Pub Date : 2019-11-28DOI: 10.1177/1783591719889161
M. Finger
This short text serves as an introduction to this special issue of Competition and Regulation in Network Industries, with its special focus on the defragmentation of the European airspace. The context of this special issue is the question of how current nationally organized air traffic management (ATM) will cope with air traffic growth. While this is a problem in the airspace of many countries worldwide—notably in countries with rapid growth, such as the United States, China, and India—it is in Europe where the problem appears to be most acute. This is due to a combination of two trends. On one hand, air traffic in Europe is growing particularly rapidly, with a 34% increase in air passenger numbers over the past 5 years. On the other hand, the European airspace is especially fragmented, given that airspace is nationally managed by socalled air navigation service providers (ANSPs), most of which are optimizing their own airspace by segmenting it. In response, in 1999, the European Commission (EC) launched the so-called Single European Sky (SES) initiative, aimed at reducing delays, increasing safety, mitigating the environmental impact, and reducing costs related to service provision in the aviation sector. The EC has sought to achieve this by promoting the defragmentation of the European airspace and by creating a more efficient ATM system. Although the policy is evolving and new features such as functional airspace blocks (FABs) and a technological pillar, SESAR (Single European Sky ATM Research), have been added to the original concept, the SES has failed to deliver the expected progress. As a result, the European airspace remains fragmented and capacity problems increase parallel to rapidly growing air traffic. This special issue of CRNI addresses selected aspects of the fragmented European airspace, as well as means and ways to defragment it from an academic perspective:
{"title":"Defragmentation of the skies","authors":"M. Finger","doi":"10.1177/1783591719889161","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1783591719889161","url":null,"abstract":"This short text serves as an introduction to this special issue of Competition and Regulation in Network Industries, with its special focus on the defragmentation of the European airspace. The context of this special issue is the question of how current nationally organized air traffic management (ATM) will cope with air traffic growth. While this is a problem in the airspace of many countries worldwide—notably in countries with rapid growth, such as the United States, China, and India—it is in Europe where the problem appears to be most acute. This is due to a combination of two trends. On one hand, air traffic in Europe is growing particularly rapidly, with a 34% increase in air passenger numbers over the past 5 years. On the other hand, the European airspace is especially fragmented, given that airspace is nationally managed by socalled air navigation service providers (ANSPs), most of which are optimizing their own airspace by segmenting it. In response, in 1999, the European Commission (EC) launched the so-called Single European Sky (SES) initiative, aimed at reducing delays, increasing safety, mitigating the environmental impact, and reducing costs related to service provision in the aviation sector. The EC has sought to achieve this by promoting the defragmentation of the European airspace and by creating a more efficient ATM system. Although the policy is evolving and new features such as functional airspace blocks (FABs) and a technological pillar, SESAR (Single European Sky ATM Research), have been added to the original concept, the SES has failed to deliver the expected progress. As a result, the European airspace remains fragmented and capacity problems increase parallel to rapidly growing air traffic. This special issue of CRNI addresses selected aspects of the fragmented European airspace, as well as means and ways to defragment it from an academic perspective:","PeriodicalId":38329,"journal":{"name":"Competition and Regulation in Network Industries","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1783591719889161","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49033676","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-11-01DOI: 10.1177/17835917211012326
P. Bougette, A. Gautier, F. Marty
In the European rail industry, to enable competition in the market, entrants should be granted access to a large set of complementary services, beyond access to the tracks. For an efficient and effective entry, temporary access to quasi-essential complementary assets like rolling stock, mechanical maintenance workshops, data, schedules, etc. is required. In the liberalized rail sector, several observed anticompetitive practices involve distorted access to these quasiessential facilities. Therefore, competition agencies must deal with litigation between the incumbent and new entrants. Most cases have been settled, resulting in commitments from the incumbent. We argue that such transitory and case-by-case remedies fail to produce favorable conditions for a secure and efficient entry. Thus, we propose to systematize such remedies through asymmetric and enduring ex-ante regulation.
