This paper examines how Sartre’s early phenomenological works were influenced by Emmanuel Levinas’s The Theory of Intuition in Husserl’s Phenomenology. Sartre embraced two key aspects of Levinas’s interpretation of Husserl: 1) that phenomenology is an ontological philosophy whose foundation is the doctrine of intentionality; and, 2) that consciousness’s being consists in intentionality, which entails that consciousness is non-substantial as well as pre-reflectively or non-thetically aware of itself. In addition to adopting these views, Sartre also became gripped by a methodological problem raised by Levinas. Namely, phenomenology reflects on consciousness, yet reflection modifies the consciousness it reflects on. I argue that Sartre responds to this problem by developing two of Levinas’s ideas: that reflection is a motivated act and that reflection must adequately grasp consciousness’s temporality.
{"title":"Your Past Comes Back to Haunt You","authors":"Curtis Sommerlatte","doi":"10.3167/ssi.2020.260206","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3167/ssi.2020.260206","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines how Sartre’s early phenomenological works were influenced by Emmanuel Levinas’s The Theory of Intuition in Husserl’s Phenomenology. Sartre embraced two key aspects of Levinas’s interpretation of Husserl: 1) that phenomenology is an ontological philosophy whose foundation is the doctrine of intentionality; and, 2) that consciousness’s being consists in intentionality, which entails that consciousness is non-substantial as well as pre-reflectively or non-thetically aware of itself. In addition to adopting these views, Sartre also became gripped by a methodological problem raised by Levinas. Namely, phenomenology reflects on consciousness, yet reflection modifies the consciousness it reflects on. I argue that Sartre responds to this problem by developing two of Levinas’s ideas: that reflection is a motivated act and that reflection must adequately grasp consciousness’s temporality.","PeriodicalId":41680,"journal":{"name":"Sartre Studies International","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.3167/ssi.2020.260206","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47657396","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I have two aims: to analyze Jonathan Webber’s analysis of bad faith and compare it to my own, traditional, account and to show that Webber’s focus on character, as a set of dispositions or character traits that incline but do not determine us to view the world and behave in certain ways, contributes further to understanding Sartre’s ‘bad faith’. Most Sartre scholars have ignored any emphasis on ‘character’. What is distinctive and emphatic in Webber’s interpretation is his insistence ‘on bad faith’ as a ‘social disease’ distorting the way one views, interprets, and even thinks about the world. (Matt Eshleman also moves in this direction). But, again, this pattern is not deterministic. Early in his work, Webber tells us that Sartre does not claim that we have bad faith by ‘ascribing character traits where there are none but by pretending to ourselves that we have ‘fixed natures’ that e.g. preclude the behaviour or character trait of which one is being accused.Though hardly disagreeing radically with Webber (or he with me) I do offer critical considerations. While Webber focuses on character, I focus on Sartre’s contention that the ‘most basic’ or ‘first act’ of bad faith is ‘to flee from what [the human being] cannot flee, from what it is’, specifically human freedom. And I disagree partially with Webber’s articulation of the ‘spirit of seriousness’, and strongly with both Sartre’s and his supporting claim that bad faith cannot be cynical. I also demur from Webber’s overemphasis on the ‘social’. For me, the root of all bad faith is our primitive ontological condition; namely, that at its very ‘upsurge’, human reality, anguished by its ‘reflective apprehension’ of its freedom and lack of Being, is disposed to flee from its nothingness in pursuit of identity, substantiality - in short, Being.
