S. Donald, H. Bateman, Ross P. Buckley, K. Liu, Rob Nicholls
The funds, entities, and regulators involved in the Australian superannuation industry together comprise a system that is complex and dynamic. The differentiation between roles and the distribution of responsibility amongst entities provides the system with a measure of resilience against the local failure of any one of the entities. However, the interconnections that bind and constitute the system also have the potential to transmit risks within the system, creating the potential for the impact of local failures to amplify through propagation, or in other ways to pose risks to the system as a whole. This article uses a new data set on 200 of Australia’s largest superannuation funds to map and assess those links and to identify the challenges those links pose to the scheme of prudential regulation applied to the superannuation system in Australia. It finds that the function of the entity and the legal form of the linkages, both of which are more variegated than typically occurs in banking sector transactions, crucially influences whether, and to what extent, various types of failures might be transmitted across the system. It also finds that we may be materially under-estimating the possibility that local failures in the superannuation system, which are a near certainty given the current regulatory risk appetite, will have a systemic impact. The findings have broad application across pension and institutional investment markets worldwide.
{"title":"Too connected to fail: the regulation of systemic risk within Australia’s superannuation system","authors":"S. Donald, H. Bateman, Ross P. Buckley, K. Liu, Rob Nicholls","doi":"10.1093/jfr/fjv010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jfr/fjv010","url":null,"abstract":"The funds, entities, and regulators involved in the Australian superannuation industry together comprise a system that is complex and dynamic. The differentiation between roles and the distribution of responsibility amongst entities provides the system with a measure of resilience against the local failure of any one of the entities. However, the interconnections that bind and constitute the system also have the potential to transmit risks within the system, creating the potential for the impact of local failures to amplify through propagation, or in other ways to pose risks to the system as a whole. This article uses a new data set on 200 of Australia’s largest superannuation funds to map and assess those links and to identify the challenges those links pose to the scheme of prudential regulation applied to the superannuation system in Australia. It finds that the function of the entity and the legal form of the linkages, both of which are more variegated than typically occurs in banking sector transactions, crucially influences whether, and to what extent, various types of failures might be transmitted across the system. It also finds that we may be materially under-estimating the possibility that local failures in the superannuation system, which are a near certainty given the current regulatory risk appetite, will have a systemic impact. The findings have broad application across pension and institutional investment markets worldwide.","PeriodicalId":42830,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Regulation","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2016-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/jfr/fjv010","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"61718345","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The design of financial supervision for the purposes of implementing anti-money laundering (AML) regulation has become essential in the agendas of governments. This AML regulation has been implemented through the creation of specialized agencies known as Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs). The establishment of FIUs was triggered by international pressures exerted by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), which at the same time leaves any country free to choose its preferred model. A crucial question thus arises: how do the policymakers select their FIU models? The economics of AML suggests that a financial model of FIU (FFIU) should be the best choice, given its comparative informational advantages. Nevertheless, our empirical analysis of the establishment of FIUs shows a more nuanced reality: after the September 11 terrorist attack, the policymakers preferred the Law Enforcement model of Financial Intelligence Unit (LEFIU). Using a political economy framework, two possible and non-alternative explanations are offered. In order to counteract the terrorist threat, policymakers could have preferred the comparative advantages of the LEFIU model in terms of police and investigation powers. At the same time, politicians could have used September 11 just as an occasion to avoid the establishment of a FFIU with its higher risks of banking capture and/or an over-powerful financial agency.
