Pub Date : 2019-06-30DOI: 10.14394/FILNAU.2019.0013
M. Haraburda
Quine’s position is counted as a reductive naturalism. It overcomes both the traditional Cartesian-Kantian approach to philosophy and the theory of logical empiricism. In consequence, Quine turns for guidance to empirical science. Philosophical reflection turns out to be secondary and dependent on science, for it is the empirical sciences that are the only source of genuine knowledge. As a result, philosophy should be reduced, in Quine’s view, to the application of scientific methods to problems that more general than those raised within the sciences themselves. Quine’s position is criticized in this article both internally, for being inconsistent, and externally, from the point of view of non-reductive naturalism. The criticism primarily pertains to (a) the doctrine of physicalism, (b) the thought-experiment regarding the indeterminacy of translation, and (c) non-observability of the principles of naturalism.
{"title":"Problemy koncepcyjne naturalizmu redukcyjnego Quine’a","authors":"M. Haraburda","doi":"10.14394/FILNAU.2019.0013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14394/FILNAU.2019.0013","url":null,"abstract":"Quine’s position is counted as a reductive naturalism. It overcomes both the traditional Cartesian-Kantian approach to philosophy and the theory of logical empiricism. In consequence, Quine turns for guidance to empirical science. Philosophical reflection turns out to be secondary and dependent on science, for it is the empirical sciences that are the only source of genuine knowledge. As a result, philosophy should be reduced, in Quine’s view, to the application of scientific methods to problems that more general than those raised within the sciences themselves. Quine’s position is criticized in this article both internally, for being inconsistent, and externally, from the point of view of non-reductive naturalism. The criticism primarily pertains to (a) the doctrine of physicalism, (b) the thought-experiment regarding the indeterminacy of translation, and (c) non-observability of the principles of naturalism.","PeriodicalId":41424,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Nauki","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2019-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47998020","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-06-30DOI: 10.14394/FILNAU.2019.0011
J. Jonkisz
Contemporary consciousness studies are a field that presents us with a multiplicity of more or less fundamental empirical and theoretical problems. Of these, the most basic concerns the lack of an unambiguous characterization of consciousness itself. There is no universal description of the phenomenon in question, or at least no widely accepted definition, while most working applications of the concept in articles, research projects or empirical trials vary significantly. A closely linked question concerns the relationship between consciousness and subjectivity: are the conscious states of an organism or system coextensive with its subjective states? Such an assumption, though by no means self-evidently valid, seems to be operative in many influential conceptions and theories of consciousness today. Yet another important issue within the current debate concerns the question of whether consciousness is a graded or an all-or-none phenomenon. This problem is particularly interesting because some researchers insist that it is very difficult to justify ascribing such gradedness to consciousness given its manifold dimensions. The aim of this article is to present and justify these solutions in a condensed form, while at the same time pointing out their consequences and related issues worthy of further study.
{"title":"Jednoznaczna charakterystyka, subiektywność oraz stopniowalność świadomości. Zarys rozwiązań trzech problemów","authors":"J. Jonkisz","doi":"10.14394/FILNAU.2019.0011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14394/FILNAU.2019.0011","url":null,"abstract":"Contemporary consciousness studies are a field that presents us with a multiplicity of more or less fundamental empirical and theoretical problems. Of these, the most basic concerns the lack of an unambiguous characterization of consciousness itself. There is no universal description of the phenomenon in question, or at least no widely accepted definition, while most working applications of the concept in articles, research projects or empirical trials vary significantly. A closely linked question concerns the relationship between consciousness and subjectivity: are the conscious states of an organism or system coextensive with its subjective states? Such an assumption, though by no means self-evidently valid, seems to be operative in many influential conceptions and theories of consciousness today. Yet another important issue within the current debate concerns the question of whether consciousness is a graded or an all-or-none phenomenon. This problem is particularly interesting because some researchers insist that it is very difficult to justify ascribing such gradedness to consciousness given its manifold dimensions. The aim of this article is to present and justify these solutions in a condensed form, while at the same time pointing out their consequences and related issues worthy of further study.","PeriodicalId":41424,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Nauki","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2019-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49018167","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-06-30DOI: 10.14394/FILNAU.2019.0012
K. Werner
The project of experimental philosophy rests on the assumption that comparing the philosophical views held by professional philosophers with the views of non-philosophers is logically correct and philosophically plausible. There are at least three components of this assumption. First, experimental philosophers are committed to the institutional account of philosophical competence: a person counts as a philosopher if they have graduated in philosophy or at least attended philosophy lectures. Second, experimental philosophers assume that some words from everyday vocabulary automatically refer to certain philosophical problems. Third, experimental philosophy fails to distinguish between de re and de dicto philosophical beliefs. I propose harking back to an approach to philosophical competence that portrays it as a kind of self-knowledge (the recognition of one’s epistemic position, similar to what Husserl referred to as bracketing of the natural attitude). In this light, I offer some new prospects for experimental philosophy.
