Pub Date : 2020-03-31DOI: 10.4454/PHILINQ.V8I1.283
I. Basso
{"title":"On Madness and Free Will: A Kantian Debate in Denmark in the First Half of 19th Century","authors":"I. Basso","doi":"10.4454/PHILINQ.V8I1.283","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4454/PHILINQ.V8I1.283","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41386,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Inquiries","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87186535","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-11-05DOI: 10.4454/PHILINQ.V7I2.267
Matteo Vagelli
{"title":"Cecile Malaspina, An Epistemology of Noise","authors":"Matteo Vagelli","doi":"10.4454/PHILINQ.V7I2.267","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4454/PHILINQ.V7I2.267","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41386,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Inquiries","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2019-11-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78632517","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-11-05DOI: 10.4454/PHILINQ.V7I2.247
Hannes Gustav Melichar
Neo-Aristotelian metaethics is conceived as a suitable alternative to a Kantian-style ethics. Instead of grounding moral duties in practical reason and an abstract and categorical imperative, the appeal to the concept of human nature promises a rich and detailed picture of virtues and vices. As an objection by John McDowell indicates, practical reason turns out to be crucial for the concept of human nature as well. In Hegel’s philosophy of the subjective spirit, we can find an early attempt to combine the Kantian and the Aristotelian approaches. The attempt is still interesting because of the interpretation of human faculties as directed towards the capacity for practical reasoning. This paper presents Hegel’s argument as the attempt to transcendentalize the concept of human nature and as offering a synthetic metaethical stance.
{"title":"The universal will as final end. On Hegel’s moral conception of the human mind between Aristotelian naturalism and Kantianism","authors":"Hannes Gustav Melichar","doi":"10.4454/PHILINQ.V7I2.247","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4454/PHILINQ.V7I2.247","url":null,"abstract":"Neo-Aristotelian metaethics is conceived as a suitable alternative to a Kantian-style ethics. Instead of grounding moral duties in practical reason and an abstract and categorical imperative, the appeal to the concept of human nature promises a rich and detailed picture of virtues and vices. As an objection by John McDowell indicates, practical reason turns out to be crucial for the concept of human nature as well. In Hegel’s philosophy of the subjective spirit, we can find an early attempt to combine the Kantian and the Aristotelian approaches. The attempt is still interesting because of the interpretation of human faculties as directed towards the capacity for practical reasoning. This paper presents Hegel’s argument as the attempt to transcendentalize the concept of human nature and as offering a synthetic metaethical stance.","PeriodicalId":41386,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Inquiries","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2019-11-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78072840","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-11-05DOI: 10.4454/PHILINQ.V7I2.248
Tommaso Allodi
The analogy between moral judgments and the evaluation of animals and plants is a pivotal feature of Neo-Aristotelian Naturalism by means of which this metaethical position attempts to explain the naturalness of morality. However, the usual objection argues that the schema of natural normativity embraced by the main representatives of this view commits it to biological naturalism (a thesis that programmatically Neo-Aristotelian Naturalism rejects). This essay considers the contribution that John Hacker-Wright and Michael Thompson give in answering this challenge. They suggest a non empirical conception of the schema of natural normativity somehow different to the one endorsed by Rosalind Hursthouse. As a result, I will try to show that according to their notion of natural normativity, Neo-Aristotelian Naturalism can maintain the thesis that moral judgments are analogous to the evaluation of animals and plants while avoiding the commitment to biological naturalism.
{"title":"Neo-Aristotelian Naturalism and the analogy between moral judgments and the evaluation of other living beings","authors":"Tommaso Allodi","doi":"10.4454/PHILINQ.V7I2.248","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4454/PHILINQ.V7I2.248","url":null,"abstract":"The analogy between moral judgments and the evaluation of animals and plants is a pivotal feature of Neo-Aristotelian Naturalism by means of which this metaethical position attempts to explain the naturalness of morality. However, the usual objection argues that the schema of natural normativity embraced by the main representatives of this view commits it to biological naturalism (a thesis that programmatically Neo-Aristotelian Naturalism rejects). This essay considers the contribution that John Hacker-Wright and Michael Thompson give in answering this challenge. They suggest a non empirical conception of the schema of natural normativity somehow different to the one endorsed by Rosalind Hursthouse. As a result, I will try to show that according to their notion of natural normativity, Neo-Aristotelian Naturalism can maintain the thesis that moral judgments are analogous to the evaluation of animals and plants while avoiding the commitment to biological naturalism.","PeriodicalId":41386,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Inquiries","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2019-11-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86756051","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-11-05DOI: 10.4454/PHILINQ.V7I2.235
K. Nieswandt, Ulf Hlobil
We answer the title question with a qualified “No.” We arrive at this answer by spelling out what the proper place of the con- cept ‘happiness’ is in a neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics: (1) Happiness in the sense of personal well-being has only a loose relation to virtue; it doesn’t deserve any prominent place in virtue ethics. (2) Happi- ness in the sense of flourishing is impossible without virtue, but that doesn’t imply that individual actions should aim at flourishing. (3) Instead, flourishing sets the standard of good practical reasoning; it is hardly ever the proper aim of a practical inference. This paper begins with a common (mis)interpretation of neo- Aristotelian virtue ethics, on which it is a form of rational egoism. We then develop our alternative understanding against this foil.