{"title":"Designing Financial Supervision: The Puzzling Case of the FIUs against Money Laundering","authors":"D. Masciandaro, Alessio Volpicella","doi":"10.1093/JFR/FJW002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JFR/FJW002","url":null,"abstract":"The design of financial supervision for the purposes of implementing anti-money laundering (AML) regulation has become essential in the agendas of governments. This AML regulation has been implemented through the creation of specialized agencies known as Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs). The establishment of FIUs was triggered by international pressures exerted by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), which at the same time leaves any country free to choose its preferred model. A crucial question thus arises: how do the policymakers select their FIU models? The economics of AML suggests that a financial model of FIU (FFIU) should be the best choice, given its comparative informational advantages. Nevertheless, our empirical analysis of the establishment of FIUs shows a more nuanced reality: after the September 11 terrorist attack, the policymakers preferred the Law Enforcement model of Financial Intelligence Unit (LEFIU). Using a political economy framework, two possible and non-alternative explanations are offered. In order to counteract the terrorist threat, policymakers could have preferred the comparative advantages of the LEFIU model in terms of police and investigation powers. At the same time, politicians could have used September 11 just as an occasion to avoid the establishment of a FFIU with its higher risks of banking capture and/or an over-powerful financial agency.","PeriodicalId":42830,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Regulation","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2016-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/JFR/FJW002","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"61718461","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Within the Eurozone’s macroeconomic policy framework, fiscal policy was assigned the task of managing the level of fiscal deficits, and ensuring that the level of public debt was not too high. Within this framework, monetary policy was to stabilize the macroeconomy, wage and price setting was to ensure that countries remained sufficiently competitive in relation to each other, and financial liberalization was undertaken to enable integration of the peripheral European economies with their northern neighbours, thereby generating an increase in well-being. But, even before the onset of the global financial crisis, the competitive position of the GIIPS countries had become unsustainable, and financial liberalization had been grossly mismanaged. The onset of the global financial crisis has meant that interest rates have reached the zero bound so that monetary policy is no longer able to stabilize the Eurozone economy effectively. In these circumstances, fiscal policy needs to both help stabilize the economy, in a way not allowed by the Stability and Growth Pact, and also needs to play a part in ensuring the resolution of imbalances within Europe. For this to be possible, some of the sovereign debt of countries will need to be written down.
在欧元区宏观经济政策框架内，财政政策的任务是管理财政赤字水平，并确保公共债务水平不过高。在这一框架内，货币政策是为了稳定宏观经济，工资和价格的制定是为了确保各国在相互之间保持足够的竞争力，实行金融自由化是为了使欧洲外围经济体能够与其北部邻国一体化，从而增加福利。但是，即使在全球金融危机爆发之前，gips国家的竞争地位已经变得不可持续，金融自由化管理严重不善。全球金融危机的爆发意味着利率已经接近于零，因此货币政策不再能够有效地稳定欧元区经济。在这种情况下，财政政策既需要以《稳定与增长公约》(Stability and Growth Pact)不允许的方式帮助稳定经济，也需要在确保解决欧洲内部失衡方面发挥作用。要做到这一点，就需要减记一些国家的主权债务。
{"title":"Fiscal Governance: How Can the Eurozone Get What It Needs?","authors":"D. Vines","doi":"10.1093/JFR/FJW003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JFR/FJW003","url":null,"abstract":"Within the Eurozone’s macroeconomic policy framework, fiscal policy was assigned the task of managing the level of fiscal deficits, and ensuring that the level of public debt was not too high. Within this framework, monetary policy was to stabilize the macroeconomy, wage and price setting was to ensure that countries remained sufficiently competitive in relation to each other, and financial liberalization was undertaken to enable integration of the peripheral European economies with their northern neighbours, thereby generating an increase in well-being. But, even before the onset of the global financial crisis, the competitive position of the GIIPS countries had become unsustainable, and financial liberalization had been grossly mismanaged. The onset of the global financial crisis has meant that interest rates have reached the zero bound so that monetary policy is no longer able to stabilize the Eurozone economy effectively. In these circumstances, fiscal policy needs to both help stabilize the economy, in a way not allowed by the Stability and Growth Pact, and also needs to play a part in ensuring the resolution of imbalances within Europe. For this to be possible, some of the sovereign debt of countries will need to be written down.","PeriodicalId":42830,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Regulation","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2016-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/JFR/FJW003","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"61718787","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Eleven months after the deadline, in November 2015, Italy implemented the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive. The detailed structure of the Directive drove most of the choices, but the Italian implementing acts are overall clearer than the Directive, especially in outlining the sequence of decisions that the competent authorities and the resolution authorities have to take with respect to a bank that is failing or likely to fail. Less than a week after their enactment, the new rules were applied to resolve four regional banks that until then had been under temporary administration. Although the resolution has been carried swiftly and in accordance with the principles of the Directive, this apparently minor case shows two lessons: that almost all banking crises will be handled with the new rules, liquidation being confined to micro-banks, and that the practical challenges of resolution actions are enormous.
