Pub Date : 2019-01-01DOI: 10.1142/s2377740019500192
Serafettin Yilmaz, Wang Xiang-yu
Dissatisfaction is a major concept in power transition theory, which postulates that a rapidly rising power tends to be dissatisfied with the international system and would thus attempt to reform or replace it, whereas the hegemonic power would, by default, be satisfied with and work to maintain the status quo. This paper, however, offers an alternative outlook on the reigning-rising power dynamics by examining the conditions for and implications of hegemonic dissatisfaction and rising power satisfaction. It argues that although China, as a potential systemic challenger harboring grievances against the existing global regimes, has been a recurrent subject for studies, it is the United States, the established hegemon, that appears increasingly dissatisfied with the status quo. The U.S. dissatisfaction is informed by a set of internal and external factors often justified with a reference to China as a challenger, and is manifested in a number of anti-system strategies, including unconventional diplomatic rhetoric, as well as withdrawal from various international institutions or attempts to undermine them. The U.S. discontent, as contrasted with China’s satisfaction as a rising power, has a number of potential geopolitical and economic implications at the bilateral, regional, and global levels, endangering the viability and sustainability of the universally accepted political and economic regimes.
{"title":"Power Transition Theory Revisited: When Rising China Meets Dissatisfied United States","authors":"Serafettin Yilmaz, Wang Xiang-yu","doi":"10.1142/s2377740019500192","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/s2377740019500192","url":null,"abstract":"Dissatisfaction is a major concept in power transition theory, which postulates that a rapidly rising power tends to be dissatisfied with the international system and would thus attempt to reform or replace it, whereas the hegemonic power would, by default, be satisfied with and work to maintain the status quo. This paper, however, offers an alternative outlook on the reigning-rising power dynamics by examining the conditions for and implications of hegemonic dissatisfaction and rising power satisfaction. It argues that although China, as a potential systemic challenger harboring grievances against the existing global regimes, has been a recurrent subject for studies, it is the United States, the established hegemon, that appears increasingly dissatisfied with the status quo. The U.S. dissatisfaction is informed by a set of internal and external factors often justified with a reference to China as a challenger, and is manifested in a number of anti-system strategies, including unconventional diplomatic rhetoric, as well as withdrawal from various international institutions or attempts to undermine them. The U.S. discontent, as contrasted with China’s satisfaction as a rising power, has a number of potential geopolitical and economic implications at the bilateral, regional, and global levels, endangering the viability and sustainability of the universally accepted political and economic regimes.","PeriodicalId":42595,"journal":{"name":"China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1142/s2377740019500192","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45347459","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-01DOI: 10.1142/s2377740019500118
Shuai Feng
With the increasing use of machine learning algorithms in strategic decision-making and military affairs, the artificial intelligence (AI) revolution is bringing about significant changes to the current international system. AI applications will further tilt the global balance of power in favor of actors who can make the best use of the emerging technology. AI-assisted automation is also changing prevailing socioeconomic production models on the global scale; and in the not too distant future, it is expected to exert systemic impacts on the current global order. Having recognized the full potential of AI technology in propelling the next industrial revolution, China has adopted an AI development strategy for guiding a nation-wide campaign to harness AI power at an early stage, so as to seize the strategic initiative in an emerging global AI competition. China’s initial efforts have produced remarkable achievements with theoretical and practical implications.