{"title":"Do the Virtues Make You Happy","authors":"K. Nieswandt, Ulf Hlobil","doi":"10.4454/PHILINQ.V7I2.235","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4454/PHILINQ.V7I2.235","url":null,"abstract":"We answer the title question with a qualified “No.” We arrive at this answer by spelling out what the proper place of the con- cept ‘happiness’ is in a neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics: (1) Happiness in the sense of personal well-being has only a loose relation to virtue; it doesn’t deserve any prominent place in virtue ethics. (2) Happi- ness in the sense of flourishing is impossible without virtue, but that doesn’t imply that individual actions should aim at flourishing. (3) Instead, flourishing sets the standard of good practical reasoning; it is hardly ever the proper aim of a practical inference. This paper begins with a common (mis)interpretation of neo- Aristotelian virtue ethics, on which it is a form of rational egoism. We then develop our alternative understanding against this foil.","PeriodicalId":41386,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Inquiries","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2019-11-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87046585","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-11-05DOI: 10.4454/PHILINQ.V7I2.214
A. Zhok
We try to provide in outline an understanding of emergent properties, which should possibly make the idea of emergence not just plausible but compelling. It is our conviction that the core truth of emergentism is neither especially exotic nor counterintuitive, while its apparent eccentricity is essentially due to some prejudicial ontological assumptions. In the first half of the paper our argument develops through Jaegwon Kim’s rejection of emergentism. We argue that Kim’s use of both the “causal inheritance principle” and the “causal closure principle” in his criticism of emergence is unwarranted. In the second half of the paper we develop a positive account of emergence through a restoration of the ontological notion of quality. We contend that any monistic ontology, in order to account for experience, must make room for irreducible qualities and that efficaciousness cannot be denied to them. The novelty of emergent properties amounts to a priori unpredictability, due to the very nature of combination. Their efficaciousness is interpreted in terms of qualifying thresholds modulating the mode of efficaciousness.
{"title":"Making Room for Emergence","authors":"A. Zhok","doi":"10.4454/PHILINQ.V7I2.214","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4454/PHILINQ.V7I2.214","url":null,"abstract":"We try to provide in outline an understanding of emergent properties, which should possibly make the idea of emergence not just plausible but compelling. It is our conviction that the core truth of emergentism is neither especially exotic nor counterintuitive, while its apparent eccentricity is essentially due to some prejudicial ontological assumptions. In the first half of the paper our argument develops through Jaegwon Kim’s rejection of emergentism. We argue that Kim’s use of both the “causal inheritance principle” and the “causal closure principle” in his criticism of emergence is unwarranted. In the second half of the paper we develop a positive account of emergence through a restoration of the ontological notion of quality. We contend that any monistic ontology, in order to account for experience, must make room for irreducible qualities and that efficaciousness cannot be denied to them. The novelty of emergent properties amounts to a priori unpredictability, due to the very nature of combination. Their efficaciousness is interpreted in terms of qualifying thresholds modulating the mode of efficaciousness.","PeriodicalId":41386,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Inquiries","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2019-11-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81821959","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-11-05DOI: 10.4454/PHILINQ.V7I2.263
A. Müller
Respected traditions oppose emotionality to reason. In recent decades there has been growing awareness of, and attention to, the rational side of feelings. In particular, emotions have been taken to embody value judgements. I argue instead that every type of emotion owes its specific character to a (quasi-)inferential pattern that connects the import of a token emotion’s occasion, or object, with the meaning of its manifestation in a response. Man’s ability and tendency to connect occasions with responses in this way constitutes a first degree of emotional rationality. A second degree is attained where the subject’s emotionality accords with their settled normative views on what to feel. And where these views are right, namely in a virtuous life, the subject is emotionally rational to a third degree.
{"title":"Virtuous feelings? Three grades of emotional rationality","authors":"A. Müller","doi":"10.4454/PHILINQ.V7I2.263","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4454/PHILINQ.V7I2.263","url":null,"abstract":"Respected traditions oppose emotionality to reason. In recent decades there has been growing awareness of, and attention to, the rational side of feelings. In particular, emotions have been taken to embody value judgements. I argue instead that every type of emotion owes its specific character to a (quasi-)inferential pattern that connects the import of a token emotion’s occasion, or object, with the meaning of its manifestation in a response. Man’s ability and tendency to connect occasions with responses in this way constitutes a first degree of emotional rationality. A second degree is attained where the subject’s emotionality accords with their settled normative views on what to feel. And where these views are right, namely in a virtuous life, the subject is emotionally rational to a third degree.","PeriodicalId":41386,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Inquiries","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2019-11-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76115667","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-11-05DOI: 10.4454/PHILINQ.V7I2.246
Julia Peters
Virtue ethicists assume that the notion of (moral) character should hold a prominent place in our moral thought. In this paper, I offer an argument in support of this view. Central to my argument is a reflection on what it means to be committed to a principle of action. I argue that the notion of commitment is inherently connected to the notion of moral character in two ways. The first is based on the idea that an action that expresses our character is an action that we own in the most substantial way. I suggest that the notion of owning one’s action can be cashed out through the idea of committing to a practical principle. The second connection arises from the thought that the notion of moral character refers to a persistent, enduring moral identity. I argue that in order for a person to be genuinely committed to a principle, she must act in accord with it in a way that is not merely consistent, but persistent across a number of situations. Accordingly, to say of someone that they are committed to a principle of action is eo ipso to ascribe them an enduring moral character. Against this background, I turn to a reading of Aristotle’s notion of virtue as hexis prohairetike as a paradigm example of how the idea of enduring moral commitment may be spelled out in more specific detail.
