Pub Date : 2020-01-01DOI: 10.1142/s2377740020500189
K. Armel
Over the years, China has forged and mastered its own distinctive foreign aid practices as an emerging aid donor. China’s approach to foreign assistance has become highly appreciated as the country’s stature as a provider of economic assistance has matured. In 2013, under President Xi Jinping, Beijing introduced the Belt and Road Initiative, which has become a leading component of China’s foreign policy and triggered a new round of policy reform in its foreign aid agenda. In Africa, China’s foreign assistance has kept in line with the policy of equal treatment. It has shared its development experience, helped many African countries to transition from “poor” to “developing”, from “aid recipients” to “wealth creators,” and many African countries are thus turning their interests from the West to the East. Certainly, the European Union as a traditional aid donor, remains the largest aid distributor in the world, especially in Africa. In other words, the EU’s foreign assistance has become an indispensable source of funding for many African countries. However, foreign aid effectiveness remains low on the African continent because of the absence of native African policymakers in aid programs designed and implemented by Beijing and Brussels. Some critics argue that Chinese and European assistance to Africa is not bringing about the best results as expected. This article argues that a new international architecture of foreign assistance through trilateral cooperation is needed to increase Chinese and European aid effectiveness in Africa. Trilateral cooperation will not only increase foreign assistance efficiency in Africa, but also give a chance to African countries to strengthen their own development capacity through assistance and guidance, reduce Africa’s aid dependence, and hopefully guarantee a smooth “graduation” of African countries from official development assistance.
{"title":"Trilateral Cooperation","authors":"K. Armel","doi":"10.1142/s2377740020500189","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/s2377740020500189","url":null,"abstract":"Over the years, China has forged and mastered its own distinctive foreign aid practices as an emerging aid donor. China’s approach to foreign assistance has become highly appreciated as the country’s stature as a provider of economic assistance has matured. In 2013, under President Xi Jinping, Beijing introduced the Belt and Road Initiative, which has become a leading component of China’s foreign policy and triggered a new round of policy reform in its foreign aid agenda. In Africa, China’s foreign assistance has kept in line with the policy of equal treatment. It has shared its development experience, helped many African countries to transition from “poor” to “developing”, from “aid recipients” to “wealth creators,” and many African countries are thus turning their interests from the West to the East. Certainly, the European Union as a traditional aid donor, remains the largest aid distributor in the world, especially in Africa. In other words, the EU’s foreign assistance has become an indispensable source of funding for many African countries. However, foreign aid effectiveness remains low on the African continent because of the absence of native African policymakers in aid programs designed and implemented by Beijing and Brussels. Some critics argue that Chinese and European assistance to Africa is not bringing about the best results as expected. This article argues that a new international architecture of foreign assistance through trilateral cooperation is needed to increase Chinese and European aid effectiveness in Africa. Trilateral cooperation will not only increase foreign assistance efficiency in Africa, but also give a chance to African countries to strengthen their own development capacity through assistance and guidance, reduce Africa’s aid dependence, and hopefully guarantee a smooth “graduation” of African countries from official development assistance.","PeriodicalId":42595,"journal":{"name":"China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41520555","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-09-11DOI: 10.1142/s237774001950009x
A. Brînză
The second decade of the 21st century has been marked by rising tensions between the United States and China, with the European Union caught between the two powers in an era of strategic competition. The “[Formula: see text]” mechanism, which focuses on economic cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, is not spared from the U.S.-China economic confrontation. The United States has launched a political and public campaign against China’s telecommunication giant Huawei in the CEE region, where most countries are U.S. allies. Since its establishment as “[Formula: see text]” in 2012, the mechanism has made slow progress in generating expected benefits to CEE countries, as many of China’s investments are under negotiation, delayed, or even canceled. The case of Romania indicates that CEE countries’ engagement in “[Formula: see text]” depends heavily on the changing priorities of their political leadership, which adds much uncertainty to the future development of the mechanism. Besides, there is lingering EU concern that the mechanism may divide the Union. To enhance its status as a strong and responsible partner with CEE countries and the EU, China needs to reform “[Formula: see text]” into a more transparent, effective and inclusive regional mechanism that engages all interested countries.
