Pub Date : 2019-03-03DOI: 10.4454/PHILINQ.V7I1.238
H. Kanemitsu
In this paper, the author considers the robot from a philosophical point of view, particularly the question of the robot as other. First, he introduces a philosophical framework to view technology and a new configuration caused by the development of robotics. Then, he uses several case studies to describe the state of current robotics. Finally, the author examines how to deal with this new reality, raising several issues.
{"title":"The robot as other: a postphenomenological perspective","authors":"H. Kanemitsu","doi":"10.4454/PHILINQ.V7I1.238","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4454/PHILINQ.V7I1.238","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, the author considers the robot from a philosophical point of view, particularly the question of the robot as other. First, he introduces a philosophical framework to view technology and a new configuration caused by the development of robotics. Then, he uses several case studies to describe the state of current robotics. Finally, the author examines how to deal with this new reality, raising several issues.","PeriodicalId":41386,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Inquiries","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2019-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79601987","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-03-03DOI: 10.4454/PHILINQ.V7I1.243
S. Caiani
It is generally agreed that our beliefs must have epistemic justification if they are to count as knowledge. It is also a commonplace thought that our beliefs can be either inferentially justified or empirically justified. However, while the theory of inferential reasoning provides a theoretical framework for understanding how a belief may get inferential justification, we lack a similar framework for empirical justification. Indeed, since inferential justification is transmitted only from propositional contents to propositional contents, experiences cannot figure as part of this process, unless their qualitative format are translated in a propositional format. This paper aims at clarifying the nature of empirical justification by focusing on the longstanding problem of how experiences get a propositional content. After a rebuttal of two popular naturalization strategies, I will argue that also the phenomenal intentionality research program suffers from a critical flow. Indeed, although experiences have intrinsic phenomenal intentionality, this is not sufficient for experience to obtain propositional content.
{"title":"From qualitative states to propositional contents: the puzzle of experiential justification","authors":"S. Caiani","doi":"10.4454/PHILINQ.V7I1.243","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4454/PHILINQ.V7I1.243","url":null,"abstract":"It is generally agreed that our beliefs must have epistemic justification if they are to count as knowledge. It is also a commonplace thought that our beliefs can be either inferentially justified or empirically justified. However, while the theory of inferential reasoning provides a theoretical framework for understanding how a belief may get inferential justification, we lack a similar framework for empirical justification. Indeed, since inferential justification is transmitted only from propositional contents to propositional contents, experiences cannot figure as part of this process, unless their qualitative format are translated in a propositional format. This paper aims at clarifying the nature of empirical justification by focusing on the longstanding problem of how experiences get a propositional content. After a rebuttal of two popular naturalization strategies, I will argue that also the phenomenal intentionality research program suffers from a critical flow. Indeed, although experiences have intrinsic phenomenal intentionality, this is not sufficient for experience to obtain propositional content.","PeriodicalId":41386,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Inquiries","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2019-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74139953","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-03-03DOI: 10.4454/PHILINQ.V7I1.241
P. Graziani, M. Tagliaferri
To rigorously describe the structure of the human body a rich formal language is needed: this language must be able to describe all the parts of the body and the spatial regions those parts occupy; moreover, it must be able to describe the relations that occur between those parts and those spatial regions; finally, it must be able to distinguish between essential and contingent features of the body and it must do so based on the context that is relevant for the descriptions given. Our aim in this paper is to provide a formal language that can express all those kinds of information. The language we present is inspired by Vakarelov (2008) and is a modally augmented version of the discrete mereotopology due to Galton (2014) with an added relation for location (this latter addition is inspired by Donnelly (2004)): we will call this language modal discrete mereotopology with location. In the paper, we also suggest a neighbourhood semantics for our language: this will make the language context-sensitive, making it fit for different computer graphics applications.
