Pub Date : 2021-08-02DOI: 10.4454/PHILINQ.V9I2.260
Ernesto Graziani
In a series of recent papers Francesco Orilia has presented an argument for the moral desirability of presentism. It goes, in brief, as follows: since the existence of painful events is morally undesirable, presentism, which denies that past painful events (tenselessly) exist, is morally more desirable than non-presentism, which instead affirms that past painful events (tenselessly) exist. An objection against this argument, which has already been taken into consideration by Orilia, is the ugly history objection or radical objection: what really matters in the moral appraisal of a world is the history of it, and since the presentist and the non-presentist versions of our world share the same ugly history, they are morally on a par. This paper aims at corroborating this objection and defending it from Orilia’s criticisms. This will be done by bringing into play various thought experiments and a distinction between relevance (of an event or a fact about the occurrence of an event) to the moral evaluation of a world and moral (and psychological) involvement (in an event or in a fact about the occurrence of an event).
{"title":"Presentism and the Pain of the Past: A Reply to Orilia","authors":"Ernesto Graziani","doi":"10.4454/PHILINQ.V9I2.260","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4454/PHILINQ.V9I2.260","url":null,"abstract":"In a series of recent papers Francesco Orilia has presented an argument for the moral desirability of presentism. It goes, in brief, as follows: since the existence of painful events is morally undesirable, presentism, which denies that past painful events (tenselessly) exist, is morally more desirable than non-presentism, which instead affirms that past painful events (tenselessly) exist. An objection against this argument, which has already been taken into consideration by Orilia, is the ugly history objection or radical objection: what really matters in the moral appraisal of a world is the history of it, and since the presentist and the non-presentist versions of our world share the same ugly history, they are morally on a par. This paper aims at corroborating this objection and defending it from Orilia’s criticisms. This will be done by bringing into play various thought experiments and a distinction between relevance (of an event or a fact about the occurrence of an event) to the moral evaluation of a world and moral (and psychological) involvement (in an event or in a fact about the occurrence of an event).","PeriodicalId":41386,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Inquiries","volume":"12 1","pages":"49-62"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76098356","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-08-02DOI: 10.4454/PHILINQ.V9I2.367
A. Barale
AI art certainly belongs among the most under-researched art forms of today. While the ethical aspects of AI are often discussed, its implications for aesthetics are rarely considered. The reason is perhaps that the ability of AI to produce art is a very recent development. Artificial intelligence is becoming more and more important nowadays due to the many changes it has made in our lives. In this context, one of the most surprising fields in which AI has suddenly progressed in the last few years concerns the very human (until now) capacity for artistic (and in a more general sense, aesthetic) expression. However, the general public still tends to confuse AI art with the more general category of digital art, and what AI really does in the artistic field is scarcely known. AI art is not only computer assisted but computer generated. In AI art there is at least one part of the artistic process that is left to the machine. The artist gives the AI some data and has to wait, in order to see how the AI will elaborate upon them. AI, therefore, becomes not just a tool for artists, but also something different, the nature of which needs to be explored. What does AI art have to say about our way of seeing art, and perhaps about our way of seeing the world in general? This will be the leading question of this paper, which will be addressed through the analysis of some relevant aspects of this new kind of art.
