Pub Date : 2020-03-31DOI: 10.4454/PHILINQ.V8I1.280
N. Wildman
As Vetter says, we are at the “beginning of the debate, not the end” (2015: 300) when it comes to evaluating her potentiality-based account of metaphysical modality. This paper contributes to this developing debate by highlighting three problems for Vetter’s account. Specifically, I begin (§1) by articulating some relevant details of Vetter’s potentiality-based view. This leads to the first issue (§2), concerning unclarity in the idea of degrees of potentiality. Similarly, the second issue (§3) raises trouble for Vetter’s proposed individuation conditions for potentialities. Finally, the third issue (§4) is about apparently unmanifestable intrinsic potentialities, and suggests that there might be some deeper problems with anchoring metaphysical possibilities in concrete objects. More generally, though the issues detailed here are problematic, I do not take them to be fatal. However, they do show that, at minimum, further clarification of Vetter’s potentiality view is required.
{"title":"Potential Problems? Some issues with Vetter's potentiality account of modality","authors":"N. Wildman","doi":"10.4454/PHILINQ.V8I1.280","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4454/PHILINQ.V8I1.280","url":null,"abstract":"As Vetter says, we are at the “beginning of the debate, not the end” (2015: 300) when it comes to evaluating her potentiality-based account of metaphysical modality. This paper contributes to this developing debate by highlighting three problems for Vetter’s account. Specifically, I begin (§1) by articulating some relevant details of Vetter’s potentiality-based view. This leads to the first issue (§2), concerning unclarity in the idea of degrees of potentiality. Similarly, the second issue (§3) raises trouble for Vetter’s proposed individuation conditions for potentialities. Finally, the third issue (§4) is about apparently unmanifestable intrinsic potentialities, and suggests that there might be some deeper problems with anchoring metaphysical possibilities in concrete objects. More generally, though the issues detailed here are problematic, I do not take them to be fatal. However, they do show that, at minimum, further clarification of Vetter’s potentiality view is required.","PeriodicalId":41386,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Inquiries","volume":"1 1","pages":"167-184"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90955348","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-03-31DOI: 10.4454/PHILINQ.V8I1.276
A. Bird
I examine Barbara Vetter’s dispositional account of modality and the analysis of dispositions upon which it is based. The latter ties dispositions to manifestations only. I argue that this feature gives Vetter’s account an advantage over other dispositional accounts of modality – it avoids the ‘problem of [how to ground] non-conditional possibilities’. On the other hand, I argue that we need stimuli as well as manifestations in order to distinguish distinct dispositions that have identical manifestations. Vetter’s answer to the latter says that some manifestations are conditional in nature. That answer undermines the advantage that Vetter’s account had with regard to the problem of non-conditional possibilities – her view now also faces that problem. I also raise the question of how it is that the analysis of an ‘everyday’ concept such as ‘disposition’ could provide insight into fundamental questions of modal metaphysics.
{"title":"Possibility and the analysis of dispositions","authors":"A. Bird","doi":"10.4454/PHILINQ.V8I1.276","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4454/PHILINQ.V8I1.276","url":null,"abstract":"I examine Barbara Vetter’s dispositional account of modality and the analysis of dispositions upon which it is based. The latter ties dispositions to manifestations only. I argue that this feature gives Vetter’s account an advantage over other dispositional accounts of modality – it avoids the ‘problem of [how to ground] non-conditional possibilities’. On the other hand, I argue that we need stimuli as well as manifestations in order to distinguish distinct dispositions that have identical manifestations. Vetter’s answer to the latter says that some manifestations are conditional in nature. That answer undermines the advantage that Vetter’s account had with regard to the problem of non-conditional possibilities – her view now also faces that problem. I also raise the question of how it is that the analysis of an ‘everyday’ concept such as ‘disposition’ could provide insight into fundamental questions of modal metaphysics.","PeriodicalId":41386,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Inquiries","volume":"31 1","pages":"83-96"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87145018","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-03-31DOI: 10.4454/PHILINQ.V8I1.279
J. Mckitrick
In Potentiality: From Dispositions to Modality , Barbara Vetter attempts to ground modality in properties that she calls “potentialities”. Whether potentialities are up to this task depends on what properties are. However, major accounts of the metaphysics of properties, such as Class Nominalism, Trope Theory, Immanent Realism, Platonism, are incompatible with Vetter’s claims about potentialities. Nevertheless, a modified account of potentialities might be compatible with Immanent Realism or Trope Nominalism.
