Pub Date : 2019-07-01DOI: 10.1177/1783591719858737
Carlos Gutiérrez-Hita, Aurora Ruiz-Rua
European country members have been opening up to competition railway passenger services in recent years, whereas others still remain on the way to liberalization. The recent Commission’s fourth European Union (EU) Railway Package has updated the European legislation to ensure an effective liberalization within the EU country members by 2020. It is intended to enhance firms’ efficiency and also consumers’ benefits. In this article, we study different paths towards liberalization from the traditional state-owned monopoly configuration. First, the monopoly outcome is presented, as it is the current situation in a number of EU country members. Second, the oligopoly models are introduced to study different paths towards an effective competition as a result of different market configurations. It is found that liberalization may enhance consumer surplus keeping operators’ profitability only when variable costs and access charge to the network are low. Finally, some regulatory measures are discussed.
{"title":"Competition in the railway passenger market: The challenge of liberalization","authors":"Carlos Gutiérrez-Hita, Aurora Ruiz-Rua","doi":"10.1177/1783591719858737","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1783591719858737","url":null,"abstract":"European country members have been opening up to competition railway passenger services in recent years, whereas others still remain on the way to liberalization. The recent Commission’s fourth European Union (EU) Railway Package has updated the European legislation to ensure an effective liberalization within the EU country members by 2020. It is intended to enhance firms’ efficiency and also consumers’ benefits. In this article, we study different paths towards liberalization from the traditional state-owned monopoly configuration. First, the monopoly outcome is presented, as it is the current situation in a number of EU country members. Second, the oligopoly models are introduced to study different paths towards an effective competition as a result of different market configurations. It is found that liberalization may enhance consumer surplus keeping operators’ profitability only when variable costs and access charge to the network are low. Finally, some regulatory measures are discussed.","PeriodicalId":38329,"journal":{"name":"Competition and Regulation in Network Industries","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1783591719858737","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45730214","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-06-27DOI: 10.1177/1783591719857660
Douglas J. Howe
Regulation of utilities at the state level in the United States is undertaken by a commission on which anywhere from three to seven commissioners sit and must vote on virtually all significant utility actions, including rate requests, resource plans, acquisitions and mergers, and financing mechanisms. Public utility commissions (PUCs) are, in a very real sense, courts with adjudicatory responsibility over the area of state utility laws. In hearing a utility case, they must follow the state’s statutes and court rules. The commissioners function as judges in this court of public utility law. In a majority of states, commissioners are appointed by the state’s governor with the advice and consent of the state legislature. In a significant minority of states, commissioners are elected by popular vote. However, recent changes in US election law have made it easier for corporations and special interest groups, called political action committees, to influence elections through donations targeting direct voter outreach on behalf of specific candidates. This chapter examines what the entry of political spending in PUC elections means, and whether elected commissioners can adjudicate in the public interest, or will adjudicate for special interests. The chapter concludes that while both the appointment and election governance model can produce both “good” and “bad” commissioners, it is the elected commission that is most at risk of selecting commissioners that will not be truly independent and objective arbiters of the law.
{"title":"Governance models of public utility commissions in the United States","authors":"Douglas J. Howe","doi":"10.1177/1783591719857660","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1783591719857660","url":null,"abstract":"Regulation of utilities at the state level in the United States is undertaken by a commission on which anywhere from three to seven commissioners sit and must vote on virtually all significant utility actions, including rate requests, resource plans, acquisitions and mergers, and financing mechanisms. Public utility commissions (PUCs) are, in a very real sense, courts with adjudicatory responsibility over the area of state utility laws. In hearing a utility case, they must follow the state’s statutes and court rules. The commissioners function as judges in this court of public utility law. In a majority of states, commissioners are appointed by the state’s governor with the advice and consent of the state legislature. In a significant minority of states, commissioners are elected by popular vote. However, recent changes in US election law have made it easier for corporations and special interest groups, called political action committees, to influence elections through donations targeting direct voter outreach on behalf of specific candidates. This chapter examines what the entry of political spending in PUC elections means, and whether elected commissioners can adjudicate in the public interest, or will adjudicate for special interests. The chapter concludes that while both the appointment and election governance model can produce both “good” and “bad” commissioners, it is the elected commission that is most at risk of selecting commissioners that will not be truly independent and objective arbiters of the law.","PeriodicalId":38329,"journal":{"name":"Competition and Regulation in Network Industries","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1783591719857660","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44445360","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"“Regulation by contract” – the French model","authors":"M. Finger","doi":"10.4324/9780429449567-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429449567-7","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":38329,"journal":{"name":"Competition and Regulation in Network Industries","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80774323","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Why do network industries need regulation?","authors":"M. Finger","doi":"10.4324/9780429449567-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429449567-3","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":38329,"journal":{"name":"Competition and Regulation in Network Industries","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78645697","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-06-26DOI: 10.4324/9780429449567-12
M. Finger
{"title":"New digital infrastructures","authors":"M. Finger","doi":"10.4324/9780429449567-12","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429449567-12","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":38329,"journal":{"name":"Competition and Regulation in Network Industries","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75841483","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The politics of regulation","authors":"M. Finger","doi":"10.4324/9780429449567-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429449567-4","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":38329,"journal":{"name":"Competition and Regulation in Network Industries","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84304955","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-06-26DOI: 10.4324/9780429449567-13
Matthias Finger
{"title":"Conclusion","authors":"Matthias Finger","doi":"10.4324/9780429449567-13","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429449567-13","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":38329,"journal":{"name":"Competition and Regulation in Network Industries","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77460584","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Regulatory authorities","authors":"M. Finger","doi":"10.4324/9780429449567-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429449567-5","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":38329,"journal":{"name":"Competition and Regulation in Network Industries","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88734561","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Why are network industries interesting?","authors":"M. Finger","doi":"10.4324/9780429449567-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429449567-2","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":38329,"journal":{"name":"Competition and Regulation in Network Industries","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82066296","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Transport","authors":"Matthias Finger","doi":"10.4324/9780429449567-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429449567-9","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":38329,"journal":{"name":"Competition and Regulation in Network Industries","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83766291","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}