{"title":"Which access to which assets for an effective liberalization of the railway sector?","authors":"P. Bougette, A. Gautier, F. Marty","doi":"10.1177/17835917211012326","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/17835917211012326","url":null,"abstract":"In the European rail industry, to enable competition in the market, entrants should be granted access to a large set of complementary services, beyond access to the tracks. For an efficient and effective entry, temporary access to quasi-essential complementary assets like rolling stock, mechanical maintenance workshops, data, schedules, etc. is required. In the liberalized rail sector, several observed anticompetitive practices involve distorted access to these quasiessential facilities. Therefore, competition agencies must deal with litigation between the incumbent and new entrants. Most cases have been settled, resulting in commitments from the incumbent. We argue that such transitory and case-by-case remedies fail to produce favorable conditions for a secure and efficient entry. Thus, we propose to systematize such remedies through asymmetric and enduring ex-ante regulation.","PeriodicalId":38329,"journal":{"name":"Competition and Regulation in Network Industries","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/17835917211012326","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45588295","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-10-21DOI: 10.1177/1783591719881990
Engin Zeki, Paula Leal de Matos, Kirsteen Purves, Marco Gibellini
This article explores the impact that flight-centric air traffic control (ATC), a concept under development, has on ATC market structure and ATC business models. Flight-centric operations bring forth changes in how the stakeholders adapt their roles to the emerging ATC market. We compared current ATC and market structures with the emerging flight-centric concept and analyzed the market changes in structure and competition from the emergence of flight-centric operations using Porter’s five forces model. Four potential business models for flight-centric ATC are identified and described: current air navigation service providers adapt, vertical integration by airlines, new ATC providers, and the network manager as capacity-demand manager. In the final chapter, we briefly describe the future regulation of the market for flight-centric operations. We conclude that new concepts and technologies, such as flight-centric operations, create the necessary dynamics for change in the current market structure by unbundling of the market.
{"title":"Business models for flight-centric air traffic control","authors":"Engin Zeki, Paula Leal de Matos, Kirsteen Purves, Marco Gibellini","doi":"10.1177/1783591719881990","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1783591719881990","url":null,"abstract":"This article explores the impact that flight-centric air traffic control (ATC), a concept under development, has on ATC market structure and ATC business models. Flight-centric operations bring forth changes in how the stakeholders adapt their roles to the emerging ATC market. We compared current ATC and market structures with the emerging flight-centric concept and analyzed the market changes in structure and competition from the emergence of flight-centric operations using Porter’s five forces model. Four potential business models for flight-centric ATC are identified and described: current air navigation service providers adapt, vertical integration by airlines, new ATC providers, and the network manager as capacity-demand manager. In the final chapter, we briefly describe the future regulation of the market for flight-centric operations. We conclude that new concepts and technologies, such as flight-centric operations, create the necessary dynamics for change in the current market structure by unbundling of the market.","PeriodicalId":38329,"journal":{"name":"Competition and Regulation in Network Industries","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1783591719881990","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48249582","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-09-01DOI: 10.1177/1783591719865420
M. Finger
This short text serves as an introduction to this special issue of Competition and Regulation in Network Industries, which focuses on the complex and complicated relationship between politics and regulation. Discussing this evolving relationship is somewhat of a taboo topic, at least in the academic literature. Consequently, this special issue is not composed of typical academic papers, but of personal reflections upon the experiences of ‘‘academic practitioners.’’ Most of the authors of this special issue, including myself, have held academic positions at the same time as being members of regulatory authorities in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Continental Europe.
{"title":"Introduction: Politics and regulation","authors":"M. Finger","doi":"10.1177/1783591719865420","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1783591719865420","url":null,"abstract":"This short text serves as an introduction to this special issue of Competition and Regulation in Network Industries, which focuses on the complex and complicated relationship between politics and regulation. Discussing this evolving relationship is somewhat of a taboo topic, at least in the academic literature. Consequently, this special issue is not composed of typical academic papers, but of personal reflections upon the experiences of ‘‘academic practitioners.’’ Most of the authors of this special issue, including myself, have held academic positions at the same time as being members of regulatory authorities in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Continental Europe.","PeriodicalId":38329,"journal":{"name":"Competition and Regulation in Network Industries","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1783591719865420","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45336045","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-08-25DOI: 10.25384/SAGE.C.4644794.V1
Alberto Ansuategi, I. Galarraga, Luis Orea, T. Standfuss
The Single European Sky (SES) legislation is intended to have a major impact on the fragmentation in the European Air Traffic Management and Communications, Navigation and Surveillance (ATM/CNS) sy...