{"title":"“Who inspires who?” Aesthetics in front of AI art","authors":"A. Barale","doi":"10.4454/PHILINQ.V9I2.367","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4454/PHILINQ.V9I2.367","url":null,"abstract":"AI art certainly belongs among the most under-researched art forms of today. While the ethical aspects of AI are often discussed, its implications for aesthetics are rarely considered. The reason is perhaps that the ability of AI to produce art is a very recent development. Artificial intelligence is becoming more and more important nowadays due to the many changes it has made in our lives. In this context, one of the most surprising fields in which AI has suddenly progressed in the last few years concerns the very human (until now) capacity for artistic (and in a more general sense, aesthetic) expression. However, the general public still tends to confuse AI art with the more general category of digital art, and what AI really does in the artistic field is scarcely known. AI art is not only computer assisted but computer generated. In AI art there is at least one part of the artistic process that is left to the machine. The artist gives the AI some data and has to wait, in order to see how the AI will elaborate upon them. AI, therefore, becomes not just a tool for artists, but also something different, the nature of which needs to be explored. What does AI art have to say about our way of seeing art, and perhaps about our way of seeing the world in general? This will be the leading question of this paper, which will be addressed through the analysis of some relevant aspects of this new kind of art.","PeriodicalId":41386,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Inquiries","volume":"127 1","pages":"195-220"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76272424","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-08-02DOI: 10.4454/PHILINQ.V9I2.368
E. Caldarola
The starting point of this paper is two views. On the one hand, two general claims about street art: first, that all works of street art are subversive (see, e.g., Bacharach 2015; 2018; Chackal 2016; Baldini 2015; 2016; 2017; 2018; Willard 2016), second, that works of street art are the result of acts of self-expression (Riggle 2016). On the other hand, a much more specific view about certain contemporary tags produced, roughly, over the past twenty years: those tags are artworks, even though they are not presented, mainly, for appreciation of aesthetic properties grounded in their perceptual properties, because they are works of conceptual street art (see Lewisohn 2010; JAK 2012). The key question of the paper concerns “very early tags” (VETs) – the extremely simple, unadorned tags that first appeared in the late 1960s and that some scholars consider as the historical predecessors of the various practices that today we group under the category “street art” (see, e.g., Young 2014; Gastman et al. 2015): should we regard VETs as artworks? On the one hand, VETs writers tend to answer this question in the negative. On the other hand, already in the early 1970s, artists and intellectuals such as Norman Mailer and Gordon Matta-Clark seemed to believe that it was appropriate to regard both VETs and later tags as art, although they didn’t defend this claim with argument. The view that some contemporary tags that are not presented, mainly, for appreciation of their aesthetic properties might be candidates for appreciation as works of conceptual art suggests a strategy for assessing the issue of whether VETs are candidates for art appreciation: can we defend the claim that the extremely simple, unadorned VETs were presented for appreciation as works of conceptual street art? I argue that we have good reasons to hold this view.
本文的出发点是两种观点。一方面，关于街头艺术有两个普遍的说法:第一，所有的街头艺术作品都是颠覆性的(参见，例如Bacharach 2015;2018;Chackal 2016;巴尔迪尼2015;2016;2017;2018;Willard 2016)，第二，街头艺术作品是自我表达行为的结果(Riggle 2016)。另一方面，关于过去二十年来产生的某些当代标签的更具体的观点大致是:这些标签是艺术品，即使它们没有被呈现，主要是为了欣赏基于其感知属性的美学属性，因为它们是概念街头艺术的作品(见Lewisohn 2010;木菠萝2012)。这篇论文的关键问题是关于“早期标签”(very early tags, VETs)——这种极其简单、不加修饰的标签最早出现在20世纪60年代末，一些学者认为它是今天我们归类为“街头艺术”的各种实践的历史前身(参见，例如Young 2014;Gastman et al. 2015):我们应该把退伍军人当作艺术品吗?一方面，退伍军人作家倾向于用否定的方式回答这个问题。另一方面，早在20世纪70年代初，诺曼·梅勒(Norman Mailer)和戈登·马塔-克拉克(Gordon Matta-Clark)等艺术家和知识分子似乎就认为，把退伍军人和后来的标签都视为艺术是合适的，尽管他们没有为这一主张辩护。一些当代标签，主要不是为了欣赏它们的美学属性而呈现的，这一观点可能是作为观念艺术作品的候选者，这一观点提出了一种评估VETs是否为艺术欣赏候选者的策略:我们是否可以为极端简单、未经装饰的VETs作为观念街头艺术作品被呈现供欣赏的说法辩护?我认为我们有充分的理由持这种观点。
