Pub Date : 2019-03-25DOI: 10.1177/1783591719836874
K. Costello
To some observers, public utility regulation has expanded its domain far beyond its original mandate and what is socially optimal. Their view is that regulators should stick to setting just and reasonable rates and taking other actions that improve the long-term welfare of utility consumers. After all the raison d’etre for public utility regulation is to protect consumers from “monopoly” utilities. Utilities provide essential services to both individuals and society. When left unregulated, these services would presumably be excessively priced with no guarantee of availability for those who want it and willing to pay for it. Diverting from this focus—driven by escalating politics—risks regulators’ ability to achieve their core objective of protecting consumers. One positive aspect of politicization is that it allows regulators to have access to more diversified information from stakeholders that could result in better decisions. One criticism of regulation is that it tends to stay with its policies and practices too long in spite of changing market and technological conditions. Additional stakeholders in the regulatory process could push regulators toward changes that are in the public interest but would not pursue on their own.
{"title":"The consequences of escalated politicization in the US regulatory process","authors":"K. Costello","doi":"10.1177/1783591719836874","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1783591719836874","url":null,"abstract":"To some observers, public utility regulation has expanded its domain far beyond its original mandate and what is socially optimal. Their view is that regulators should stick to setting just and reasonable rates and taking other actions that improve the long-term welfare of utility consumers. After all the raison d’etre for public utility regulation is to protect consumers from “monopoly” utilities. Utilities provide essential services to both individuals and society. When left unregulated, these services would presumably be excessively priced with no guarantee of availability for those who want it and willing to pay for it. Diverting from this focus—driven by escalating politics—risks regulators’ ability to achieve their core objective of protecting consumers. One positive aspect of politicization is that it allows regulators to have access to more diversified information from stakeholders that could result in better decisions. One criticism of regulation is that it tends to stay with its policies and practices too long in spite of changing market and technological conditions. Additional stakeholders in the regulatory process could push regulators toward changes that are in the public interest but would not pursue on their own.","PeriodicalId":38329,"journal":{"name":"Competition and Regulation in Network Industries","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-03-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1783591719836874","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46510652","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-03-14DOI: 10.1177/1783591719834864
S. Wahyuningtyas
The growth of the digital market has challenged competition policy in terms of how innovation should be considered. This article deals with the current market development in Indonesia as a showcase for how innovation responds to market demand faster than state regulations. The study focuses on Go-Jek, a technology company that offers a wide range of online services, including transportation, delivery, and mobile payment, by bringing together consumers and service providers; hence, Go-Jek plays a role as an intermediary and at the same time also as an infomediary that collects information from users and shares it with its users. While policy makers and regulators struggle to find the most workable policies and regulations, markets take initiatives to regulate themselves to protect the interests of the contracting parties. Questions remain about the extent to which party interests are balanced out and how self-regulation could meet established public policy. The analysis in this article considers Indonesian competition authority (KPPU) Regulation No. 4. In the European Union (EU), the desire to advocate self-regulation has been emphasized in the EU Agenda on Better Regulation in 2015 by considering “well-designed non-regulatory means” in the policy for better regulation. Taking a lesson from the EU, this article discusses three key issues. First, how and to what extent does self-regulation of online platforms govern transactions being made on the platform. Second, what challenges do self-regulation of online platforms pose to competition. Third, which policies could the government make to deal with the self-regulation of online platforms.
