Pub Date : 2021-02-25DOI: 10.4454/PHILINQ.V9I1.346
J. Sullivan
Ian Hacking instigated a revolution in 20th century philosophy of science by putting experiments (“interventions”) at the top of a philosophical agenda that historically had focused nearly exclusively on representations (“theories”). In this paper, I focus on a set of conceptual tools Hacking (1992) put forward to understand how laboratory sciences become stable and to explain what such stability meant for the prospects of unity of science and kind discovery in experimental science. I first use Hacking’s tools to understand sources of instability and disunity in rodent behavioral neuroscience. I then use them to understand recent grass-roots collaborative initiatives aimed at establishing stability in this research area and tease out some implications for unity of science and kind creation and discovery in cognitive neuroscience.
{"title":"Understanding stability in cognitive neuroscience through Hacking's lens","authors":"J. Sullivan","doi":"10.4454/PHILINQ.V9I1.346","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4454/PHILINQ.V9I1.346","url":null,"abstract":"Ian Hacking instigated a revolution in 20th century philosophy of science by putting experiments (“interventions”) at the top of a philosophical agenda that historically had focused nearly exclusively on representations (“theories”). In this paper, I focus on a set of conceptual tools Hacking (1992) put forward to understand how laboratory sciences become stable and to explain what such stability meant for the prospects of unity of science and kind discovery in experimental science. I first use Hacking’s tools to understand sources of instability and disunity in rodent behavioral neuroscience. I then use them to understand recent grass-roots collaborative initiatives aimed at establishing stability in this research area and tease out some implications for unity of science and kind creation and discovery in cognitive neuroscience.","PeriodicalId":41386,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Inquiries","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-02-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78929348","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-02-25DOI: 10.4454/PHILINQ.V9I1.293
E. Coffman
What kinds of things can we be morally responsible for? Andrew Khoury offers an answer that includes (i) an argument for the impossibility of blameworthiness for overt action, and (ii) the assertion that “willings are the proper object of responsibility in the context of action”. After presenting an argument for the inconsistency of Khoury’s answer to our focal question, I defend the following partial answer that resembles, but differs importantly from, Khoury’s answer: one can be blameworthy for a practical decision—that is, an essentially intentional momentary mental action of forming an intention to do something that resolves prior felt unsettledness about what to do.
{"title":"Blameworthiness, willings, and practical decisions","authors":"E. Coffman","doi":"10.4454/PHILINQ.V9I1.293","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4454/PHILINQ.V9I1.293","url":null,"abstract":"What kinds of things can we be morally responsible for? Andrew Khoury offers an answer that includes (i) an argument for the impossibility of blameworthiness for overt action, and (ii) the assertion that “willings are the proper object of responsibility in the context of action”. After presenting an argument for the inconsistency of Khoury’s answer to our focal question, I defend the following partial answer that resembles, but differs importantly from, Khoury’s answer: one can be blameworthy for a practical decision—that is, an essentially intentional momentary mental action of forming an intention to do something that resolves prior felt unsettledness about what to do.","PeriodicalId":41386,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Inquiries","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-02-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76139708","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-02-25DOI: 10.4454/PHILINQ.V9I1.360
K. Westphal
Paolo Parrini devoted concerted philosophical attention to theoretical phi- losophy, re-examining core issues in epistemology, philosophy of language and history and philosophy of science, not only for their intrinsic philosophical interest, but also for their cultural significance. This pair of papers published here in English he himself affiliated closely. “Analyticity and Epistemological Holism: Prague Alternatives” appeared originally in Italian in 2006; “Quine on Analyticity and Holism. A critical appraisal in dialogue with Sandro Nannini,” in 2018. He translated both into English early in 2020, posting their original Italian together with their new English versions on his own website. Doubtless both are related to his research interests in Herbart’s conceptual Bearbeitung, which surely must be a vigorous form of conceptual explication. Most unfortunately, Paolo was taken from us suddenly, unexpectedly, at the start of July (2020). What more we can learn from him, we shall learn from his considerable published accomplishments. This brief Introduction seeks to epitomize the core issues and significance of this pair of papers, in tribute to him and his very substantial philosophical achievements.