{"title":"On tags and conceptual street art","authors":"E. Caldarola","doi":"10.4454/PHILINQ.V9I2.368","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4454/PHILINQ.V9I2.368","url":null,"abstract":"The starting point of this paper is two views. On the one hand, two general claims about street art: first, that all works of street art are subversive (see, e.g., Bacharach 2015; 2018; Chackal 2016; Baldini 2015; 2016; 2017; 2018; Willard 2016), second, that works of street art are the result of acts of self-expression (Riggle 2016). On the other hand, a much more specific view about certain contemporary tags produced, roughly, over the past twenty years: those tags are artworks, even though they are not presented, mainly, for appreciation of aesthetic properties grounded in their perceptual properties, because they are works of conceptual street art (see Lewisohn 2010; JAK 2012). The key question of the paper concerns “very early tags” (VETs) – the extremely simple, unadorned tags that first appeared in the late 1960s and that some scholars consider as the historical predecessors of the various practices that today we group under the category “street art” (see, e.g., Young 2014; Gastman et al. 2015): should we regard VETs as artworks? On the one hand, VETs writers tend to answer this question in the negative. On the other hand, already in the early 1970s, artists and intellectuals such as Norman Mailer and Gordon Matta-Clark seemed to believe that it was appropriate to regard both VETs and later tags as art, although they didn’t defend this claim with argument. The view that some contemporary tags that are not presented, mainly, for appreciation of their aesthetic properties might be candidates for appreciation as works of conceptual art suggests a strategy for assessing the issue of whether VETs are candidates for art appreciation: can we defend the claim that the extremely simple, unadorned VETs were presented for appreciation as works of conceptual street art? I argue that we have good reasons to hold this view.","PeriodicalId":41386,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Inquiries","volume":"30 1","pages":"89-110"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90529916","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-08-02DOI: 10.4454/PHILINQ.V9I2.331
M. Ghilardi
The article focuses on some aesthetic issues in an intercultural perspective. The confrontation with a context of thought that developed outside the Western influence for centuries, such as the Sino-japanese one, allows to discuss and intertwine some notions, experiences and arguments, in order to provide a possible mutual understanding and self-reflection among different cultures through aesthetics and artistic experience. In particular, the notions of “image” and “body”, traditionally relevant in Western aesthetics, are presented as thought-provoking in a cross-cultural “fusion of horizon”. So, a de-coincidence with the European atavic categories and their “unthought” can be promoted and enhanced, thus providing new prespectives and non-eurocentric views.
{"title":"On the Way to a Cross-Cultural Thought: Steps between European and Sino-Japanese Aesthetics","authors":"M. Ghilardi","doi":"10.4454/PHILINQ.V9I2.331","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4454/PHILINQ.V9I2.331","url":null,"abstract":"The article focuses on some aesthetic issues in an intercultural perspective. The confrontation with a context of thought that developed outside the Western influence for centuries, such as the Sino-japanese one, allows to discuss and intertwine some notions, experiences and arguments, in order to provide a possible mutual understanding and self-reflection among different cultures through aesthetics and artistic experience. In particular, the notions of “image” and “body”, traditionally relevant in Western aesthetics, are presented as thought-provoking in a cross-cultural “fusion of horizon”. So, a de-coincidence with the European atavic categories and their “unthought” can be promoted and enhanced, thus providing new prespectives and non-eurocentric views.","PeriodicalId":41386,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Inquiries","volume":"95 1","pages":"153-170"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82789158","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-02-25DOI: 10.4454/PHILINQ.V9I1.358
K. Westphal, P. Parrini
In the early 1930’s Carnap and Quine met in Prague and discussed logic and philosophy. Carnap was working on the Logische Syntax der Sprache; when Quine went back to Harvard he published “Truth by Convention.” The purpose of the present paper is to establish three main points: (1) in “Truth by Convention” some important aspects of the future position Quine will assume about the analytic/synthetic and the a priori/a posteriori dichotomies are already expressed; (2) in the Logische Syntax der Sprache, Carnap maintains the distinction between L-rules and P-rules, at the same time being aware of the holistic character of empirical control and of the possibility to revise the acceptance of every kind of sentences; (3) Quine’s idea that the holistic conception requires completely abandoning the analytic/synthetic and a priori/a posteriori distinctions does not seem wholly correct. On the contrary, in the Logische Syntax Carnap takes a step forward in his conception of the “relativized a priori”. Thus, we can say that in the Prague years two alternative accounts of the theory/experience relation began to emerge. These two alternatives are still pivotal in the contemporary epistemological debate.
