Pub Date : 2019-03-31DOI: 10.14394/FILNAU.2019.0007
B. Ellis
Steven Pinker’s book Enlightenment Now is a landmark achievement, if it is considered only as a review of the history of social progress in the world since the mid-eighteenth century. Pinker demonstrates, beyond reasonable doubt, that great progress has been made on almost every front. But, it is argued, much of this progress has been bought at the cost of social progress in First World countries. For it has been achieved by reverse engineering the social structures to make them resemble more closely the neoclassical model of a nation’s economy — a model that contains neither a government nor any socially-funded social services. The reviewer argues that the practice of changing the social facts, in order to make them fit a given theoretical model better, is contrary to scientific method, and that we need a new enlightenment now to develop scientifically more realistic theories in the social sciences.
{"title":"Enlightenment and Realism","authors":"B. Ellis","doi":"10.14394/FILNAU.2019.0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14394/FILNAU.2019.0007","url":null,"abstract":"Steven Pinker’s book Enlightenment Now is a landmark achievement, if it is considered only as a review of the history of social progress in the world since the mid-eighteenth century. Pinker demonstrates, beyond reasonable doubt, that great progress has been made on almost every front. But, it is argued, much of this progress has been bought at the cost of social progress in First World countries. For it has been achieved by reverse engineering the social structures to make them resemble more closely the neoclassical model of a nation’s economy — a model that contains neither a government nor any socially-funded social services. The reviewer argues that the practice of changing the social facts, in order to make them fit a given theoretical model better, is contrary to scientific method, and that we need a new enlightenment now to develop scientifically more realistic theories in the social sciences.","PeriodicalId":41424,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Nauki","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2019-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46715486","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-12-31DOI: 10.14394/FILNAU.2018.0025
J. Dadaczyński
Hilbert’s views on the ontology of mathematics changed significantly between 1891 and 1904. Although his contributions to the foundations of mathematics in the years 1899-1904 paved the way for his later program of formalism, in the ontology of mathematics he was then still far from methodological nominalism associated with his mature formalism. Paradoxically, Hilbert’s original position in the ontology of mathematics (from 1891) was that of conceptualism combinedwith constructivism. These two views were the philosophical basis for Brouwer’s intuitionist attacks on Hilbert’s account of the foundations of mathematics in the 1920s.
{"title":"Ontologia matematyki wczesnego Hilberta","authors":"J. Dadaczyński","doi":"10.14394/FILNAU.2018.0025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14394/FILNAU.2018.0025","url":null,"abstract":"Hilbert’s views on the ontology of mathematics changed significantly between 1891 and 1904. Although his contributions to the foundations of mathematics in the years 1899-1904 paved the way for his later program of formalism, in the ontology of mathematics he was then still far from methodological nominalism associated with his mature formalism. Paradoxically, Hilbert’s original position in the ontology of mathematics (from 1891) was that of conceptualism combinedwith constructivism. These two views were the philosophical basis for Brouwer’s intuitionist attacks on Hilbert’s account of the foundations of mathematics in the 1920s.","PeriodicalId":41424,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Nauki","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2018-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48697933","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-12-31DOI: 10.14394/FILNAU.2018.0028
Jakub Rudnicki
The paper is a review of the book Rationality and Decision Making: From Normative Rules to Heuristics edited by Marek Hetmanski. The volume consists of eighteen chapters on different topics revolving around the common theme of rationality. The review discusses each paper, focusing more closely on some, in order to evaluate the arguments and claims that I find interesting, controversial, or surprising. Most chapters fall into the category of standard analytic philosophy with just a few lightly flirting with other philosophical traditions and one discussing Jose Ortega y Gasset.
{"title":"Are We Rational When It Comes to Rationality?","authors":"Jakub Rudnicki","doi":"10.14394/FILNAU.2018.0028","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14394/FILNAU.2018.0028","url":null,"abstract":"The paper is a review of the book Rationality and Decision Making: From Normative Rules to Heuristics edited by Marek Hetmanski. The volume consists of eighteen chapters on different topics revolving around the common theme of rationality. The review discusses each paper, focusing more closely on some, in order to evaluate the arguments and claims that I find interesting, controversial, or surprising. Most chapters fall into the category of standard analytic philosophy with just a few lightly flirting with other philosophical traditions and one discussing Jose Ortega y Gasset.","PeriodicalId":41424,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Nauki","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2018-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44567248","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-12-31DOI: 10.14394/FILNAU.2018.0026
A. Chybińska
It is widely assumed that reism, a philosophical position introduced by Tadeusz Kotarbinski, had two aspects: ontological and semantic. Sometimes it is also claimed that reism ultimately became a kind of methodological program. The aim of this article is to analyze the methodological aspect of reism (or methodological reism). Since Kotarbinski did not explicitly formulate this layer of his theory, the first part of the article attempts to reconstruct methodological reism. In the second part, I discuss some of its problems. Finally, in the third part, I try to show its merits.