{"title":"Introduction. Paolo Parrini & relative a priori principles","authors":"K. Westphal","doi":"10.4454/PHILINQ.V9I1.360","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4454/PHILINQ.V9I1.360","url":null,"abstract":"Paolo Parrini devoted concerted philosophical attention to theoretical phi- losophy, re-examining core issues in epistemology, philosophy of language and history and philosophy of science, not only for their intrinsic philosophical interest, but also for their cultural significance. This pair of papers published here in English he himself affiliated closely. “Analyticity and Epistemological Holism: Prague Alternatives” appeared originally in Italian in 2006; “Quine on Analyticity and Holism. A critical appraisal in dialogue with Sandro Nannini,” in 2018. He translated both into English early in 2020, posting their original Italian together with their new English versions on his own website. Doubtless both are related to his research interests in Herbart’s conceptual Bearbeitung, which surely must be a vigorous form of conceptual explication. Most unfortunately, Paolo was taken from us suddenly, unexpectedly, at the start of July (2020). What more we can learn from him, we shall learn from his considerable published accomplishments. This brief Introduction seeks to epitomize the core issues and significance of this pair of papers, in tribute to him and his very substantial philosophical achievements.","PeriodicalId":41386,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Inquiries","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-02-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82073579","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-02-25DOI: 10.4454/PHILINQ.V9I1.361
Matteo Vagelli, Marica Setaro
Ian Hacking is among the few that have successfully undermined the Analytic/Continental divide, by working on the “trading zones” between these two strands, and forged their conceptual instruments by drawing these latter from different sources and applying them to widely diverse philosophical debates, across natural, social and medical sciences: debates ranging from the problem of induction and proofs and deduction in mathematics to the theories of meaning and truth as well as to the controversy between realism and constructivism in natural and social sciences. Albeit well-known and widely inspiring, Hacking is still rarely studied, and his wide-ranging production has not yet received an accurate and comprehensive analysis. This Focus aims to precisely fill this gap, by providing one of the first extensive studies dedicated to Hacking’s philosophy. It does not wish, however, to cover all the philosophical areas to which he has possibly contributed, neither does it aim, more generally, to provide a commentary nor an exegesis of his works. By collecting papers by both established and young scholars, this Focus rather intends to explore why Hacking has so largely in- fluenced the field of history and philosophy of science. Analyzing Hacking’s contribution to the 20th-century attempts to bring together history and philosophy of science as well as discussing his arguments on scientific stability, the Focus tackles, from different perspectives, the question of the historicity of reason. Without aspiring to definitive answers, this Focus wishes to open up lines of further research on Hacking’s works as well as along their path.
{"title":"Introduction. Ian Hacking and the Historical Reason of the Sciences","authors":"Matteo Vagelli, Marica Setaro","doi":"10.4454/PHILINQ.V9I1.361","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4454/PHILINQ.V9I1.361","url":null,"abstract":"Ian Hacking is among the few that have successfully undermined the Analytic/Continental divide, by working on the “trading zones” between these two strands, and forged their conceptual instruments by drawing these latter from different sources and applying them to widely diverse philosophical debates, across natural, social and medical sciences: debates ranging from the problem of induction and proofs and deduction in mathematics to the theories of meaning and truth as well as to the controversy between realism and constructivism in natural and social sciences. \u0000Albeit well-known and widely inspiring, Hacking is still rarely studied, and his wide-ranging production has not yet received an accurate and comprehensive analysis. This Focus aims to precisely fill this gap, by providing one of the first extensive studies dedicated to Hacking’s philosophy. It does not wish, however, to cover all the philosophical areas to which he has possibly contributed, neither does it aim, more generally, to provide a commentary nor an exegesis of his works. By collecting papers by both established and young scholars, this Focus rather intends to explore why Hacking has so largely in- fluenced the field of history and philosophy of science. Analyzing Hacking’s contribution to the 20th-century attempts to bring together history and philosophy of science as well as discussing his arguments on scientific stability, the Focus tackles, from different perspectives, the question of the historicity of reason. Without aspiring to definitive answers, this Focus wishes to open up lines of further research on Hacking’s works as well as along their path.","PeriodicalId":41386,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Inquiries","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-02-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73076051","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-02-25DOI: 10.4454/PHILINQ.V9I1.339
M. Simons, Matteo Vagelli