{"title":"Pan Cogito wypełnia kwestionariusz. Filozofia eksperymentalna wobec pytania o naturę kompetencji filozoficznej","authors":"K. Werner","doi":"10.14394/FILNAU.2019.0012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14394/FILNAU.2019.0012","url":null,"abstract":"The project of experimental philosophy rests on the assumption that comparing the philosophical views held by professional philosophers with the views of non-philosophers is logically correct and philosophically plausible. There are at least three components of this assumption. First, experimental philosophers are committed to the institutional account of philosophical competence: a person counts as a philosopher if they have graduated in philosophy or at least attended philosophy lectures. Second, experimental philosophers assume that some words from everyday vocabulary automatically refer to certain philosophical problems. Third, experimental philosophy fails to distinguish between de re and de dicto philosophical beliefs. I propose harking back to an approach to philosophical competence that portrays it as a kind of self-knowledge (the recognition of one’s epistemic position, similar to what Husserl referred to as bracketing of the natural attitude). In this light, I offer some new prospects for experimental philosophy.","PeriodicalId":41424,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Nauki","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2019-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43925922","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-06-30DOI: 10.14394/FILNAU.2019.0014
Tomasz Szubart
Representation is one of the key concepts in cognitive science and philosophy of mind. The philosophical problem of musical meaning, or rather its naturalistic reformulation, has only recently become the topic of empirical investigation. It might seem obvious that an explication of the concept of meaning would appeal to the concept of representation. It is not a popular approach in the philosophy of the cognitive science of music, however. The aim of this paper is to provide an overview of possible frames of analysis of musical representation within selected contemporary paradigms in the broadly understood philosophy of mind and cognitive science.
{"title":"Reprezentacja muzyczna a filozofia umysłu","authors":"Tomasz Szubart","doi":"10.14394/FILNAU.2019.0014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14394/FILNAU.2019.0014","url":null,"abstract":"Representation is one of the key concepts in cognitive science and philosophy of mind. The philosophical problem of musical meaning, or rather its naturalistic reformulation, has only recently become the topic of empirical investigation. It might seem obvious that an explication of the concept of meaning would appeal to the concept of representation. It is not a popular approach in the philosophy of the cognitive science of music, however. The aim of this paper is to provide an overview of possible frames of analysis of musical representation within selected contemporary paradigms in the broadly understood philosophy of mind and cognitive science.","PeriodicalId":41424,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Nauki","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2019-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47993262","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-06-30DOI: 10.14394/FILNAU.2019.0008
A. Karimi
Proving a paradox from very weak assumptions helps us to reveal what the source of the paradox is. We introduce a weak non-arithmetical theory in a language of predicate logic and give proofs for various versions of Yablo’s paradox in this weak system. We prove Always, Sometimes, Almost ,Always, and Infinitely Often versions of Yablo’s paradox in the presented weak axiom system, which is much weaker than the arithmetical setting.
{"title":"Yablo’s Paradoxes in Non-arithmetical Setting","authors":"A. Karimi","doi":"10.14394/FILNAU.2019.0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14394/FILNAU.2019.0008","url":null,"abstract":"Proving a paradox from very weak assumptions helps us to reveal what the source of the paradox is. We introduce a weak non-arithmetical theory in a language of predicate logic and give proofs for various versions of Yablo’s paradox in this weak system. We prove Always, Sometimes, Almost ,Always, and Infinitely Often versions of Yablo’s paradox in the presented weak axiom system, which is much weaker than the arithmetical setting.","PeriodicalId":41424,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Nauki","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2019-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41595964","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-06-30DOI: 10.14394/FILNAU.2019.0009
I. Hanzel
The paper reconstructs the methods used by Schrodinger in the construction of wave mechanics as given in his four Mitteilungen. These methods are described from the point of view of modern philosophy of science, with a focus on the relationships between scientific theories and on the reconstruction of the structure of scientific laws and the relations between scientific laws. After reconstructing the derivation of the first equation in Mitteilung 1, it analyzes the methodology of the optical-mechanical analogy in Mitteilung 2 and reconstructs the two heuristic pathways that led to the construction of wave equations as the basis of wave mechanics in the first two Mitteilungen. Finally, it addresses the methods of generalization, application, and explanation by which the second, third, and fourth Mitteilungen are constructed.