{"title":"The Implementation of the BRRD in Italy and its First Test: Policy Implications","authors":"Lorenzo Stanghellini","doi":"10.1093/JFR/FJW005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JFR/FJW005","url":null,"abstract":"Eleven months after the deadline, in November 2015, Italy implemented the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive. The detailed structure of the Directive drove most of the choices, but the Italian implementing acts are overall clearer than the Directive, especially in outlining the sequence of decisions that the competent authorities and the resolution authorities have to take with respect to a bank that is failing or likely to fail. Less than a week after their enactment, the new rules were applied to resolve four regional banks that until then had been under temporary administration. Although the resolution has been carried swiftly and in accordance with the principles of the Directive, this apparently minor case shows two lessons: that almost all banking crises will be handled with the new rules, liquidation being confined to micro-banks, and that the practical challenges of resolution actions are enormous.","PeriodicalId":42830,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Regulation","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2016-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/JFR/FJW005","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"61718914","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article discusses the most important principles of one of the most relevant financial markets in the world—Singapore. While little affected by the Global Financial Crisis, Singapore is currently reforming the regulatory framework for banks operating in its territory, both nationally and foreign headquartered. This contribution starts by providing some brief information on the structure of the Singaporean banking sector and its regulator, the Monetary Authority of Singapore. The main discussion focuses on the principles of bank regulation, especially in comparison to the rules of the Third Basel Accord (Basel III). This part is followed by the principles that apply to banks in crises and Singapore's role in cooperation with regulators from other jurisdictions. This last section includes an analysis of Singapore's willingness to participate in transnational efforts that seek to address the challenges resulting from the activities of global systemically important banks.
本文讨论了世界上最相关的金融市场之一新加坡的最重要原则。虽然受全球金融危机影响不大，但新加坡目前正在改革在其境内经营的银行的监管框架，包括国内和外国总部。本文首先简要介绍了新加坡银行业及其监管机构——新加坡金融管理局(Monetary Authority of Singapore)的结构。主要讨论的重点是银行监管的原则，特别是与第三巴塞尔协议(巴塞尔协议III)的规则进行比较。这一部分之后是适用于危机中的银行的原则，以及新加坡在与其他司法管辖区监管机构合作中的作用。最后一部分包括对新加坡参与跨国努力的意愿的分析，这些努力寻求解决全球系统重要性银行活动所带来的挑战。
{"title":"Bank Regulation in Singapore","authors":"C. Hofmann","doi":"10.1093/JFR/FJV004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JFR/FJV004","url":null,"abstract":"This article discusses the most important principles of one of the most relevant financial markets in the world—Singapore. While little affected by the Global Financial Crisis, Singapore is currently reforming the regulatory framework for banks operating in its territory, both nationally and foreign headquartered. This contribution starts by providing some brief information on the structure of the Singaporean banking sector and its regulator, the Monetary Authority of Singapore. The main discussion focuses on the principles of bank regulation, especially in comparison to the rules of the Third Basel Accord (Basel III). This part is followed by the principles that apply to banks in crises and Singapore's role in cooperation with regulators from other jurisdictions. This last section includes an analysis of Singapore's willingness to participate in transnational efforts that seek to address the challenges resulting from the activities of global systemically important banks.","PeriodicalId":42830,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Regulation","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2015-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/JFR/FJV004","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"61718182","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The substituted compliance regulatory framework is currently being phased in for cross-border over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives transactions involving US and, in some instances, non-US dealers. Implementation of a substituted compliance regime revealed significant flaws in how regulators approached the extraterritorial application of their authority. This article revisits the approach to substituted compliance with OTC derivatives rules and suggests that a calibration of this approach, which would create a more flexible framework while not affecting allocation of systemic risk, is required.
