Pub Date : 2018-02-25DOI: 10.4454/PHILINQ.V6I1.209
Matthew C. Haug
In this paper I return to the mid-20th-century debate between Quine and Carnap on the status of metaphysical questions with an eye toward advancing contemporary debates about whether naturalists can coherently undertake substantive metaphysical inquiry. Following Huw Price, I take the debate between Quine and Carnap to hinge, in part, on whether human inquiry is functionally unified. However, unlike Price, I suggest that this question is not best understood as a question about the function(s) of descriptive discourse. This goes along with rejecting a “linguistic conception” of the starting point of metaphysical inquiry, which, although shared by Quine and Carnap, Price gives us no good reason to think is mandatory for naturalists. I sketch two reasons naturalists have to reject a particular manifestation of this linguistic conception in Quine’s work – his criterion of ontological commitment. Finally, I show how these reasons can help us identify the grains of truth in some recent critiques of “mainstream metaphysics of mind”
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Pub Date : 2018-02-25DOI: 10.4454/PHILINQ.V6I1.208
F. Janssen-Lauret, F. MacBride
In 1901 Russell had envisaged the new analytic philosophy as uniquely systematic, borrowing the methods of science and mathematics. A century later, have Russell’s hopes become reality? David Lewis is often celebrated as a great systematic metaphysician, his influence proof that we live in a heyday of systematic philosophy. But, we argue, this common belief is misguided: Lewis was not a systematic philosopher, and he didn’t want to be. Although some aspects of his philosophy are systematic, mainly his pluriverse of possible worlds and its many applications, that systematicity was due to the influence of his teacher Quine, who really was an heir to Russell. Drawing upon Lewis’s posthumous papers and his correspondence as well as the published record, we show that Lewis’s non-Quinean influences, including G.E. Moore and D.M. Armstrong, led Lewis to an anti-systematic methodology which leaves each philosopher’s views and starting points to his or her own personal conscience.
{"title":"David Lewis’s place in the history of late analytic philosophy: his conservative and liberal methodology","authors":"F. Janssen-Lauret, F. MacBride","doi":"10.4454/PHILINQ.V6I1.208","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4454/PHILINQ.V6I1.208","url":null,"abstract":"In 1901 Russell had envisaged the new analytic philosophy as uniquely systematic, borrowing the methods of science and mathematics. A century later, have Russell’s hopes become reality? David Lewis is often celebrated as a great systematic metaphysician, his influence proof that we live in a heyday of systematic philosophy. But, we argue, this common belief is misguided: Lewis was not a systematic philosopher, and he didn’t want to be. Although some aspects of his philosophy are systematic, mainly his pluriverse of possible worlds and its many applications, that systematicity was due to the influence of his teacher Quine, who really was an heir to Russell. Drawing upon Lewis’s posthumous papers and his correspondence as well as the published record, we show that Lewis’s non-Quinean influences, including G.E. Moore and D.M. Armstrong, led Lewis to an anti-systematic methodology which leaves each philosopher’s views and starting points to his or her own personal conscience.","PeriodicalId":41386,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Inquiries","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2018-02-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81499635","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-02-25DOI: 10.4454/PHILINQ.V6I1.183
Abraham D. Stone
Stanley Cavell and David Lewis agree on the conditions under which philosophical argument can reveal truth, and on the type of truth that can be revealed. Neverthelss, they disagree on whether the academy is a good site for philosophy.
{"title":"Lewis and Cavell on Ordinary Language and Academic Philosophy","authors":"Abraham D. Stone","doi":"10.4454/PHILINQ.V6I1.183","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4454/PHILINQ.V6I1.183","url":null,"abstract":"Stanley Cavell and David Lewis agree on the conditions under which philosophical argument can reveal truth, and on the type of truth that can be revealed. Neverthelss, they disagree on whether the academy is a good site for philosophy.","PeriodicalId":41386,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Inquiries","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2018-02-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88597698","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-02-25DOI: 10.4454/PHILINQ.V6I1.212
Richard Davies
Review of Aaron Preston (Ed.), Analytic Philosophy: An Interpretive History , Routledge, London 2017, pp. 168.