{"title":"Self-regulation of online platform and competition policy challenges: A case study on Go-Jek","authors":"S. Wahyuningtyas","doi":"10.1177/1783591719834864","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1783591719834864","url":null,"abstract":"The growth of the digital market has challenged competition policy in terms of how innovation should be considered. This article deals with the current market development in Indonesia as a showcase for how innovation responds to market demand faster than state regulations. The study focuses on Go-Jek, a technology company that offers a wide range of online services, including transportation, delivery, and mobile payment, by bringing together consumers and service providers; hence, Go-Jek plays a role as an intermediary and at the same time also as an infomediary that collects information from users and shares it with its users. While policy makers and regulators struggle to find the most workable policies and regulations, markets take initiatives to regulate themselves to protect the interests of the contracting parties. Questions remain about the extent to which party interests are balanced out and how self-regulation could meet established public policy. The analysis in this article considers Indonesian competition authority (KPPU) Regulation No. 4. In the European Union (EU), the desire to advocate self-regulation has been emphasized in the EU Agenda on Better Regulation in 2015 by considering “well-designed non-regulatory means” in the policy for better regulation. Taking a lesson from the EU, this article discusses three key issues. First, how and to what extent does self-regulation of online platforms govern transactions being made on the platform. Second, what challenges do self-regulation of online platforms pose to competition. Third, which policies could the government make to deal with the self-regulation of online platforms.","PeriodicalId":38329,"journal":{"name":"Competition and Regulation in Network Industries","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-03-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1783591719834864","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43666768","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-03-01DOI: 10.1177/1783591719886101
P. Parcu
The proliferation of news and information has reached unprecedented levels. Notwithstanding this apparent richness, increasing doubts about the quality and diversity of online news have grown for many years. The article arguments that the threats to quality information and media pluralism essentially come from two sources: the increasing concentration of economic resources into just a few gigantic online platforms/media and the spreading of the disinformation that is favored by the available technological instruments. After having analyzed these threats also in terms of their consequences for the public and democratic debate, the article focuses on the available responses, exploring the necessity of explicit and multidimensional public policies to preserve quality news and media pluralism as public goods that are indispensable to democracy.
{"title":"New digital threats to media pluralism in the information age","authors":"P. Parcu","doi":"10.1177/1783591719886101","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1783591719886101","url":null,"abstract":"The proliferation of news and information has reached unprecedented levels. Notwithstanding this apparent richness, increasing doubts about the quality and diversity of online news have grown for many years. The article arguments that the threats to quality information and media pluralism essentially come from two sources: the increasing concentration of economic resources into just a few gigantic online platforms/media and the spreading of the disinformation that is favored by the available technological instruments. After having analyzed these threats also in terms of their consequences for the public and democratic debate, the article focuses on the available responses, exploring the necessity of explicit and multidimensional public policies to preserve quality news and media pluralism as public goods that are indispensable to democracy.","PeriodicalId":38329,"journal":{"name":"Competition and Regulation in Network Industries","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1783591719886101","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45642974","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-17DOI: 10.1177/1783591718823922
Agam Gupta, Arqum Mateen, Divya Sharma, U. Sarkar, Vinu Cheruvil Thomas
This article studies the competitive dynamics between an incumbent and a late entrant in a market governed by network effects. Classifying markets based on decision criterion used by majority of consumers in a market, an analytical model for the likelihood of incumbent displacement in these markets is developed and corroborated using simulations. Using product quality offered and product price charged by the entrant as managerial levers, the impact of managerial decision-making on the expected market share of the entrant is discussed. Efficacy of seeding and delayed entry by the entrant in an attempt to perfect its product is also examined.