{"title":"Bad Faith and Character in Jonathan Webber’s Sartre","authors":"Ronald E. Santoni","doi":"10.3167/ssi.2020.260105","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3167/ssi.2020.260105","url":null,"abstract":"I have two aims: to analyze Jonathan Webber’s analysis of bad faith and compare it to my own, traditional, account and to show that Webber’s focus on character, as a set of dispositions or character traits that incline but do not determine us to view the world and behave in certain ways, contributes further to understanding Sartre’s ‘bad faith’. Most Sartre scholars have ignored any emphasis on ‘character’. What is distinctive and emphatic in Webber’s interpretation is his insistence ‘on bad faith’ as a ‘social disease’ distorting the way one views, interprets, and even thinks about the world. (Matt Eshleman also moves in this direction). But, again, this pattern is not deterministic. Early in his work, Webber tells us that Sartre does not claim that we have bad faith by ‘ascribing character traits where there are none but by pretending to ourselves that we have ‘fixed natures’ that e.g. preclude the behaviour or character trait of which one is being accused.Though hardly disagreeing radically with Webber (or he with me) I do offer critical considerations. While Webber focuses on character, I focus on Sartre’s contention that the ‘most basic’ or ‘first act’ of bad faith is ‘to flee from what [the human being] cannot flee, from what it is’, specifically human freedom. And I disagree partially with Webber’s articulation of the ‘spirit of seriousness’, and strongly with both Sartre’s and his supporting claim that bad faith cannot be cynical. I also demur from Webber’s overemphasis on the ‘social’. For me, the root of all bad faith is our primitive ontological condition; namely, that at its very ‘upsurge’, human reality, anguished by its ‘reflective apprehension’ of its freedom and lack of Being, is disposed to flee from its nothingness in pursuit of identity, substantiality - in short, Being.","PeriodicalId":41680,"journal":{"name":"Sartre Studies International","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2020-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46486275","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I am so grateful to Matthew Eshleman and Adrian van den Hoven for their generous, insightful comments. Translating can be a lonely activity, especially when the text is as lengthy as BN. At the end of hours of involvement with Sartre’s French – perched, as it were, on the edge of his mind – I often felt in need of other, auxiliary minds to re-centre me, to save me from toppling over completely into Sartre’s consciousness and drowning. In these moments, I usually turned to dictionaries and other internet resources to bolster my critical distance; more rarely, I would email fellow translators or philosophers for help. But I have had very little of the attentive, fine-grained dialogue offered here, and I have immensely enjoyed, and benefited from, this exchange. Hopefully, SSI readers will also find it of interest.
我非常感谢Matthew Eshleman和Adrian van den Hoven慷慨而富有洞察力的评论。翻译可能是一项孤独的活动，尤其是当文本像BN一样长时。在沉浸于萨特的法语之中的最后几个小时——仿佛置身于他思想的边缘——我常常感到需要其他辅助的思想来重新集中我的注意力，拯救我，使我不至于完全倾倒在萨特的意识中而被淹死。在这种情况下，我通常会求助于字典和其他网络资源来支撑我的临界距离;更罕见的是，我会给其他翻译或哲学家发邮件寻求帮助。但我很少有这里提供的那种细致入微的对话，我非常享受这种交流，并从中受益。希望SSI读者也会对它感兴趣。
{"title":"Responses to Matthew Eshleman and Adrian van den Hoven","authors":"S. Richmond","doi":"10.3167/ssi.2020.260104","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3167/ssi.2020.260104","url":null,"abstract":"I am so grateful to Matthew Eshleman and Adrian van den Hoven for their generous, insightful comments. Translating can be a lonely activity, especially when the text is as lengthy as BN. At the end of hours of involvement with Sartre’s French – perched, as it were, on the edge of his mind – I often felt in need of other, auxiliary minds to re-centre me, to save me from toppling over completely into Sartre’s consciousness and drowning. In these moments, I usually turned to dictionaries and other internet resources to bolster my critical distance; more rarely, I would email fellow translators or philosophers for help. But I have had very little of the attentive, fine-grained dialogue offered here, and I have immensely enjoyed, and benefited from, this exchange. Hopefully, SSI readers will also find it of interest.","PeriodicalId":41680,"journal":{"name":"Sartre Studies International","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2020-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48922729","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This issue has something of a symposium feel about it: a genuine conversation between some of our most eminent Sartre scholars, which, while clearly not planned this way, turns out to be rather appropriate in these socially distanced times. Whereas recent issues have testified to the breadth of Sartre’s work, the focus this time is on Sartre’s early philosophy, mainly, but not exclusively, on L’Etre et le néant.