Ian Hacking’s Representing and Intervening (1983) is often credited to be one of the first works that focused on the role of experimentation in philosophy of science, initiating a movement which is sometimes called the “philosophy of experiment” (Hacking, 1988) or “new experimentalism” (Ackermann, 1989). Moreover, in the 1980s, a number of other movements and scholars also started to focus on the role of experimentation and instruments in science, ranging from science studies (Pickering, 1984; Shapin & Schaffer, 1985; Latour, 1987), Hans Radder (1984) and postphenomenology (Ihde, 1979). A philosophical study of experiments seems thus to be an invention of the 1980s, with Hacking being one of its central figures.This article aims to assess this historical claim by Hacking and others. First of all, from a broader perspective on the history of philosophy, this invention narrative is incorrect, since experiment has been a topic for philosophers before, ranging from Ernst Mach (1905), Pierre Duhem (1906), Hugo Dingler (1928) to Gaston Bachelard (1934). Secondly, also a possible reassessment of this historical claim in the form of a rediscovery narrative, where Hacking and others merely rediscovered the work of these earlier authors is also problematized. The conclusion, nonetheless, is not that Hacking made no relevant contribution whatsoever to the philosophy of experiment nor that the hype around experiments in the 1980s should be dismissed as historically uninformed. Rather, it leads to a reevaluation of how to assess the history of the philosophy of experiment and Hacking’s position in it.Instead of looking at experimentation as a fixed research object that is either present or not in the work of specific authors, such an essentialist thesis about experiments should be abandoned in favour of a contextualist narrative that rather asks the questions in what way experimentation becomes a philosophical problem for certain authors and for what purpose. This also enables us to resituate Hacking’s philosophy of experiment, which should not be evaluated solely on the fact whether he was the first to talk about experiments or not, but rather in relation to the specific debates in which he was intervening with these claims. Hacking’s claims, such as his experimental argument for the reality of theoretical entities, therefore, will be situated within his debates with the sociology of science (Bloor, 1976; Collins, 1985), Bruno Latour’s constructivism (Latour, 1987; 1999) and the Science Wars (Hacking, 1999).
{"title":"Were experiments ever neglected? Ian Hacking and the history of philosophy of experiment","authors":"M. Simons, Matteo Vagelli","doi":"10.4454/PHILINQ.V9I1.339","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4454/PHILINQ.V9I1.339","url":null,"abstract":"Ian Hacking’s Representing and Intervening (1983) is often credited to be one of the first works that focused on the role of experimentation in philosophy of science, initiating a movement which is sometimes called the “philosophy of experiment” (Hacking, 1988) or “new experimentalism” (Ackermann, 1989). Moreover, in the 1980s, a number of other movements and scholars also started to focus on the role of experimentation and instruments in science, ranging from science studies (Pickering, 1984; Shapin & Schaffer, 1985; Latour, 1987), Hans Radder (1984) and postphenomenology (Ihde, 1979). A philosophical study of experiments seems thus to be an invention of the 1980s, with Hacking being one of its central figures.This article aims to assess this historical claim by Hacking and others. First of all, from a broader perspective on the history of philosophy, this invention narrative is incorrect, since experiment has been a topic for philosophers before, ranging from Ernst Mach (1905), Pierre Duhem (1906), Hugo Dingler (1928) to Gaston Bachelard (1934). Secondly, also a possible reassessment of this historical claim in the form of a rediscovery narrative, where Hacking and others merely rediscovered the work of these earlier authors is also problematized. The conclusion, nonetheless, is not that Hacking made no relevant contribution whatsoever to the philosophy of experiment nor that the hype around experiments in the 1980s should be dismissed as historically uninformed. Rather, it leads to a reevaluation of how to assess the history of the philosophy of experiment and Hacking’s position in it.Instead of looking at experimentation as a fixed research object that is either present or not in the work of specific authors, such an essentialist thesis about experiments should be abandoned in favour of a contextualist narrative that rather asks the questions in what way experimentation becomes a philosophical problem for certain authors and for what purpose. This also enables us to resituate Hacking’s philosophy of experiment, which should not be evaluated solely on the fact whether he was the first to talk about experiments or not, but rather in relation to the specific debates in which he was intervening with these claims. Hacking’s claims, such as his experimental argument for the reality of theoretical entities, therefore, will be situated within his debates with the sociology of science (Bloor, 1976; Collins, 1985), Bruno Latour’s constructivism (Latour, 1987; 1999) and the Science Wars (Hacking, 1999).","PeriodicalId":41386,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Inquiries","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-02-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90879600","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-02-25DOI: 10.4454/PHILINQ.V9I1.362
L. Fabry
The translation in the following essay of this issue of Philosophical inquiries makes available a preliminary version of what would become the introduction to Le Rationalisme applique (Bachelard 1949). We can regard it as a first step towards making Le Rationalisme applique accessible to the English readers, hoping that it may lead to a translation of the entire work. The introduction to Le Rationalisme applique can be regarded as one of the most canonical expositions of Bachelard’s philosophy of science. It echoes the introductions and conclusions of each of his epistemological works since The New Scientific Spirit, in a series of small philosophical treatises that offer a remarkable continuity.