{"title":"A language for the human body: a tentative proposal","authors":"P. Graziani, M. Tagliaferri","doi":"10.4454/PHILINQ.V7I1.241","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4454/PHILINQ.V7I1.241","url":null,"abstract":"To rigorously describe the structure of the human body a rich formal language is needed: this language must be able to describe all the parts of the body and the spatial regions those parts occupy; moreover, it must be able to describe the relations that occur between those parts and those spatial regions; finally, it must be able to distinguish between essential and contingent features of the body and it must do so based on the context that is relevant for the descriptions given. Our aim in this paper is to provide a formal language that can express all those kinds of information. The language we present is inspired by Vakarelov (2008) and is a modally augmented version of the discrete mereotopology due to Galton (2014) with an added relation for location (this latter addition is inspired by Donnelly (2004)): we will call this language modal discrete mereotopology with location. In the paper, we also suggest a neighbourhood semantics for our language: this will make the language context-sensitive, making it fit for different computer graphics applications.","PeriodicalId":41386,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Inquiries","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2019-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88691171","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-03-03DOI: 10.4454/PHILINQ.V7I1.187
M. Vaccarezza
The aim of this paper is to single out four main kinds of ethical moralism, which might be associated to virtue ethics, and to offer a virtue-ethical response to each. By doing so, I aim at defending virtue ethics, properly understood, from the intrinsic danger of a moralistic drift. I begin by proposing a definition of moralism and a list of its main forms. I define moralism as the “perception of a moral judgment as coming from outside the agent”, and I single four main forms out, which I label Inflexibility moralism (IM), Pervasivity moralism (PM), Extremeness moralism (EM) and Unentitlement moralism (UM). Then, I list the main features of the virtue-ethical perspective I embrace, and finally, I argue that such normative approach can prevent a moralistic drift, insofar as it effectively avoids the mentioned charges. Thus, I conclude that a virtue-ethical approach, thanks to its capacity of reconciling reasons and motives, and to its proposing a first-personal perspective on morality, has an advantage in presenting moral requirements in a non-moralistic fashion.
{"title":"Virtue ethics: an anti-moralistic defence","authors":"M. Vaccarezza","doi":"10.4454/PHILINQ.V7I1.187","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4454/PHILINQ.V7I1.187","url":null,"abstract":"The aim of this paper is to single out four main kinds of ethical moralism, which might be associated to virtue ethics, and to offer a virtue-ethical response to each. By doing so, I aim at defending virtue ethics, properly understood, from the intrinsic danger of a moralistic drift. I begin by proposing a definition of moralism and a list of its main forms. I define moralism as the “perception of a moral judgment as coming from outside the agent”, and I single four main forms out, which I label Inflexibility moralism (IM), Pervasivity moralism (PM), Extremeness moralism (EM) and Unentitlement moralism (UM). Then, I list the main features of the virtue-ethical perspective I embrace, and finally, I argue that such normative approach can prevent a moralistic drift, insofar as it effectively avoids the mentioned charges. Thus, I conclude that a virtue-ethical approach, thanks to its capacity of reconciling reasons and motives, and to its proposing a first-personal perspective on morality, has an advantage in presenting moral requirements in a non-moralistic fashion.","PeriodicalId":41386,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Inquiries","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2019-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85971914","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-03-03DOI: 10.4454/PHILINQ.V7I1.191
G. Lodovici
The aim of this essay is to reflect on the concept of the good, whose notion, albeit central not only in philosophy but also in various other fields, is not easy to semanticize. In what follows, at first the good is semanticized as a lovable and/or admirable and/or desirable entity; then the analysis moves on to the question of the status of moral properties. The present essay then proposes a differentiation between good and evil in the ontological and in the moral sense, also addressing the relationship between the ontological goods and good/evil acts. Finally, it is argued that there are some acts that are always evil but not acts that are always good.
{"title":"The Good (some Elements)","authors":"G. Lodovici","doi":"10.4454/PHILINQ.V7I1.191","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4454/PHILINQ.V7I1.191","url":null,"abstract":"The aim of this essay is to reflect on the concept of the good, whose notion, albeit central not only in philosophy but also in various other fields, is not easy to semanticize. In what follows, at first the good is semanticized as a lovable and/or admirable and/or desirable entity; then the analysis moves on to the question of the status of moral properties. The present essay then proposes a differentiation between good and evil in the ontological and in the moral sense, also addressing the relationship between the ontological goods and good/evil acts. Finally, it is argued that there are some acts that are always evil but not acts that are always good.","PeriodicalId":41386,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Inquiries","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2019-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89840997","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-03-03DOI: 10.4454/PHILINQ.V7I1.239
Takeshi Konno
People communicate with others via intention. This is likewise true for the primitive behavior of joint visual attention: directing one’s attention to an object another person is looking at. However, the mechanism by which intention, a kind of internal state, causes that behavior is unclear. In this paper, we construct a simple computational model for examining these mechanisms, and investigate mechanisms for categorizing visual input and for recalling and comparing between these categories. In addition, we lay out some interaction experiments involving a human and a robot equipped with the constructed computational model, to serve as a platform for verifying the intentionality demonstrated by these mechanisms.