{"title":"Analyticity and Epistemological Holism: Prague alternatives","authors":"K. Westphal, P. Parrini","doi":"10.4454/PHILINQ.V9I1.358","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4454/PHILINQ.V9I1.358","url":null,"abstract":"In the early 1930’s Carnap and Quine met in Prague and discussed logic and philosophy. Carnap was working on the Logische Syntax der Sprache; when Quine went back to Harvard he published “Truth by Convention.” The purpose of the present paper is to establish three main points: (1) in “Truth by Convention” some important aspects of the future position Quine will assume about the analytic/synthetic and the a priori/a posteriori dichotomies are already expressed; (2) in the Logische Syntax der Sprache, Carnap maintains the distinction between L-rules and P-rules, at the same time being aware of the holistic character of empirical control and of the possibility to revise the acceptance of every kind of sentences; (3) Quine’s idea that the holistic conception requires completely abandoning the analytic/synthetic and a priori/a posteriori distinctions does not seem wholly correct. On the contrary, in the Logische Syntax Carnap takes a step forward in his conception of the “relativized a priori”. Thus, we can say that in the Prague years two alternative accounts of the theory/experience relation began to emerge. These two alternatives are still pivotal in the contemporary epistemological debate.","PeriodicalId":41386,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Inquiries","volume":"86 1","pages":"79-94"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-02-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79135241","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-02-25DOI: 10.4454/PHILINQ.V9I1.359
K. Westphal, P. Parrini
The first four sections evaluate Quine’s thesis that the two dogmas of empiricism (analyticity and reductionism) are at root identical. In particular, a full compatibility is developed and defended between epistemological, anti-reductionist holism and both the analytic/synthetic and a priori/a posteriori distinctions. According to the view defended here, understanding the relations between theory and experience requires not the rejection of such distinctions, but rather their relativization. In the fifth and final section, the importance of such distinctions is shown regarding epistemological analysis and discussions of the relations between science and philosophy.
{"title":"Quine on Analyticity and Holism: A critical appraisal in dialogue with Sandro Nannini","authors":"K. Westphal, P. Parrini","doi":"10.4454/PHILINQ.V9I1.359","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4454/PHILINQ.V9I1.359","url":null,"abstract":"The first four sections evaluate Quine’s thesis that the two dogmas of empiricism (analyticity and reductionism) are at root identical. In particular, a full compatibility is developed and defended between epistemological, anti-reductionist holism and both the analytic/synthetic and a priori/a posteriori distinctions. According to the view defended here, understanding the relations between theory and experience requires not the rejection of such distinctions, but rather their relativization. In the fifth and final section, the importance of such distinctions is shown regarding epistemological analysis and discussions of the relations between science and philosophy.","PeriodicalId":41386,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Inquiries","volume":"100 1","pages":"95-112"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-02-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88964779","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-02-25DOI: 10.4454/PHILINQ.V9I1.363
Gaston Bachelard, G. Lauro
This essay points out the necessity of evoking several philosophical systems in order to realize the evolution of the scientific theory of knowledge in modern physics. It proposes a sort of spectrum of philosophical systems with seven conceptions set in the following order : realism, empiricism, positivism, rationalism, formalism, conventionalism, idealism. A double filiation unites these philosophies in the center of the spectrum, so that, rationalism, in conjunction with technical materialism, seems to be the most strongly established philosophy, and the backbone of modern scientific thought. Rationalism, far from representing a detached point of view, appears as a dialectical philosophy as soon as it seeks its confirmation in technical experience.