{"title":"Toward a Transformed and Unequal World","authors":"Shuai Feng","doi":"10.1142/s2377740019500118","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/s2377740019500118","url":null,"abstract":"With the increasing use of machine learning algorithms in strategic decision-making and military affairs, the artificial intelligence (AI) revolution is bringing about significant changes to the current international system. AI applications will further tilt the global balance of power in favor of actors who can make the best use of the emerging technology. AI-assisted automation is also changing prevailing socioeconomic production models on the global scale; and in the not too distant future, it is expected to exert systemic impacts on the current global order. Having recognized the full potential of AI technology in propelling the next industrial revolution, China has adopted an AI development strategy for guiding a nation-wide campaign to harness AI power at an early stage, so as to seize the strategic initiative in an emerging global AI competition. China’s initial efforts have produced remarkable achievements with theoretical and practical implications.","PeriodicalId":42595,"journal":{"name":"China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1142/s2377740019500118","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46532767","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-01DOI: 10.1142/S2377740019500131
Z. Khan
The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) offers a massive platform for China and Pakistan to promote regional connectivity, trade growth, and infrastructure development. Pakistan views CPEC not only as an infrastructure and economic development program as well as a key initiative with wide-ranging implications for the country’s domestic economy and social makeup, but also a potential “game changer” in the regional situation. However, this project also faces grave internal and external challenges, such as route controversy, militancy, religious extremism, competing narratives, media propaganda, debt-trap accusation, and synergy of institutions. To make CPEC a sustainable project that benefits Pakistan and the whole of South Asia in the long run, both the Chinese and Pakistani governments need to address these challenges through greater transparency of the CPEC projects, as well as more consultation with all stakeholders involved, so as to ease their concerns about the profound implications of the grand project.
{"title":"The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor","authors":"Z. Khan","doi":"10.1142/S2377740019500131","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S2377740019500131","url":null,"abstract":"The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) offers a massive platform for China and Pakistan to promote regional connectivity, trade growth, and infrastructure development. Pakistan views CPEC not only as an infrastructure and economic development program as well as a key initiative with wide-ranging implications for the country’s domestic economy and social makeup, but also a potential “game changer” in the regional situation. However, this project also faces grave internal and external challenges, such as route controversy, militancy, religious extremism, competing narratives, media propaganda, debt-trap accusation, and synergy of institutions. To make CPEC a sustainable project that benefits Pakistan and the whole of South Asia in the long run, both the Chinese and Pakistani governments need to address these challenges through greater transparency of the CPEC projects, as well as more consultation with all stakeholders involved, so as to ease their concerns about the profound implications of the grand project.","PeriodicalId":42595,"journal":{"name":"China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1142/S2377740019500131","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44534485","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-01DOI: 10.1142/s2377740019500246
Yu Hongyuan
In December 2018, the 24th Conference of the Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was held in Katowice, Poland, and reached a package of agreements. It provided a new opportunity for the promotion of global climate negotiations and new momentum for the transformation of global climate governance as well. The Katowice conference continued the tradition of the previous conferences in enhancing policy coordination and contribution among various actors. The success of the conference depends on scientific reports of climate disasters, coordinated efforts by major countries, and the contribution of various non-state actors. However, as an ongoing process, global climate governance is still faced by many difficulties, such as weak synergy, staggering development of global environmental governance, daunting challenges to least developed countries (LDCs) in climate actions, and lack of fairness, which need to be tackled through joint endeavor by both developed and developing countries. As the second largest economy and biggest greenhouse gas emitter, China’s future engagement in global climate governance will be focused on promoting green competitiveness, enhancing its institutional power in the governance process, and strengthening pragmatic multi-stakeholder climate diplomacy, so as to promote common understanding among countries and help with their policy coordination for climate actions.