回顾亚伦普雷斯顿(编)，分析哲学:一个解释的历史，劳特利奇，伦敦2017年，第168页。
{"title":"Aaron Preston (Ed.), Analytic Philosophy: An Interpretive History","authors":"Richard Davies","doi":"10.4454/PHILINQ.V6I1.212","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4454/PHILINQ.V6I1.212","url":null,"abstract":"Review of Aaron Preston (Ed.), Analytic Philosophy: An Interpretive History , Routledge, London 2017, pp. 168.","PeriodicalId":41386,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Inquiries","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2018-02-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85553607","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-02-25DOI: 10.4454/PHILINQ.V6I1.207
G. Bonino, P. Tripodi
As editors of this special issue, we thought it useful to ask the same three questions on the history of late analytic philosophy to some philosophers. (1) What are the main philosophical and metaphilosophical similarities and differences between early analytic philosophy and late analytic philosophy? (2) Is it possible to identify a mainstream in late analytic philosophy? If so, what are its main (cultural, ideological, philosophical, methodological, metaphilosophical) features? (3) What are, in your view, the main critical and controversial aspects of late analytic philosophy? We warmly thank all the interviewees for their collaboration and their interesting answers: Thomas R. Baldwin (University of York) Michael Beaney (Humboldt-Universitat zu Berlin and King’s College, London) Cora Diamond (University of Virginia) Hans-Johann Glock (Universitat Zurich) Matthew Haug (The College of William & Mary, Williamsburg) Cheryl Misak (University of Toronto) Philip Pettit (Princeton University) Nicholas Rescher (University of Pittsburgh) John Skorupski (University of St. Andrews) Brian Weatherson (University of Michigan, Ann Arbor) Timothy Williamson (University of Oxford) Jonathan Wolff (University of Oxford)
{"title":"Interviews on the history of late analytic philosophy","authors":"G. Bonino, P. Tripodi","doi":"10.4454/PHILINQ.V6I1.207","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4454/PHILINQ.V6I1.207","url":null,"abstract":"As editors of this special issue, we thought it useful to ask the same three questions on the history of late analytic philosophy to some philosophers. (1) What are the main philosophical and metaphilosophical similarities and differences between early analytic philosophy and late analytic philosophy? (2) Is it possible to identify a mainstream in late analytic philosophy? If so, what are its main (cultural, ideological, philosophical, methodological, metaphilosophical) features? (3) What are, in your view, the main critical and controversial aspects of late analytic philosophy? We warmly thank all the interviewees for their collaboration and their interesting answers: Thomas R. Baldwin (University of York) Michael Beaney (Humboldt-Universitat zu Berlin and King’s College, London) Cora Diamond (University of Virginia) Hans-Johann Glock (Universitat Zurich) Matthew Haug (The College of William & Mary, Williamsburg) Cheryl Misak (University of Toronto) Philip Pettit (Princeton University) Nicholas Rescher (University of Pittsburgh) John Skorupski (University of St. Andrews) Brian Weatherson (University of Michigan, Ann Arbor) Timothy Williamson (University of Oxford) Jonathan Wolff (University of Oxford)","PeriodicalId":41386,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Inquiries","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2018-02-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81470643","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-02-25DOI: 10.4454/PHILINQ.V6I1.210
Dionysis Christias
The purpose of the first part of this paper is to examine the major turning point events that transformed the attitude of analytic philosophers towards metaphysical discourse. We will focus on one such turning point, the modal revolution, based on the resources of possible world semantics, developed by Kripke (who devised suitable models for modal logic) and by philosophers such as Lewis and Plantinga (who offered influential metaphysical interpretations of those models). We shall see how the modal revolution, by bringing an unprecedented change in the way in which modal notions were understood by analytic philosophers, was central to the revival of metaphysics in contemporary philosophy. Yet, analytic philosophers encountered serious obstacles in their attempt to understand the ontological and epistemological foundations and implications of one of the most basic notions of the modal revolution, that of a possible world. In the second part of the paper, it will be argued that, surprisingly enough, the work of the pre-Kripkean “middle” analytic philosopher Wilfrid Sellars, especially as interpreted and reconstructed by Robert Brandom, can perhaps throw light on the semantic, epistemic and ontological dimension of possible world talk. Sellars does this mainly through 1) (what Brandom calls) the “Kant-Sellars thesis about modality”, 2) his understanding of modal discourse as non-descriptive, expressive, categorial and “metaliguistic”, and 3) his nominalism about abstract entities. Thus, it will be suggested that the implications of this Sellars-inspired position are such that make it an unexpectedly relevant and novel contribution to contemporary debates in analytic metaphysics.
