Résumé:L'article discute la distinction entre deux sortes de raisons, publiques et non publiques, qui joue un rôle majeur dans la manière dont John Rawls s'était efforcé de répondre aux critiques communautaristes, et que Catherine Audard réélabore pour en faire la clef d'une philosophie politique qui affronte ce qu'elle appelle la fragmentation culturelle. Faut-il concevoir les raisons publiques comme étant d'une nature argumentative, bien différente de celle des raisons non publiques ? Ou bien doit-on considérer que la différence est surtout entre leurs objets et oppose l'adoption d'une ligne de conduite à des croyances et des valorisations qui peuvent aussi répondre à des raisons ?
{"title":"Comment distinguer raisons publiques et raisons non publiques ?","authors":"Laurent Jaffro","doi":"10.3138/ttr.41.1.41","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3138/ttr.41.1.41","url":null,"abstract":"Résumé:L'article discute la distinction entre deux sortes de raisons, publiques et non publiques, qui joue un rôle majeur dans la manière dont John Rawls s'était efforcé de répondre aux critiques communautaristes, et que Catherine Audard réélabore pour en faire la clef d'une philosophie politique qui affronte ce qu'elle appelle la fragmentation culturelle. Faut-il concevoir les raisons publiques comme étant d'une nature argumentative, bien différente de celle des raisons non publiques ? Ou bien doit-on considérer que la différence est surtout entre leurs objets et oppose l'adoption d'une ligne de conduite à des croyances et des valorisations qui peuvent aussi répondre à des raisons ?","PeriodicalId":41972,"journal":{"name":"Tocqueville Review","volume":"41 1","pages":"41 - 53"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49026628","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Résumé:L'introduction du dossier « La raison a-t-elle encore sa place en démocratie ? Hommage à Catherine Audard » rappelle brièvement le parcours et les apports les plus décisifs de la philosophe C. Audard à la philosophie politique francophone. Puis elle présente les différentes contributions du dossier.
{"title":"La raison a-t-elle encore sa place dans la démocratie ? Hommage à Catherine Audard","authors":"Magali Bessone, Sophie Guérard de Latour","doi":"10.3138/ttr.41.1.7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3138/ttr.41.1.7","url":null,"abstract":"Résumé:L'introduction du dossier « La raison a-t-elle encore sa place en démocratie ? Hommage à Catherine Audard » rappelle brièvement le parcours et les apports les plus décisifs de la philosophe C. Audard à la philosophie politique francophone. Puis elle présente les différentes contributions du dossier.","PeriodicalId":41972,"journal":{"name":"Tocqueville Review","volume":"41 1","pages":"12 - 7"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42706424","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract:This article tries to place the liberal thought of Raymond Aron during the 1970s in a transatlantic context. Doing so, it argues, allows for a better understanding of Aron's liberalism during the so-called French liberal revival that occurred during this decade. Aron, it shows, was critical of much of the turn to liberalism during this time in France, and in particular the appeal that international human rights had for former French Marxists turned liberals. The paper shows that Aron's critique of various elements of the French liberal revival only really make sense in light of his fears concerning US political and military decline due to the Vietnam War, economic inflation, the SALT treaty discussions, and perceived Soviet military advantages facilitated by the turn to a foreign policy of détente in the United States. These developments, signaled to Aron, the expansion of Soviet economic and political hegemony into Western Europe. Given these concerns, the trajectory of Aron's thought took a decidedly neoconservative turn during the 1970s, much like the thought of his neoconservative allies in the United States whom remained uncompromising in their Cold War liberal commitments to containing Communism.