{"title":"Combating incumbency advantage of network effects: The role of entrant’s decisions and consumer preferences","authors":"Agam Gupta, Arqum Mateen, Divya Sharma, U. Sarkar, Vinu Cheruvil Thomas","doi":"10.1177/1783591718823922","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1783591718823922","url":null,"abstract":"This article studies the competitive dynamics between an incumbent and a late entrant in a market governed by network effects. Classifying markets based on decision criterion used by majority of consumers in a market, an analytical model for the likelihood of incumbent displacement in these markets is developed and corroborated using simulations. Using product quality offered and product price charged by the entrant as managerial levers, the impact of managerial decision-making on the expected market share of the entrant is discussed. Efficacy of seeding and delayed entry by the entrant in an attempt to perfect its product is also examined.","PeriodicalId":38329,"journal":{"name":"Competition and Regulation in Network Industries","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1783591718823922","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48874765","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-09-01DOI: 10.1177/1783591719836629
Barbara Antonioli Mantegazzini, A. Giusti
The electricity sector is in transition towards a market where the roles of the operators and institutional actors are changing. The rise in production from renewable energy sources is determining a move from a centrally, fossil-fuel generation to a local distributed one with, among the other things, implications in terms of volatility, intermittency and reserve ‘backup’ capacity. This renewed and challenging scenario represents the basis for the Swiss2Grid pilot project. Its main objective is the development of an innovative approach for the grid load management based on the adoption of an active algorithm (Household Appliance Controller (HAC)) located on individual homes – then decentralized – governed by simple network rules. The goal is to reduce the level of complexity of the system, flattering at the same time the peak load curve. This load optimization is intended also having positive effects in terms of consumers’ bills expenditure. The amount of potential costs reduction of selected consumers, associated with a load shifting by HAC, has been estimated for several price scenario hypothesis, sketched in order to find the price scheme that better fits to the new consumption’s profile. In detail, we tested time constant rates as well as time variable ones, from flat rates to real prices. This project has indeed given us the opportunity to investigate about the use – and the actual advantages – of real-time prices for electricity combined with enabling technologies and on the new roles of utilities and Distribution System Operators (DSOs).
{"title":"Smart grid, load management and dynamic pricing for electricity: Simulation results from a field project in Switzerland","authors":"Barbara Antonioli Mantegazzini, A. Giusti","doi":"10.1177/1783591719836629","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1783591719836629","url":null,"abstract":"The electricity sector is in transition towards a market where the roles of the operators and institutional actors are changing. The rise in production from renewable energy sources is determining a move from a centrally, fossil-fuel generation to a local distributed one with, among the other things, implications in terms of volatility, intermittency and reserve ‘backup’ capacity. This renewed and challenging scenario represents the basis for the Swiss2Grid pilot project. Its main objective is the development of an innovative approach for the grid load management based on the adoption of an active algorithm (Household Appliance Controller (HAC)) located on individual homes – then decentralized – governed by simple network rules. The goal is to reduce the level of complexity of the system, flattering at the same time the peak load curve. This load optimization is intended also having positive effects in terms of consumers’ bills expenditure. The amount of potential costs reduction of selected consumers, associated with a load shifting by HAC, has been estimated for several price scenario hypothesis, sketched in order to find the price scheme that better fits to the new consumption’s profile. In detail, we tested time constant rates as well as time variable ones, from flat rates to real prices. This project has indeed given us the opportunity to investigate about the use – and the actual advantages – of real-time prices for electricity combined with enabling technologies and on the new roles of utilities and Distribution System Operators (DSOs).","PeriodicalId":38329,"journal":{"name":"Competition and Regulation in Network Industries","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1783591719836629","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49600109","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-09-01DOI: 10.1177/1783591719829043
M. Abbott
Recent Internet-induced declines in mail volumes have put at risk the profitability of Australia’s most enduring government business enterprise, Australia Post. The post office after its reform in the 1970s and 1980s was a strongly performing enterprise. This article observes the long-term performance of the industry since 1901. In particular, the growth in demand, productivity growth, as well as prices, and profits are presented over the longer term.
{"title":"The long-term performance of a utility: The case of the Australian Post Office","authors":"M. Abbott","doi":"10.1177/1783591719829043","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1783591719829043","url":null,"abstract":"Recent Internet-induced declines in mail volumes have put at risk the profitability of Australia’s most enduring government business enterprise, Australia Post. The post office after its reform in the 1970s and 1980s was a strongly performing enterprise. This article observes the long-term performance of the industry since 1901. In particular, the growth in demand, productivity growth, as well as prices, and profits are presented over the longer term.","PeriodicalId":38329,"journal":{"name":"Competition and Regulation in Network Industries","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1783591719829043","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48686113","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-09-01DOI: 10.1177/1783591719829421
Brenda Espinosa Apráez, S. Lavrijssen
Big data have become a driver of innovation in multiple sectors, including the management of infrastructures employed for the provision of essential goods and services, such as drinking water. As technology enables new possibilities of action for infrastructure managers, it could be questioned whether the regulations in place still deal adequately with such possibilities or if certain adjustments are necessary, especially considering that infrastructure managers usually operate in highly regulated environments. This study explores the regulatory challenges of introducing smart water meters (SWM) in the Netherlands. In particular, it discusses whether the introduction of SWM will require adjusting the regulations of the sector, to deal with the new possibilities of action enabled by this technology.