{"title":"Metodologiczny postulat reizmu. Zarys analizy","authors":"A. Chybińska","doi":"10.14394/FILNAU.2018.0026","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14394/FILNAU.2018.0026","url":null,"abstract":"It is widely assumed that reism, a philosophical position introduced by Tadeusz Kotarbinski, had two aspects: ontological and semantic. Sometimes it is also claimed that reism ultimately became a kind of methodological program. The aim of this article is to analyze the methodological aspect of reism (or methodological reism). Since Kotarbinski did not explicitly formulate this layer of his theory, the first part of the article attempts to reconstruct methodological reism. In the second part, I discuss some of its problems. Finally, in the third part, I try to show its merits.","PeriodicalId":41424,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Nauki","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2018-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42161710","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-12-31DOI: 10.14394/FILNAU.2018.0023
Tufan Kıymaz
The paper provides a critical evaluation of Lynne Rudder Baker’s nonmereological theory of material constitution in light of the “thinking into existence” objection, formulated by Theodore Sider and Dean W. Zimmerman. Although Baker responds to it, she focuses on its specific versions presented by Sider and Zimmerman and does not address the source of the problem. Baker maintains that beliefs, social practices, and conventions can bring a new intention-dependentobject into existence. However, as I argue, the thinking into existence objection shows that constituted objects, if there are any, are ontologically independent of beliefs, social practices, and conventions. In fact, Baker’s theory doesn’t give us any reason for believing that intention-dependent objects are any more real than fictional objects.
{"title":"Baker’s Theory of Material Constitution and Thinking Things into Existence","authors":"Tufan Kıymaz","doi":"10.14394/FILNAU.2018.0023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14394/FILNAU.2018.0023","url":null,"abstract":"The paper provides a critical evaluation of Lynne Rudder Baker’s nonmereological theory of material constitution in light of the “thinking into existence” objection, formulated by Theodore Sider and Dean W. Zimmerman. Although Baker responds to it, she focuses on its specific versions presented by Sider and Zimmerman and does not address the source of the problem. Baker maintains that beliefs, social practices, and conventions can bring a new intention-dependentobject into existence. However, as I argue, the thinking into existence objection shows that constituted objects, if there are any, are ontologically independent of beliefs, social practices, and conventions. In fact, Baker’s theory doesn’t give us any reason for believing that intention-dependent objects are any more real than fictional objects.","PeriodicalId":41424,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Nauki","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2018-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49383267","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-12-31DOI: 10.14394/FILNAU.2018.0022
Zoltán Vecsey
Strawson once observed that sentences containing non-referring definite descriptions tend to elicit different types of intuitive responses from language users. While some of these sentences elicit a sense of squeamishness, others elicit a robust sense of falsity. Strawson explained this type of response difference in terms of presupposition and topicality. In the last decades, Strawson’s approach has been often criticized on the ground that it cannot provide a uniform explanation forall possible occurrences of non-referring definites. In this paper, I examine two recent Strawson-inspired projects and argue that they also fall short of providing a uniform explanation of the data. In the final section, I briefly delineate an alternative approach, which seems to have greater explanatory power than its rivals.