{"title":"The Neoconservative Moment in France: Raymond Aron, The United States, and the 1970s","authors":"Daniel Steinmetz-Jenkins","doi":"10.3138/ttr.41.1.183","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3138/ttr.41.1.183","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:This article tries to place the liberal thought of Raymond Aron during the 1970s in a transatlantic context. Doing so, it argues, allows for a better understanding of Aron's liberalism during the so-called French liberal revival that occurred during this decade. Aron, it shows, was critical of much of the turn to liberalism during this time in France, and in particular the appeal that international human rights had for former French Marxists turned liberals. The paper shows that Aron's critique of various elements of the French liberal revival only really make sense in light of his fears concerning US political and military decline due to the Vietnam War, economic inflation, the SALT treaty discussions, and perceived Soviet military advantages facilitated by the turn to a foreign policy of détente in the United States. These developments, signaled to Aron, the expansion of Soviet economic and political hegemony into Western Europe. Given these concerns, the trajectory of Aron's thought took a decidedly neoconservative turn during the 1970s, much like the thought of his neoconservative allies in the United States whom remained uncompromising in their Cold War liberal commitments to containing Communism.","PeriodicalId":41972,"journal":{"name":"Tocqueville Review","volume":"41 1","pages":"183 - 204"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48587733","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Résumé:Un consensus politique est-il possible sans intervention de la force ou de la persuasion, sur la seule base de la raison ? La réponse de John Rawls dans Libéralisme politique est celle de l'abstinence épistémique. En renonçant à faire intervenir le Vrai, mais seulement le Raisonnable, en mobilisant des raisons publiques et non des croyances personnelles ou collectives, il serait possible d'arbitrer les conflits politiques et de stabiliser les institutions démocratiques sans intervention de la force. Mais cette solution a suscité de nombreuses critiques et, un peu à la manière du « patriotisme constitutionnel » défendu par Habermas, elle semble une base trop pauvre pour protéger le consensus démocratique contre ses ennemis. Surtout cette démarche exige des compétences cognitives et morales excessives. Après avoir analysé les conditions de possibilité de l'abstinence épistémique, je répondrai à trois séries d'objections et je conclurai qu'autant que de compétences cognitives et morales, la justification publique a besoin d'un espace public vraiment démocratique et pluraliste. C'est une question sociale et politique tout autant que cognitive ou morale.
{"title":"La démocratie et la raison : les exigences cognitives et morales de la justification publique sont-elles excessives ?","authors":"C. Audard","doi":"10.3138/ttr.41.1.13","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3138/ttr.41.1.13","url":null,"abstract":"Résumé:Un consensus politique est-il possible sans intervention de la force ou de la persuasion, sur la seule base de la raison ? La réponse de John Rawls dans Libéralisme politique est celle de l'abstinence épistémique. En renonçant à faire intervenir le Vrai, mais seulement le Raisonnable, en mobilisant des raisons publiques et non des croyances personnelles ou collectives, il serait possible d'arbitrer les conflits politiques et de stabiliser les institutions démocratiques sans intervention de la force. Mais cette solution a suscité de nombreuses critiques et, un peu à la manière du « patriotisme constitutionnel » défendu par Habermas, elle semble une base trop pauvre pour protéger le consensus démocratique contre ses ennemis. Surtout cette démarche exige des compétences cognitives et morales excessives. Après avoir analysé les conditions de possibilité de l'abstinence épistémique, je répondrai à trois séries d'objections et je conclurai qu'autant que de compétences cognitives et morales, la justification publique a besoin d'un espace public vraiment démocratique et pluraliste. C'est une question sociale et politique tout autant que cognitive ou morale.","PeriodicalId":41972,"journal":{"name":"Tocqueville Review","volume":"41 1","pages":"13 - 40"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44926597","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract:Which forms of contestation are beneficial for democracies, and which are not? This essay responds to this question by looking at writings on political contestation during 1968 by the French political theorist Claude Lefort. Although Lefort is now seen as a major theorist of democracy, I show that in 1968 he made almost no reference to democracy. Only from the 1970s onwards did he develop an elaborate theory of democracy that allowed him to better explain the role democracy and its symbolic principles could play in fostering contestation and also changed what he saw as proper forms of contestation. While in 1968 he had been enthusiastic about selfmanagement and was critical of traditional structures, in the 1970s almost the reverse was true. This essay ends with a brief comparison with Gauchet, which shows that Lefort, unlike Gauchet, continued to believe that democracies need contestation to flourish. In spite of all the changes in his theory post-1968, Lefort thus held on to 1968's spirit of contestation.
{"title":"Deepening Democracy Through Contestation? Lefort and Gauchet on May 1968 and its Legacy","authors":"Wim Weymans","doi":"10.3138/ttr.41.1.121","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3138/ttr.41.1.121","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:Which forms of contestation are beneficial for democracies, and which are not? This essay responds to this question by looking at writings on political contestation during 1968 by the French political theorist Claude Lefort. Although Lefort is now seen as a major theorist of democracy, I show that in 1968 he made almost no reference to democracy. Only from the 1970s onwards did he develop an elaborate theory of democracy that allowed him to better explain the role democracy and its symbolic principles could play in fostering contestation and also changed what he saw as proper forms of contestation. While in 1968 he had been enthusiastic about selfmanagement and was critical of traditional structures, in the 1970s almost the reverse was true. This essay ends with a brief comparison with Gauchet, which shows that Lefort, unlike Gauchet, continued to believe that democracies need contestation to flourish. In spite of all the changes in his theory post-1968, Lefort thus held on to 1968's spirit of contestation.","PeriodicalId":41972,"journal":{"name":"Tocqueville Review","volume":"41 1","pages":"121 - 139"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43256612","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract:What were the moral effects of commerce for society as a whole thought to be during the long eighteenth century in Europe? To answer, this paper distinguishes between high merchants (leading guild officials) and low (peddlers), and between the self-images of merchants and their perception by articulate elites. It finds surprising convergences between the self-images of peddlers and guildsmen (along with the less surprising divergences), and surprisingly similar positive evaluations of the merchant in paradigmatic eighteenth-century thinkers such as Montesquieu and Rousseau.