{"title":"Analysis of cost-effectiveness in the provision of air navigation services at functional air blocks:","authors":"Alberto Ansuategi, I. Galarraga, Luis Orea, T. Standfuss","doi":"10.25384/SAGE.C.4644794.V1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.25384/SAGE.C.4644794.V1","url":null,"abstract":"The Single European Sky (SES) legislation is intended to have a major impact on the fragmentation in the European Air Traffic Management and Communications, Navigation and Surveillance (ATM/CNS) sy...","PeriodicalId":38329,"journal":{"name":"Competition and Regulation in Network Industries","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47295243","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-08-19DOI: 10.1177/1783591719857664
J. Vasconcelos
In the first part, the author describes the evolution of European Union politics of regulation since liberalization of network industries and provides a critical assessment of its major shortcomings. The second part discusses the importance of consistent regulatory policies that take into account new technologies and increasingly complex public policies.
{"title":"Energy regulation in Europe: The politics of regulation and regulatory policy revisited","authors":"J. Vasconcelos","doi":"10.1177/1783591719857664","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1783591719857664","url":null,"abstract":"In the first part, the author describes the evolution of European Union politics of regulation since liberalization of network industries and provides a critical assessment of its major shortcomings. The second part discusses the importance of consistent regulatory policies that take into account new technologies and increasingly complex public policies.","PeriodicalId":38329,"journal":{"name":"Competition and Regulation in Network Industries","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1783591719857664","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48288078","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-08-13DOI: 10.1177/1783591719866047
T. Standfuss, Frank Fichert, M. Schultz, Petros Stratis
Fragmentation has been suspected of contributing to inefficiencies in the European Air Traffic Management (ATM) system. Heterogeneities between providers may contain multiple aspects, such as airspace structure, staff rostering, or systems used for flow management. Applying the scientific approach of data envelopment analysis, this article provides a new outlook on the relationship between airspace fragmentation and efficiency in the admittedly complex and highly dynamic environment of European ATM. We show that there are airspaces that might benefit from economies of scale, but that there is a tipping point where diseconomies of scale occur. Subsequently, the current approach of functional airspace blocks might inhere inefficiencies for some air navigation service providers.
{"title":"Efficiency losses through fragmentation? Scale effects in European ANS provision","authors":"T. Standfuss, Frank Fichert, M. Schultz, Petros Stratis","doi":"10.1177/1783591719866047","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1783591719866047","url":null,"abstract":"Fragmentation has been suspected of contributing to inefficiencies in the European Air Traffic Management (ATM) system. Heterogeneities between providers may contain multiple aspects, such as airspace structure, staff rostering, or systems used for flow management. Applying the scientific approach of data envelopment analysis, this article provides a new outlook on the relationship between airspace fragmentation and efficiency in the admittedly complex and highly dynamic environment of European ATM. We show that there are airspaces that might benefit from economies of scale, but that there is a tipping point where diseconomies of scale occur. Subsequently, the current approach of functional airspace blocks might inhere inefficiencies for some air navigation service providers.","PeriodicalId":38329,"journal":{"name":"Competition and Regulation in Network Industries","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1783591719866047","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48355626","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-08-07DOI: 10.1177/1783591719865988
J. Beecher
Regulation has always been “political” to some degree, born of politics and subject to political forces, both good and bad. The more intractable question might be whether regulation as we know it is sustainable, given signs of institutional weakness. In this context, regulators need to either sustain their institution or concede to alternative institutional forms and conceptions of the public interest.
{"title":"Does regulation fail or do we fail regulation?","authors":"J. Beecher","doi":"10.1177/1783591719865988","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1783591719865988","url":null,"abstract":"Regulation has always been “political” to some degree, born of politics and subject to political forces, both good and bad. The more intractable question might be whether regulation as we know it is sustainable, given signs of institutional weakness. In this context, regulators need to either sustain their institution or concede to alternative institutional forms and conceptions of the public interest.","PeriodicalId":38329,"journal":{"name":"Competition and Regulation in Network Industries","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1783591719865988","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48567110","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-08-01DOI: 10.1177/1783591719866105
Goran Pavlović, Frank Fichert
The European Air Traffic Management (ATM) system is highly fragmented. It consists of 37 air navigation service providers (ANSPs) whose areas of responsibility are, in most cases, limited to national borders. ATM fragmentation impacts air traffic operations in Europe in several ways. One of them is reflected through the current route charging system, which is designed and adapted to the fragmented ATM system to recover air navigation service provision costs at the level of individual ANSPs. Differences in unit rates have led to the phenomenon of aircraft taking detours around expensive charging zones, resulting in additional fuel consumption and emissions, as well as traffic shifts caused by varying unit rates. In this article, we analyze the differences in the unit rates across Europe and their evolution over the past few years. The main focus of the article is the analysis of the route charge variability on an airport-pair level, measured by an airport-pair variability indicator, which we suggest as a metric. We show the route charge variability for different flight distances, geographic areas, and flight directions, and we also identify airport pairs with the highest route charge variability. Finally, we discuss selected alternatives to the current route charging system, such as the uniform charge method and different approaches to airport-pair charging.