{"title":"The “17 + 1” Mechanism","authors":"A. Brînză","doi":"10.1142/s237774001950009x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/s237774001950009x","url":null,"abstract":"The second decade of the 21st century has been marked by rising tensions between the United States and China, with the European Union caught between the two powers in an era of strategic competition. The “[Formula: see text]” mechanism, which focuses on economic cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, is not spared from the U.S.-China economic confrontation. The United States has launched a political and public campaign against China’s telecommunication giant Huawei in the CEE region, where most countries are U.S. allies. Since its establishment as “[Formula: see text]” in 2012, the mechanism has made slow progress in generating expected benefits to CEE countries, as many of China’s investments are under negotiation, delayed, or even canceled. The case of Romania indicates that CEE countries’ engagement in “[Formula: see text]” depends heavily on the changing priorities of their political leadership, which adds much uncertainty to the future development of the mechanism. Besides, there is lingering EU concern that the mechanism may divide the Union. To enhance its status as a strong and responsible partner with CEE countries and the EU, China needs to reform “[Formula: see text]” into a more transparent, effective and inclusive regional mechanism that engages all interested countries.","PeriodicalId":42595,"journal":{"name":"China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2019-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1142/s237774001950009x","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44873514","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-08-19DOI: 10.1142/S2377740019500027
Jin Wang, Dehang Kong
As Islamic extremist threats have grown to be a common issue of focus and a major cooperation area between China and Central Asian states since the 1990s, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) provides China with an important regional and even international counter-terrorism platform. Highlighting sustainable security cooperation and countering terrorism in a peaceful way under the “Shanghai Spirit,” the SCO helps stabilize China’s internal security environment while enhancing the country’s economic and cultural cooperation with its Central Asian neighbors. This article reviews the Islamic extremist and terrorist challenges to China and the counter-terrorism cooperation between China and Central Asian states under the framework of the SCO, with a focus on how to tackle the weaknesses of such cooperation. It is concluded that SCO member states must be prudent in taking further steps in counter-terrorism cooperation, especially with regard to whether the organization should be transformed into a quasi-military and political alliance.
{"title":"Counter-Terrorism Cooperation Between China and Central Asian States in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization","authors":"Jin Wang, Dehang Kong","doi":"10.1142/S2377740019500027","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S2377740019500027","url":null,"abstract":"As Islamic extremist threats have grown to be a common issue of focus and a major cooperation area between China and Central Asian states since the 1990s, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) provides China with an important regional and even international counter-terrorism platform. Highlighting sustainable security cooperation and countering terrorism in a peaceful way under the “Shanghai Spirit,” the SCO helps stabilize China’s internal security environment while enhancing the country’s economic and cultural cooperation with its Central Asian neighbors. This article reviews the Islamic extremist and terrorist challenges to China and the counter-terrorism cooperation between China and Central Asian states under the framework of the SCO, with a focus on how to tackle the weaknesses of such cooperation. It is concluded that SCO member states must be prudent in taking further steps in counter-terrorism cooperation, especially with regard to whether the organization should be transformed into a quasi-military and political alliance.","PeriodicalId":42595,"journal":{"name":"China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2019-08-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1142/S2377740019500027","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44343122","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-08-19DOI: 10.1142/S2377740019500076
M. Trombetta
Despite the traditional resistance to consider climate change as a national security issue, the security impact of climate change has been increasingly recognized by official discourses in China over the past few years. The Chinese perception on climate change has shifted from a development issue to a security topic; and two driving forces are behind the emergence of the climate security discourse: the shift of China’s economy towards a “New Normal” and the commitments China made in the Paris Agreement on Climate Change. Meanwhile, two modalities of discourse that characterize the Chinese context are also discerned. One that involves national security has a rather fixed procedure about how security can be spoken of and by whom; the other is more relevant for issues like climate change and air pollution. In both cases, even if the language of security is used with regard to climate issues, they are handled as normal politics and governmental actions are legitimized by the use of security language. Although China has taken on more climate responsibilities, it seems unprepared for global climate leadership because security considerations not only determine the country’s participation but also limit its international commitments in global climate governance.