{"title":"A dialogical philosophy: Bachelard’s “Introduction” to “Le Rationalisme appliqué”","authors":"L. Fabry","doi":"10.4454/PHILINQ.V9I1.362","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4454/PHILINQ.V9I1.362","url":null,"abstract":"The translation in the following essay of this issue of Philosophical inquiries makes available a preliminary version of what would become the introduction to Le Rationalisme applique (Bachelard 1949). We can regard it as a first step towards making Le Rationalisme applique accessible to the English readers, hoping that it may lead to a translation of the entire work. \u0000The introduction to Le Rationalisme applique can be regarded as one of the most canonical expositions of Bachelard’s philosophy of science. It echoes the introductions and conclusions of each of his epistemological works since The New Scientific Spirit, in a series of small philosophical treatises that offer a remarkable continuity.","PeriodicalId":41386,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Inquiries","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-02-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83979982","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-02-25DOI: 10.4454/PHILINQ.V9I1.342
D. Hyder
Historical Epistemology is a discipline that draws on quite distinct sources, straddling the analytic-continental divide within the history and philosophy of science. In this paper, I examine the analytic side of the equation, namely the tradition of empiricist naturalism, and the emergence, within the work of Goodman, Kuhn and Hacking, of naturalized transcendental structures resembling Wittgensteinian language-games, and the correlated multiplication of “worlds”.
{"title":"Naturalism, pragmatism and historical epistemology","authors":"D. Hyder","doi":"10.4454/PHILINQ.V9I1.342","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4454/PHILINQ.V9I1.342","url":null,"abstract":"Historical Epistemology is a discipline that draws on quite distinct sources, straddling the analytic-continental divide within the history and philosophy of science. In this paper, I examine the analytic side of the equation, namely the tradition of empiricist naturalism, and the emergence, within the work of Goodman, Kuhn and Hacking, of naturalized transcendental structures resembling Wittgensteinian language-games, and the correlated multiplication of “worlds”.","PeriodicalId":41386,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Inquiries","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-02-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88969315","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-07-20DOI: 10.4454/PHILINQ.V8I2.271
E. D. Bona
In this paper, I challenge the idea that music is language-like, in the sense it has a semantic-like dimension, as apparently implied in Peter Kivy’s view on the relationship between music and language. Kivy suggests that music is semantic-like because it expresses something at the level of meaning which appeals to “musical expressivity”. Musical expressivity is captured by the emotive properties constituting the musical content and recognized by a competent listener. I discuss two positions on musical expressivity, cognitivism and emotivism, which characterize the two aspects of musical expressivity differently – the emotional experience of the listener, and the musical objects and their features – the connection between them, and how they shape musical content. I conclude that since none of them provides an exhaustive explanation of musical expressivity, we should abandon the idea that music is semantic-like and, a fortiori , that music is language-like, at least within a framework which considers the semantic dimension of music to be related to emotive properties and musical expressivity.
{"title":"Music is not even language-like: Analyzing Kivy’s view on music and language","authors":"E. D. Bona","doi":"10.4454/PHILINQ.V8I2.271","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4454/PHILINQ.V8I2.271","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, I challenge the idea that music is language-like, in the sense it has a semantic-like dimension, as apparently implied in Peter Kivy’s view on the relationship between music and language. Kivy suggests that music is semantic-like because it expresses something at the level of meaning which appeals to “musical expressivity”. Musical expressivity is captured by the emotive properties constituting the musical content and recognized by a competent listener. I discuss two positions on musical expressivity, cognitivism and emotivism, which characterize the two aspects of musical expressivity differently – the emotional experience of the listener, and the musical objects and their features – the connection between them, and how they shape musical content. I conclude that since none of them provides an exhaustive explanation of musical expressivity, we should abandon the idea that music is semantic-like and, a fortiori , that music is language-like, at least within a framework which considers the semantic dimension of music to be related to emotive properties and musical expressivity.","PeriodicalId":41386,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Inquiries","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-07-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83661138","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-07-20DOI: 10.4454/PHILINQ.V8I2.255
Leonardo Massantini
In this paper I analyse nostalgia by reflecting on the theories coming from cultural studies, psychology, sociology and philosophy. Then I use theories of situated affectivity to achieve a better understanding of the role the environment plays in this affective phenomenon. I focus on the way nostalgia is “ordinarily” experienced today, that is to say in a society deeply influenced by technologies that constantly allow quick access to an infinite amount of nostalgically relevant material. To better achieve these goals, I mainly focus on childhood nostalgia, which is one of the, if not the, most widespread kinds of nostalgia. In the first part of this paper, after having introduced the meaning and history of the term nostalgia, I focus on Boym’s theories to verify if her classification can be applied to the everyday experience of nostalgia, especially childhood nostalgia. In the second part, I show how at its core nostalgia consists in a selection and renarration of memories that deeply shape and reveal one’s personal identity. In the third section I offer an introduction to the concept of affective scaffolding. In the fourth section I show how the media we consume through material culture constitutes a synchronic scaffold for the alleviation of the sense of nostalgic longing. In the fifth section I show how the processes of selection and renarration can also be scaffolded, and I discuss whether these processes can be externally influenced in a way that resembles what Slaby calls mind invasion.