{"title":"Moral Character, Commitment, and Persistence","authors":"Julia Peters","doi":"10.4454/PHILINQ.V7I2.246","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4454/PHILINQ.V7I2.246","url":null,"abstract":"Virtue ethicists assume that the notion of (moral) character should hold a prominent place in our moral thought. In this paper, I offer an argument in support of this view. Central to my argument is a reflection on what it means to be committed to a principle of action. I argue that the notion of commitment is inherently connected to the notion of moral character in two ways. The first is based on the idea that an action that expresses our character is an action that we own in the most substantial way. I suggest that the notion of owning one’s action can be cashed out through the idea of committing to a practical principle. The second connection arises from the thought that the notion of moral character refers to a persistent, enduring moral identity. I argue that in order for a person to be genuinely committed to a principle, she must act in accord with it in a way that is not merely consistent, but persistent across a number of situations. Accordingly, to say of someone that they are committed to a principle of action is eo ipso to ascribe them an enduring moral character. Against this background, I turn to a reading of Aristotle’s notion of virtue as hexis prohairetike as a paradigm example of how the idea of enduring moral commitment may be spelled out in more specific detail.","PeriodicalId":41386,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Inquiries","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2019-11-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88069063","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-11-05DOI: 10.4454/PHILINQ.V7I2.251
Erica A. Holberg
I argue that Kant's use, in the critical ethical writings, of our nature as autonomous, rational beings (if imperfectly so) to argue against the normative authority of human nature shows Kant's ethical system to instantiate its own distinctive version of ethical naturalism. The formal structure of Kant's argument fits within ethical naturalism: our nature is what explains how we get onto and are bound by ethical norms. What changes is that Kant rejects the authority of human nature to generate these moral norms by arguing that only rational nature as free and autonomous could sanction this sort of normative grip. In order to show the viability of reading Kant as an ethical naturalist, I address two problems: 1) how to specify a Kantian first nature that is not too human, nor too formal and so empty; 2) how to specify a Kantian second nature as some settled disposition towards willing morally good actions and yet compatible with reason's autonomy.
{"title":"Kant as Ethical Naturalist: First and Second Natures in Kant's Ethics","authors":"Erica A. Holberg","doi":"10.4454/PHILINQ.V7I2.251","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4454/PHILINQ.V7I2.251","url":null,"abstract":"I argue that Kant's use, in the critical ethical writings, of our nature as autonomous, rational beings (if imperfectly so) to argue against the normative authority of human nature shows Kant's ethical system to instantiate its own distinctive version of ethical naturalism. The formal structure of Kant's argument fits within ethical naturalism: our nature is what explains how we get onto and are bound by ethical norms. What changes is that Kant rejects the authority of human nature to generate these moral norms by arguing that only rational nature as free and autonomous could sanction this sort of normative grip. In order to show the viability of reading Kant as an ethical naturalist, I address two problems: 1) how to specify a Kantian first nature that is not too human, nor too formal and so empty; 2) how to specify a Kantian second nature as some settled disposition towards willing morally good actions and yet compatible with reason's autonomy.","PeriodicalId":41386,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Inquiries","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2019-11-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84309406","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-11-05DOI: 10.4454/PHILINQ.V7I2.236
Matteo Negro
In order to safeguard the link between rationality and happiness, first of all we have to recognize that this link is not anchored in the first place to the level of the particular action and its external contraints, but to the level of disposition. Particular choices in fact are rational in that they express and manifest a rational disposition to choose, which gives form and unity to the actions themselves. The alternative is a theory of rationality as a causal theory of choice.
{"title":"Some remarks on Intentions, Dispositions, and Normative Constraints","authors":"Matteo Negro","doi":"10.4454/PHILINQ.V7I2.236","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4454/PHILINQ.V7I2.236","url":null,"abstract":"In order to safeguard the link between rationality and happiness, first of all we have to recognize that this link is not anchored in the first place to the level of the particular action and its external contraints, but to the level of disposition. Particular choices in fact are rational in that they express and manifest a rational disposition to choose, which gives form and unity to the actions themselves. The alternative is a theory of rationality as a causal theory of choice.","PeriodicalId":41386,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Inquiries","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2019-11-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77786069","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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