Pub Date : 2022-10-18DOI: 10.1177/2336825X221135127
Francesco Melito
The enormous attention devoted to populism has simplified the framework for analysis of the “illiberal turn” in Central-Eastern Europe. Although a populist aspect is certainly present, reductio ad populismum neglects other interpretations of the current political polarization. The article contributes to the literature on the cultural aspects of illiberalism as it offers an innovative theoretical examination of illiberalism(s) in the region. It proposes the concept of neo-traditionalism as a more comprehensive lens of analysis of the anti-colonial narrative against the “foreign liberal West” to defend the “genuine traditional Europe.” Neo-traditionalism in Central-Eastern Europe captures two criticisms of progressive liberalism. First, it contrasts progressive modernizing values. Emancipation and fluid identities are counterbalanced by a discourse where traditions provide ontological security and culturally defined identities. Second, it denounces the foreign origin of progressivism. The liberal West is described as a colonial power aiming to destroy “our authentic way of life.” Thus, the populist dimension of illiberalism in Central-Eastern Europe could be better grasped if we applied the concept of neo-traditionalism. Not only are the elites isolated from the people. They are also deemed to impose a colonial project to replace and modernize true European values.
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Pub Date : 2022-10-14DOI: 10.1177/2336825X221132934
Nicholas Kiersey
This review essay argues that once a fuller genealogy of populism is presented, Hochuli et al.’s rationale for attempting to corral the left into an embrace of nationalism begins to look suspicious. Despite the authors’ claims, the genealogy of American left populism reveals a political project that is not at all aligned with the virtue-hoarding desires of the left flank of the Professional Managerial Class (PMC). To the contrary, it is a political project synonymous with the material struggles of the global working class. Thus, while we should concede that the contemporary Left has been captured to no small degree by PMC sensibilities, a full understanding of today’s ongoing revival in socialism requires further explanation. To this end, this essay argues that we need a proper discussion about the history of left populism in the United States, its meaningful achievements, and its potential as a strategic partner. Admittedly, the term “populism” has very different valences, depending on whether it is used in an American or European context. But it cannot be gainsaid that the term originated in America, and that American populism has hewed more toward working class struggle over the sort of “woke” ideologies, worried about in The End of the End of History.
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Pub Date : 2022-10-13DOI: 10.1177/2336825X221134194
Anna Shimomura
‘Kresy’ [borderlands/outskirts] is a sentimental term used by Poles to denote the lands of today’s Western Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania. The Polish rule in that region has rarely been discussed in terms of colonialism. In this article, I employ the framework of postcolonial theory within the context of Polish rule in ‘Kresy’. The article juxtaposes anthropologist Józef Obrębski’s ethnographic writings about Polesia region (a part of ‘Kresy’ that was polonised in the most extreme manner) with Heart of Darkness by Joseph Conrad – a Polish-British author born and raised in ‘Kresy’, that during his time was subjugated by Russian Empire. The figure of Conrad, whose ambivalent relationship with colonialism was pointed out by many postcolonial scholars starting with Chinua Achebe, becomes a point of departure to think about what Maria Janion describes as ‘the paradoxical Polish postcolonial mentality’: the ambivalence of being a colonised coloniser. The article is an attempt of contribution to the ongoing debate about identity and dependence in the East Central Europe region.
“Kresy”[边境/郊区]是波兰人用来表示今天西乌克兰，白俄罗斯和立陶宛的土地的情感术语。很少从殖民主义的角度来讨论波兰在该地区的统治。在这篇文章中，我将后殖民理论的框架运用到《Kresy》中波兰统治的语境中。这篇文章将人类学家Józef Obrębski关于波利西亚地区(Kresy的一部分，以最极端的方式被波兰化)的民族志著作与约瑟夫·康拉德(Joseph Conrad)的《黑暗之心》(Heart of Darkness)并列，约瑟夫·康拉德是一位波兰裔英国作家，在“Kresy”出生并长大，在他的时代被俄罗斯帝国征服。从Chinua Achebe开始，许多后殖民学者都指出了康拉德与殖民主义的矛盾关系，康拉德的形象成为思考玛丽亚·贾尼恩所描述的“矛盾的波兰后殖民心态”的出发点:作为一个被殖民的殖民者的矛盾心理。这篇文章试图对正在进行的关于东中欧地区身份和依赖的辩论做出贡献。
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Pub Date : 2022-10-12DOI: 10.1177/2336825X221132930
Alexandre C. Hochuli
That the End of History is over is no longer in dispute, but drift and decay, rather than a restarting of History proper, is the order of the day. In this article, critical discussions of The End of the End of History by Daniel Zamora, Anton Jäger, Nicholas Kiersey and Richard Sakwa are responded to. Zamora’s focus on the displacement of social conflict outside the workplace is discussed as a feature of political disintermediation, creating a boundless sort of politics. An alternative to Jäger’s proposed term, ‘hyperpolitics’, is then advanced, as a means of leaving open the possibility of greater politicisation in the future. A defence of the way left-populist movements are cast as essentially ‘anti-political’ is then ventured, in opposition to Kiersey. Sakwa’s criticisms of our historicism are then turned on their head, before we consider the impact that the Ukraine war may have on History’s putative return. By way of conclusion, the dichotomies of resignation versus autonomy, and compliance versus social purpose, are discussed as the pivots on which History’s return will be decided.
