Pub Date : 2022-03-19DOI: 10.1142/s2377740021500081
H. Sibiri
The eighth Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in November 2021 marked two decades since the first major contemporary Sino–African meeting was held in Beijing in 2000. Despite the framework being entrenched as the principal inter-governmental and functional platform for China-Africa diplomacy and an avenue through which China’s policy toward Africa and Africa’s policy toward China is charted, doubts remain among some reviewers about the true nature of the framework. The arguable contention has been whether FOCAC is a self-interested grand machination imposed by China as the dominant actor to aid its global resurgence or African-oriented, serving the interests of Africa’s great power diplomacy in the twenty-first century. This paper maintains that both standpoints misinterpret what the forum truly represents. It argues that, contrary to the contending perspectives, FOCAC is a “bargained institutional framework” for shared impacts. Consequently, FOCAC represents a policy platform for collective engagement and serves as a knowledge production platform for developing and exchanging ideas and experiences to advance shared development goals.
{"title":"FOCAC at Twenty: A “Bargained Institutional Framework” for Shared Impacts","authors":"H. Sibiri","doi":"10.1142/s2377740021500081","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/s2377740021500081","url":null,"abstract":"The eighth Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in November 2021 marked two decades since the first major contemporary Sino–African meeting was held in Beijing in 2000. Despite the framework being entrenched as the principal inter-governmental and functional platform for China-Africa diplomacy and an avenue through which China’s policy toward Africa and Africa’s policy toward China is charted, doubts remain among some reviewers about the true nature of the framework. The arguable contention has been whether FOCAC is a self-interested grand machination imposed by China as the dominant actor to aid its global resurgence or African-oriented, serving the interests of Africa’s great power diplomacy in the twenty-first century. This paper maintains that both standpoints misinterpret what the forum truly represents. It argues that, contrary to the contending perspectives, FOCAC is a “bargained institutional framework” for shared impacts. Consequently, FOCAC represents a policy platform for collective engagement and serves as a knowledge production platform for developing and exchanging ideas and experiences to advance shared development goals.","PeriodicalId":42595,"journal":{"name":"China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-03-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44103858","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-05DOI: 10.1142/s2377740020500244
Sun Haiyong
Security risks arising from accelerating technological advances have become increasingly evident as humanity now stands on the threshold of a new industrial revolution. Not only are technology-driven military reforms and technology races intensifying broader geopolitical competition among major powers, advancing frontiers of scientific inquiry such as cyberspace and outer space are also opening up new domains of potential conflict, making governance of the global commons an increasingly contentious issue. Promoting global science and technology governance to mitigate and reduce the potential security risks presented by the technological revolution has become an increasingly urgent task. However, today’s global efforts at risk control and prevention face significant challenges and constraints, including a fragmented governance architecture, an outdated power politics mentality, and inequitable distribution of technological power. To improve global science and technology governance, the international community should build an inclusive, resilient, and effective platform that is able to accommodate and reflect the interests and aspirations of both developed countries and developing nations, with a focus on addressing major risks accompanying emerging and foundational technologies like information and communications, artificial intelligence, and digital infrastructure.
{"title":"Global Science and Technology Governance: Impetus, Challenges, and Prospects","authors":"Sun Haiyong","doi":"10.1142/s2377740020500244","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/s2377740020500244","url":null,"abstract":"Security risks arising from accelerating technological advances have become increasingly evident as humanity now stands on the threshold of a new industrial revolution. Not only are technology-driven military reforms and technology races intensifying broader geopolitical competition among major powers, advancing frontiers of scientific inquiry such as cyberspace and outer space are also opening up new domains of potential conflict, making governance of the global commons an increasingly contentious issue. Promoting global science and technology governance to mitigate and reduce the potential security risks presented by the technological revolution has become an increasingly urgent task. However, today’s global efforts at risk control and prevention face significant challenges and constraints, including a fragmented governance architecture, an outdated power politics mentality, and inequitable distribution of technological power. To improve global science and technology governance, the international community should build an inclusive, resilient, and effective platform that is able to accommodate and reflect the interests and aspirations of both developed countries and developing nations, with a focus on addressing major risks accompanying emerging and foundational technologies like information and communications, artificial intelligence, and digital infrastructure.","PeriodicalId":42595,"journal":{"name":"China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-03-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44295519","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-03DOI: 10.1142/s2377740021500068
Wei Zongyou, Zhang Yunhan
The Biden administration has yet to announce its Indo-Pacific strategy, but the overall framework seems all clear: it views China as the main challenger, if not a direct threat, to its political, economic, and military influence in the region, and vows to take diplomatic, economic, and military actions to counterbalance China’s growing influence, preferably with its allies and partners. The Biden administration has taken a series of steps to unite its Asian and even European allies and partners, offered economic alternatives to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), revamped regional institutional architectures, and tried to shape the regional order to its advantage. As a result, China-U.S. relations have deteriorated further on Biden’s watch and is moving in the direction of confrontation.