{"title":"Potentialities as properties","authors":"J. Mckitrick","doi":"10.4454/PHILINQ.V8I1.279","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4454/PHILINQ.V8I1.279","url":null,"abstract":"In Potentiality: From Dispositions to Modality , Barbara Vetter attempts to ground modality in properties that she calls “potentialities”. Whether potentialities are up to this task depends on what properties are. However, major accounts of the metaphysics of properties, such as Class Nominalism, Trope Theory, Immanent Realism, Platonism, are incompatible with Vetter’s claims about potentialities. Nevertheless, a modified account of potentialities might be compatible with Immanent Realism or Trope Nominalism.","PeriodicalId":41386,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Inquiries","volume":"112 1","pages":"141-166"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87736998","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-03-31DOI: 10.4454/PHILINQ.V8I1.286
Elena Pagni
Review of Stephen T. Asma and Rami Gabriel's The Emotional Mind. The affective roots of culture and cognition , Harvard University Press 2019, pp. 448.
{"title":"Stephen T. Asma and Rami Gabriel, The Emotional Mind. The affective roots of culture and cognition","authors":"Elena Pagni","doi":"10.4454/PHILINQ.V8I1.286","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4454/PHILINQ.V8I1.286","url":null,"abstract":"Review of Stephen T. Asma and Rami Gabriel's The Emotional Mind. The affective roots of culture and cognition , Harvard University Press 2019, pp. 448.","PeriodicalId":41386,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Inquiries","volume":"37 1","pages":"1-11"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83854307","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-03-31DOI: 10.4454/PHILINQ.V8I1.233
Abraham Mounitz
The study offers a practical model of Spinoza’s behavioral teachings for empowering a person’s ability to cope in stressful situations. The concept of different and indifferent exerts significant implications on everyday lives of a person. This model offers philosophical tool for the intellectual control of emotions that weaken a person’s power to act. The first part offers Spinoza’s metaphysical basis, focusing on the two titular concepts that represent humans and nature. Next is Spinoza’s philosophical method of guiding people toward conduct that is associated with and derived from nature’s reasoning as values that ameliorate everyday conduct. The practical layer of this study offers a basic model, a philosophical anchor, which can be used for the formulation of empirical research questionnaires on various topic associated with an individual’s adaptation to a challenging emotional environment and all it entails (feelings, ability to function etc.). The study also present a sample questionnaire formulated according to the Spinozist model. The study’s final part presents several interviews conducted by the author in the model’s spirit as an outline for future empirical studies and for the formulation of curricula designed in the spirit of Spinoza’s behavioral philosophy.
{"title":"Spinoza: reasoned indifference as an introduction to adaptation in unusual circumstances","authors":"Abraham Mounitz","doi":"10.4454/PHILINQ.V8I1.233","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4454/PHILINQ.V8I1.233","url":null,"abstract":"The study offers a practical model of Spinoza’s behavioral teachings for empowering a person’s ability to cope in stressful situations. The concept of different and indifferent exerts significant implications on everyday lives of a person. This model offers philosophical tool for the intellectual control of emotions that weaken a person’s power to act. The first part offers Spinoza’s metaphysical basis, focusing on the two titular concepts that represent humans and nature. Next is Spinoza’s philosophical method of guiding people toward conduct that is associated with and derived from nature’s reasoning as values that ameliorate everyday conduct. The practical layer of this study offers a basic model, a philosophical anchor, which can be used for the formulation of empirical research questionnaires on various topic associated with an individual’s adaptation to a challenging emotional environment and all it entails (feelings, ability to function etc.). The study also present a sample questionnaire formulated according to the Spinozist model. The study’s final part presents several interviews conducted by the author in the model’s spirit as an outline for future empirical studies and for the formulation of curricula designed in the spirit of Spinoza’s behavioral philosophy.","PeriodicalId":41386,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Inquiries","volume":"157 10 1","pages":"9-36"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83214723","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-03-31DOI: 10.4454/PHILINQ.V8I1.277
David Yates
According to dispositionalism about modality, a proposition is possible just in case something has, or some things have, a power or disposition for its truth; and is necessary just in case nothing has a power for its falsity. But are there enough powers to go around? In Yates (2015) I argued that in the case of mathematical truths such as , nothing has the power to bring about their falsity or their truth, which means they come out both necessary and not possible. Combining this with axiom (T): p⊃◇p, it is easy to derive a contradiction. I suggested that dispositionalists ought to retreat a little and say that is possible just in case either p, or there is a power to bring it about that p, grounding the possibility of mathematical propositions in their truth rather than in powers. Vetter’s (2015) has the resources to provide a response to my argument, and in her (2018) she explicitly addresses it by arguing for a plenitude of powers, based on the idea that dispositions come in degrees, with necessary properties a limiting case of dispositionality. On this view there is a power for , without there being a power to bring about its truth. In this paper I argue that Vetter’s case for plenitude does not work. However, I suggest, if we are prepared to accept metaphysical causation, a case can be made that there is indeed a power for .