{"title":"Exploring the regulatory challenges of a possible rollout of smart water meters in the Netherlands","authors":"Brenda Espinosa Apráez, S. Lavrijssen","doi":"10.1177/1783591719829421","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1783591719829421","url":null,"abstract":"Big data have become a driver of innovation in multiple sectors, including the management of infrastructures employed for the provision of essential goods and services, such as drinking water. As technology enables new possibilities of action for infrastructure managers, it could be questioned whether the regulations in place still deal adequately with such possibilities or if certain adjustments are necessary, especially considering that infrastructure managers usually operate in highly regulated environments. This study explores the regulatory challenges of introducing smart water meters (SWM) in the Netherlands. In particular, it discusses whether the introduction of SWM will require adjusting the regulations of the sector, to deal with the new possibilities of action enabled by this technology.","PeriodicalId":38329,"journal":{"name":"Competition and Regulation in Network Industries","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1783591719829421","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49557186","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-09-01DOI: 10.1177/1783591718819333
S. Berg, Michelle A. Phillips
The primary drivers of the creation of infrastructure networks are the benefits that can be achieved through collective action. For example, global and regional networks of regulators enable agencies to obtain inputs and create outputs that would otherwise be unavailable or very expensive. Such organizations act as intermediaries, providing forums for discussions, sharing data for benchmarking, producing public pronouncements, developing materials for stakeholders, providing capacity building for professional staff, and evaluating best practice laws (and procedures) that address institutional and policy issues. This article provides a census of such organizations, with particular emphasis on organizations within Latin America and the Caribbean. Although there is some evidence that these activities influence national regulations through the provision of benchmarking data and adoption of shared principles, quantifying those impacts is difficult. Organizations providing infrastructure services also collaborate within and across nations. These operator and regulatory networks can be across countries, within nations, or mixed in nature. Some are more ministerial in structure, while others were created to strengthen regulatory autonomy. Regulatory networks strengthen the operational capacity of national regulators, provide opportunities for improving staff expertise, promote the theme of greater independence of agencies, and reinforce their legitimacy as agencies that can improve infrastructure performance. Operator networks emerged as organizations for promoting best practice, sharing experiences, and developing strategies for dealing with operational and regulatory challenges. Examples from Latin America and the Caribbean illustrate the growth of networks that provide a wide range of “outputs” for those developing, implementing, and responding to public policy.