{"title":"The Biden Administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy and China-U.S. Strategic Competition","authors":"Wei Zongyou, Zhang Yunhan","doi":"10.1142/s2377740021500068","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/s2377740021500068","url":null,"abstract":"The Biden administration has yet to announce its Indo-Pacific strategy, but the overall framework seems all clear: it views China as the main challenger, if not a direct threat, to its political, economic, and military influence in the region, and vows to take diplomatic, economic, and military actions to counterbalance China’s growing influence, preferably with its allies and partners. The Biden administration has taken a series of steps to unite its Asian and even European allies and partners, offered economic alternatives to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), revamped regional institutional architectures, and tried to shape the regional order to its advantage. As a result, China-U.S. relations have deteriorated further on Biden’s watch and is moving in the direction of confrontation.","PeriodicalId":42595,"journal":{"name":"China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43795493","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-03DOI: 10.1142/s2377740021500056
Yu Hongyuan, Pan Jiahua, C. Qingchen, Chai Qimin, Zhu Yunjie, Jiang Lixiao, Cao Jiahan
The international community is now acutely aware of the negative global impact of climate change. But efforts to advance global climate agendas will not go far without China and the United States leading the way, given the two major powers’ sheer economic size, global influence, and contributions to greenhouse gas emissions. A growing consensus is that China and the United States share common interests in promoting a global transition toward a carbon-free future. China-U.S. climate cooperation may also encourage other major carbon emitters to shoulder greater international responsibilities and help advance a global low-carbon agenda. This article previews the Biden administration’s climate and energy policies, analyzes the state and impact of China-U.S. interactions in climate governance and energy transition, and presents a set of policy recommendations on how to build trust and increase cooperation between the world’s largest economies and carbon emitters. Washington’s green recovery-centered climate plan will not go far without advancing international cooperation in industrial restructuring, infrastructure investment, emerging key resource development, and market demand. Likewise, Beijing’s ambitious goals of peaking carbon dioxide emissions by 2030 and achieving carbon neutrality by 2060 will also be difficult to attain if it cannot accelerate green economic growth at home and shoulder the joint leadership of climate governance abroad. In this context, China-U.S. climate cooperation and joint efforts toward carbon neutrality could serve as an icebreaker for the current frosty bilateral relationship.