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Pub Date : 2022-10-10DOI: 10.1177/2336825X221132935
Tarak Barkawi
This essay considers the Ukraine conflict as a war of decolonization. It understands decolonization as a practice of world order making that creates international relations out of imperial relations. What does such a perspective tell us about the conflict in Ukraine and its implications for world politics?
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Pub Date : 2022-10-10DOI: 10.1177/2336825X221132933
Anton Jäger
What would it mean to treat post-history as ‘history’? Taking up this question, Alex Hochuli, George Hoare and Phil Cunliffe’s The End of the End of History reads Francis Fukuyama’s diagnosis of the ‘end of history’ thesis through the lens of political economy, while anatomizing its demise in the populist 2010s. This roundtable contribution assesses Hoare, Cunliffe and Hochuli’s diagnosis in light of recent developments. Stalked by inflation, resurgent militarism and so-called hyper-politics, the 2020s present both challenge and vindication to the ‘Aufhebunga’ approach to post-post-history.
将后历史视为“历史”意味着什么?针对这个问题，Alex Hochuli, George Hoare和Phil Cunliffe的《历史终结的终结》通过政治经济学的视角解读了Francis Fukuyama对“历史终结”理论的诊断，同时剖析了它在2010年代民粹主义的消亡。这个圆桌会议的贡献根据最近的发展评估了Hoare, Cunliffe和Hochuli的诊断。本世纪20年代，通货膨胀、军国主义和所谓的超级政治卷土重来，对“后后历史”的“自由主义”(Aufhebunga)方法既是挑战，也是证明。
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Pub Date : 2022-10-07DOI: 10.1177/2336825X221132931
Daniel Zamora Vargas
In the autumn of 1901, after spending three years in exile in a peasant’s hut in Siberia, Lenin began writing what would become his most influential book:What Is To Be Done? (Lenin, 1902) “Without revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement,” the Russian Bolshevik famously argued in the first chapter of his pamphlet. But more than a plea for the importance of ideas in the making of history, Lenin’s argument was essentially about the leading role of the party in the revolution. The workers themselves, he thought, couldn’t reach spontaneously the consciousness of their historic mission. Revolutionary theory could then only “be brought to [the workers] from without,” “from outside the sphere of relations between workers and employers” (Lenin, 1902: 48). Behind the abstract laws of historical materialism, Lenin’s task was, as the Belgian Marxist Marcel Liebman once wrote, to create the “instrument” through which the revolutionary project could be realized (Liebman, 1973: 15). Historical turns required organizations that could channel collective struggles into specific directions. In order to be more than “just one fucking thing after another,” to quote Alan Bennett, history had to be coerced into grand narratives. The flow of events could only be shaped by collective and conscious actors. Class struggle was the steam of History but it needed an engine to move forward. The fall of the Soviet Union, exactly ninety years after Lenin theorized the revolution, would however put History on hold. As Fukuyama famously wrote, we had reached “the total exhaustion of viable systematic alternatives to Western liberalism.”While his end of history didn’t imply the end of conflicts nor that all societies would embrace liberal democracy, it nonetheless meant the replacement of ideological battles by “boring” “economic calculation,” “the endless solving of technical problems, environmental concerns, and the satisfaction of sophisticated consumer demands” (Fukuyama, 1989). As in Frederick Taylor’s scientific management, governments wouldn’t require anymore “generals or statesmen” but engineers to deal with what would remain: “economic activity.” Citizens could opt out from grand narratives, unbound by the will of the majority and free to lead their lives as they wish within the rules set by technocrats. And in effect, the expansion of markets as the ordering principle of the social order—guiding investment and reshaping the global division of labor—reduced the relevance of collective decisions. Citizens could now exert their rights as consumers, outside any kind of collective body. Voting on the marketplace, as Milton and Rose Friedman argued, could bring “unanimity without conformity” (Friedman and Friedman, 1980: 66).