{"title":"The resurgence of metaphysics in late analytic philosophy: A constructive critique","authors":"Dionysis Christias","doi":"10.4454/PHILINQ.V6I1.210","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4454/PHILINQ.V6I1.210","url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of the first part of this paper is to examine the major turning point events that transformed the attitude of analytic philosophers towards metaphysical discourse. We will focus on one such turning point, the modal revolution, based on the resources of possible world semantics, developed by Kripke (who devised suitable models for modal logic) and by philosophers such as Lewis and Plantinga (who offered influential metaphysical interpretations of those models). We shall see how the modal revolution, by bringing an unprecedented change in the way in which modal notions were understood by analytic philosophers, was central to the revival of metaphysics in contemporary philosophy. Yet, analytic philosophers encountered serious obstacles in their attempt to understand the ontological and epistemological foundations and implications of one of the most basic notions of the modal revolution, that of a possible world. In the second part of the paper, it will be argued that, surprisingly enough, the work of the pre-Kripkean “middle” analytic philosopher Wilfrid Sellars, especially as interpreted and reconstructed by Robert Brandom, can perhaps throw light on the semantic, epistemic and ontological dimension of possible world talk. Sellars does this mainly through 1) (what Brandom calls) the “Kant-Sellars thesis about modality”, 2) his understanding of modal discourse as non-descriptive, expressive, categorial and “metaliguistic”, and 3) his nominalism about abstract entities. Thus, it will be suggested that the implications of this Sellars-inspired position are such that make it an unexpectedly relevant and novel contribution to contemporary debates in analytic metaphysics.","PeriodicalId":41386,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Inquiries","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2018-02-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82600334","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-02-25DOI: 10.4454/PHILINQ.V6I1.218
M. Marion
{"title":"Was Royaumont merely a dialogue de sourds? An Introduction to the discussion générale","authors":"M. Marion","doi":"10.4454/PHILINQ.V6I1.218","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4454/PHILINQ.V6I1.218","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41386,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Inquiries","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2018-02-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75985579","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-08-04DOI: 10.4454/PHILINQ.V5I2.197
S. Sullivan
In this essay, I use William James’s theory of emotion from his Principles of Psychology to develop an account of trauma as fully and non-reductively psychophysiological. After explaining James’s account of emotion as bodily change, I develop a Jamesian understanding of trauma and healing in three steps. Drawing from examples of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) experienced by both soldiers and victims of sexual assault, I argue that (1) all traumatic events, even ones that seem to leave no physical wound, are physiological because they are emotional, and (2) a Jamesian understanding of trauma need not be confined to the individual; it can account for the prememories and postmemories of collective and transgenerational trauma. Finally (3), I argue that because trauma involves bodily movement and change, so too should successful recovery from trauma, a Jamesian insight that supports the use of movement therapies to promote healing. Shannon Sullivan ssullivan@uncc.edu University of North Carolina at Charlotte
{"title":"Toward a Jamesian account of trauma and healing","authors":"S. Sullivan","doi":"10.4454/PHILINQ.V5I2.197","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4454/PHILINQ.V5I2.197","url":null,"abstract":"In this essay, I use William James’s theory of emotion from his Principles of Psychology to develop an account of trauma as fully and non-reductively psychophysiological. After explaining James’s account of emotion as bodily change, I develop a Jamesian understanding of trauma and healing in three steps. Drawing from examples of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) experienced by both soldiers and victims of sexual assault, I argue that (1) all traumatic events, even ones that seem to leave no physical wound, are physiological because they are emotional, and (2) a Jamesian understanding of trauma need not be confined to the individual; it can account for the prememories and postmemories of collective and transgenerational trauma. Finally (3), I argue that because trauma involves bodily movement and change, so too should successful recovery from trauma, a Jamesian insight that supports the use of movement therapies to promote healing. Shannon Sullivan ssullivan@uncc.edu University of North Carolina at Charlotte","PeriodicalId":41386,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Inquiries","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2017-08-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85601828","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-08-04DOI: 10.4454/PHILINQ.V5I2.199
M. Borri
Open access Review of Frontiers in Neuroethics. Conceptual and Empirical Advancements , edited by Andrea Lavazza, Cambridge Scholar Publishing, Newcastle upon Tyne, 2016, pp. 168.