{"title":"The dialogical philosophy: La philosophie dialoguée","authors":"Gaston Bachelard, G. Lauro","doi":"10.4454/PHILINQ.V9I1.363","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4454/PHILINQ.V9I1.363","url":null,"abstract":"This essay points out the necessity of evoking several philosophical systems in order to realize the evolution of the scientific theory of knowledge in modern physics. It proposes a sort of spectrum of philosophical systems with seven conceptions set in the following order : realism, empiricism, positivism, rationalism, formalism, conventionalism, idealism. A double filiation unites these philosophies in the center of the spectrum, so that, rationalism, in conjunction with technical materialism, seems to be the most strongly established philosophy, and the backbone of modern scientific thought. Rationalism, far from representing a detached point of view, appears as a dialectical philosophy as soon as it seeks its confirmation in technical experience.","PeriodicalId":41386,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Inquiries","volume":"9 1","pages":"231-240"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-02-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79741644","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-02-25DOI: 10.4454/PHILINQ.V9I1.270
Marta Vero
With this paper I aim to deal with the theme of trust on the Internet by associating it to the invention of classical rhetoric in Aristotle’s thought. I argue that the latest technical developments of the Internet, which have provided a progressive introduction of orality and bodily performance to the Web, aspire to make the Internet a more trustworthy place than it was before. Aristotle had already discovered the tight nexus between trust and bodily-oral performance. This connection was indeed one of the fundamental tasks of the classical rhetor. I claim that this Aristotelian nexus has been maintained through modernity and employed in the Web 2.0 bodily turn, or in its use as an oral register of communication. In conclusion, I refer to Instagram celebrities (“influencers”) to examine their use of the bodily performance to promote purchases or ideas, and to gain the trust of the users in order to gain real leverage over their on- and offline life.
{"title":"Virtual trust: Persuasion in social media","authors":"Marta Vero","doi":"10.4454/PHILINQ.V9I1.270","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4454/PHILINQ.V9I1.270","url":null,"abstract":"With this paper I aim to deal with the theme of trust on the Internet by associating it to the invention of classical rhetoric in Aristotle’s thought. I argue that the latest technical developments of the Internet, which have provided a progressive introduction of orality and bodily performance to the Web, aspire to make the Internet a more trustworthy place than it was before. Aristotle had already discovered the tight nexus between trust and bodily-oral performance. This connection was indeed one of the fundamental tasks of the classical rhetor. I claim that this Aristotelian nexus has been maintained through modernity and employed in the Web 2.0 bodily turn, or in its use as an oral register of communication. In conclusion, I refer to Instagram celebrities (“influencers”) to examine their use of the bodily performance to promote purchases or ideas, and to gain the trust of the users in order to gain real leverage over their on- and offline life.","PeriodicalId":41386,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Inquiries","volume":"72 1","pages":"9-28"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-02-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84937939","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-02-25DOI: 10.4454/PHILINQ.V9I1.314
M. Simos, T. Arabatzis
In this paper we attempt a critical appraisal of the relation between history of science and philosophy of science in Ian Hacking’s styles of scientific reasoning project. In our analysis, we employ a distinction between “historical philosophy of science” and “philosophical history of science”: the former aims at addressing philosophical issues, while the latter aims at telling stories about the scientific past that are informed by philosophical considerations. We argue that Hacking practices historical philosophy of science; discuss how his approach is differentiated from the so-called confrontation model; and show that he opts for a strong integration between history and philosophy of science. Finally, we discuss the historiographical implications of his approach and suggest that his aim at maintaining a middle position, on the one hand, between contingency and inevitabilism, and, on the other, between internalism and externalism in the explanation of the stability of scientific knowledge, is compromised by his philosophical commitments.