{"title":"Affective scaffolds of nostalgia","authors":"Leonardo Massantini","doi":"10.4454/PHILINQ.V8I2.255","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4454/PHILINQ.V8I2.255","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper I analyse nostalgia by reflecting on the theories coming from cultural studies, psychology, sociology and philosophy. Then I use theories of situated affectivity to achieve a better understanding of the role the environment plays in this affective phenomenon. I focus on the way nostalgia is “ordinarily” experienced today, that is to say in a society deeply influenced by technologies that constantly allow quick access to an infinite amount of nostalgically relevant material. To better achieve these goals, I mainly focus on childhood nostalgia, which is one of the, if not the, most widespread kinds of nostalgia. In the first part of this paper, after having introduced the meaning and history of the term nostalgia, I focus on Boym’s theories to verify if her classification can be applied to the everyday experience of nostalgia, especially childhood nostalgia. In the second part, I show how at its core nostalgia consists in a selection and renarration of memories that deeply shape and reveal one’s personal identity. In the third section I offer an introduction to the concept of affective scaffolding. In the fourth section I show how the media we consume through material culture constitutes a synchronic scaffold for the alleviation of the sense of nostalgic longing. In the fifth section I show how the processes of selection and renarration can also be scaffolded, and I discuss whether these processes can be externally influenced in a way that resembles what Slaby calls mind invasion.","PeriodicalId":41386,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Inquiries","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-07-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80727791","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-07-20DOI: 10.4454/PHILINQ.V8I2.304
R. Gronda
Scientific objectivity is a highly complex notion. As a consequence of its intrinsic complexity, the notion is usually conceived of as lacking a core of essential properties. A pluralist account has thus been put forth, which acknowledges a variety of senses in which that notion can be understood. The aim of this paper is to add a further sense to the list. By shifting the attention from a peer-to-peer scenario to an expert-layperson framework, I argue for the notion of “expressive objectivity” as a key to clarifying what public objectivity is. Public objectivity is the result of a well-conducted public inquiry. Unlike the scientific inquiry, which is carried out by scientists, the public inquiry is conducted by an enlarged community of inquirers, encompassing scientific experts and citizens. Since citizens do not have any scientific training, I endorse the view that if an agreement is to be reached, it can only be reached at the linguistic level. The thesis that I develop in the article is that public objectivity can be achieved if and only if the public language in which the inquiry is conducted is rich enough to make it possible for each member of the community of inquirers to formulate their viewpoint and to express their epistemic values.
{"title":"Language, objectivity, and public inquiry: a pragmatist theory of expertise","authors":"R. Gronda","doi":"10.4454/PHILINQ.V8I2.304","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4454/PHILINQ.V8I2.304","url":null,"abstract":"Scientific objectivity is a highly complex notion. As a consequence of its intrinsic complexity, the notion is usually conceived of as lacking a core of essential properties. A pluralist account has thus been put forth, which acknowledges a variety of senses in which that notion can be understood. The aim of this paper is to add a further sense to the list. By shifting the attention from a peer-to-peer scenario to an expert-layperson framework, I argue for the notion of “expressive objectivity” as a key to clarifying what public objectivity is. Public objectivity is the result of a well-conducted public inquiry. Unlike the scientific inquiry, which is carried out by scientists, the public inquiry is conducted by an enlarged community of inquirers, encompassing scientific experts and citizens. Since citizens do not have any scientific training, I endorse the view that if an agreement is to be reached, it can only be reached at the linguistic level. The thesis that I develop in the article is that public objectivity can be achieved if and only if the public language in which the inquiry is conducted is rich enough to make it possible for each member of the community of inquirers to formulate their viewpoint and to express their epistemic values.","PeriodicalId":41386,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Inquiries","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-07-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81546593","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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