Pub Date : 2021-08-19DOI: 10.1080/07343469.2021.1964820
Sandra Moats
{"title":"Browne, Stephen Howard. The First Inauguration: George Washington and the Invention of the Republic","authors":"Sandra Moats","doi":"10.1080/07343469.2021.1964820","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/07343469.2021.1964820","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41473,"journal":{"name":"Congress & The Presidency-A Journal of Capital Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-08-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42059898","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-08-19DOI: 10.1080/07343469.2021.1964829
W. Court
The debate about the potential influence of vice presidential nominees on voters has long been dominated by outdated stereotypes and speculative political punditry. This foundation was a result of ...
{"title":"Devine, Christopher J., and Kyle C. Kopko. Do Running Mates Matter? The Influence of Vice Presidential Candidates in Presidential Elections","authors":"W. Court","doi":"10.1080/07343469.2021.1964829","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/07343469.2021.1964829","url":null,"abstract":"The debate about the potential influence of vice presidential nominees on voters has long been dominated by outdated stereotypes and speculative political punditry. This foundation was a result of ...","PeriodicalId":41473,"journal":{"name":"Congress & The Presidency-A Journal of Capital Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-08-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46902371","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-08-17DOI: 10.1080/07343469.2021.1964819
Y. Ouyang
{"title":"Bose, Meena, and Andrew Rudalevige, Eds. Executive Policymaking: The Role of the OMB in the Presidency","authors":"Y. Ouyang","doi":"10.1080/07343469.2021.1964819","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/07343469.2021.1964819","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41473,"journal":{"name":"Congress & The Presidency-A Journal of Capital Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-08-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47569233","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Unorthodox Presidency of Donald J. Trump","authors":"R. L. Riley","doi":"10.2307/j.ctv1vg7nzn","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv1vg7nzn","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41473,"journal":{"name":"Congress & The Presidency-A Journal of Capital Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-08-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48396120","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-27DOI: 10.1080/07343469.2021.1922540
Kevin M. Baron
Abstract The president’s formal role in lawmaking comes through the veto power, although Neustadt noted the informal power of persuasion through bargaining. Building from Azari and Smith’s work on information institutions, this research demonstrates how bargaining and veto threats function as an informal institution operating within the formal rules and constraints of the legislative development process, as there are no formal rules to govern presidential bargaining with Congress. The president’s power to persuade becomes contextual and situational to the issue, individual, and moment in time. Using the development of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and the first amendment to the bill, I examine how and why presidents will choose to employ a private versus public bargaining strategy based on the context in which they find themselves. Using the same policy issue across three administrations – Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon, and Gerald Ford - provides consistency in the political contexts allowing for an in-depth examination of a single policy issue. The informal nature of presidential engagement on legislation highlights the motivations and constraints presidents face in choosing a private or public strategy. Original archival research was conducted to provide the context-rich examination of the internal White House conversations along with the conversations between the president and Congress.