这个问题有一种研讨会的感觉：我们一些最著名的萨特学者之间的真诚对话，虽然显然不是这样计划的，但在这个社交距离遥远的时代，这是相当合适的。尽管最近的问题证明了萨特作品的广度，但这一次的焦点是萨特早期的哲学，主要但不完全是《Etre et le néant》。
{"title":"Editorial","authors":"John Gillespie, Katherine C. Morris","doi":"10.3167/ssi.2020.260101","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3167/ssi.2020.260101","url":null,"abstract":"This issue has something of a symposium feel about it: a genuine conversation between some of our most eminent Sartre scholars, which, while clearly not planned this way, turns out to be rather appropriate in these socially distanced times. Whereas recent issues have testified to the breadth of Sartre’s work, the focus this time is on Sartre’s early philosophy, mainly, but not exclusively, on L’Etre et le néant.","PeriodicalId":41680,"journal":{"name":"Sartre Studies International","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2020-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45501466","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
George Pattison and Kate Kirkpatrick, The Mystical Sources of Existentialist Thought: Being, Nothingness, Love (New York: Routledge, 2019) 228 pp., ISBN-13: 978-1138092372 (hardback)Oliver Davis and Colin Davis, eds, Freedom and the Subject of Theory: Essays in Honour of Christina Howells (Cambridge: Legenda, 2019) vii + 216 pp. ISBN: 978-178188-7332 (hardback)
George Pattison和Kate Kirkpatrick，《存在主义思想的神秘来源：存在、虚无、爱》（纽约：Routledge，2019）228页，ISBN-13:978-1138092372（精装本）Oliver Davis和Colin Davis主编，《自由与理论主题：纪念Christina Howells的散文》（剑桥：Legenda，2019）vii+216页，ISBN:978-178188-7332（精装本
{"title":"Book Reviews","authors":"K. Shuttleworth, Nik Farrell Fox","doi":"10.3167/ssi.2020.260108","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3167/ssi.2020.260108","url":null,"abstract":"George Pattison and Kate Kirkpatrick, The Mystical Sources of Existentialist Thought: Being, Nothingness, Love (New York: Routledge, 2019) 228 pp., ISBN-13: 978-1138092372 (hardback)Oliver Davis and Colin Davis, eds, Freedom and the Subject of Theory: Essays in Honour of Christina Howells (Cambridge: Legenda, 2019) vii + 216 pp. ISBN: 978-178188-7332 (hardback)","PeriodicalId":41680,"journal":{"name":"Sartre Studies International","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2020-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41349075","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Kate Kirkpatrick, Becoming Beauvoir: A Life (London: Bloomsbury, 2019), xiv + 476 pp. ISBN: 9781–350–04717–4Simone de Beauvoir, Diary of a Philosophy Student: Volume 2, 1928–29. The Beauvoir Series. Edited by Barbara Klaw, Sylvie Le Bon de Beauvoir, Margaret Simons, and Marybeth Timmerman; translated by Barbara Klaw; series edited by Margaret Simons and Sylvie Le Bon de Beauvoir (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2019), xii + 374 pp. ISBN: 978–0-252–04254–6
Kate Kirkpatrick，《成为波伏娃：一生》（Becoming Beauvoir:A Life）（伦敦：布鲁姆斯伯里出版社，2019），xiv+476页，国际标准图书编号：9781–350–04717–4西蒙·德·波伏娃，《哲学学生日记》：第2卷，1928–29。波伏娃系列。由Barbara Klaw、Sylvie Le Bon de Beauvoir、Margaret Simons和Marybeth Timmerman编辑；Barbara Klaw翻译；Margaret Simons和Sylvie Le Bon de Beauvoir编辑的系列（Urbana:伊利诺伊大学出版社，2019），xii+374页，ISBN:978–0-252–04254–6
{"title":"Beauvoir and Writing as the Creation of the Self","authors":"Liesbeth Schoonheim","doi":"10.3167/ssi.2020.260107","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3167/ssi.2020.260107","url":null,"abstract":"Kate Kirkpatrick, Becoming Beauvoir: A Life (London: Bloomsbury, 2019), xiv + 476 pp. ISBN: 9781–350–04717–4Simone de Beauvoir, Diary of a Philosophy Student: Volume 2, 1928–29. The Beauvoir Series. Edited by Barbara Klaw, Sylvie Le Bon de Beauvoir, Margaret Simons, and Marybeth Timmerman; translated by Barbara Klaw; series edited by Margaret Simons and Sylvie Le Bon de Beauvoir (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2019), xii + 374 pp. ISBN: 978–0-252–04254–6","PeriodicalId":41680,"journal":{"name":"Sartre Studies International","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2020-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43432795","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article surveys most of the recent reviews of Sarah Richmond’s excellent new translation of L’Être et le néant. It offers some close textual comparisons between Richmond’s translation, Hazel Barnes’ translation, and the Checklist of Errors of Hazel Barnes’ Translation of L’Être et le néant. This article concludes that Richmond delivers a higher semantic resolution translation that overcomes nearly all the liabilities found in Barnes and does so without sacrificing much by way of readability.
