Pub Date : 2018-08-01DOI: 10.4454/PHILINQ.V6I2.224
C. T. Nguyen
In The Great Endarkenment, Elijah Millgram argues that the hyper-specialization of expert domains has led to an intellectual crisis. Each field of human knowledge has its own specialized jargon, knowledge, and form of reasoning, and each is mutually incomprehensible to the next. Furthermore, says Millgram, modern scientific practical arguments are draped across many fields. Thus, there is no person in a position to assess the success of such a practical argument for themselves. This arrangement virtually guarantees that mistakes will accrue whenever we engage in cross-field practical reasoning. Furthermore, Millgram argues, hyper-specialization makes intellectual autonomy extremely difficult. Our only hope is to provide better translations between the fields, in order to achieve intellectual transparency. I argue against Millgram’s pessimistic conclusion about intellectual autonomy, and against his suggested solution of translation. Instead, I take his analysis to reveal that there are actually several very distinct forms intellectual autonomy that are significantly in tension. One familiar kind is direct autonomy, where we seek to understand arguments and reasons for ourselves. Another kind is delegational autonomy, where we seek to find others to invest with our intellectual trust when we cannot understand. A third is management autonomy, where we seek to encapsulate fields, in order to manage their overall structure and connectivity. Intellectual transparency will help us achieve direct autonomy, but many intellectual circumstances require that we exercise delegational and management autonomy. However, these latter forms of autonomy require us to give up on transparency.
伊利亚·米尔格拉姆(Elijah Millgram)在《大黑暗》(The Great Endarkenment)一书中指出，专家领域的高度专业化导致了一场智力危机。人类知识的每个领域都有自己的专业术语、知识和推理形式，而且彼此之间互不理解。此外，米尔格拉姆说，现代科学实践的论点覆盖了许多领域。因此，没有人有资格为自己评价这样一个实际的论点是否成功。这种安排实际上保证了，每当我们从事跨领域的实践推理时，错误就会累积起来。此外，米尔格拉姆认为，高度专业化使得智力自主极其困难。我们唯一的希望是提供更好的领域之间的翻译，以实现知识的透明度。我反对米尔格拉姆关于知识自主的悲观结论，也反对他提出的翻译解决方案。相反，我用他的分析来揭示，实际上有几种非常不同的智力自主形式，它们明显处于紧张状态。一种熟悉的是直接自主，我们寻求自己理解论点和理由。另一种是委托自治，当我们无法理解时，我们寻求找到其他人来投入我们的智力信任。第三个是管理自治，我们试图封装字段，以便管理它们的整体结构和连通性。知识透明将帮助我们实现直接自治，但许多知识环境要求我们行使授权和管理自治。然而，后一种形式的自治要求我们放弃透明度。
{"title":"Expertise and the fragmentation of intellectual autonomy","authors":"C. T. Nguyen","doi":"10.4454/PHILINQ.V6I2.224","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4454/PHILINQ.V6I2.224","url":null,"abstract":"In The Great Endarkenment, Elijah Millgram argues that the hyper-specialization of expert domains has led to an intellectual crisis. Each field of human knowledge has its own specialized jargon, knowledge, and form of reasoning, and each is mutually incomprehensible to the next. Furthermore, says Millgram, modern scientific practical arguments are draped across many fields. Thus, there is no person in a position to assess the success of such a practical argument for themselves. This arrangement virtually guarantees that mistakes will accrue whenever we engage in cross-field practical reasoning. Furthermore, Millgram argues, hyper-specialization makes intellectual autonomy extremely difficult. Our only hope is to provide better translations between the fields, in order to achieve intellectual transparency. I argue against Millgram’s pessimistic conclusion about intellectual autonomy, and against his suggested solution of translation. Instead, I take his analysis to reveal that there are actually several very distinct forms intellectual autonomy that are significantly in tension. One familiar kind is direct autonomy, where we seek to understand arguments and reasons for ourselves. Another kind is delegational autonomy, where we seek to find others to invest with our intellectual trust when we cannot understand. A third is management autonomy, where we seek to encapsulate fields, in order to manage their overall structure and connectivity. Intellectual transparency will help us achieve direct autonomy, but many intellectual circumstances require that we exercise delegational and management autonomy. However, these latter forms of autonomy require us to give up on transparency.","PeriodicalId":41386,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Inquiries","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2018-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75432575","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-08-01DOI: 10.4454/PHILINQ.V6I2.222
B. Crowe
My argument focuses on Chapter Ten, where Millgram argues that a family of recent theories of agency mistakenly transfers a model of agency that works for parts of a life to a person’s life as a whole. As serial hyperspecializers, we are segmented agents. In their efforts at explaining the distinction between attitudes (or actions) that are merely attributable to an agent versus those that are attributable in a superlative sense, philosophers produce conceptual devices that actually fail to capture what happens in the crucial interstices between segments. Without myself proposing to defend any particular recent account of agency, I examine below why this merely-superlatively attributable distinction matters. Picking up some threads from three nineteenth-century works of literature, I suggest that this distinction helps us to identify whether or not someone is being in earnest about life. I conclude the discussion by first considering what difference segmented agency makes to my account and then by taking a look at another literary work, Goethe’s Faust, in order to motivate mild skepticism about whether we are likely to find a conceptual device that can help us in our passages from one segment of agency to another.