{"title":"Rebalancing Global Climate Governance and China’s Endeavor","authors":"Yu Hongyuan","doi":"10.1142/s2377740019500246","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/s2377740019500246","url":null,"abstract":"In December 2018, the 24th Conference of the Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was held in Katowice, Poland, and reached a package of agreements. It provided a new opportunity for the promotion of global climate negotiations and new momentum for the transformation of global climate governance as well. The Katowice conference continued the tradition of the previous conferences in enhancing policy coordination and contribution among various actors. The success of the conference depends on scientific reports of climate disasters, coordinated efforts by major countries, and the contribution of various non-state actors. However, as an ongoing process, global climate governance is still faced by many difficulties, such as weak synergy, staggering development of global environmental governance, daunting challenges to least developed countries (LDCs) in climate actions, and lack of fairness, which need to be tackled through joint endeavor by both developed and developing countries. As the second largest economy and biggest greenhouse gas emitter, China’s future engagement in global climate governance will be focused on promoting green competitiveness, enhancing its institutional power in the governance process, and strengthening pragmatic multi-stakeholder climate diplomacy, so as to promote common understanding among countries and help with their policy coordination for climate actions.","PeriodicalId":42595,"journal":{"name":"China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1142/s2377740019500246","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44791558","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-01DOI: 10.1142/s237774001950026x
X. Guifang, Zheng Jie
China’s military capability to perform out-of-area operations and provide international public goods falls short of the increasing need to protect its expanding economic, political, and security interests abroad. Overseas military bases can not only facilitate the soft application of China’s growing hard power, but also benefit the host nations in terms of national security, economic development, and job creation. A strong case can be made on both legal and precedential grounds for China’s construction of overseas military bases in the future. It is irreproachable for a great power like China to have overseas military installations as long as the Charter of the United Nations, host nations’ laws, and the longstanding non-intervention policy are upheld. Planning for overseas base-building must involve shaping an international environment that accepts Chinese military presence and conducting systemic risk assessments and practical solutions on such related matters as the location, size, functions, law enforcement, and maintenance of each military base.
{"title":"China’s Building of Overseas Military Bases: Rationale and Challenges","authors":"X. Guifang, Zheng Jie","doi":"10.1142/s237774001950026x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/s237774001950026x","url":null,"abstract":"China’s military capability to perform out-of-area operations and provide international public goods falls short of the increasing need to protect its expanding economic, political, and security interests abroad. Overseas military bases can not only facilitate the soft application of China’s growing hard power, but also benefit the host nations in terms of national security, economic development, and job creation. A strong case can be made on both legal and precedential grounds for China’s construction of overseas military bases in the future. It is irreproachable for a great power like China to have overseas military installations as long as the Charter of the United Nations, host nations’ laws, and the longstanding non-intervention policy are upheld. Planning for overseas base-building must involve shaping an international environment that accepts Chinese military presence and conducting systemic risk assessments and practical solutions on such related matters as the location, size, functions, law enforcement, and maintenance of each military base.","PeriodicalId":42595,"journal":{"name":"China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1142/s237774001950026x","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47944010","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-01DOI: 10.1142/s2377740019500167
You-Shi Yuan
Since the establishment of the China-U.S. diplomatic relationship, think tank exchange between both countries has undergone four phases, from very limited communication in the early years to a growing number of mutual visits, co-organized conferences and events, joint research projects, as well as representative offices or joint research/teaching programs set up in the past decade. China-U.S. think tank exchange plays a unique role in enhancing mutual understanding and mitigating distrust between both countries, thus contributing to bilateral strategic stability and closer cooperation. Under the Trump administration’s trade war and decoupling attempts toward China, however, bilateral think tank exchange has experienced a significant decline over the past few years, marked by increasing restrictions on each other’s visits, less willingness of some think tanks in such exchange, and more hardline policy stance on each other, especially from the American side. At this difficult time for China-U.S. relations, bilateral think tank exchange should be encouraged and strengthened so as to help bring the bilateral relationship back on track.