{"title":"Mechanisms of intentional joint visual attention","authors":"Takeshi Konno","doi":"10.4454/PHILINQ.V7I1.239","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4454/PHILINQ.V7I1.239","url":null,"abstract":"People communicate with others via intention. This is likewise true for the primitive behavior of joint visual attention: directing one’s attention to an object another person is looking at. However, the mechanism by which intention, a kind of internal state, causes that behavior is unclear. In this paper, we construct a simple computational model for examining these mechanisms, and investigate mechanisms for categorizing visual input and for recalling and comparing between these categories. In addition, we lay out some interaction experiments involving a human and a robot equipped with the constructed computational model, to serve as a platform for verifying the intentionality demonstrated by these mechanisms.","PeriodicalId":41386,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Inquiries","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2019-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89722702","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-08-01DOI: 10.4454/PHILINQ.V6I2.168
F. Malfatti
There are two main things I want to do in this paper. The first is to defend the idea that understanding, and not knowledge, is to be recognized as the aim of science, and to show how this idea can be strengthened and sharpened in light of structural realism. The second is to investigate the connection between understanding and structures, in order to give some tentative insight concerning what is involved in an act of understanding and what is to be recognized as a plausible necessary condition for understanding. In the first section [I] I recall and emphasize the gap between knowledge and understanding, highlighting the differences concerning the epistemic object involved. In the second section [II] I present the main idea behind structural realism in philosophy of science and examine its direct consequences concerning epistemology. In the third section [III] I try to connect the results of these two lines of inquiries, in order to show how understanding, better than knowledge, can do justice to both the practice and the history of science – especially in light of structural realism. In the last section [IV] I sketch some concluding remarks concerning how, appealing to structures, it seems to be possible to explain the cognitive value of models in scientific inquiries.
{"title":"On the epistemological potential of Worrall’s structural realism","authors":"F. Malfatti","doi":"10.4454/PHILINQ.V6I2.168","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4454/PHILINQ.V6I2.168","url":null,"abstract":"There are two main things I want to do in this paper. The first is to defend the idea that understanding, and not knowledge, is to be recognized as the aim of science, and to show how this idea can be strengthened and sharpened in light of structural realism. The second is to investigate the connection between understanding and structures, in order to give some tentative insight concerning what is involved in an act of understanding and what is to be recognized as a plausible necessary condition for understanding. In the first section [I] I recall and emphasize the gap between knowledge and understanding, highlighting the differences concerning the epistemic object involved. In the second section [II] I present the main idea behind structural realism in philosophy of science and examine its direct consequences concerning epistemology. In the third section [III] I try to connect the results of these two lines of inquiries, in order to show how understanding, better than knowledge, can do justice to both the practice and the history of science – especially in light of structural realism. In the last section [IV] I sketch some concluding remarks concerning how, appealing to structures, it seems to be possible to explain the cognitive value of models in scientific inquiries.","PeriodicalId":41386,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Inquiries","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2018-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76746522","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-08-01DOI: 10.4454/philinq.v6i2.227
C. Ferri
Review of Helen Watt's The Ethics of Pregnancy, Abortion and Childbirth: Exploring Moral Choices in Childbearing , Routledge, Abingdon-New York, 2016, pp. 157
{"title":"The Ethics of Pregnancy, Abortion and Childbirth: Exploring Moral Choices in Childbearing","authors":"C. Ferri","doi":"10.4454/philinq.v6i2.227","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4454/philinq.v6i2.227","url":null,"abstract":"Review of Helen Watt's The Ethics of Pregnancy, Abortion and Childbirth: Exploring Moral Choices in Childbearing , Routledge, Abingdon-New York, 2016, pp. 157","PeriodicalId":41386,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Inquiries","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2018-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82435524","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-08-01DOI: 10.4454/PHILINQ.V6I2.202
A. Fischer, C. Illies
Manipulation is a significant feature in human interaction and its study is now of growing importance in areas such as marketing, politics, and policy. Questions concerning the nature of manipulation have become important in recent debates in ethics and political philosophy, referred to in terms such as “nudging” and “choice architecture”. But what precisely is manipulation? How does it operate? Without conceptual analysis, ethics cannot perform any critical evaluation of manipulation. We discuss and reject some recent definitions of manipulation before proposing a new analysis and suggesting a more precise use of the term “manipulation”. Manipulation should be seen as a form of power where the manipulator makes it more likely that the manipulated chooses some end (action, belief etc.) but where the manipulated remains ultimately free to choose or not to choose this end. Manipulation works by actively changing the emotional attraction of certain ends or their realisation. This transformation of emotional bonds makes some options more appealing (or unappealing) to the manipulated, and thus more likely to be chosen. We call this the “Pleasurable-Ends-Model”. We argue for the suggested model against the background of Aristotelian action theory. This theory states that human beings act either for some end which they consider good, or useful, or pleasurable. Consequently, agents can be made to act by influencing them in three fundamentally different ways: giving reasons may affect actions done for the good, economic bargaining influences actions done for utility, and manipulation affects the pleasurable ends. From this starting point, we further develop the Pleasurable-Ends-Model and elucidate its power.