{"title":"Agency in search of a function","authors":"B. Crowe","doi":"10.4454/PHILINQ.V6I2.222","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4454/PHILINQ.V6I2.222","url":null,"abstract":"My argument focuses on Chapter Ten, where Millgram argues that a family of recent theories of agency mistakenly transfers a model of agency that works for parts of a life to a person’s life as a whole. As serial hyperspecializers, we are segmented agents. In their efforts at explaining the distinction between attitudes (or actions) that are merely attributable to an agent versus those that are attributable in a superlative sense, philosophers produce conceptual devices that actually fail to capture what happens in the crucial interstices between segments. Without myself proposing to defend any particular recent account of agency, I examine below why this merely-superlatively attributable distinction matters. Picking up some threads from three nineteenth-century works of literature, I suggest that this distinction helps us to identify whether or not someone is being in earnest about life. I conclude the discussion by first considering what difference segmented agency makes to my account and then by taking a look at another literary work, Goethe’s Faust, in order to motivate mild skepticism about whether we are likely to find a conceptual device that can help us in our passages from one segment of agency to another.","PeriodicalId":41386,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Inquiries","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2018-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76884328","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-08-01DOI: 10.4454/philinq.v6i2.229
G. Wolters
Review of Sami Pihlstrom, Friedrich Stadler, Niels Weidtmann (eds.), Logical Empiricism and Pragmatism (Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook Vol. 19), Springer, Cham, 2017, pp. VIII+245.
{"title":"Logical Empiricism and Pragmatism","authors":"G. Wolters","doi":"10.4454/philinq.v6i2.229","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4454/philinq.v6i2.229","url":null,"abstract":"Review of Sami Pihlstrom, Friedrich Stadler, Niels Weidtmann (eds.), Logical Empiricism and Pragmatism (Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook Vol. 19), Springer, Cham, 2017, pp. VIII+245.","PeriodicalId":41386,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Inquiries","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2018-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91214625","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-08-01DOI: 10.4454/PHILINQ.V6I2.226
Kenneth Walden
I examine skeptical arguments about the constitutive nature of agency, with special attention to those of Elijah Millgram. I suggest that these arguments lead us not to the conclusion that agency has no such nature, but that it is an essentially contested kind in the same way that art is. I argue that this undermines traditional forms of constitutivism in metaethics but opens the door to a different way of pursuing the same program. Finally, I take issue with Millgram’s solution to the problem of “logical aliens” and suggest an alternative based my analogy with art.