{"title":"\"Is There a Uniform Explanation for Strawsonian Contrast Cases?\"","authors":"Zoltán Vecsey","doi":"10.14394/FILNAU.2018.0022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14394/FILNAU.2018.0022","url":null,"abstract":"Strawson once observed that sentences containing non-referring definite descriptions tend to elicit different types of intuitive responses from language users. While some of these sentences elicit a sense of squeamishness, others elicit a robust sense of falsity. Strawson explained this type of response difference in terms of presupposition and topicality. In the last decades, Strawson’s approach has been often criticized on the ground that it cannot provide a uniform explanation forall possible occurrences of non-referring definites. In this paper, I examine two recent Strawson-inspired projects and argue that they also fall short of providing a uniform explanation of the data. In the final section, I briefly delineate an alternative approach, which seems to have greater explanatory power than its rivals.","PeriodicalId":41424,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Nauki","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2018-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42818371","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-10-31DOI: 10.14394/FILNAU.2018.0018
Wojciech Rutkiewicz
Evidence-based medicine (EBM) provides basic rules for diagnostic procedures. A physician is required critically to appraise clinical evidence and to internalize the quantitative approach to data processing in her practice. There is a common agreement that knowledge of statistical methods is among the core skills of a competent physician. This includes Bayes Theorem. The key role of statistics in medicine gives rise to a normative way of clinical reasoning. However, many researches point out that medicine practitioners do not follow this normative way. Instead, they use common decision strategies mostly based on heuristics. This situation opens a gap between normative and descriptive aspects of clinical reasoning. Consequently, many experts are prone to draw unfavorable conclusions about rationality of clinical decisions. This paper characterizes normative and descriptive aspects of clinical reasoning regarding the concepts of Bayes Theoremand heuristics. It differentiates between two interpretations of heuristics: one presented by Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman and another by Gerd Gigerenzer. It is argued that clinical decisions based on heuristics are not necessarily flawed and irrational.
{"title":"Normatywność i deskryptywność wnioskowania diagnostycznego w nurcie evidence-based medicine","authors":"Wojciech Rutkiewicz","doi":"10.14394/FILNAU.2018.0018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14394/FILNAU.2018.0018","url":null,"abstract":"Evidence-based medicine (EBM) provides basic rules for diagnostic procedures. A physician is required critically to appraise clinical evidence and to internalize the quantitative approach to data processing in her practice. There is a common agreement that knowledge of statistical methods is among the core skills of a competent physician. This includes Bayes Theorem. The key role of statistics in medicine gives rise to a normative way of clinical reasoning. However, many researches point out that medicine practitioners do not follow this normative way. Instead, they use common decision strategies mostly based on heuristics. This situation opens a gap between normative and descriptive aspects of clinical reasoning. Consequently, many experts are prone to draw unfavorable conclusions about rationality of clinical decisions. This paper characterizes normative and descriptive aspects of clinical reasoning regarding the concepts of Bayes Theoremand heuristics. It differentiates between two interpretations of heuristics: one presented by Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman and another by Gerd Gigerenzer. It is argued that clinical decisions based on heuristics are not necessarily flawed and irrational.","PeriodicalId":41424,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Nauki","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2018-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44185180","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-10-31DOI: 10.14394/FILNAU.2018.0017
Katarzyna Paprzycka-Hausman
The omissions account offers structurally close explanations of the Knobe effect, the Butler problem, and the epistemic side-effect effect. Moreover, it predicts that the epistemic side-effect effect should be present not only in Knobe-type stories but also in Butler-type stories. Since the probability that the effect takes place is not greater than 1/6, the attribution of knowledge that it will take place is prima facie irrational. However, according to the omissions account, in the immoral situations, the knowledge claim can be read as a consequence-knowledge claim, which can be rationally accepted. I report the results of two studies, based on Nadelhoffer’s study of the Butler problem, where ascriptions of knowledge in Butler-type scenarios are investigated.
{"title":"Epistemiczny efekt Knobe’a a problem Butlera. Test hipotezy zaniechaniowej","authors":"Katarzyna Paprzycka-Hausman","doi":"10.14394/FILNAU.2018.0017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14394/FILNAU.2018.0017","url":null,"abstract":"The omissions account offers structurally close explanations of the Knobe effect, the Butler problem, and the epistemic side-effect effect. Moreover, it predicts that the epistemic side-effect effect should be present not only in Knobe-type stories but also in Butler-type stories. Since the probability that the effect takes place is not greater than 1/6, the attribution of knowledge that it will take place is prima facie irrational. However, according to the omissions account, in the immoral situations, the knowledge claim can be read as a consequence-knowledge claim, which can be rationally accepted. I report the results of two studies, based on Nadelhoffer’s study of the Butler problem, where ascriptions of knowledge in Butler-type scenarios are investigated.","PeriodicalId":41424,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Nauki","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2018-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48603506","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-10-31DOI: 10.14394/FILNAU.2018.0015
Karol Matuszkiewicz
This paper argues that pragmatics can yield interesting insights into the nature of paradoxes of self-reference. These insights help us understand that self-referential questions in philosophy do not necessarily lead to antinomy. First, the article summarizes the results of the traditional, formal-semantic approach to antinomies and determines which kind of attempts at resolving them has led philosophers to reject all self-referential sentences as nonsensical. Next, it presents two pragmatically-oriented attempts at solving the Liar paradox. Critical examination of these attempts makes it possible to distill the specific features of the pragmatic approach and to use these features in an analysis of several self-referential utterances. Accordingly, the paper proposes a classification of pragmatic self-reference, which is then used to analyze the argument from self-referential inconsistency against skepticism. The paper closes with a summary emphasizing that, in light of pragmatic analysis, self-referential arguments in philosophy are not affected by paradox, which shows that the inadmissibility thesis is unjustified.