{"title":"Merchants and Morals: Perspectives High and Low in the Long Eighteenth Century","authors":"H. C. Clark","doi":"10.3138/ttr.40.2.19","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3138/ttr.40.2.19","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:What were the moral effects of commerce for society as a whole thought to be during the long eighteenth century in Europe? To answer, this paper distinguishes between high merchants (leading guild officials) and low (peddlers), and between the self-images of merchants and their perception by articulate elites. It finds surprising convergences between the self-images of peddlers and guildsmen (along with the less surprising divergences), and surprisingly similar positive evaluations of the merchant in paradigmatic eighteenth-century thinkers such as Montesquieu and Rousseau.","PeriodicalId":41972,"journal":{"name":"Tocqueville Review","volume":"40 1","pages":"19 - 34"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2019-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42691602","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract:Cet article propose une approche diachronique, sur plus d'un demi-siècle, du discours des confédérations syndicales françaises de salariés pour qualifier le système capitaliste. Deux grandes périodes historiques sont étudiées afin de rendre compte à la fois de la spécificité des termes retenus, de leur évolution et des visions du monde auxquelles ils renvoient. Un premier coup de sonde sur l'immédiat après Seconde Guerre mondiale montre ainsi un discours dépréciatif sur le capitalisme commun à la centrale syndicale chrétienne, la CFTC, et à la centrale de sensibilité communiste, la CGT. Un deuxième éclairage porte sur les années 1960 et insiste sur la richesse des analyses produites par la CFDT, critique de l'action des firmes multinationales mais aussi des pratiques consuméristes. Enfin, une dernière partie met en regard les mots choisis par les syndicats de salariés avec ceux présents dans le discours des organisations syndicales d'employeurs.
{"title":"Le systéme capitaliste passé au crible de l'analyse syndicale. France 1945-2019","authors":"S. Béroud, J. Lefềvre","doi":"10.3138/ttr.40.2.235","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3138/ttr.40.2.235","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:Cet article propose une approche diachronique, sur plus d'un demi-siècle, du discours des confédérations syndicales françaises de salariés pour qualifier le système capitaliste. Deux grandes périodes historiques sont étudiées afin de rendre compte à la fois de la spécificité des termes retenus, de leur évolution et des visions du monde auxquelles ils renvoient. Un premier coup de sonde sur l'immédiat après Seconde Guerre mondiale montre ainsi un discours dépréciatif sur le capitalisme commun à la centrale syndicale chrétienne, la CFTC, et à la centrale de sensibilité communiste, la CGT. Un deuxième éclairage porte sur les années 1960 et insiste sur la richesse des analyses produites par la CFDT, critique de l'action des firmes multinationales mais aussi des pratiques consuméristes. Enfin, une dernière partie met en regard les mots choisis par les syndicats de salariés avec ceux présents dans le discours des organisations syndicales d'employeurs.","PeriodicalId":41972,"journal":{"name":"Tocqueville Review","volume":"40 1","pages":"235 - 250"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2019-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46427677","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract:Adam Ferguson's claim to fame legitimately rests on his 1767 Essay on the History of civil society, in which he proved to be a worried observer of the effects of the still nascent commercial society on the human character. While recognizing on the one hand the huge gains in efficiency and productivity entailed by what he called "the age of separations", he was no less keenly aware that it inevitably brought about in its wake the degradation of a sizeable part of mankind, reduced to menial, repetitive tasks. He also contended that the overall effect of the new society was to isolate individuals from each other, paradoxically leading to a situation that is not unlike the state of nature. The most disturbing feature of Ferguson's thought, however, is that according to him, the deleterious effects of commercial society on the human character could only be undone by war, an extreme situation in which men could at last be led to recover their native spirit.