{"title":"Nature, agency, and the nature of agency","authors":"Kenneth Walden","doi":"10.4454/PHILINQ.V6I2.226","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4454/PHILINQ.V6I2.226","url":null,"abstract":"I examine skeptical arguments about the constitutive nature of agency, with special attention to those of Elijah Millgram. I suggest that these arguments lead us not to the conclusion that agency has no such nature, but that it is an essentially contested kind in the same way that art is. I argue that this undermines traditional forms of constitutivism in metaethics but opens the door to a different way of pursuing the same program. Finally, I take issue with Millgram’s solution to the problem of “logical aliens” and suggest an alternative based my analogy with art.","PeriodicalId":41386,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Inquiries","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2018-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89539684","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-08-01DOI: 10.4454/PHILINQ.V6I2.221
Carla Bagnoli
Introduction to Focus section of Philosophical Inquiries Vol. VI, issue 2, 2018, "The great endarkenment". Open Access article.
《哲学研究》2018年第6卷第2期“大觉醒”焦点部分导言。开放获取文章。
{"title":"Introduction to \"The great endarkenment\"","authors":"Carla Bagnoli","doi":"10.4454/PHILINQ.V6I2.221","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4454/PHILINQ.V6I2.221","url":null,"abstract":"Introduction to Focus section of Philosophical Inquiries Vol. VI, issue 2, 2018, \"The great endarkenment\". Open Access article.","PeriodicalId":41386,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Inquiries","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2018-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89480410","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-08-01DOI: 10.4454/PHILINQ.V6I2.228
J. Archibald
Review of Marco Solinas' From Aristotle’s Teleology to Darwin’s Genealogy: The Stamp of Inutility , Macmillan, London, 2015, pp. 200.
《从亚里士多德的目的论到达尔文的宗谱:无效用的印记》，《麦克米伦》，伦敦，2015年，第200页。
{"title":"From Aristotle’s Teleology to Darwin’s Genealogy: The Stamp of Inutility","authors":"J. Archibald","doi":"10.4454/PHILINQ.V6I2.228","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4454/PHILINQ.V6I2.228","url":null,"abstract":"Review of Marco Solinas' From Aristotle’s Teleology to Darwin’s Genealogy: The Stamp of Inutility , Macmillan, London, 2015, pp. 200.","PeriodicalId":41386,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Inquiries","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2018-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76011771","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-08-01DOI: 10.4454/PHILINQ.V6I2.225
E. Millgram
Extreme specialization will require us to replace generic conceptions of autonomy with discipline-specific methods of assessing whether one has matters in hand, is acting in earnest, and can be taken seriously. The uniform personality structures predominantly discussed in recent moral philosophy will not do; however, solutions to the problems of cross-disciplinary quality control will have to figure into those assessments. This sort of quality control cannot be managed by having experts explain themselves to nonexperts, but checking for refractive equilibrium across areas of expertise may do much of the job.
{"title":"Are you Serious","authors":"E. Millgram","doi":"10.4454/PHILINQ.V6I2.225","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4454/PHILINQ.V6I2.225","url":null,"abstract":"Extreme specialization will require us to replace generic conceptions of autonomy with discipline-specific methods of assessing whether one has matters in hand, is acting in earnest, and can be taken seriously. The uniform personality structures predominantly discussed in recent moral philosophy will not do; however, solutions to the problems of cross-disciplinary quality control will have to figure into those assessments. This sort of quality control cannot be managed by having experts explain themselves to nonexperts, but checking for refractive equilibrium across areas of expertise may do much of the job.","PeriodicalId":41386,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Inquiries","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2018-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89138987","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-02-25DOI: 10.4454/PHILINQ.V6I1.184
E. Petrovich, V. Buonomo
This paper aims to present a quantitative approach to history of late analytic philosophy. In the first section, we focus on methodological issues of our approach. We discuss the relation between history of philosophy and metaphilosophy, distinguish between qualitative and quantitative history of philosophy, and present the theoretical framework we choose for quantitative study of late analytic philosophy, namely scientometrics and citation analysis. In the second section, we discuss the results of our method. We present a list of high-impact authors in late analytic philosophy, and we analyze the evolution of the field in the light of citational networks (science maps) generated with VOSviewer. Finally, we propose several lines for further research.