{"title":"Andrea Lavazza (ed.), Frontiers in Neuroethics","authors":"M. Borri","doi":"10.4454/PHILINQ.V5I2.199","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4454/PHILINQ.V5I2.199","url":null,"abstract":"Open access Review of Frontiers in Neuroethics. Conceptual and Empirical Advancements , edited by Andrea Lavazza, Cambridge Scholar Publishing, Newcastle upon Tyne, 2016, pp. 168.","PeriodicalId":41386,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Inquiries","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2017-08-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85405477","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-08-04DOI: 10.4454/PHILINQ.V5I2.200
Dimitri D'Andrea
Wolfgang Mommsen described the relationship between Weber and Michels as an “asymmetrical partnership” (Mommsen 1981). This asymmetry was not only linked to the former’s academic position and age, but also to the fact that Weber sensed something in Michels’ views that he himself had distanced himself from, but at the same time continued to reflect on. It was a subtle mix of similarities and differences that allowed Weber to engage in a dialogue with himself, in which he was able to formulate his positions in an unusually explicit and direct way (Mommsen 1989: 88). The issues were discussed in a correspondence which spanned many years, but was particularly intense and significant between 1906 and 1909, and actually revolved around two central themes: 1) a realistic analysis of political phenomena, processes and institutions which aimed, among other things, at defining the scope of what is politically possible and, 2) a reflection on the subjective attitude to be assumed in dealing with the ongoing political transformations and the aspirations of various collective actors in the field. Precisely because of its ambiguity, this Weberian perspective constituted an anomalous political realism, which was anything but indifferent to the normative questions that a realistic diagnosis poses to subjectivity. Michels’ letter of August 4, 1908, presented here for the first time in its entirety in an English translation, enables us to grasp a crucial phase in the development of this particular Weberian realism in which the fundamental inspiration is already present but in the argumentation of which neither the categories (ethics of conviction, ethics of responsibility and, in particular, the acosmism of love), nor the conclusions that he would reach in a later phase (Politics as Vocation) are put forward. What the letter offers the reader is a glimpse of a work in progress, which is not just of philological-exegetical interest but also highly valuable in a theoretical sense, since it allows us to reflect on questions such as the connection between ethics and politics, the limits and conditions of a possible radical transformation of the world which, even after the end of the short Twentieth century, continue to be of burning relevance.
{"title":"Revolutions without any Goal. Ethics and politics in a letter from Max Weber to Roberto Michels","authors":"Dimitri D'Andrea","doi":"10.4454/PHILINQ.V5I2.200","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4454/PHILINQ.V5I2.200","url":null,"abstract":"Wolfgang Mommsen described the relationship between Weber and Michels as an “asymmetrical partnership” (Mommsen 1981). This asymmetry was not only linked to the former’s academic position and age, but also to the fact that Weber sensed something in Michels’ views that he himself had distanced himself from, but at the same time continued to reflect on. It was a subtle mix of similarities and differences that allowed Weber to engage in a dialogue with himself, in which he was able to formulate his positions in an unusually explicit and direct way (Mommsen 1989: 88). The issues were discussed in a correspondence which spanned many years, but was particularly intense and significant between 1906 and 1909, and actually revolved around two central themes: 1) a realistic analysis of political phenomena, processes and institutions which aimed, among other things, at defining the scope of what is politically possible and, 2) a reflection on the subjective attitude to be assumed in dealing with the ongoing political transformations and the aspirations of various collective actors in the field. Precisely because of its ambiguity, this Weberian perspective constituted an anomalous political realism, which was anything but indifferent to the normative questions that a realistic diagnosis poses to subjectivity. Michels’ letter of August 4, 1908, presented here for the first time in its entirety in an English translation, enables us to grasp a crucial phase in the development of this particular Weberian realism in which the fundamental inspiration is already present but in the argumentation of which neither the categories (ethics of conviction, ethics of responsibility and, in particular, the acosmism of love), nor the conclusions that he would reach in a later phase (Politics as Vocation) are put forward. What the letter offers the reader is a glimpse of a work in progress, which is not just of philological-exegetical interest but also highly valuable in a theoretical sense, since it allows us to reflect on questions such as the connection between ethics and politics, the limits and conditions of a possible radical transformation of the world which, even after the end of the short Twentieth century, continue to be of burning relevance.","PeriodicalId":41386,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Inquiries","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2017-08-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82883980","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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