本文调查了莎拉·里奇蒙（Sarah Richmond）对L‘Uncated tre et le néant的优秀新译本的大多数最新评论。它提供了Richmond的翻译、Hazel Barnes的翻译和Hazel巴恩斯翻译的L‘specified tre et le néant的错误清单之间的一些密切的文本比较。本文得出的结论是，Richmond提供了一种更高语义分辨率的翻译，几乎克服了Barnes中的所有责任，并且在不牺牲可读性的情况下做到了这一点。
{"title":"In Praise of Sarah Richmond's Translation of L'Être et le néant","authors":"Matthew C. Eshleman","doi":"10.3167/ssi.2020.260102","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3167/ssi.2020.260102","url":null,"abstract":"This article surveys most of the recent reviews of Sarah Richmond’s excellent new translation of L’Être et le néant. It offers some close textual comparisons between Richmond’s translation, Hazel Barnes’ translation, and the Checklist of Errors of Hazel Barnes’ Translation of L’Être et le néant. This article concludes that Richmond delivers a higher semantic resolution translation that overcomes nearly all the liabilities found in Barnes and does so without sacrificing much by way of readability.","PeriodicalId":41680,"journal":{"name":"Sartre Studies International","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2020-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48882340","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Sarah Richmond’s translation makes an important contribution to Sartrean scholarship. L’Etre et le néant was first translated by Hazel Barnes in 1956 but it contained various errors. Richmond also had access to the internet and to Sartre’s French and German sources. Her edition also contains an Introduction and a ‘Notes on the translation’ section.Sartre published his work in 1943 and, unable to access all the works he cited, he often did so from memory. He also adopted certain translators’ neologisms: for example, Corbin’s translation of Heidegger’s Qu’est-ce que la métaphysique? , and when he quoted Nietzsche, he used two different translations, and he quotes Spinoza using a text by Hegel. He quotes a line from the playwright Beaumarchais without clarifying the context.Sarah Richmond deals with many of these problems and also notes that the French gender system can be problematic. Also, Sartre’s neologisms rendered finding English equivalents difficult. This is an excellent translation.
莎拉·里奇蒙的翻译对萨特的学术研究做出了重要贡献。Hazel Barnes于1956年首次翻译了《L'Etre et le néant》，但其中包含了各种错误。里士满还可以访问互联网以及萨特的法国和德国消息来源。她的版本还包含一个引言和一个“翻译注释”部分。萨特于1943年出版了他的作品，由于无法访问他引用的所有作品，他经常在记忆中这样做。他还采用了一些翻译家的新词：例如，科尔宾翻译的海德格尔的《艺术的本质》，当他引用尼采时，他使用了两种不同的翻译，他引用了斯宾诺莎使用的黑格尔的文本。他引用了剧作家博马尔查伊的一句话，但没有澄清上下文。Sarah Richmond处理了其中的许多问题，并指出法国的性别制度可能存在问题。此外，萨特的新词使寻找英语对等词变得困难。这是一个很好的翻译。
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This article is a clarification and development of my interpretation of Sartre’s theory of bad faith in response to Ronald Santoni’s sophisticated critique, published in this issue. It begins by clarifying Sartre’s conception of a project and explaining his claim that one project is fundamental, thereby elucidating the idea that bad faith is a fundamental project. This forms the groundwork of my responses to Santoni’s critique of my interpretation, which comprises four arguments: Sartre does not consider us to be ontologically and congenitally disposed to bad faith; Santoni is right that social pressure cannot explain the prevalence of bad faith, but this is a problem with Sartre’s theory rather than a problem for my interpretation of it; Sartre’s conception of seriousness is merely an optional strategy of bad faith; and Sartre is right to deny that bad faith is an inherently cynical project.