{"title":"Securitization of Climate Change in China: Implications for Global Climate Governance","authors":"M. Trombetta","doi":"10.1142/S2377740019500076","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S2377740019500076","url":null,"abstract":"Despite the traditional resistance to consider climate change as a national security issue, the security impact of climate change has been increasingly recognized by official discourses in China over the past few years. The Chinese perception on climate change has shifted from a development issue to a security topic; and two driving forces are behind the emergence of the climate security discourse: the shift of China’s economy towards a “New Normal” and the commitments China made in the Paris Agreement on Climate Change. Meanwhile, two modalities of discourse that characterize the Chinese context are also discerned. One that involves national security has a rather fixed procedure about how security can be spoken of and by whom; the other is more relevant for issues like climate change and air pollution. In both cases, even if the language of security is used with regard to climate issues, they are handled as normal politics and governmental actions are legitimized by the use of security language. Although China has taken on more climate responsibilities, it seems unprepared for global climate leadership because security considerations not only determine the country’s participation but also limit its international commitments in global climate governance.","PeriodicalId":42595,"journal":{"name":"China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2019-08-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1142/S2377740019500076","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44540955","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-08-19DOI: 10.1142/S2377740019500015
Degang Sun
To safeguard its economic and security interests, China has adopted a whole-of-region diplomacy in the Middle East since the end of the Cold war. Through a multitude of regional and international organizations, China has been able to maintain constructive interactions with Middle Eastern countries while deepening its ties with other major powers like the United States, the European Union, Russia, Japan and India. China’s diplomatic efforts have paid off in the Middle East and increased the influence of developing countries as a whole in international politics. Meanwhile, China’s whole-of-region diplomacy is faced with a number of challenges given the complexity of ethnic, religious and security landscapes in the Middle East. China needs more holistic and well-coordinated ways of whole-of-region diplomacy to seek closer relationships with Middle Eastern countries. To this end, it is important for China to consolidate its network of strategic partnerships on the basis of bilateral collaboration and multilateral cooperation, further strengthen its discourse power and agenda-setting capacity, and consider adopting a common but differentiated strategy toward regional countries according to their different national conditions, political systems and paths of socioeconomic development.
{"title":"China’s Whole-of-Region Diplomacy in the Middle East: Opportunities and Challenges","authors":"Degang Sun","doi":"10.1142/S2377740019500015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S2377740019500015","url":null,"abstract":"To safeguard its economic and security interests, China has adopted a whole-of-region diplomacy in the Middle East since the end of the Cold war. Through a multitude of regional and international organizations, China has been able to maintain constructive interactions with Middle Eastern countries while deepening its ties with other major powers like the United States, the European Union, Russia, Japan and India. China’s diplomatic efforts have paid off in the Middle East and increased the influence of developing countries as a whole in international politics. Meanwhile, China’s whole-of-region diplomacy is faced with a number of challenges given the complexity of ethnic, religious and security landscapes in the Middle East. China needs more holistic and well-coordinated ways of whole-of-region diplomacy to seek closer relationships with Middle Eastern countries. To this end, it is important for China to consolidate its network of strategic partnerships on the basis of bilateral collaboration and multilateral cooperation, further strengthen its discourse power and agenda-setting capacity, and consider adopting a common but differentiated strategy toward regional countries according to their different national conditions, political systems and paths of socioeconomic development.","PeriodicalId":42595,"journal":{"name":"China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2019-08-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1142/S2377740019500015","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47866288","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-08-19DOI: 10.1142/S2377740019500052
Kejin Zhao
Fundamental changes are taking place both within national borders and on the international stage. While technological advances are accelerating globalization, which brings all the nations closer together, the resurgence of populism, protectionism and nationalism is causing greater divisions along racial, ethnic, and national lines. The spectacular rise of China and the growing weight of developing nations as a whole are changing the world’s geopolitical and geoeconomic landscapes, constraining the West’s influence in global affairs and strengthening the developing world’s capacity in bargaining with advanced economies. In a new era of growing uncertainty and unpredictability, leadership and vision are the most valuable assets for any great power that seeks to shape a new world order according to its grand blueprints. From the Chinese perspective, an era of uncertainty does not only imply hidden risks and threats, but may also bring forth unprecedented strategic opportunities. Standing on the threshold of a new era with ever more readiness to claim its rightful place in the world, China is in the best position since the beginning of its modern history to play a significant role in fostering a new, truly multilateral order.
{"title":"China’s Role in a World of Epochal Changes","authors":"Kejin Zhao","doi":"10.1142/S2377740019500052","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S2377740019500052","url":null,"abstract":"Fundamental changes are taking place both within national borders and on the international stage. While technological advances are accelerating globalization, which brings all the nations closer together, the resurgence of populism, protectionism and nationalism is causing greater divisions along racial, ethnic, and national lines. The spectacular rise of China and the growing weight of developing nations as a whole are changing the world’s geopolitical and geoeconomic landscapes, constraining the West’s influence in global affairs and strengthening the developing world’s capacity in bargaining with advanced economies. In a new era of growing uncertainty and unpredictability, leadership and vision are the most valuable assets for any great power that seeks to shape a new world order according to its grand blueprints. From the Chinese perspective, an era of uncertainty does not only imply hidden risks and threats, but may also bring forth unprecedented strategic opportunities. Standing on the threshold of a new era with ever more readiness to claim its rightful place in the world, China is in the best position since the beginning of its modern history to play a significant role in fostering a new, truly multilateral order.","PeriodicalId":42595,"journal":{"name":"China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2019-08-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1142/S2377740019500052","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43561519","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-01DOI: 10.1142/S2377740019500039
Chun Zhang
Targeting a group of developing nations in a specific region, whole-of-region diplomacy as a relatively new practice of China’s diplomacy has caught much attention across the world. Since the 1990s, China’s whole-of-region diplomacy has achieved remarkable breakthroughs in terms of its geographical coverage, extending from Southeast and Central Asia to the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, and even Central and Eastern Europe. Through whole-of-region diplomacy, China has not only fulfilled its political commitment and strategic reassurance toward developing nations, but also enhanced the collective identity of various developing regions. Despite the great achievements, China’s whole-of-region diplomacy is far from fully developed and needs further upgrading so as to lay a solid foundation for the country’s sustainable rise. In the future, China’s whole-of-region diplomacy can be advanced by clarifying its strategic position, renovating its institutional framework and scaling up its capacity-building efforts. In the long run, whole-of-region diplomacy, as a key component of the “Xi Jinping thought on diplomacy” and “major-country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics,” is expected to help China tackle challenges of interest, identity and influence in the developing world and to ultimately achieve its peaceful rise.