{"title":"Leading the Global Race to Zero Emissions: A New China-U.S. Climate Agenda","authors":"Yu Hongyuan, Pan Jiahua, C. Qingchen, Chai Qimin, Zhu Yunjie, Jiang Lixiao, Cao Jiahan","doi":"10.1142/s2377740021500056","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/s2377740021500056","url":null,"abstract":"The international community is now acutely aware of the negative global impact of climate change. But efforts to advance global climate agendas will not go far without China and the United States leading the way, given the two major powers’ sheer economic size, global influence, and contributions to greenhouse gas emissions. A growing consensus is that China and the United States share common interests in promoting a global transition toward a carbon-free future. China-U.S. climate cooperation may also encourage other major carbon emitters to shoulder greater international responsibilities and help advance a global low-carbon agenda. This article previews the Biden administration’s climate and energy policies, analyzes the state and impact of China-U.S. interactions in climate governance and energy transition, and presents a set of policy recommendations on how to build trust and increase cooperation between the world’s largest economies and carbon emitters. Washington’s green recovery-centered climate plan will not go far without advancing international cooperation in industrial restructuring, infrastructure investment, emerging key resource development, and market demand. Likewise, Beijing’s ambitious goals of peaking carbon dioxide emissions by 2030 and achieving carbon neutrality by 2060 will also be difficult to attain if it cannot accelerate green economic growth at home and shoulder the joint leadership of climate governance abroad. In this context, China-U.S. climate cooperation and joint efforts toward carbon neutrality could serve as an icebreaker for the current frosty bilateral relationship.","PeriodicalId":42595,"journal":{"name":"China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47107749","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-31DOI: 10.1142/s2377740021500032
Chen Dongxiao, Su Liuqiang, Wang Guoxing, Ye Yu, Li Yanliang
The China-U.S. relationship has entered a new phase of “competition.” A fundamental shift in Washington’s China policy under President Trump’s watch intensified strategic competition to the extent of nearly eliminating any possibility of cooperation. As Washington resorts to a policy of “containment and suppression,” competition will be the defining feature of the bilateral relationship for the foreseeable future and the focus of China-U.S. diplomacy should be on risk control, crisis stability, and getting around the Thucydides Trap. Even if growing strategic competition seems inescapable, there are plenty of shared interests and common concerns that warrant closer coordination between the two superpowers. The most pressing issue is how to restart the engine of cooperation under the Biden presidency after almost all the available avenues of coordination have been shut down by the Trump administration. Beijing and Washington may have calibrated their strategic objectives and developed new perceptions of each other as they find themselves in a new balance of power and profoundly changed circumstances, but some of the success stories of bilateral strategic collaboration over the past forty years since normalization still hold important lessons, and a world of growing uncertainty has rendered those lessons even more relevant for today’s bilateral relationship.
{"title":"China-U.S. Strategic Collaboration: Four Cases and Their Lessons","authors":"Chen Dongxiao, Su Liuqiang, Wang Guoxing, Ye Yu, Li Yanliang","doi":"10.1142/s2377740021500032","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/s2377740021500032","url":null,"abstract":"The China-U.S. relationship has entered a new phase of “competition.” A fundamental shift in Washington’s China policy under President Trump’s watch intensified strategic competition to the extent of nearly eliminating any possibility of cooperation. As Washington resorts to a policy of “containment and suppression,” competition will be the defining feature of the bilateral relationship for the foreseeable future and the focus of China-U.S. diplomacy should be on risk control, crisis stability, and getting around the Thucydides Trap. Even if growing strategic competition seems inescapable, there are plenty of shared interests and common concerns that warrant closer coordination between the two superpowers. The most pressing issue is how to restart the engine of cooperation under the Biden presidency after almost all the available avenues of coordination have been shut down by the Trump administration. Beijing and Washington may have calibrated their strategic objectives and developed new perceptions of each other as they find themselves in a new balance of power and profoundly changed circumstances, but some of the success stories of bilateral strategic collaboration over the past forty years since normalization still hold important lessons, and a world of growing uncertainty has rendered those lessons even more relevant for today’s bilateral relationship.","PeriodicalId":42595,"journal":{"name":"China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49541639","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-14DOI: 10.1142/s2377740021500019
B. Buzan
Climate change is a threat to all of humankind, yet there is still a leadership vacuum on climate governance. At the same time, the deepening climate crisis also presents a golden opportunity for Beijing to assume the role of a global leader. China has the capacity to do it in a way that the United States, Russia, India, and the European Union do not. Taking swift climate action is in Beijing’s interest. Greater contributions to climate governance will certainly help advance China’s long-term political interest in both raising its political status and demonstrating the claimed superiority of its system of government. Positive rhetoric and robust action by China are likely to have a disproportionate effect on the rest of the world. Policy adjustment and implementation by Beijing will bring benefits to the rest of the world. Climate policy options that Beijing may take in the future are not mutually exclusive. The policy shift on climate change could also be attached more firmly to the idea of sustainable development as a defining factor of China’s approach to tackling the climate change threat.
