2020.1826810
Ryan Shaffer
The Spy in Moscow Station describes the National Security Agency (NSA) investigation into the bugging of United States Embassy in Moscow starting in 1978 to Project GUNMAN that revealed sophisticat...
{"title":"The spy in Moscow station: a counterspy’s hunt for a deadly cold war threat","authors":"Ryan Shaffer","doi":"10.1080/16161262.2020.1826810","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16161262.2020.1826810","url":null,"abstract":"The Spy in Moscow Station describes the National Security Agency (NSA) investigation into the bugging of United States Embassy in Moscow starting in 1978 to Project GUNMAN that revealed sophisticat...","PeriodicalId":37890,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Intelligence History","volume":"20 1","pages":"105 - 106"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/16161262.2020.1826810","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46427087","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-09DOI: 10.1080/16161262.2020.1826809
Yoram Fried
ABSTRACT Before the end of the British Mandate and the establishment of the State of Israel, the Yishuv’s intelligence services assessed that King Abdullah would be willing to accept the existence of a Jewish state and that the other Arab countries, for internal and external reasons, would not be interested in getting involved in war. They concluded that an invasion by regular Arab armies in response to a declaration of a Jewish state would be a ‘low probability’ and that Arab propaganda calling for the destruction of Israel only amounted to a war of nerves. Today it is abundantly clear that the intelligence agencies failed to weigh these factors correctly. In fact, what primarily motivated the Arab regimes to launch an all-out war was indeed their internal and external situation, since by so doing they could divert public attention away from their internal problems and ameliorate their external status.
{"title":"Jewish intelligence and the question of the Arab countries invasion prior to the 1948 War of Independence","authors":"Yoram Fried","doi":"10.1080/16161262.2020.1826809","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16161262.2020.1826809","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Before the end of the British Mandate and the establishment of the State of Israel, the Yishuv’s intelligence services assessed that King Abdullah would be willing to accept the existence of a Jewish state and that the other Arab countries, for internal and external reasons, would not be interested in getting involved in war. They concluded that an invasion by regular Arab armies in response to a declaration of a Jewish state would be a ‘low probability’ and that Arab propaganda calling for the destruction of Israel only amounted to a war of nerves. Today it is abundantly clear that the intelligence agencies failed to weigh these factors correctly. In fact, what primarily motivated the Arab regimes to launch an all-out war was indeed their internal and external situation, since by so doing they could divert public attention away from their internal problems and ameliorate their external status.","PeriodicalId":37890,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Intelligence History","volume":"20 1","pages":"203 - 220"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/16161262.2020.1826809","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45264439","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-09-12DOI: 10.1080/16161262.2020.1801018
Claire Hubbard-Hall, Adrian O’Sullivan
ABSTRACT The German military-intelligence service (the Abwehr) was a macrospatial organisation whose clandestine operational activities were significantly affected by such factors as place and space. As the Second World War progressed, the Abwehr’s covert spaces expanded and contracted dynamically, producing some challenging operational environments. The service responded in various ways to a changing landscape engendered by military occupation, overseas deployment, geographical distance, enemy activity, and imminent defeat. In response to the recent spatial turn in the theory and methodology of other disciplines, intelligence historians should now consider incorporating geospatial viewpoints more often into their textual accounts and perhaps even publishing dynamic online visualisations with the aid of historical geographic information systems (HGIS).
{"title":"Landscapes of intelligence in the Third Reich: visualising Abwehr operations during the Second World War","authors":"Claire Hubbard-Hall, Adrian O’Sullivan","doi":"10.1080/16161262.2020.1801018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16161262.2020.1801018","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The German military-intelligence service (the Abwehr) was a macrospatial organisation whose clandestine operational activities were significantly affected by such factors as place and space. As the Second World War progressed, the Abwehr’s covert spaces expanded and contracted dynamically, producing some challenging operational environments. The service responded in various ways to a changing landscape engendered by military occupation, overseas deployment, geographical distance, enemy activity, and imminent defeat. In response to the recent spatial turn in the theory and methodology of other disciplines, intelligence historians should now consider incorporating geospatial viewpoints more often into their textual accounts and perhaps even publishing dynamic online visualisations with the aid of historical geographic information systems (HGIS).","PeriodicalId":37890,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Intelligence History","volume":"21 1","pages":"88 - 112"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/16161262.2020.1801018","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41332116","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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