{"title":"Reconstructing Late Analytic Philosophy. A Quantitative Approach","authors":"E. Petrovich, V. Buonomo","doi":"10.4454/PHILINQ.V6I1.184","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4454/PHILINQ.V6I1.184","url":null,"abstract":"This paper aims to present a quantitative approach to history of late analytic philosophy. In the first section, we focus on methodological issues of our approach. We discuss the relation between history of philosophy and metaphilosophy, distinguish between qualitative and quantitative history of philosophy, and present the theoretical framework we choose for quantitative study of late analytic philosophy, namely scientometrics and citation analysis. In the second section, we discuss the results of our method. We present a list of high-impact authors in late analytic philosophy, and we analyze the evolution of the field in the light of citational networks (science maps) generated with VOSviewer. Finally, we propose several lines for further research.","PeriodicalId":41386,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Inquiries","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2018-02-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85436243","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-02-25DOI: 10.4454/philinq.v6i1.213
P. Leonardi
Review of Frederique Janssen-Lauret and Gary Kemp (Eds.) Quine and His Place in History , Palgrave, London 2016, pp. 224. Abstract not available. Full-text open access PDF.
{"title":"Frederique Janssen-Lauret and Gary Kemp (Eds.), Quine and His Place in History Palgrave","authors":"P. Leonardi","doi":"10.4454/philinq.v6i1.213","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4454/philinq.v6i1.213","url":null,"abstract":"Review of Frederique Janssen-Lauret and Gary Kemp (Eds.) Quine and His Place in History , Palgrave, London 2016, pp. 224. Abstract not available. Full-text open access PDF.","PeriodicalId":41386,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Inquiries","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2018-02-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78297068","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Over the last thirty years historical attention has been directed toward analytic philosophy: some analytic philosophers have begun reflecting on the philosophical tradition they belong to, while many other scholars have been working on what has now become a well-established discipline known as “history of analytic philosophy” (for a comprehensive bibliography see Beaney 2013). Yet this historiographical perspective mainly focuses on the origins of analytic philosophy or on the central decades of the 20th century. These two periods can be labelled respectively as early analytic philosophy (Frege, Russell, Moore, the early Wittgenstein, etc.) and as middle analytic philosophy (Carnap, Ryle, the later Wittgenstein, Quine, etc.) The use of the former label is firmly established, whereas the latter is less common, yet fairly natural. By contrast, a proper historical investigation of the most recent stages of analytic philosophy is greatly needed. Some contributions towards a better understanding of this issue are available. Among them: Baldwin (2001), Priest (2003), Soames (2003: vol. II, 461-476), Williamson (2007, chapter i and “Afterword”), Beaney (2013), Williamson (2014), Tripodi (2015, chapter iv). But they are still few and far between. This special issue of Philosophical Inquiries is intended to be a further stimulus for such an investigation. Full-text PDF of this introduction is available in open access.
{"title":"Introduction to \"History of Late Analytic Philosophy\"","authors":"G. Bonino, P. Tripodi","doi":"10.4454/PHILINQ.V6I1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4454/PHILINQ.V6I1","url":null,"abstract":"Over the last thirty years historical attention has been directed toward analytic philosophy: some analytic philosophers have begun reflecting on the philosophical tradition they belong to, while many other scholars have been working on what has now become a well-established discipline known as “history of analytic philosophy” (for a comprehensive bibliography see Beaney 2013). Yet this historiographical perspective mainly focuses on the origins of analytic philosophy or on the central decades of the 20th century. These two periods can be labelled respectively as early analytic philosophy (Frege, Russell, Moore, the early Wittgenstein, etc.) and as middle analytic philosophy (Carnap, Ryle, the later Wittgenstein, Quine, etc.) The use of the former label is firmly established, whereas the latter is less common, yet fairly natural. By contrast, a proper historical investigation of the most recent stages of analytic philosophy is greatly needed. Some contributions towards a better understanding of this issue are available. Among them: Baldwin (2001), Priest (2003), Soames (2003: vol. II, 461-476), Williamson (2007, chapter i and “Afterword”), Beaney (2013), Williamson (2014), Tripodi (2015, chapter iv). But they are still few and far between. This special issue of Philosophical Inquiries is intended to be a further stimulus for such an investigation. Full-text PDF of this introduction is available in open access.","PeriodicalId":41386,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Inquiries","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2018-02-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86642140","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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