{"title":"China and Climate Change Governance: A Golden Opportunity","authors":"B. Buzan","doi":"10.1142/s2377740021500019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/s2377740021500019","url":null,"abstract":"Climate change is a threat to all of humankind, yet there is still a leadership vacuum on climate governance. At the same time, the deepening climate crisis also presents a golden opportunity for Beijing to assume the role of a global leader. China has the capacity to do it in a way that the United States, Russia, India, and the European Union do not. Taking swift climate action is in Beijing’s interest. Greater contributions to climate governance will certainly help advance China’s long-term political interest in both raising its political status and demonstrating the claimed superiority of its system of government. Positive rhetoric and robust action by China are likely to have a disproportionate effect on the rest of the world. Policy adjustment and implementation by Beijing will bring benefits to the rest of the world. Climate policy options that Beijing may take in the future are not mutually exclusive. The policy shift on climate change could also be attached more firmly to the idea of sustainable development as a defining factor of China’s approach to tackling the climate change threat.","PeriodicalId":42595,"journal":{"name":"China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-01-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44270919","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-15DOI: 10.1142/s237774002050013x
Zheng Yingqin
This paper takes the social unrest in 2019 as a case study and identifies three factors that contributed to the radicalization of social protests in Hong Kong: globalization, digitalization and the U.S. meddling in Hong Kong affairs. First, with the deepening of globalization, the worsening of social-economic conditions had bred populism among the youth. Second, digital technologies and social media platforms also made it easy for young people in Hong Kong to protest in a more covert and radical way. Third, the U.S. support for the Hong Kong opposition leaders added fuel to the radicalization of youth protesters. All these factors finally led to radicalized social protests in Hong Kong. Nevertheless, following the implementation of the National Security Law in Hong Kong SAR, violent activities were largely stopped and social order was gradually restored.
{"title":"The Radicalization of Young Protesters in Hong Kong: Under the Context of Globalization and Power Relations","authors":"Zheng Yingqin","doi":"10.1142/s237774002050013x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/s237774002050013x","url":null,"abstract":"This paper takes the social unrest in 2019 as a case study and identifies three factors that contributed to the radicalization of social protests in Hong Kong: globalization, digitalization and the U.S. meddling in Hong Kong affairs. First, with the deepening of globalization, the worsening of social-economic conditions had bred populism among the youth. Second, digital technologies and social media platforms also made it easy for young people in Hong Kong to protest in a more covert and radical way. Third, the U.S. support for the Hong Kong opposition leaders added fuel to the radicalization of youth protesters. All these factors finally led to radicalized social protests in Hong Kong. Nevertheless, following the implementation of the National Security Law in Hong Kong SAR, violent activities were largely stopped and social order was gradually restored.","PeriodicalId":42595,"journal":{"name":"China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-11-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48941251","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-10DOI: 10.1142/s2377740020500232
Yu Hongyuan, Zhu Yunjie
Beijing’s environmental diplomacy has gained growing momentum in recent years, reflecting China’s activism in a shifting global political and economic landscape. The upcoming 15th Conference of Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity in Kunming in southwestern China will be the first biodiversity-themed event Beijing will host since it signed up for global biodiversity governance in the early 1990s, offering another opportunity for Beijing to contribute its proposals and perspective to the global response to another slow-moving but deepening crisis. Despite the raised international expectations about the conference and the strategic action plan it is expected to produce, the focus of global biodiversity governance should be on delivering real results on existing pledges by addressing the major institutional shortcomings and building up national capabilities.
{"title":"Kunming Summit on the Convention on Biological Diversity and China’s Environmental Diplomacy","authors":"Yu Hongyuan, Zhu Yunjie","doi":"10.1142/s2377740020500232","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/s2377740020500232","url":null,"abstract":"Beijing’s environmental diplomacy has gained growing momentum in recent years, reflecting China’s activism in a shifting global political and economic landscape. The upcoming 15th Conference of Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity in Kunming in southwestern China will be the first biodiversity-themed event Beijing will host since it signed up for global biodiversity governance in the early 1990s, offering another opportunity for Beijing to contribute its proposals and perspective to the global response to another slow-moving but deepening crisis. Despite the raised international expectations about the conference and the strategic action plan it is expected to produce, the focus of global biodiversity governance should be on delivering real results on existing pledges by addressing the major institutional shortcomings and building up national capabilities.","PeriodicalId":42595,"journal":{"name":"China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-11-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42339481","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-06DOI: 10.1142/s2377740020500220
E. Yazdani
China’s increasing strategic investment and continued diplomatic outreach has indicated that it aims to play a larger leadership role in global affairs in the years to come. To project its global power, Beijing has not only tried to bolster its position in existing regional and global institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, but also launched its own initiatives, programs, and projects to reinforce and reform the current international order. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) stands out as the only grouping whose inception, expansion, and functioning best showcase China’s rise and ambitions in the region and the larger world. Indeed, the SCO is a key platform for Beijing’s efforts to play such a role; it is a multilateral mechanism that has long provided an effective means for achieving China’s regional and international goals and interests. Yet, internal tensions between member states may pose new challenges, which will be a major test of the SCO’s resilience and capacity in the years to come.