{"title":"Self-Reference in Philosophical Argumentation from the Perspective of Pragmatics","authors":"Karol Matuszkiewicz","doi":"10.14394/FILNAU.2018.0015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14394/FILNAU.2018.0015","url":null,"abstract":"This paper argues that pragmatics can yield interesting insights into the nature of paradoxes of self-reference. These insights help us understand that self-referential questions in philosophy do not necessarily lead to antinomy. First, the article summarizes the results of the traditional, formal-semantic approach to antinomies and determines which kind of attempts at resolving them has led philosophers to reject all self-referential sentences as nonsensical. Next, it presents two pragmatically-oriented attempts at solving the Liar paradox. Critical examination of these attempts makes it possible to distill the specific features of the pragmatic approach and to use these features in an analysis of several self-referential utterances. Accordingly, the paper proposes a classification of pragmatic self-reference, which is then used to analyze the argument from self-referential inconsistency against skepticism. The paper closes with a summary emphasizing that, in light of pragmatic analysis, self-referential arguments in philosophy are not affected by paradox, which shows that the inadmissibility thesis is unjustified.","PeriodicalId":41424,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Nauki","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2018-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44121717","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-10-30DOI: 10.14394/FILNAU.2018.0019
J. Dadaczyński
Hilbert’s program of formalism was undoubtedly a result of many mathematical, logical, and philosophical factors. The aim of this paper is to indicate some rarely highlighted contexts. One important goal of Hilbert’s program was to prove the consistency of arithmetic. The paper shows that Hilbert did not begin the study of this issue only after the discovery of Russell’s paradox. The issue of the consistency of the arithmetic of real numbers was associated with the discovery — by Burali-Forti and Cantor — of the first set-theoretical antinomy, i.e. the antinomy of the greatest ordinal number. Hilbert, already in 1899, asked whether the set of real numbers — to use Cantor’s terminology — was a consistent collection. He then raised the issue of the consistency of the arithmetic of natural numbers in 1904, after the discovery of Russell’s paradox. Fundamental for Hilbert’s mature program of formalism was the distinction between the finitistic and the infinitisticmathematics. The paper points out that the source of this distinction can be found in Brouwer’s proof-theoretical and constructivist criticism of certain theorems of the classical logic. So significant was the criticism that Hilbert had to take it into account in his formalistic reconstruction of classical mathematics. The result was precisely his distinction between the finitistic and the infinitistic mathematics.
{"title":"O niektórych inspiracjach Hilbertowskiego programu formalizmu","authors":"J. Dadaczyński","doi":"10.14394/FILNAU.2018.0019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14394/FILNAU.2018.0019","url":null,"abstract":"Hilbert’s program of formalism was undoubtedly a result of many mathematical, logical, and philosophical factors. The aim of this paper is to indicate some rarely highlighted contexts. One important goal of Hilbert’s program was to prove the consistency of arithmetic. The paper shows that Hilbert did not begin the study of this issue only after the discovery of Russell’s paradox. The issue of the consistency of the arithmetic of real numbers was associated with the discovery — by Burali-Forti and Cantor — of the first set-theoretical antinomy, i.e. the antinomy of the greatest ordinal number. Hilbert, already in 1899, asked whether the set of real numbers — to use Cantor’s terminology — was a consistent collection. He then raised the issue of the consistency of the arithmetic of natural numbers in 1904, after the discovery of Russell’s paradox. Fundamental for Hilbert’s mature program of formalism was the distinction between the finitistic and the infinitisticmathematics. The paper points out that the source of this distinction can be found in Brouwer’s proof-theoretical and constructivist criticism of certain theorems of the classical logic. So significant was the criticism that Hilbert had to take it into account in his formalistic reconstruction of classical mathematics. The result was precisely his distinction between the finitistic and the infinitistic mathematics.","PeriodicalId":41424,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Nauki","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2018-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41680846","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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