总统在立法中的正式作用是通过否决权来实现的，尽管纽施塔特指出了通过讨价还价来说服的非正式力量。基于Azari和Smith对信息制度的研究，本研究展示了议价和否决威胁如何作为一种非正式制度在立法发展过程的正式规则和约束下运作，因为没有正式规则来管理总统与国会的议价。总统的说服能力变得与问题、个人和时刻相关和情境化。本文以《信息自由法》(Freedom of Information Act, FOIA)的发展及其第一修正案为例，探讨总统如何以及为什么会根据自己所处的环境，选择采用私下与公开谈判的策略。在三届政府(林登·约翰逊、理查德·尼克松和杰拉尔德·福特)中使用相同的政策问题，提供了政治背景的一致性，允许对单个政策问题进行深入研究。总统参与立法的非正式性质凸显了总统在选择私人或公共战略时面临的动机和限制。进行原始档案研究是为了对白宫内部对话以及总统与国会之间的对话进行背景丰富的检查。
{"title":"Informal and Private: Bargaining and Veto Threats over the Freedom of Information Act","authors":"Kevin M. Baron","doi":"10.1080/07343469.2021.1922540","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/07343469.2021.1922540","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The president’s formal role in lawmaking comes through the veto power, although Neustadt noted the informal power of persuasion through bargaining. Building from Azari and Smith’s work on information institutions, this research demonstrates how bargaining and veto threats function as an informal institution operating within the formal rules and constraints of the legislative development process, as there are no formal rules to govern presidential bargaining with Congress. The president’s power to persuade becomes contextual and situational to the issue, individual, and moment in time. Using the development of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and the first amendment to the bill, I examine how and why presidents will choose to employ a private versus public bargaining strategy based on the context in which they find themselves. Using the same policy issue across three administrations – Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon, and Gerald Ford - provides consistency in the political contexts allowing for an in-depth examination of a single policy issue. The informal nature of presidential engagement on legislation highlights the motivations and constraints presidents face in choosing a private or public strategy. Original archival research was conducted to provide the context-rich examination of the internal White House conversations along with the conversations between the president and Congress.","PeriodicalId":41473,"journal":{"name":"Congress & The Presidency-A Journal of Capital Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-07-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/07343469.2021.1922540","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48424279","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-27DOI: 10.1080/07343469.2021.1922541
Chase B. Meyer
Abstract Primary challenges are semi-regular occurrences for incumbent members of Congress, and while many of these primary challengers never pose a serious threat to the incumbent, there are occasions when the incumbent faces a difficult primary challenge. How do incumbent members of Congress, particularly members of the Senate, act in response to primary challengers? This study examines the impact a primary challenger has on the voting behavior of incumbent senators to determine if incumbents change how they vote in Congress to counter their primary threat. In response to a primary challenger incumbent I find that senators shift their voting behavior and vote more often with their party’s leadership, but this is conditional on the threat-level posed by the primary challenger. High-quality primary challengers elicit the greatest shift in the incumbent’s behavior, according to this study. Supplemental data for this article is available online at https://doi.org/10.1080/07343469.2021.1922541 .
{"title":"Getting “Primaried” in the Senate: Primary Challengers and the Roll-Call Voting Behavior of Sitting senators","authors":"Chase B. Meyer","doi":"10.1080/07343469.2021.1922541","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/07343469.2021.1922541","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Primary challenges are semi-regular occurrences for incumbent members of Congress, and while many of these primary challengers never pose a serious threat to the incumbent, there are occasions when the incumbent faces a difficult primary challenge. How do incumbent members of Congress, particularly members of the Senate, act in response to primary challengers? This study examines the impact a primary challenger has on the voting behavior of incumbent senators to determine if incumbents change how they vote in Congress to counter their primary threat. In response to a primary challenger incumbent I find that senators shift their voting behavior and vote more often with their party’s leadership, but this is conditional on the threat-level posed by the primary challenger. High-quality primary challengers elicit the greatest shift in the incumbent’s behavior, according to this study. Supplemental data for this article is available online at https://doi.org/10.1080/07343469.2021.1922541 .","PeriodicalId":41473,"journal":{"name":"Congress & The Presidency-A Journal of Capital Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-07-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/07343469.2021.1922541","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44641624","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-08DOI: 10.1080/07343469.2021.1934186
Christopher A. Martínez, Mariana Llanos, R. Tatalovich
Abstract Our main objective is to explain why and under what conditions legislators (co)sponsor impeachment resolutions against the president of the United States. We examine the impact of political, institutional, and economic variables, suggested by presidency and impeachment scholarship, on the behavior of 2,044 legislators who were members of the House of Representatives between 1973 and 2019. To test these hypotheses, we use two-level logistic regressions and an original dataset of all presidential impeachment resolutions filed in the House during that period. Our primary findings are that impeachment resolutions against the president are driven by individual-level variables such as representatives’ ideological extremity and partisanship. Our analysis also shows that the occurrence of major presidential scandals incentivizes representatives to target the chief executive. Surprisingly, we find no statistical evidence for the effects of divided government, presidential approval, and macro-economic factors. Our results suggest that representatives use impeachment resolutions both for position taking and for rendering the president accountable.