{"title":"The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: An Emerging Venue for China’s New Diplomacy","authors":"E. Yazdani","doi":"10.1142/s2377740020500220","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/s2377740020500220","url":null,"abstract":"China’s increasing strategic investment and continued diplomatic outreach has indicated that it aims to play a larger leadership role in global affairs in the years to come. To project its global power, Beijing has not only tried to bolster its position in existing regional and global institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, but also launched its own initiatives, programs, and projects to reinforce and reform the current international order. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) stands out as the only grouping whose inception, expansion, and functioning best showcase China’s rise and ambitions in the region and the larger world. Indeed, the SCO is a key platform for Beijing’s efforts to play such a role; it is a multilateral mechanism that has long provided an effective means for achieving China’s regional and international goals and interests. Yet, internal tensions between member states may pose new challenges, which will be a major test of the SCO’s resilience and capacity in the years to come.","PeriodicalId":42595,"journal":{"name":"China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42730598","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-09-09DOI: 10.1142/s2377740020500219
Wang Liwan
In recognition of religion’s growing role in social life, the Chinese government places ample political trust in religions and encourages religious organizations and leaders to be more deeply involved in Beijing’s public diplomacy. Having completed the transition from prudence to activism, China’s religious public diplomacy now takes many forms, from hosting high-profile international religious forums and participation in international religious organizations to engaging in exchanges of visit and multiple religious dialogues. Beijing has secured an institutionalized role for religion in public diplomacy through a string of legislative actions and policy measures, for example, erecting a legal and policy framework, putting in place a robust multiparty operational mechanism, formulating a well-defined list of targets, and granting religious groups greater autonomy and flexibility. Beijing’s religious public diplomacy also faces significant risks and competition, which will affect its effectiveness and outcomes. Going forward, religious public diplomacy should put more emphasis on its spiritual dimension, build more internationalized organizing platforms, expand its engagement targets, and improve risk control and prevention mechanisms. Moreover, Beijing should increase the institutional stability and creativity for its faith diplomacy and encourage the five state-sanctioned religions and folk beliefs to play a larger role, with a view to consolidating national identity and religious identity among the Chinese people.
{"title":"Religion in China’s Public Diplomacy: Transition and Institutionalization","authors":"Wang Liwan","doi":"10.1142/s2377740020500219","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/s2377740020500219","url":null,"abstract":"In recognition of religion’s growing role in social life, the Chinese government places ample political trust in religions and encourages religious organizations and leaders to be more deeply involved in Beijing’s public diplomacy. Having completed the transition from prudence to activism, China’s religious public diplomacy now takes many forms, from hosting high-profile international religious forums and participation in international religious organizations to engaging in exchanges of visit and multiple religious dialogues. Beijing has secured an institutionalized role for religion in public diplomacy through a string of legislative actions and policy measures, for example, erecting a legal and policy framework, putting in place a robust multiparty operational mechanism, formulating a well-defined list of targets, and granting religious groups greater autonomy and flexibility. Beijing’s religious public diplomacy also faces significant risks and competition, which will affect its effectiveness and outcomes. Going forward, religious public diplomacy should put more emphasis on its spiritual dimension, build more internationalized organizing platforms, expand its engagement targets, and improve risk control and prevention mechanisms. Moreover, Beijing should increase the institutional stability and creativity for its faith diplomacy and encourage the five state-sanctioned religions and folk beliefs to play a larger role, with a view to consolidating national identity and religious identity among the Chinese people.","PeriodicalId":42595,"journal":{"name":"China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45066521","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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