{"title":"The Methods of Construction in Schrödinger’s Mitteilungen","authors":"I. Hanzel","doi":"10.14394/FILNAU.2019.0009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14394/FILNAU.2019.0009","url":null,"abstract":"The paper reconstructs the methods used by Schrodinger in the construction of wave mechanics as given in his four Mitteilungen. These methods are described from the point of view of modern philosophy of science, with a focus on the relationships between scientific theories and on the reconstruction of the structure of scientific laws and the relations between scientific laws. After reconstructing the derivation of the first equation in Mitteilung 1, it analyzes the methodology of the optical-mechanical analogy in Mitteilung 2 and reconstructs the two heuristic pathways that led to the construction of wave equations as the basis of wave mechanics in the first two Mitteilungen. Finally, it addresses the methods of generalization, application, and explanation by which the second, third, and fourth Mitteilungen are constructed.","PeriodicalId":41424,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Nauki","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2019-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46089845","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-03-31DOI: 10.14394/FILNAU.2019.0005
Joanna Luc
The aim of this paper is to analyze the terms “law” (of nature) and “form” in two works of Francis Bacon: the Novum Organum and The Advancement of Learning. The term “form” belongs to the scholastic tradition, whereas the term “law” is crucial for modern scientific methodology. The analysis starts with general characteristics of both terms and then traces them in Bacon’s writings. Both terms turn out to be important for Bacon, but it is argued that to fully understand his approach, his nominalistic tendencies should be acknowledged as well.
{"title":"Prawo czy forma? Francisa Bacona koncepcja prawidłowości w przyrodzie","authors":"Joanna Luc","doi":"10.14394/FILNAU.2019.0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14394/FILNAU.2019.0005","url":null,"abstract":"The aim of this paper is to analyze the terms “law” (of nature) and “form” in two works of Francis Bacon: the Novum Organum and The Advancement of Learning. The term “form” belongs to the scholastic tradition, whereas the term “law” is crucial for modern scientific methodology. The analysis starts with general characteristics of both terms and then traces them in Bacon’s writings. Both terms turn out to be important for Bacon, but it is argued that to fully understand his approach, his nominalistic tendencies should be acknowledged as well.","PeriodicalId":41424,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Nauki","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2019-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41435202","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-03-31DOI: 10.14394/FILNAU.2019.0003
M. Grygianiec
In a number of works, Peter Simons proposed an interesting theory of persistence in time, which he sometimes describes as invariantism. Unfortunately, in the last two decades, despite its unquestionable merits, invariantism has attracted little interest among thinkers engaged in the debate over persistence. The debate continues to revolve around well-known solutions, i.e., endurantism, perdurantism, and exdurantism. It seems to ignore the efforts of the few thinkers who try to break the theoretical deadlock that has for many years dominated the discussion. The purpose of this article is, first, to reconstruct and critically analyze Simons’ invariantist theory, and second, to compare it with another theoretical proposal, namely transcendentism, recently advanced by Damiano Costa and Alessandro Giordani. By means of a simple comparative analysis, I shall try to show that these views are convergent: they differ only in a few elements that are either negligible or could be accepted within both theories. This result should not, however, be interpreted as an attempt to formulate a hybrid position. On the one hand, transcendentism can be treated, to some extent, as a fairly natural foundation of invariantism, whereas invariantism canbe regarded as a technical development of transcendentism (providing it with a suitable remedy for some interpretative difficulties). On the other hand, invariantism and transcendentism interpret temporal location of objects completely differently, and so, at the end of the day, their paths must diverge. The indirect aim of the paper is to show that both invariantism and transcendentism should no longer be ignored in the debate on the nature of persistence.