{"title":"Cross-Border Application of OTC Derivatives Rules: Revisiting the Substituted Compliance Approach","authors":"A. Artamonov","doi":"10.1093/JFR/FJV006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JFR/FJV006","url":null,"abstract":"The substituted compliance regulatory framework is currently being phased in for cross-border over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives transactions involving US and, in some instances, non-US dealers. Implementation of a substituted compliance regime revealed significant flaws in how regulators approached the extraterritorial application of their authority. This article revisits the approach to substituted compliance with OTC derivatives rules and suggests that a calibration of this approach, which would create a more flexible framework while not affecting allocation of systemic risk, is required.","PeriodicalId":42830,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Regulation","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2015-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/JFR/FJV006","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"61718420","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Virtual currencies present many challenges for regulators, not least the concern that it might be the via media for money laundering and terrorist financing. Thus, even as liberal economies embrace the new medium for the transfer of value globally, they face, first, the challenge of designing safeguards against such risks without chilling its use for legitimate purposes and, second, the issue of whether virtual currency holders' interest are adequately protected. This article examines the policy concerns that regulators in Singapore face as they seek to navigate the challenge of encouraging virtual currencies while addressing the risks they present.
{"title":"Virtual Currency Regulation in Singapore","authors":"Alexander F. H. Loke","doi":"10.1093/JFR/FJV001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JFR/FJV001","url":null,"abstract":"Virtual currencies present many challenges for regulators, not least the concern that it might be the via media for money laundering and terrorist financing. Thus, even as liberal economies embrace the new medium for the transfer of value globally, they face, first, the challenge of designing safeguards against such risks without chilling its use for legitimate purposes and, second, the issue of whether virtual currency holders' interest are adequately protected. This article examines the policy concerns that regulators in Singapore face as they seek to navigate the challenge of encouraging virtual currencies while addressing the risks they present.","PeriodicalId":42830,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Regulation","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2015-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/JFR/FJV001","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"61718623","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Over the past few decades, the US Securities and Exchange Commission experimented with a number of different approaches to relaxing Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rules to facilitate entry of foreign firms into US capital markets. Initially, the SEC favoured an approach I denominate as modified national treatment, under which foreign firms were allowed exemption from a limited number of specific US requirements that were likely to conflict with, or be redundant with respect to, regulatory requirements in their home jurisdictions. In general, these exemptions were available regardless of the quality of home country oversight. Sometimes those exemptions were available only for transactions with large institutional investors located in the USA. Starting in 2007, the Commission began to comtemplate more far-reaching acceptance of foreign regulatory oversight, most prominently in an approach that came to be known as substituted compliance. A hallmark of substituted compliance was that it was to be selective, and thus available only to those jurisdictions that the Commission determined to be substantially comparable to US regulatory oversight. In the face of the Global Financial Crisis in 2008, the Commission backed away from its initial experiment with substituted compliance, but the exercise still offers an interesting content in which to consider the manner in which the Commission might have determined the comparability of foreign regulatory systems. This essay explores the various analytical options available for making such supervisory assessments. It then concludes with some preliminary thoughts on what might be called ‘second-generation’ substituted compliance, which the SEC and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission have begun to employ in the past few years to limit the extraterritorial application of certain provisions of the Dodd–Frank Act.