{"title":"Networks in infrastructure with applications to Latin America and the Caribbean","authors":"S. Berg, Michelle A. Phillips","doi":"10.1177/1783591718819333","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1783591718819333","url":null,"abstract":"The primary drivers of the creation of infrastructure networks are the benefits that can be achieved through collective action. For example, global and regional networks of regulators enable agencies to obtain inputs and create outputs that would otherwise be unavailable or very expensive. Such organizations act as intermediaries, providing forums for discussions, sharing data for benchmarking, producing public pronouncements, developing materials for stakeholders, providing capacity building for professional staff, and evaluating best practice laws (and procedures) that address institutional and policy issues. This article provides a census of such organizations, with particular emphasis on organizations within Latin America and the Caribbean. Although there is some evidence that these activities influence national regulations through the provision of benchmarking data and adoption of shared principles, quantifying those impacts is difficult. Organizations providing infrastructure services also collaborate within and across nations. These operator and regulatory networks can be across countries, within nations, or mixed in nature. Some are more ministerial in structure, while others were created to strengthen regulatory autonomy. Regulatory networks strengthen the operational capacity of national regulators, provide opportunities for improving staff expertise, promote the theme of greater independence of agencies, and reinforce their legitimacy as agencies that can improve infrastructure performance. Operator networks emerged as organizations for promoting best practice, sharing experiences, and developing strategies for dealing with operational and regulatory challenges. Examples from Latin America and the Caribbean illustrate the growth of networks that provide a wide range of “outputs” for those developing, implementing, and responding to public policy.","PeriodicalId":38329,"journal":{"name":"Competition and Regulation in Network Industries","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1783591718819333","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45855574","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-09-01DOI: 10.1177/1783591719837410
Diana Korsakaitė, Darius Biekša, Egle Bieksiene
Transition from monopoly to competition-based markets is widely recognized processes around the globe when it comes to achieving efficient electricity and gas trade thus presenting direct benefits to the final energy consumers. But when talking about smaller infrastructures like district heating (DH) market is still viewed as a natural monopoly. This article presents Lithuanian case to open up existing municipal infrastructure to third-party access in order to complete fuel switch in DH generation faster and to increase efficiency of the entire system through competitive pressure. The article presents the set of circumstances in DH sector back in 2010; focuses on regulatory framework, which was developed and introduced through two phases in Lithuania; and formulates impacts of the reorganization of DH sector from vertically integrated monopoly to single buyer model for de-monopolized generation.
{"title":"Third-party access in district heating: Lithuanian case analysis","authors":"Diana Korsakaitė, Darius Biekša, Egle Bieksiene","doi":"10.1177/1783591719837410","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1783591719837410","url":null,"abstract":"Transition from monopoly to competition-based markets is widely recognized processes around the globe when it comes to achieving efficient electricity and gas trade thus presenting direct benefits to the final energy consumers. But when talking about smaller infrastructures like district heating (DH) market is still viewed as a natural monopoly. This article presents Lithuanian case to open up existing municipal infrastructure to third-party access in order to complete fuel switch in DH generation faster and to increase efficiency of the entire system through competitive pressure. The article presents the set of circumstances in DH sector back in 2010; focuses on regulatory framework, which was developed and introduced through two phases in Lithuania; and formulates impacts of the reorganization of DH sector from vertically integrated monopoly to single buyer model for de-monopolized generation.","PeriodicalId":38329,"journal":{"name":"Competition and Regulation in Network Industries","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1783591719837410","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46919362","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-03-01DOI: 10.1177/1783591718809485
C. M. Rossotto, Prasanna Lal Das, Elena Gasol Ramos, Eva Clemente Miranda, M. Badran, Martha Martinez Licetti, Graciela Miralles Murciego
This article takes stock of the literature around digital platforms and shows how this review can inform policy choices in developing countries. Through the review, this article sets a research agenda for platforms in emerging markets. Four elements are specifically analyzed. First, the definition of multisided platforms; second, technology and behavioral enablers; third, the emerging business models; and, fourth, platform dynamics. Each of these elements is assessed in terms of its relevance in emerging and developing countries. Policy implications for development are also highlighted, building the foundations for a new research agenda.
{"title":"Digital platforms: A literature review and policy implications for development","authors":"C. M. Rossotto, Prasanna Lal Das, Elena Gasol Ramos, Eva Clemente Miranda, M. Badran, Martha Martinez Licetti, Graciela Miralles Murciego","doi":"10.1177/1783591718809485","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1783591718809485","url":null,"abstract":"This article takes stock of the literature around digital platforms and shows how this review can inform policy choices in developing countries. Through the review, this article sets a research agenda for platforms in emerging markets. Four elements are specifically analyzed. First, the definition of multisided platforms; second, technology and behavioral enablers; third, the emerging business models; and, fourth, platform dynamics. Each of these elements is assessed in terms of its relevance in emerging and developing countries. Policy implications for development are also highlighted, building the foundations for a new research agenda.","PeriodicalId":38329,"journal":{"name":"Competition and Regulation in Network Industries","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1783591718809485","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49198106","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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