{"title":"Regulating monopolies","authors":"M. Finger","doi":"10.4324/9780429449567-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429449567-6","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":38329,"journal":{"name":"Competition and Regulation in Network Industries","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89750175","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-06-26DOI: 10.4324/9780429449567-11
Matthias Finger
{"title":"Water","authors":"Matthias Finger","doi":"10.4324/9780429449567-11","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429449567-11","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":38329,"journal":{"name":"Competition and Regulation in Network Industries","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83451409","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Post and telecom","authors":"M. Finger","doi":"10.4324/9780429449567-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429449567-8","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":38329,"journal":{"name":"Competition and Regulation in Network Industries","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78054736","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-06-24DOI: 10.1177/1783591719857652
Pippo Ranci
As president of a newly created regulatory authority for energy in Italy from 1996 to 2003, I lived through a radical transformation of the industry of electricity and gas, and also of the Italian institutions dealing with the governance of the economy. It was a complex task, based on a clear legal basis and support from the industry and from the public, and yet facing resistance from cultural inertia and organised interests. The same transformation was under way in all Europe, and strong European links were greatly useful.
{"title":"The early years of the energy regulator in Italy","authors":"Pippo Ranci","doi":"10.1177/1783591719857652","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1783591719857652","url":null,"abstract":"As president of a newly created regulatory authority for energy in Italy from 1996 to 2003, I lived through a radical transformation of the industry of electricity and gas, and also of the Italian institutions dealing with the governance of the economy. It was a complex task, based on a clear legal basis and support from the industry and from the public, and yet facing resistance from cultural inertia and organised interests. The same transformation was under way in all Europe, and strong European links were greatly useful.","PeriodicalId":38329,"journal":{"name":"Competition and Regulation in Network Industries","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1783591719857652","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47971263","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-06-09DOI: 10.1177/1783591719847545
M. Stasi
Social media platforms have become the main channel for people to communicate, access information and share content. A handful of giant platforms dominate the markets and, through a complex typology of conducts, are able to strongly affect users’ exposure to content, violating their privacy, as well as their freedom of expression and information. Regulators have at disposal a toolbox to fix the problem. This article analyses possible instruments and makes suggestions to contribute to the debate.
{"title":"Social media platforms and content exposure: How to restore users’ control","authors":"M. Stasi","doi":"10.1177/1783591719847545","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1783591719847545","url":null,"abstract":"Social media platforms have become the main channel for people to communicate, access information and share content. A handful of giant platforms dominate the markets and, through a complex typology of conducts, are able to strongly affect users’ exposure to content, violating their privacy, as well as their freedom of expression and information. Regulators have at disposal a toolbox to fix the problem. This article analyses possible instruments and makes suggestions to contribute to the debate.","PeriodicalId":38329,"journal":{"name":"Competition and Regulation in Network Industries","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1783591719847545","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47964629","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-05-29DOI: 10.1177/1783591719847615
Carlos Augusto Olarte Bacares, J. Brunel, Damien Sigaud
The arrival of a new operator on the Italian high-speed railway (HSR) market, its maintanance and its market share made Italian open access experience one of the most successful liberalization models in the HSR sector. Researchers noticed that since the entry of the new operator, expansion of Italian HSR market is mostly due to the presence of this new operator. The aim of this article is to establish whether there were some other characteristics of the Italian HSR market that may explain this success even if it may be in opposition with what theory commonly suggests about competition in HSR markets. This research tries to do a complementary analysis by making a comparison with another successful HSR market that is not already liberalized: the French HSR market. After retracing supply, demand and markets maturity of Rome–Milan and Paris–Marseille lines, results reveal that supply and demand evolutions in both markets were very similar, if not identical after the commissioning of HSR. It suggests that liberalization may not be the only explanation of the significant evolution of Italian HSR market but that the opening of new infrastructures may also lead to positive trends that remain until markets reach a high level of maturity. This maturity understood as the residual capacity of the network and partially determined by infrastructure improvement seems to be another variable that had influenced the success of NTV. Indeed, before liberalization, Italian HSR network was far from saturation that allowed new entrant to capture important market shares.