{"title":"Ian Hacking's metahistory of science","authors":"M. Simos, T. Arabatzis","doi":"10.4454/PHILINQ.V9I1.314","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4454/PHILINQ.V9I1.314","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we attempt a critical appraisal of the relation between history of science and philosophy of science in Ian Hacking’s styles of scientific reasoning project. In our analysis, we employ a distinction between “historical philosophy of science” and “philosophical history of science”: the former aims at addressing philosophical issues, while the latter aims at telling stories about the scientific past that are informed by philosophical considerations. We argue that Hacking practices historical philosophy of science; discuss how his approach is differentiated from the so-called confrontation model; and show that he opts for a strong integration between history and philosophy of science. Finally, we discuss the historiographical implications of his approach and suggest that his aim at maintaining a middle position, on the one hand, between contingency and inevitabilism, and, on the other, between internalism and externalism in the explanation of the stability of scientific knowledge, is compromised by his philosophical commitments.","PeriodicalId":41386,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Inquiries","volume":"13 1","pages":"145-166"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-02-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81998372","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-02-25DOI: 10.4454/PHILINQ.V9I1.269
F. Pisanò
In this paper I draw from Husserl’s lectures on ethics and manuscripts on phantasy to clarify the role and the structure of aesthetic education within a phenomenological theory of value experience. First, I show that Husserl’s take on emotions as material contents of value experiences involves the problem of justifying the validity of the relation between factual emotional states and ideal values. I then suggest, on the basis of some of Husserl’s phenomenological arguments on phantasy, that this discrepancy can be bridged through the enjoyment of art – that is, through a process of aesthetic education. I will focus, as Husserl does, on theatrical art as a case study. My aim is to support the claim that artistic phantasy offers us the possibility of an education of emotions by helping us to progressively explore the eidetic structure of emotional states in their individuality, but regardless of their isolated here and now (that is, of their factual occasionality). The first part of the argument refers mainly to the last chapters of Husserl’s Einleitung in die Ethik (1920/1924). The second part focuses on a 1918 manuscript. I conclude by hinting at how the idea of a phenomenological aesthetic education could help providing a coherent interpretation of Husserl’s ethics, while also contributing to the ongoing debate about fictional objects.
{"title":"Neutral phantasies and possible emotions: A phenomenological perspective on aesthetic education","authors":"F. Pisanò","doi":"10.4454/PHILINQ.V9I1.269","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4454/PHILINQ.V9I1.269","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper I draw from Husserl’s lectures on ethics and manuscripts on phantasy to clarify the role and the structure of aesthetic education within a phenomenological theory of value experience. First, I show that Husserl’s take on emotions as material contents of value experiences involves the problem of justifying the validity of the relation between factual emotional states and ideal values. I then suggest, on the basis of some of Husserl’s phenomenological arguments on phantasy, that this discrepancy can be bridged through the enjoyment of art – that is, through a process of aesthetic education. I will focus, as Husserl does, on theatrical art as a case study. My aim is to support the claim that artistic phantasy offers us the possibility of an education of emotions by helping us to progressively explore the eidetic structure of emotional states in their individuality, but regardless of their isolated here and now (that is, of their factual occasionality). The first part of the argument refers mainly to the last chapters of Husserl’s Einleitung in die Ethik (1920/1924). The second part focuses on a 1918 manuscript. I conclude by hinting at how the idea of a phenomenological aesthetic education could help providing a coherent interpretation of Husserl’s ethics, while also contributing to the ongoing debate about fictional objects.","PeriodicalId":41386,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Inquiries","volume":"579 1","pages":"29-48"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-02-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76579666","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：