{"title":"Effects of fragmentation on route charges","authors":"Goran Pavlović, Frank Fichert","doi":"10.1177/1783591719866105","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1783591719866105","url":null,"abstract":"The European Air Traffic Management (ATM) system is highly fragmented. It consists of 37 air navigation service providers (ANSPs) whose areas of responsibility are, in most cases, limited to national borders. ATM fragmentation impacts air traffic operations in Europe in several ways. One of them is reflected through the current route charging system, which is designed and adapted to the fragmented ATM system to recover air navigation service provision costs at the level of individual ANSPs. Differences in unit rates have led to the phenomenon of aircraft taking detours around expensive charging zones, resulting in additional fuel consumption and emissions, as well as traffic shifts caused by varying unit rates. In this article, we analyze the differences in the unit rates across Europe and their evolution over the past few years. The main focus of the article is the analysis of the route charge variability on an airport-pair level, measured by an airport-pair variability indicator, which we suggest as a metric. We show the route charge variability for different flight distances, geographic areas, and flight directions, and we also identify airport pairs with the highest route charge variability. Finally, we discuss selected alternatives to the current route charging system, such as the uniform charge method and different approaches to airport-pair charging.","PeriodicalId":38329,"journal":{"name":"Competition and Regulation in Network Industries","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1783591719866105","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44918839","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-07-23DOI: 10.1177/1783591719861722
Juan J. Montero
There is an increasing number of voices calling for asymmetric regulation to reinforce competition in European railways as they are liberalized in December 2020. The regulatory framework defined in the Directives of the European Union (EU) might be insufficient to ensure effective and widespread competition. But the EU Directive declares tracks a natural monopoly, and structural measures in the form of vertical separation with transport activities have been imposed. Behavioral obligations have also been imposed on infrastructure managers in the form of access obligations. There is no room for asymmetry between competing networks, as tracks are a natural monopoly. Furthermore, as access conditions are ruled by the principle of nondiscrimination, it does not seem possible to introduce asymmetries in favor of newcomers, for instance in the form of access charges below the price charged to incumbent railway undertakings. For the rest of railway assets, which only exceptionally can be considered essential facilities, the EU Directives either impose no access obligations (rolling stock, drivers, ticketing systems) or when they impose access obligations (maintenance facilities), there is no formal asymmetry, as all undertakings are subject to the same access obligations. National regulatory authorities considering the introduction of asymmetric access obligations should take into account economic literature describing how asymmetries attract inefficient market entry, and they should consider that obligations introduced at a national level might fragment the Single European Railway Area.
{"title":"Asymmetric regulation for competition in European railways?","authors":"Juan J. Montero","doi":"10.1177/1783591719861722","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1783591719861722","url":null,"abstract":"There is an increasing number of voices calling for asymmetric regulation to reinforce competition in European railways as they are liberalized in December 2020. The regulatory framework defined in the Directives of the European Union (EU) might be insufficient to ensure effective and widespread competition. But the EU Directive declares tracks a natural monopoly, and structural measures in the form of vertical separation with transport activities have been imposed. Behavioral obligations have also been imposed on infrastructure managers in the form of access obligations. There is no room for asymmetry between competing networks, as tracks are a natural monopoly. Furthermore, as access conditions are ruled by the principle of nondiscrimination, it does not seem possible to introduce asymmetries in favor of newcomers, for instance in the form of access charges below the price charged to incumbent railway undertakings. For the rest of railway assets, which only exceptionally can be considered essential facilities, the EU Directives either impose no access obligations (rolling stock, drivers, ticketing systems) or when they impose access obligations (maintenance facilities), there is no formal asymmetry, as all undertakings are subject to the same access obligations. National regulatory authorities considering the introduction of asymmetric access obligations should take into account economic literature describing how asymmetries attract inefficient market entry, and they should consider that obligations introduced at a national level might fragment the Single European Railway Area.","PeriodicalId":38329,"journal":{"name":"Competition and Regulation in Network Industries","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1783591719861722","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45674721","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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