{"title":"Influence of the evolution of high-speed railway infrastructure on the success of Italian liberalization","authors":"Carlos Augusto Olarte Bacares, J. Brunel, Damien Sigaud","doi":"10.1177/1783591719847615","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1783591719847615","url":null,"abstract":"The arrival of a new operator on the Italian high-speed railway (HSR) market, its maintanance and its market share made Italian open access experience one of the most successful liberalization models in the HSR sector. Researchers noticed that since the entry of the new operator, expansion of Italian HSR market is mostly due to the presence of this new operator. The aim of this article is to establish whether there were some other characteristics of the Italian HSR market that may explain this success even if it may be in opposition with what theory commonly suggests about competition in HSR markets. This research tries to do a complementary analysis by making a comparison with another successful HSR market that is not already liberalized: the French HSR market. After retracing supply, demand and markets maturity of Rome–Milan and Paris–Marseille lines, results reveal that supply and demand evolutions in both markets were very similar, if not identical after the commissioning of HSR. It suggests that liberalization may not be the only explanation of the significant evolution of Italian HSR market but that the opening of new infrastructures may also lead to positive trends that remain until markets reach a high level of maturity. This maturity understood as the residual capacity of the network and partially determined by infrastructure improvement seems to be another variable that had influenced the success of NTV. Indeed, before liberalization, Italian HSR network was far from saturation that allowed new entrant to capture important market shares.","PeriodicalId":38329,"journal":{"name":"Competition and Regulation in Network Industries","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1783591719847615","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45304861","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-05-26DOI: 10.1177/1783591719853515
China becomes an active global provider of financial flows in recent years, and the Western Hemisphere also received more Chinese capital. The Chinese government has a significant role behind this ...
{"title":"REMOVAL NOTICE: Chinese financial flows in the Latin America: A projection of political influence?","authors":"","doi":"10.1177/1783591719853515","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1783591719853515","url":null,"abstract":"China becomes an active global provider of financial flows in recent years, and the Western Hemisphere also received more Chinese capital. The Chinese government has a significant role behind this ...","PeriodicalId":38329,"journal":{"name":"Competition and Regulation in Network Industries","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1783591719853515","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48308348","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-05-13DOI: 10.1177/1783591719847543
Anuradha Jain, Dirk Bruckmann, R. E. van der Heijden, V. Marchau
The use of online road freight transport exchanges (FTEs) in the EU-28 countries is widespread today, indicating a strong level of competition. Some exchanges attempt to distinguish themselves by developing new services, for example, warehousing services for logistics industries. In contrast, rail FTEs show a very low rate of success. Given the European Union policy goal on modal shift from road to rail and inland waterways for the next decade, there is a need to explore possibilities for improvement. This article, therefore, aims at specifying regulatory-, market-, technical- and operational success factors for implementing rail-based multimodal FTEs. It does so by exploring the success factors from established road FTEs and other successful network industries (energy and passenger transport) by performing a comparative analysis on the respective online exchanges. The theory on capability maturity development is applied, which assumes that actors engaged in a transition process steadily grow in terms of their capability to deal with various issues rising from the required transition goals. Based on the theory, a literature review and interviews, an initial capability maturity model (CMM) for FTEs is developed. Finally, learnings are summarized for the proposed multimodal FTE regarding rail and the regulatory topics for freight transport to serve as input for creating a generic CMM for online exchanges in subsequent steps of this research project. Similar research on maturity assessment of practices in online exchanges related to network industries could not be found.
{"title":"Towards rail-related multimodal freight exchange platforms: Exploring regulatory topics at EU level","authors":"Anuradha Jain, Dirk Bruckmann, R. E. van der Heijden, V. Marchau","doi":"10.1177/1783591719847543","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1783591719847543","url":null,"abstract":"The use of online road freight transport exchanges (FTEs) in the EU-28 countries is widespread today, indicating a strong level of competition. Some exchanges attempt to distinguish themselves by developing new services, for example, warehousing services for logistics industries. In contrast, rail FTEs show a very low rate of success. Given the European Union policy goal on modal shift from road to rail and inland waterways for the next decade, there is a need to explore possibilities for improvement. This article, therefore, aims at specifying regulatory-, market-, technical- and operational success factors for implementing rail-based multimodal FTEs. It does so by exploring the success factors from established road FTEs and other successful network industries (energy and passenger transport) by performing a comparative analysis on the respective online exchanges. The theory on capability maturity development is applied, which assumes that actors engaged in a transition process steadily grow in terms of their capability to deal with various issues rising from the required transition goals. Based on the theory, a literature review and interviews, an initial capability maturity model (CMM) for FTEs is developed. Finally, learnings are summarized for the proposed multimodal FTE regarding rail and the regulatory topics for freight transport to serve as input for creating a generic CMM for online exchanges in subsequent steps of this research project. Similar research on maturity assessment of practices in online exchanges related to network industries could not be found.","PeriodicalId":38329,"journal":{"name":"Competition and Regulation in Network Industries","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1783591719847543","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42693670","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-04-28DOI: 10.1177/1783591719840132
Liangfu Li
Market definition is the first step of competition analysis. In practice, relevant markets are mostly defined for the end products and services and it is also the same for current cases concerning Internet-based businesses (IBBs). Data has important influence on the competition of IBBs. However, instead of selling data directly, the IBBs usually use data to produce, improve and innovate products and services. Under such circumstances, there may be no relevant market defined for such data following the conventional market definition methods. This article’s investigation shows that online data play different roles in the competition of IBBs and the conventional competition analysis methods only miss some aspects but not all of them. Alternative approaches including the input market definition and the putative online data market definition proposition fail to solve the problem. What might be of help is to switch focus to improving the relevant market definition methods for products and services which online data are related to and pay more attention to the inner relationship between online data and the Internet-based products and services when identifying which market to define.