{"title":"China’s Whole-of-Region Diplomacy Revisited: Past Experience and Future Prospects","authors":"Chun Zhang","doi":"10.1142/S2377740019500039","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S2377740019500039","url":null,"abstract":"Targeting a group of developing nations in a specific region, whole-of-region diplomacy as a relatively new practice of China’s diplomacy has caught much attention across the world. Since the 1990s, China’s whole-of-region diplomacy has achieved remarkable breakthroughs in terms of its geographical coverage, extending from Southeast and Central Asia to the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, and even Central and Eastern Europe. Through whole-of-region diplomacy, China has not only fulfilled its political commitment and strategic reassurance toward developing nations, but also enhanced the collective identity of various developing regions. Despite the great achievements, China’s whole-of-region diplomacy is far from fully developed and needs further upgrading so as to lay a solid foundation for the country’s sustainable rise. In the future, China’s whole-of-region diplomacy can be advanced by clarifying its strategic position, renovating its institutional framework and scaling up its capacity-building efforts. In the long run, whole-of-region diplomacy, as a key component of the “Xi Jinping thought on diplomacy” and “major-country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics,” is expected to help China tackle challenges of interest, identity and influence in the developing world and to ultimately achieve its peaceful rise.","PeriodicalId":42595,"journal":{"name":"China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1142/S2377740019500039","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43180036","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-01DOI: 10.1142/s2377740019500295
M. Ampwera
The international development cooperation system has long revolved around the notion of a North-South divide and reflected much of the systemic imbalances in global economic relations. It aimed mostly at increasing official development assistance rather than tackling other key development issues like priority infrastructure and innovation capacity. Over the past decade, Africa has experienced rapid growth and rising global prominence, which has profound implications for global development cooperation on the continent. The European Union and China, two major contributors to African development, have increasingly felt the need to put infrastructure development and innovation capacity at the core of their aid policies toward Africa. Recently, important factors, such as growing competition within the international development cooperation regime, search for new markets, increasing role of regional regimes, persistent poverty, the need to stabilize the world economy, and the responsibility to support international peace and stability are shaping Europe’s and China’s aid policies toward Africa. Priority infrastructure like highways, railways, energy, and technological innovation in pillar sectors such as agriculture and textile have been prioritized in Africa’s development cooperation with China and Europe. Although Brussels and Beijing have maintained a visible level of traditional development cooperation policies, this new form of cooperation is causing an embryonic policy shift from aid to investment within their development and cooperation policies.