1901年秋，在西伯利亚一个农民的茅屋里流亡了三年之后，列宁开始写他最有影响力的书:《怎么办?》(列宁，1902)“没有革命理论就没有革命运动，”这位俄国布尔什维克在他的小册子的第一章中提出了著名的论点。但是，列宁的论述不仅仅是对思想在创造历史中的重要性的辩护，本质上是关于党在革命中的领导作用。他认为，工人本身无法自发地意识到他们的历史使命。那时，革命理论只能“从外部带给(工人)”，“从工人和雇主之间的关系范围之外”(列宁，1902:48)。在历史唯物主义的抽象规律背后，正如比利时马克思主义者马塞尔·利布曼(Marcel Liebman)曾经写过的那样，列宁的任务是创造一种“工具”，通过这种“工具”可以实现革命计划(利布曼，1973:15)。历史的转折要求组织能够将集体斗争引向具体的方向。用艾伦·班尼特(Alan Bennett)的话来说，为了超越“一件接一件该死的事情”，历史必须被强行纳入宏大的叙事。事件的发展只能由集体和有意识的行动者来塑造。阶级斗争是历史的蒸汽，但它需要发动机才能前进。然而，在列宁将革命理论化整整90年后，苏联的解体却将历史搁置了下来。正如福山所写的那样，我们已经“完全穷尽了替代西方自由主义的可行的系统选择”。虽然他的历史终结并不意味着冲突的结束，也不意味着所有社会都将拥抱自由民主，但它仍然意味着用“无聊的”“经济计算”、“无休止地解决技术问题、环境问题和满足复杂的消费者需求”来取代意识形态斗争(Fukuyama, 1989)。正如弗雷德里克·泰勒(Frederick Taylor)的科学管理理论，政府不再需要“将军或政治家”，而是需要工程师来处理剩下的“经济活动”。公民可以选择退出宏大的叙事，不受多数人意志的束缚，在技术官僚制定的规则下自由地过自己想过的生活。实际上，市场的扩张作为社会秩序的秩序原则——引导投资和重塑全球劳动分工——降低了集体决策的相关性。公民现在可以在任何集体之外行使他们作为消费者的权利。正如米尔顿和罗斯·弗里德曼(Milton and Rose Friedman)所说，在市场上投票可以带来“没有一致性的一致”(Friedman and Friedman, 1980: 66)。
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Pub Date : 2022-10-07DOI: 10.1177/2336825X221132937
R. Sakwa
When history ends, that will be the end of everything; but of course we are talking about a different sort of end. In the late 1980s, several cycles of history came to an end, although the events of that time were the culmination of changes that had been gathering for some time. The paradoxical feature of the debate at the time was that the potential for genuine change and the capacity for critical reflection on the epochal developments taking place at the time were derailed by the publication of Francis Fukuyama’s ‘The End of History’ in The National Interest in the summer of 1989. The debate thereafter focused on the rather hollow philosophical debate on the possibility of alternatives to liberal capitalism rather than on what could potentially have been a much richer discussion on the quality of the relationship between markets and democracy and the balance to be drawn between state intervention and market autonomy. No less significant, the quality of the peace order that could be built as the Cold War came to an end should have been centre stage. Instead, discussion of these two fundamental issues was muted as a sterile historicism once again predominated. Just as Marxist historicism was being chased out through the front door, a rather vulgar and conformist neoHegelian interpretation about the meaning and purpose of history slunk in through the back door.
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Pub Date : 2022-09-01DOI: 10.1177/2336825X221113257
K. Fábián
The anti-gender movements began in the West but have thus far been most influential and governmentally supported in Hungary, Poland and Russia. Anti-genderism has served multiple functions to entrench what proponents label as traditional values, while promoting specific class and racialised interests in the cloak of rejecting both the communist past and Western European political and social expectations. Why did anti-genderism develop and become pronounced in otherwise different post-communist countries? This article traces the origins of these movements based on news coverage and scholarly sources, arguing that anti-gender movements signal authoritarian trends and thus matter deeply for open, democratic societies. The Hungarian, Polish and Russian cases offer similar but distinct variations in the political trajectory of their respective movements, highlighting the feedback between conservative, expressively patriarchal, and populist forces and their embracing of anti-genderism.
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Pub Date : 2022-09-01DOI: 10.1177/2336825X221113232
Lubomir Terziev
This text elucidates some of the uses and connotations of the word “sorosoid,” which has recently permeated the public discourse in Bulgaria, used to refer to individuals and organizations affiliated with Soros’ Open Society Foundation. I am particularly interested in the inflection “-oid,” which seeks to echo the word “humanoid.” In other words, my specific concern is with strategies of dehumanization of neoliberals in Bulgaria, whereby the fundamental values of open society in this country are challenged. The paper provides a glimpse of some key ideological attitudes in one of Europe’s post-communist democracies.
{"title":"“Sorosoids”: Dehumanization and open society in contemporary Bulgaria","authors":"Lubomir Terziev","doi":"10.1177/2336825X221113232","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/2336825X221113232","url":null,"abstract":"This text elucidates some of the uses and connotations of the word “sorosoid,” which has recently permeated the public discourse in Bulgaria, used to refer to individuals and organizations affiliated with Soros’ Open Society Foundation. I am particularly interested in the inflection “-oid,” which seeks to echo the word “humanoid.” In other words, my specific concern is with strategies of dehumanization of neoliberals in Bulgaria, whereby the fundamental values of open society in this country are challenged. The paper provides a glimpse of some key ideological attitudes in one of Europe’s post-communist democracies.","PeriodicalId":42556,"journal":{"name":"New Perspectives","volume":"19 1","pages":"255 - 273"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88212512","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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