{"title":"Impeaching the President: Mapping the Political Landscape in the House of Representatives","authors":"Christopher A. Martínez, Mariana Llanos, R. Tatalovich","doi":"10.1080/07343469.2021.1934186","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/07343469.2021.1934186","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Our main objective is to explain why and under what conditions legislators (co)sponsor impeachment resolutions against the president of the United States. We examine the impact of political, institutional, and economic variables, suggested by presidency and impeachment scholarship, on the behavior of 2,044 legislators who were members of the House of Representatives between 1973 and 2019. To test these hypotheses, we use two-level logistic regressions and an original dataset of all presidential impeachment resolutions filed in the House during that period. Our primary findings are that impeachment resolutions against the president are driven by individual-level variables such as representatives’ ideological extremity and partisanship. Our analysis also shows that the occurrence of major presidential scandals incentivizes representatives to target the chief executive. Surprisingly, we find no statistical evidence for the effects of divided government, presidential approval, and macro-economic factors. Our results suggest that representatives use impeachment resolutions both for position taking and for rendering the president accountable.","PeriodicalId":41473,"journal":{"name":"Congress & The Presidency-A Journal of Capital Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-07-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/07343469.2021.1934186","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43369367","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-12DOI: 10.1080/07343469.2021.1880499
Heather Ba, B. Schneider, T. Sullivan
Abstract Contemporary research on presidential appointments tends to focus on the Senate’s political climate as a primary cause of its “broken politics.” In contrast, we focus on the role the president plays in setting the stage for Senate confirmation of federal appointees. Our empirical approach suggests that an active president who demonstrates initiative in the transition planning phase of an administration can better control the agenda of the Presidentially Appointed and Confirmed by the Senate (PAS) appointment process by jump-starting it before the Senate’s policy workload accumulates and legislative politicking takes over. This approach suggests that better transition planning can hasten the overall appointments process.
{"title":"The Longer You Wait, the Longer It Takes: Presidential Transition Planning and Appointment Politics","authors":"Heather Ba, B. Schneider, T. Sullivan","doi":"10.1080/07343469.2021.1880499","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/07343469.2021.1880499","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Contemporary research on presidential appointments tends to focus on the Senate’s political climate as a primary cause of its “broken politics.” In contrast, we focus on the role the president plays in setting the stage for Senate confirmation of federal appointees. Our empirical approach suggests that an active president who demonstrates initiative in the transition planning phase of an administration can better control the agenda of the Presidentially Appointed and Confirmed by the Senate (PAS) appointment process by jump-starting it before the Senate’s policy workload accumulates and legislative politicking takes over. This approach suggests that better transition planning can hasten the overall appointments process.","PeriodicalId":41473,"journal":{"name":"Congress & The Presidency-A Journal of Capital Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-05-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/07343469.2021.1880499","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43913892","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-04DOI: 10.1080/07343469.2021.1917965
Michael G. Hagen
{"title":"How Trump Happened: A System Shock Decades in the Making","authors":"Michael G. Hagen","doi":"10.1080/07343469.2021.1917965","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/07343469.2021.1917965","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41473,"journal":{"name":"Congress & The Presidency-A Journal of Capital Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/07343469.2021.1917965","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43211040","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-04DOI: 10.1080/07343469.2021.1917958
T. Bell
{"title":"Constitutional Dysfunction on Trial: Congressional Lawsuits and the Separation of Powers","authors":"T. Bell","doi":"10.1080/07343469.2021.1917958","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/07343469.2021.1917958","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41473,"journal":{"name":"Congress & The Presidency-A Journal of Capital Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/07343469.2021.1917958","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46921809","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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