{"title":"Modulated Feelings: The Pleasurable-Ends-Model of Manipulation","authors":"A. Fischer, C. Illies","doi":"10.4454/PHILINQ.V6I2.202","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4454/PHILINQ.V6I2.202","url":null,"abstract":"Manipulation is a significant feature in human interaction and its study is now of growing importance in areas such as marketing, politics, and policy. Questions concerning the nature of manipulation have become important in recent debates in ethics and political philosophy, referred to in terms such as “nudging” and “choice architecture”. But what precisely is manipulation? How does it operate? Without conceptual analysis, ethics cannot perform any critical evaluation of manipulation. We discuss and reject some recent definitions of manipulation before proposing a new analysis and suggesting a more precise use of the term “manipulation”. Manipulation should be seen as a form of power where the manipulator makes it more likely that the manipulated chooses some end (action, belief etc.) but where the manipulated remains ultimately free to choose or not to choose this end. Manipulation works by actively changing the emotional attraction of certain ends or their realisation. This transformation of emotional bonds makes some options more appealing (or unappealing) to the manipulated, and thus more likely to be chosen. We call this the “Pleasurable-Ends-Model”. We argue for the suggested model against the background of Aristotelian action theory. This theory states that human beings act either for some end which they consider good, or useful, or pleasurable. Consequently, agents can be made to act by influencing them in three fundamentally different ways: giving reasons may affect actions done for the good, economic bargaining influences actions done for utility, and manipulation affects the pleasurable ends. From this starting point, we further develop the Pleasurable-Ends-Model and elucidate its power.","PeriodicalId":41386,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Inquiries","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2018-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82953799","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-08-01DOI: 10.4454/PHILINQ.V6I2.223
Heather Douglas
Elijah Millgram’s book The Great Endarkenment takes philosophy to task for failing to note the kinds of creatures we are (serial hyperspecializers) and what that means for philosophy. In this commentary, I will complicate the picture he draws, while suggesting a more hopeful path forward. First, I argue that we are not actually serial hyperspecializers. Nevertheless, we are hyperspecializers, and this is the main source of the looming endarkenment. I will suggest that a proper understanding of expertise, particularly the requirement that experts (at least experts whose success is not readily assessable) be required to explicate their judgments helps to mitigate the threat of siloed expertise and endarkenment. Further, I argue that grappling directly with the institutional structures that encourage narrow and isolated hyperspecialists in academia can be a way to avoid endarkenment problems. The current landscape of academia, with its valorization of narrow disciplinary expertise, is neither necessary nor sustainable. In order to change this landscape, we need to understand how current incentives construct epistemic niches, and what we might change in order to reshape the ecology of academia.
伊利亚·米尔格拉姆(Elijah Millgram)的书《大黑暗》(The Great Endarkenment)指责哲学没有注意到我们是什么样的生物(连续的超专业化者)，以及这对哲学意味着什么。在这篇评论中，我将把他所描绘的图景复杂化，同时提出一条更有希望的前进道路。首先，我认为我们实际上并不是连续的超级专门化者。然而，我们是超级专门化者，这是即将到来的危机的主要来源。我将建议对专家的正确理解，特别是要求专家(至少是那些其成功不容易评估的专家)解释他们的判断，这有助于减轻孤立的专业知识和偏见的威胁。此外，我认为，直接与鼓励学术界狭隘和孤立的超级专家的制度结构作斗争，可能是避免陷入困境的一种方法。目前学术界的格局，其狭隘的学科专长的价值，既没有必要也不可持续。为了改变这种局面，我们需要了解当前的激励机制是如何构建认知利基的，以及为了重塑学术界的生态，我们可能会做出哪些改变。
{"title":"Resisting the Great Endarkenment: On the Future of Philosophy","authors":"Heather Douglas","doi":"10.4454/PHILINQ.V6I2.223","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4454/PHILINQ.V6I2.223","url":null,"abstract":"Elijah Millgram’s book The Great Endarkenment takes philosophy to task for failing to note the kinds of creatures we are (serial hyperspecializers) and what that means for philosophy. In this commentary, I will complicate the picture he draws, while suggesting a more hopeful path forward. First, I argue that we are not actually serial hyperspecializers. Nevertheless, we are hyperspecializers, and this is the main source of the looming endarkenment. I will suggest that a proper understanding of expertise, particularly the requirement that experts (at least experts whose success is not readily assessable) be required to explicate their judgments helps to mitigate the threat of siloed expertise and endarkenment. Further, I argue that grappling directly with the institutional structures that encourage narrow and isolated hyperspecialists in academia can be a way to avoid endarkenment problems. The current landscape of academia, with its valorization of narrow disciplinary expertise, is neither necessary nor sustainable. In order to change this landscape, we need to understand how current incentives construct epistemic niches, and what we might change in order to reshape the ecology of academia.","PeriodicalId":41386,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Inquiries","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2018-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88245985","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：