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Pub Date : 2020-03-31DOI: 10.4454/PHILINQ.V8I1.281
Jennifer Wang
Barbara Vetter’s project in Potentiality is to articulate and defend a dispositionalist theory of modality based on potentialities. My focus is on the metaphysics of her positive theory. I consider one of Vetter’s main targets, David Lewis’s theory of possible worlds, and use it to distinguish what I call “ de re first” approaches from “ de dicto first” approaches. This way of framing the disagreement helps shed light on what their respective accounts can intuitively accomplish. In particular, I introduce objections to Vetter’s requirement that the grounds of de dicto modal truths must be routed through time. I also suggest an alternative de dicto first approach that Vetter does not consider, one which does not come saddled with Lewis’s ontology or with Vetter’s issues with de dicto modal truths. Rather, on incompatibilism, modality is grounded on second-order relations between (non-potentialist) properties, e.g. incompatibility or entailment. Defenders of de dicto first approaches, including incompatibilism, can better account for such de dicto modal truths, thus undermining some of the intuitive appeal of Vetter’s theory.
芭芭拉·维特(Barbara Vetter)在《潜能》一书中的项目是阐明并捍卫基于潜能的情态的配置主义理论。我关注的是她积极理论的形而上学。我考虑了Vetter的主要目标之一，David Lewis的可能世界理论，并用它来区分我所谓的“de re first”方法和“de dicto first”方法。这种表达分歧的方式有助于阐明他们各自的说法直觉上能达到的效果。特别地，我将介绍对Vetter的要求的反对意见，即dicto模态真理的基础必须穿越时间。我还提出了另一种Vetter没有考虑到的dicto first方法，它不受Lewis的本体论或Vetter关于dicto模态真理的问题的影响。相反，在不容性上，情态是建立在(非潜在的)性质之间的二阶关系上的，例如不容性或蕴涵。包括不相容论在内的“自言自语优先”方法的捍卫者可以更好地解释这种自言自语的模态真理，从而削弱了维特理论的一些直观吸引力。
{"title":"Potentiality, modality, and time","authors":"Jennifer Wang","doi":"10.4454/PHILINQ.V8I1.281","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4454/PHILINQ.V8I1.281","url":null,"abstract":"Barbara Vetter’s project in Potentiality is to articulate and defend a dispositionalist theory of modality based on potentialities. My focus is on the metaphysics of her positive theory. I consider one of Vetter’s main targets, David Lewis’s theory of possible worlds, and use it to distinguish what I call “ de re first” approaches from “ de dicto first” approaches. This way of framing the disagreement helps shed light on what their respective accounts can intuitively accomplish. In particular, I introduce objections to Vetter’s requirement that the grounds of de dicto modal truths must be routed through time. I also suggest an alternative de dicto first approach that Vetter does not consider, one which does not come saddled with Lewis’s ontology or with Vetter’s issues with de dicto modal truths. Rather, on incompatibilism, modality is grounded on second-order relations between (non-potentialist) properties, e.g. incompatibility or entailment. Defenders of de dicto first approaches, including incompatibilism, can better account for such de dicto modal truths, thus undermining some of the intuitive appeal of Vetter’s theory.","PeriodicalId":41386,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Inquiries","volume":"3 1","pages":"185-198"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85004224","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-03-31DOI: 10.4454/PHILINQ.V8I1.278
Giacomo Giannini, Matthew Tugby
Vetter (2015) develops a localised theory of modality, based on potentialities of actual objects. Two factors play a key role in its appeal: its commitment to Hardcore Actualism, and to Naturalism. Vetter’s commitment to Naturalism is in part manifested in her adoption of Aristotelian universals. In this paper, we argue that a puzzle concerning the identity of unmanifested potentialities cannot be solved with an Aristotelian conception of properties. After introducing the puzzle, we examine Vetter’s attempt at amending the Aristotelian conception in a way that avoids the puzzle, and conclude that this amended version is no longer to be considered naturalistic. Potentiality theory cannot be both actualist and naturalist. We then argue that, if naturalism is to be abandoned by the actualist, there are good reasons to adopt a Platonist conception of universals, for they offer a number of theoretical advantages and allow us to avoid some of the problems facing Vetter’s theory.