{"title":"Sociality, Seriousness, and Cynicism","authors":"J. Webber","doi":"10.3167/ssi.2020.260106","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3167/ssi.2020.260106","url":null,"abstract":"This article is a clarification and development of my interpretation of Sartre’s theory of bad faith in response to Ronald Santoni’s sophisticated critique, published in this issue. It begins by clarifying Sartre’s conception of a project and explaining his claim that one project is fundamental, thereby elucidating the idea that bad faith is a fundamental project. This forms the groundwork of my responses to Santoni’s critique of my interpretation, which comprises four arguments: Sartre does not consider us to be ontologically and congenitally disposed to bad faith; Santoni is right that social pressure cannot explain the prevalence of bad faith, but this is a problem with Sartre’s theory rather than a problem for my interpretation of it; Sartre’s conception of seriousness is merely an optional strategy of bad faith; and Sartre is right to deny that bad faith is an inherently cynical project.","PeriodicalId":41680,"journal":{"name":"Sartre Studies International","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2020-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48320765","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Alfred Betschart has claimed that the project of existential Marxism is a contradiction in terms, but this argument, even when supported by many experts and quotes from Sartre’s 1975 interview, misses the point of my Boston Review article, “The Philosophy of Our Time.”1 I believe the important argument today is not about whether we can prove that Sartre ever became a full-fledged Marxist, but rather about the political and philosophical possibility, and importance today, of existentialist Marxism. I have come to this over a lifetime of study and political involvement. Alfred saved me from embarrassment by not citing my early work for his argument. As a young new-Left activist and scholar under the influence of Herbert Marcuse, I was much occupied with the issue of Sartre’s Marxism from the mid-1960s until Verso’s publication of my first book, Jean-Paul Sartre Philosophy in the World (1980). Already in 1978, in Western Marxism: A Critical Reader, New Left Review had published, alongside André Gorz’s presentation of The Critique of Dialectical Reason’s contribution to Marxism, my argument that the Critique reveals an unbridgeable distance between Sartre’s key concepts and those of historical materialism. That claim began a thirty-year silent dialogue between Gorz and myself over whether Sartre’s individuals were already social (Gorz’s position), or not yet social (my own). My book traced the entire sweep of Sartre’s career, from his earliest explorations of escape from the difficult world to his passionate but conflicted involvement in it, to his embrace of leftist politics, to his attraction to Marxism but rejection of its orthodox Communist forms, to his acceptance of Marxism as the “philosophy of our time” while rethinking it to accommodate our irreducible human freedom and self-determination, and then to his final break with Communism and the old age-induced abandonment of his radical theoretical projects. I concluded that through his rich and multi-faceted career,
阿尔弗雷德·贝特沙尔（Alfred Betschart）曾声称，存在主义马克思主义的项目在术语上是矛盾的，但这一论点，即使得到了许多专家的支持，并引用了萨特1975年的采访，也没有抓住我在《波士顿评论》（Boston Review）的文章《我们时代的哲学》（the Philosophy of Our Time）的要点，而是关于存在主义马克思主义的政治和哲学可能性，以及今天的重要性。我是在一生的学习和政治参与中走到这一步的。阿尔弗雷德没有引用我早期的工作作为他的论点，使我免于尴尬。作为一名受赫伯特·马库塞影响的年轻新左派活动家和学者，从20世纪60年代中期到维索出版我的第一本书《让-保罗·萨特世界哲学》（1980），我一直忙于萨特的马克思主义问题。早在1978年，在《西方马克思主义：批判读者》一书中，《新左派评论》就发表了我的论点，即《辩证理性批判》揭示了萨特的关键概念与唯物史观之间不可逾越的距离。这一说法开始了戈兹和我之间长达三十年的无声对话，讨论萨特的个人是已经社会化了（戈兹的立场），还是还没有社会化（我自己的立场）。我的书追溯了萨特的整个职业生涯，从他最早探索逃离这个困难的世界，到他对这个世界充满激情但矛盾的参与，再到他对左翼政治的拥抱，再到对马克思主义的吸引力但对其正统共产主义形式的排斥，他接受马克思主义为“我们时代的哲学”，同时重新思考它以适应我们不可剥夺的人类自由和自决，然后他与共产主义的最终决裂，以及晚年导致的对其激进理论项目的放弃。我得出的结论是，通过他丰富多彩的职业生涯，
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