{"title":"Inwariantyzm a transcendentyzm","authors":"M. Grygianiec","doi":"10.14394/FILNAU.2019.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14394/FILNAU.2019.0003","url":null,"abstract":"In a number of works, Peter Simons proposed an interesting theory of persistence in time, which he sometimes describes as invariantism. Unfortunately, in the last two decades, despite its unquestionable merits, invariantism has attracted little interest among thinkers engaged in the debate over persistence. The debate continues to revolve around well-known solutions, i.e., endurantism, perdurantism, and exdurantism. It seems to ignore the efforts of the few thinkers who try to break the theoretical deadlock that has for many years dominated the discussion. The purpose of this article is, first, to reconstruct and critically analyze Simons’ invariantist theory, and second, to compare it with another theoretical proposal, namely transcendentism, recently advanced by Damiano Costa and Alessandro Giordani. By means of a simple comparative analysis, I shall try to show that these views are convergent: they differ only in a few elements that are either negligible or could be accepted within both theories. This result should not, however, be interpreted as an attempt to formulate a hybrid position. On the one hand, transcendentism can be treated, to some extent, as a fairly natural foundation of invariantism, whereas invariantism canbe regarded as a technical development of transcendentism (providing it with a suitable remedy for some interpretative difficulties). On the other hand, invariantism and transcendentism interpret temporal location of objects completely differently, and so, at the end of the day, their paths must diverge. The indirect aim of the paper is to show that both invariantism and transcendentism should no longer be ignored in the debate on the nature of persistence.","PeriodicalId":41424,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Nauki","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2019-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49019253","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-03-31DOI: 10.14394/FILNAU.2019.0001
Joanna Komorowska-Mach
The aim of this paper is to provide a metaphilosophical analysis of the debate between monistic and pluralistic approaches to self-knowledge. I start by presenting the background for the discussion, clarifying the terminology, and drawing a distinction between moderate and radical pluralism. I then discuss and evaluate arguments for monism that appeal to general methodological guidelines as well as those relying on specific assumptions about the objects and character of self-knowledge. I offer a separate analysis of Eric Schwitzgebel’s radical pluralism, which threatens to undermine both monism and moderate pluralism. I close by describing a way of looking at the problem of the homogeneity of self-knowledge that goes beyond the monism–pluralism dichotomy and arguing that the heterogeneity and multidimensionality of the problem of self-knowledge are more important than the plurality of the solutions.
{"title":"\"Introspection — One or More? Pluralism about Self-Knowledge\"","authors":"Joanna Komorowska-Mach","doi":"10.14394/FILNAU.2019.0001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14394/FILNAU.2019.0001","url":null,"abstract":"The aim of this paper is to provide a metaphilosophical analysis of the debate between monistic and pluralistic approaches to self-knowledge. I start by presenting the background for the discussion, clarifying the terminology, and drawing a distinction between moderate and radical pluralism. I then discuss and evaluate arguments for monism that appeal to general methodological guidelines as well as those relying on specific assumptions about the objects and character of self-knowledge. I offer a separate analysis of Eric Schwitzgebel’s radical pluralism, which threatens to undermine both monism and moderate pluralism. I close by describing a way of looking at the problem of the homogeneity of self-knowledge that goes beyond the monism–pluralism dichotomy and arguing that the heterogeneity and multidimensionality of the problem of self-knowledge are more important than the plurality of the solutions.","PeriodicalId":41424,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Nauki","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2019-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44929183","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-03-31DOI: 10.14394/FILNAU.2019.0004
Jan Rostek
The causal exclusion problem, as presented by Jaegwon Kim, is aimed to show that non-reductive physicalism is self-contradictory, as it is impossible for effects already having a sufficient physical cause to have a distinct mental cause. One possible reply to Kim’s argument is compatibilism — a view within non-reductive physicalism that states that psychophysical supervenience is able to sustain the coexistence of efficacious mental and physical causes. The aim of this paper is to describe the currently most popular compatibilist strategy, as well as to present and evaluate some objections to it. First, I sketch the causal exclusion problem and show how compatibilists could undermine the causal exclusion principle using counterfactual analysis. Then I point out why this is a troublesome and insufficient tool and what challenges await compatibilism in its current form.
{"title":"Kompatybilistyczna odpowiedź na problem wykluczenia przyczynowego","authors":"Jan Rostek","doi":"10.14394/FILNAU.2019.0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14394/FILNAU.2019.0004","url":null,"abstract":"The causal exclusion problem, as presented by Jaegwon Kim, is aimed to show that non-reductive physicalism is self-contradictory, as it is impossible for effects already having a sufficient physical cause to have a distinct mental cause. One possible reply to Kim’s argument is compatibilism — a view within non-reductive physicalism that states that psychophysical supervenience is able to sustain the coexistence of efficacious mental and physical causes. The aim of this paper is to describe the currently most popular compatibilist strategy, as well as to present and evaluate some objections to it. First, I sketch the causal exclusion problem and show how compatibilists could undermine the causal exclusion principle using counterfactual analysis. Then I point out why this is a troublesome and insufficient tool and what challenges await compatibilism in its current form.","PeriodicalId":41424,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Nauki","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2019-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48850678","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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