{"title":"Infrastructure and Innovation: Emerging Priorities of EU and Chinese Aid in Africa","authors":"M. Ampwera","doi":"10.1142/s2377740019500295","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/s2377740019500295","url":null,"abstract":"The international development cooperation system has long revolved around the notion of a North-South divide and reflected much of the systemic imbalances in global economic relations. It aimed mostly at increasing official development assistance rather than tackling other key development issues like priority infrastructure and innovation capacity. Over the past decade, Africa has experienced rapid growth and rising global prominence, which has profound implications for global development cooperation on the continent. The European Union and China, two major contributors to African development, have increasingly felt the need to put infrastructure development and innovation capacity at the core of their aid policies toward Africa. Recently, important factors, such as growing competition within the international development cooperation regime, search for new markets, increasing role of regional regimes, persistent poverty, the need to stabilize the world economy, and the responsibility to support international peace and stability are shaping Europe’s and China’s aid policies toward Africa. Priority infrastructure like highways, railways, energy, and technological innovation in pillar sectors such as agriculture and textile have been prioritized in Africa’s development cooperation with China and Europe. Although Brussels and Beijing have maintained a visible level of traditional development cooperation policies, this new form of cooperation is causing an embryonic policy shift from aid to investment within their development and cooperation policies.","PeriodicalId":42595,"journal":{"name":"China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1142/s2377740019500295","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46020214","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-01DOI: 10.1142/S2377740019500179
Mir Sherbaz Khetran, M. Khalid
The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is a flagship project under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI); and its launch in 2015 was regarded as a landmark event in the history of the Sino-Pakistani relationship. With a budget amounting to over $62 billion, it has become the foremost regional integration initiative between China and Pakistan. The project is also open to all interested regional stakeholders, among which Central Asia is one of the most important in geopolitical terms. Located in a landlocked but resource-rich region, Central Asian countries need better access to regional markets including Pakistan, China, India, and the countries of West Asia. Pakistan and China have huge energy demands that can be satisfied by growing trade with Central Asia. Thus, the CPEC will not only benefit Pakistan and China, but it also presents a strategic opportunity for Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan to transport their goods more easily and gain competitiveness in regional and global markets.
{"title":"The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: Gateway to Central Asia","authors":"Mir Sherbaz Khetran, M. Khalid","doi":"10.1142/S2377740019500179","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S2377740019500179","url":null,"abstract":"The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is a flagship project under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI); and its launch in 2015 was regarded as a landmark event in the history of the Sino-Pakistani relationship. With a budget amounting to over $62 billion, it has become the foremost regional integration initiative between China and Pakistan. The project is also open to all interested regional stakeholders, among which Central Asia is one of the most important in geopolitical terms. Located in a landlocked but resource-rich region, Central Asian countries need better access to regional markets including Pakistan, China, India, and the countries of West Asia. Pakistan and China have huge energy demands that can be satisfied by growing trade with Central Asia. Thus, the CPEC will not only benefit Pakistan and China, but it also presents a strategic opportunity for Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan to transport their goods more easily and gain competitiveness in regional and global markets.","PeriodicalId":42595,"journal":{"name":"China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1142/S2377740019500179","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44838245","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-01DOI: 10.1142/s2377740019500283
Mao Ruipeng
Multilateralism is one of the key notions in China’s diplomatic discourse. Unlike the European Union, China tends to define multilateralism as a consultation process amongst all related members of the international community, so that their fundamental interests and appeals can be fully heard and considered. In the Chinese view, multilateralism features inclusive participation, UN leadership, and the goal of democratization of international relations. It is believed that, as a historical trend, multilateralism is not only crucial for tackling various global challenges, but it also helps foster a favorable international environment for China’s sustainable development. Multilateralism has been deeply ingrained in China’s foreign policy, exemplified by the country’s increasing support for the UN over the past two decades. Notably, both China’s financial contribution to the UN and the number of personnel sent on UN peacekeeping missions have grown rapidly in recent years. Also, China has been advocating the notion of a “community of shared future for mankind” on UN platforms, hoping to share its experience of development with the world. As China deepens its engagement with international organizations, however, the United States is making every effort to constrain China’s influence in the UN. In the future, China needs to work closely with supporters of multilateralism, especially developing countries, so as to play a greater role in the UN.
{"title":"Consultation and Joint Endeavor Among All Stakeholders: China’s Stance on Multilateralism and the United Nations","authors":"Mao Ruipeng","doi":"10.1142/s2377740019500283","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/s2377740019500283","url":null,"abstract":"Multilateralism is one of the key notions in China’s diplomatic discourse. Unlike the European Union, China tends to define multilateralism as a consultation process amongst all related members of the international community, so that their fundamental interests and appeals can be fully heard and considered. In the Chinese view, multilateralism features inclusive participation, UN leadership, and the goal of democratization of international relations. It is believed that, as a historical trend, multilateralism is not only crucial for tackling various global challenges, but it also helps foster a favorable international environment for China’s sustainable development. Multilateralism has been deeply ingrained in China’s foreign policy, exemplified by the country’s increasing support for the UN over the past two decades. Notably, both China’s financial contribution to the UN and the number of personnel sent on UN peacekeeping missions have grown rapidly in recent years. Also, China has been advocating the notion of a “community of shared future for mankind” on UN platforms, hoping to share its experience of development with the world. As China deepens its engagement with international organizations, however, the United States is making every effort to constrain China’s influence in the UN. In the future, China needs to work closely with supporters of multilateralism, especially developing countries, so as to play a greater role in the UN.","PeriodicalId":42595,"journal":{"name":"China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1142/s2377740019500283","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41645751","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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