{"title":"Unique Role of Think Tank Exchange in Promoting the China-U.S. Relationship","authors":"You-Shi Yuan","doi":"10.1142/s2377740019500167","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/s2377740019500167","url":null,"abstract":"Since the establishment of the China-U.S. diplomatic relationship, think tank exchange between both countries has undergone four phases, from very limited communication in the early years to a growing number of mutual visits, co-organized conferences and events, joint research projects, as well as representative offices or joint research/teaching programs set up in the past decade. China-U.S. think tank exchange plays a unique role in enhancing mutual understanding and mitigating distrust between both countries, thus contributing to bilateral strategic stability and closer cooperation. Under the Trump administration’s trade war and decoupling attempts toward China, however, bilateral think tank exchange has experienced a significant decline over the past few years, marked by increasing restrictions on each other’s visits, less willingness of some think tanks in such exchange, and more hardline policy stance on each other, especially from the American side. At this difficult time for China-U.S. relations, bilateral think tank exchange should be encouraged and strengthened so as to help bring the bilateral relationship back on track.","PeriodicalId":42595,"journal":{"name":"China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1142/s2377740019500167","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45205127","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-01DOI: 10.1142/s237774001950012x
Haiyong Sun
The Trump administration has waged a technological war against China due to the differences between China and the United States in political values and geopolitical pursuits, as well as their rivalry on regional and global arenas. The United States regards itself as being on the moral high ground in the existing international order and intends to force China to abandon its policies in high-tech industries and technology transfer from foreign enterprises, in order to maintain its global supremacy. With a zero-sum mentality, the Trump administration is trying to use the leverage of advanced science and technology to maximize benefits for the United States in trade with China. Its tech war attempts against China mainly include trade sanctions, investment control, export control, and restrictions on the exchange of technological personnel. These moves will further harm China-U.S. security relations as well as their science and technology cooperation and undermine the regional situation and global science and technology governance. In order to promote sustainable global development and strategic stability, both sides need to undertake more effective efforts to manage their strategic competition, build a more balanced and mutually beneficial relationship in high-tech industries, and expand the space for cooperation in the field of global science and technology governance.
{"title":"U.S.-China Tech War","authors":"Haiyong Sun","doi":"10.1142/s237774001950012x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/s237774001950012x","url":null,"abstract":"The Trump administration has waged a technological war against China due to the differences between China and the United States in political values and geopolitical pursuits, as well as their rivalry on regional and global arenas. The United States regards itself as being on the moral high ground in the existing international order and intends to force China to abandon its policies in high-tech industries and technology transfer from foreign enterprises, in order to maintain its global supremacy. With a zero-sum mentality, the Trump administration is trying to use the leverage of advanced science and technology to maximize benefits for the United States in trade with China. Its tech war attempts against China mainly include trade sanctions, investment control, export control, and restrictions on the exchange of technological personnel. These moves will further harm China-U.S. security relations as well as their science and technology cooperation and undermine the regional situation and global science and technology governance. In order to promote sustainable global development and strategic stability, both sides need to undertake more effective efforts to manage their strategic competition, build a more balanced and mutually beneficial relationship in high-tech industries, and expand the space for cooperation in the field of global science and technology governance.","PeriodicalId":42595,"journal":{"name":"China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1142/s237774001950012x","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46577060","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-01DOI: 10.1142/s2377740019500155
Jiahan Cao
As China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) quickly evolves into an updated version for realizing high-quality development, its long-term success will increasingly depend on how well it can earn international legitimacy and credibility. Since sustainability is a critical source of credibility for the BRI, it is necessary to move the BRI forward by amplifying its role as a development agenda and tapping its potential to support global sustainable development and facilitate implementation of the United Nations’ 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (2030 Agenda) through delivering more public goods to other developing countries. The BRI projects designed to strengthen infrastructure inter-connectivity can greatly fit the developmental needs of countries along the routes and expedite their achievement of sustainable development goals (SDGs), both explicitly and implicitly. Besides, the growing alignment between the BRI and the 2030 Agenda will generate more strengths and opportunities for China to be recognized as an indispensable player in international development cooperation, enhance the capacity of the BRI to manage environmental, social and governance risks in host countries, promote social cohesion and inclusiveness along the routes, and ultimately transcend short-term economic and political interests for China to win the hearts and minds of other stakeholders involved in the BRI.