{"title":"Potentiality: Actualism minus naturalism equals platonism","authors":"Giacomo Giannini, Matthew Tugby","doi":"10.4454/PHILINQ.V8I1.278","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4454/PHILINQ.V8I1.278","url":null,"abstract":"Vetter (2015) develops a localised theory of modality, based on potentialities of actual objects. Two factors play a key role in its appeal: its commitment to Hardcore Actualism, and to Naturalism. Vetter’s commitment to Naturalism is in part manifested in her adoption of Aristotelian universals. In this paper, we argue that a puzzle concerning the identity of unmanifested potentialities cannot be solved with an Aristotelian conception of properties. After introducing the puzzle, we examine Vetter’s attempt at amending the Aristotelian conception in a way that avoids the puzzle, and conclude that this amended version is no longer to be considered naturalistic. Potentiality theory cannot be both actualist and naturalist. We then argue that, if naturalism is to be abandoned by the actualist, there are good reasons to adopt a Platonist conception of universals, for they offer a number of theoretical advantages and allow us to avoid some of the problems facing Vetter’s theory.","PeriodicalId":41386,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Inquiries","volume":"52 1","pages":"117-140"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74868109","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-03-31DOI: 10.4454/PHILINQ.V8I1.284
F. Howitz
First English translatio of Franz Gotthard Howitz's “Om Afsindighed og Tilregnelse, et Bidrag til Psychologien og Retslaeren”, in Juridisk Tidsskrift 8, 1 (1824): 1-117. Translation from Danish by Jon B. Stewart
{"title":"On madness and ascribing responsibility","authors":"F. Howitz","doi":"10.4454/PHILINQ.V8I1.284","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4454/PHILINQ.V8I1.284","url":null,"abstract":"First English translatio of Franz Gotthard Howitz's “Om Afsindighed og Tilregnelse, et Bidrag til Psychologien og Retslaeren”, in Juridisk Tidsskrift 8, 1 (1824): 1-117. Translation from Danish by Jon B. Stewart","PeriodicalId":41386,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Inquiries","volume":"1 1","pages":"251-262"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73200411","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-03-31DOI: 10.4454/PHILINQ.V8I1.216
Thodoris Dimitrakos
McDowell’s ‘naturalism of second nature’ is one of the most important attempts to defend liberal naturalism in contemporary Anglo-American philosophy. Liberal naturalism stands as an umbrella term for philosophical accounts which place normative entities within the realm of nature. McDowell’s attempt to form an account which leaves room for normativity in nature is based on the distinction between ‘first’ and ‘second’ nature. In the present paper I shall attempt to shed light on McDowell’s notions of ‘first’ and ‘second’ nature and thereby provide an account about the status of normativity which is McDowellian in spirit. However, I suggest that human sciences offer an even more acute challenge to the conceptions of nature that aspire to be liberal naturalist, and I argue that McDowell’s account needs to be completed with a further conceptual distinction in order to cope with the challenge of human sciences. In particular, I argue that we should distinguish between the notions of explanatory reduction and normative eliminability.
{"title":"Integrating first and second nature: Rethinking John McDowell’s liberal naturalism","authors":"Thodoris Dimitrakos","doi":"10.4454/PHILINQ.V8I1.216","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4454/PHILINQ.V8I1.216","url":null,"abstract":"McDowell’s ‘naturalism of second nature’ is one of the most important attempts to defend liberal naturalism in contemporary Anglo-American philosophy. Liberal naturalism stands as an umbrella term for philosophical accounts which place normative entities within the realm of nature. McDowell’s attempt to form an account which leaves room for normativity in nature is based on the distinction between ‘first’ and ‘second’ nature. In the present paper I shall attempt to shed light on McDowell’s notions of ‘first’ and ‘second’ nature and thereby provide an account about the status of normativity which is McDowellian in spirit. However, I suggest that human sciences offer an even more acute challenge to the conceptions of nature that aspire to be liberal naturalist, and I argue that McDowell’s account needs to be completed with a further conceptual distinction in order to cope with the challenge of human sciences. In particular, I argue that we should distinguish between the notions of explanatory reduction and normative eliminability.","PeriodicalId":41386,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Inquiries","volume":"14 1","pages":"37-68"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85197407","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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