{"title":"Data and market definition of Internet-based businesses","authors":"Liangfu Li","doi":"10.1177/1783591719840132","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1783591719840132","url":null,"abstract":"Market definition is the first step of competition analysis. In practice, relevant markets are mostly defined for the end products and services and it is also the same for current cases concerning Internet-based businesses (IBBs). Data has important influence on the competition of IBBs. However, instead of selling data directly, the IBBs usually use data to produce, improve and innovate products and services. Under such circumstances, there may be no relevant market defined for such data following the conventional market definition methods. This article’s investigation shows that online data play different roles in the competition of IBBs and the conventional competition analysis methods only miss some aspects but not all of them. Alternative approaches including the input market definition and the putative online data market definition proposition fail to solve the problem. What might be of help is to switch focus to improving the relevant market definition methods for products and services which online data are related to and pay more attention to the inner relationship between online data and the Internet-based products and services when identifying which market to define.","PeriodicalId":38329,"journal":{"name":"Competition and Regulation in Network Industries","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1783591719840132","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46658516","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-03-25DOI: 10.1177/1783591719836875
Steve Thomas
The liberalization of utilities has generally led to the creation of an economic regulator, nominally independent of government. The United Kingdom, as a pioneer of this process, has more than 30 years of experience with independent regulators. However, by 2019, the three main regulated utilities in the United Kingdom, energy, water and rail, were in disarray with a combination of high prices, poor service and a failure to achieve the goals of competition set at the time of the reforms. Government, the companies and the regulators must all bear the blame for this situation. We focus on the regulator in this article and argue that there a number of factors behind their failings including a concentration on economic issues to the detriment of other issues such as environment and public welfare, a lack of public accountability and a poor culture in the regulators based on a view that regulatory interventions were always counterproductive. Given that regulators are appointed by government and funded by Parliamentary vote, the claim of independence is not credible and there are circumstances when government should be able to overrule regulators in the broader public interest. We suggest that expanding the range of skills among the regulatory decision makers, regular rigorous Parliamentary scrutiny and a much stronger focus on the attributes consumers require – affordability, reliability and sustainability – rather than the current obsession with competition would improve the regulators’ performance.
{"title":"Is the ideal of independent regulation appropriate? Evidence from the United Kingdom","authors":"Steve Thomas","doi":"10.1177/1783591719836875","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1783591719836875","url":null,"abstract":"The liberalization of utilities has generally led to the creation of an economic regulator, nominally independent of government. The United Kingdom, as a pioneer of this process, has more than 30 years of experience with independent regulators. However, by 2019, the three main regulated utilities in the United Kingdom, energy, water and rail, were in disarray with a combination of high prices, poor service and a failure to achieve the goals of competition set at the time of the reforms. Government, the companies and the regulators must all bear the blame for this situation. We focus on the regulator in this article and argue that there a number of factors behind their failings including a concentration on economic issues to the detriment of other issues such as environment and public welfare, a lack of public accountability and a poor culture in the regulators based on a view that regulatory interventions were always counterproductive. Given that regulators are appointed by government and funded by Parliamentary vote, the claim of independence is not credible and there are circumstances when government should be able to overrule regulators in the broader public interest. We suggest that expanding the range of skills among the regulatory decision makers, regular rigorous Parliamentary scrutiny and a much stronger focus on the attributes consumers require – affordability, reliability and sustainability – rather than the current obsession with competition would improve the regulators’ performance.","PeriodicalId":38329,"journal":{"name":"Competition and Regulation in Network Industries","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-03-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1783591719836875","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42006147","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}