{"title":"China’s Belt and Road Initiative 2.0","authors":"Jiahan Cao","doi":"10.1142/s2377740019500155","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/s2377740019500155","url":null,"abstract":"As China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) quickly evolves into an updated version for realizing high-quality development, its long-term success will increasingly depend on how well it can earn international legitimacy and credibility. Since sustainability is a critical source of credibility for the BRI, it is necessary to move the BRI forward by amplifying its role as a development agenda and tapping its potential to support global sustainable development and facilitate implementation of the United Nations’ 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (2030 Agenda) through delivering more public goods to other developing countries. The BRI projects designed to strengthen infrastructure inter-connectivity can greatly fit the developmental needs of countries along the routes and expedite their achievement of sustainable development goals (SDGs), both explicitly and implicitly. Besides, the growing alignment between the BRI and the 2030 Agenda will generate more strengths and opportunities for China to be recognized as an indispensable player in international development cooperation, enhance the capacity of the BRI to manage environmental, social and governance risks in host countries, promote social cohesion and inclusiveness along the routes, and ultimately transcend short-term economic and political interests for China to win the hearts and minds of other stakeholders involved in the BRI.","PeriodicalId":42595,"journal":{"name":"China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1142/s2377740019500155","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41664240","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-01DOI: 10.1142/s2377740019500234
Paulus Rudolf Yuniarto
In implementing the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), there remains a huge perception gap between China and Indonesia. Differences in ideology, politics, race, religion, and ethnicity are hindering the great potential of the BRI from being fully realized. To bridge the gap and enhance mutual understanding, people-to-people exchange between both countries should be accorded greater significance. In addition, strengthening bilateral cooperation in education, labor, tourism, and culture can bring positive spill-over effects beyond basic intercultural learning. Such non-infrastructure cooperation creates more room for people-to-people bonds to flourish, where economic interests are not blindly pursued. Deepened mutual understanding will, in turn, help achieve the major goals of the BRI and promote the building of a community of shared future along the route.
{"title":"Intercultural Gaps Between Indonesia and China on the Belt and Road Initiative: Causes and Remedies","authors":"Paulus Rudolf Yuniarto","doi":"10.1142/s2377740019500234","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/s2377740019500234","url":null,"abstract":"In implementing the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), there remains a huge perception gap between China and Indonesia. Differences in ideology, politics, race, religion, and ethnicity are hindering the great potential of the BRI from being fully realized. To bridge the gap and enhance mutual understanding, people-to-people exchange between both countries should be accorded greater significance. In addition, strengthening bilateral cooperation in education, labor, tourism, and culture can bring positive spill-over effects beyond basic intercultural learning. Such non-infrastructure cooperation creates more room for people-to-people bonds to flourish, where economic interests are not blindly pursued. Deepened mutual understanding will, in turn, help achieve the major goals of the BRI and promote the building of a community of shared future along the route.","PeriodicalId":42595,"journal":{"name":"China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1142/s2377740019500234","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45939744","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-01DOI: 10.1142/s2377740019500106
S. Tim
This paper looks at issues in the formation of the United Kingdom’s policy toward China during a period of growing strategic rivalry between the United States and China, focusing particularly on the relationship between policy debates and the output of UK-based think tanks on China. By analyzing the policy debate and think tank output on three current key themes, including maritime politics in the South China Sea, whether to allow Chinese companies to participate or invest in “critical national infrastructure,” and China’s suspected “interference” in other countries’ domestic politics, this paper shows that UK-based think tanks tend to prioritize security concerns more than economic opportunities with regard to the UK’s China policy. Nevertheless, the impact of U.S.-China tensions and of policy advocacy and research on the UK is issue-dependent.
{"title":"The UK’s China Policy under U.S.-China Strategic Rivalry","authors":"S. Tim","doi":"10.1142/s2377740019500106","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/s2377740019500106","url":null,"abstract":"This paper looks at issues in the formation of the United Kingdom’s policy toward China during a period of growing strategic rivalry between the United States and China, focusing particularly on the relationship between policy debates and the output of UK-based think tanks on China. By analyzing the policy debate and think tank output on three current key themes, including maritime politics in the South China Sea, whether to allow Chinese companies to participate or invest in “critical national infrastructure,” and China’s suspected “interference” in other countries’ domestic politics, this paper shows that UK-based think tanks tend to prioritize security concerns more than economic opportunities with regard to the UK’s China policy. Nevertheless, the impact of U.S.-China tensions and of policy advocacy and research on the UK is issue-dependent.","PeriodicalId":42595,"journal":{"name":"China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1142/s2377740019500106","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47067837","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：