{"title":"Adam Ferguson on The Dismemberment of the Human Character in the Age of Separations","authors":"P. Lurbe","doi":"10.3138/ttr.40.2.35","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3138/ttr.40.2.35","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:Adam Ferguson's claim to fame legitimately rests on his 1767 Essay on the History of civil society, in which he proved to be a worried observer of the effects of the still nascent commercial society on the human character. While recognizing on the one hand the huge gains in efficiency and productivity entailed by what he called \"the age of separations\", he was no less keenly aware that it inevitably brought about in its wake the degradation of a sizeable part of mankind, reduced to menial, repetitive tasks. He also contended that the overall effect of the new society was to isolate individuals from each other, paradoxically leading to a situation that is not unlike the state of nature. The most disturbing feature of Ferguson's thought, however, is that according to him, the deleterious effects of commercial society on the human character could only be undone by war, an extreme situation in which men could at last be led to recover their native spirit.","PeriodicalId":41972,"journal":{"name":"Tocqueville Review","volume":"40 1","pages":"35 - 48"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2019-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44100449","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Résumé:L'effondrement de l'architecture depuis la seconde moitié du XXe siècle est indissociable de la crise de légitimité des architectes dans les pays occidentaux. Suivant un des grands paradigmes tocquevilliens, l'égalitarisme des sociétés démocratiques a conduit à la remise en cause des privilèges des architectes dont la position précaire, entre client et constructeur, nécessite des règles spécifiques. Au lieu des obligations de recours qui n'ont engendré que défiance et manœuvre de contournement, la principale réponse se trouve dans les concours. La difficulté ici découle de la spécificité des concours d'architecture qui sélectionnent le meilleur projet et non le meilleur architecte. L'article étudie l'échec du système des concours français instauré dans les années 1980 et aujourd'hui presque systématiquement contourné en le comparant au succès durable des concours finlandais, adaptés du système suédois avant même l'indépendance il y a plus de 130 ans, lui-même inspiré de la France des Lumières.
{"title":"De l'architecture en démocratie","authors":"H. Plagnol","doi":"10.3138/ttr.40.2.339","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3138/ttr.40.2.339","url":null,"abstract":"Résumé:L'effondrement de l'architecture depuis la seconde moitié du XXe siècle est indissociable de la crise de légitimité des architectes dans les pays occidentaux. Suivant un des grands paradigmes tocquevilliens, l'égalitarisme des sociétés démocratiques a conduit à la remise en cause des privilèges des architectes dont la position précaire, entre client et constructeur, nécessite des règles spécifiques. Au lieu des obligations de recours qui n'ont engendré que défiance et manœuvre de contournement, la principale réponse se trouve dans les concours. La difficulté ici découle de la spécificité des concours d'architecture qui sélectionnent le meilleur projet et non le meilleur architecte. L'article étudie l'échec du système des concours français instauré dans les années 1980 et aujourd'hui presque systématiquement contourné en le comparant au succès durable des concours finlandais, adaptés du système suédois avant même l'indépendance il y a plus de 130 ans, lui-même inspiré de la France des Lumières.","PeriodicalId":41972,"journal":{"name":"Tocqueville Review","volume":"40 1","pages":"339 - 361"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2019-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46090453","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract:By its unconventional nature, the Trump Presidency has shaken the American constitutional order and raises unprecedented issues. This paper analyzes the relationship between Donald Trump and constitutional law through three perspectives. The first is the extent to which, quite counterintuitively, Trump's presidency has vivified and increased the volume of constitutional discourse, through the rediscovery of forgotten constitutional provisions and the development of new theories. The second is the extent to which Donald Trump is actually violating constitutional law. Lastly, the paper analyzes the ways in which Donald Trump has shaped constitutional law, primarily through his judicial nominations.
{"title":"Donald Trump and Constitutional Law","authors":"Idris Fassassi","doi":"10.3138/ttr.40.2.325","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3138/ttr.40.2.325","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:By its unconventional nature, the Trump Presidency has shaken the American constitutional order and raises unprecedented issues. This paper analyzes the relationship between Donald Trump and constitutional law through three perspectives. The first is the extent to which, quite counterintuitively, Trump's presidency has vivified and increased the volume of constitutional discourse, through the rediscovery of forgotten constitutional provisions and the development of new theories. The second is the extent to which Donald Trump is actually violating constitutional law. Lastly, the paper analyzes the ways in which Donald Trump has shaped constitutional law, primarily through his judicial nominations.","PeriodicalId":41972,"journal":{"name":"Tocqueville Review","volume":"40 1","pages":"325 - 338"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2019-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42785795","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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