在过去的几十年里，美国证券交易委员会尝试了许多不同的方法来放松证券交易委员会(SEC)的规则，以促进外国公司进入美国资本市场。最初，美国证交会倾向于一种我称之为“修改国民待遇”(modified national treatment)的方法，在这种方法下，外国公司被允许免于遵守数量有限的美国特定要求，这些要求可能与它们本国司法管辖区的监管要求相冲突，或者是多余的。一般来说，无论母国监督的质量如何，都可以获得这些豁免。有时这些豁免只适用于与位于美国的大型机构投资者的交易。从2007年开始，欧盟委员会开始考虑更广泛地接受外国监管，最突出的是一种后来被称为“替代合规”的方法。替代合规的一个特点是，它是有选择性的，因此只适用于那些委员会认定与美国监管相当的司法管辖区。面对2008年的全球金融危机，欧盟委员会放弃了最初的替代合规实验，但这一实践仍然提供了一个有趣的内容，可以考虑欧盟委员会可能确定外国监管体系可比性的方式。本文探讨了可用于进行此类监督评估的各种分析选项。文章最后对所谓的“第二代”替代合规提出了一些初步看法。过去几年，SEC和商品期货交易委员会(Commodity Futures Trading Commission)已经开始采用这种做法，以限制《多德-弗兰克法案》(Dodd-Frank Act)某些条款的域外适用。
{"title":"Substituted Compliance: The Emergence, Challenges, and Evolution of a New Regulatory Paradigm","authors":"H. Jackson","doi":"10.1093/JFR/FJV007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JFR/FJV007","url":null,"abstract":"Over the past few decades, the US Securities and Exchange Commission experimented with a number of different approaches to relaxing Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rules to facilitate entry of foreign firms into US capital markets. Initially, the SEC favoured an approach I denominate as modified national treatment, under which foreign firms were allowed exemption from a limited number of specific US requirements that were likely to conflict with, or be redundant with respect to, regulatory requirements in their home jurisdictions. In general, these exemptions were available regardless of the quality of home country oversight. Sometimes those exemptions were available only for transactions with large institutional investors located in the USA. Starting in 2007, the Commission began to comtemplate more far-reaching acceptance of foreign regulatory oversight, most prominently in an approach that came to be known as substituted compliance. A hallmark of substituted compliance was that it was to be selective, and thus available only to those jurisdictions that the Commission determined to be substantially comparable to US regulatory oversight. In the face of the Global Financial Crisis in 2008, the Commission backed away from its initial experiment with substituted compliance, but the exercise still offers an interesting content in which to consider the manner in which the Commission might have determined the comparability of foreign regulatory systems. This essay explores the various analytical options available for making such supervisory assessments. It then concludes with some preliminary thoughts on what might be called ‘second-generation’ substituted compliance, which the SEC and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission have begun to employ in the past few years to limit the extraterritorial application of certain provisions of the Dodd–Frank Act.","PeriodicalId":42830,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Regulation","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2015-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/JFR/FJV007","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"61718518","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The three European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) have been entrusted with various tasks relating to the supervision over financial market sectors by competent authorities. These tasks are complemented by legally binding powers vis-a-vis competent authorities. In addition, the ESAs draft standards are to be adopted in the form of directly applicable regulations. This article examines how private undertakings may challenge ESA acts judicially and quasi-judicially. The outcome of the analysis is that Union law may offer ample opportunities for private parties to challenge ESA acts not addressed to them. This may come as a surprise given the traditionally restrictive interpretation of standing in Union law, but can be supported de lege lata even though the question has not yet been ruled upon authoritatively. The article also discusses the question of standing against supervisory decisions of the European Central Bank within the framework of the Single Supervisory Mechanism. The question is placed within the broader context of the EU’s self-imposed standards of rule of law, which require extensive powers of European institutions to be accompanied with sufficient opportunities for judicial review, not only to protect rights of market actors but also to promote the further development and harmonization of substantive EU law.
{"title":"Standing and judicial review in the new EU financial markets architecture","authors":"A. Witte","doi":"10.1093/JFR/FJV002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JFR/FJV002","url":null,"abstract":"The three European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) have been entrusted with various tasks relating to the supervision over financial market sectors by competent authorities. These tasks are complemented by legally binding powers vis-a-vis competent authorities. In addition, the ESAs draft standards are to be adopted in the form of directly applicable regulations. This article examines how private undertakings may challenge ESA acts judicially and quasi-judicially. The outcome of the analysis is that Union law may offer ample opportunities for private parties to challenge ESA acts not addressed to them. This may come as a surprise given the traditionally restrictive interpretation of standing in Union law, but can be supported de lege lata even though the question has not yet been ruled upon authoritatively. The article also discusses the question of standing against supervisory decisions of the European Central Bank within the framework of the Single Supervisory Mechanism. The question is placed within the broader context of the EU’s self-imposed standards of rule of law, which require extensive powers of European institutions to be accompanied with sufficient opportunities for judicial review, not only to protect rights of market actors but also to promote the further development and harmonization of substantive EU law.","PeriodicalId":42830,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Regulation","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2015-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/JFR/FJV002","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"61718173","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article discusses the special bank insolvency laws that have been enacted in the UK, Germany and the Netherlands since the onset of the global financial crisis. By 1 January 2015, the national regimes had to be adjusted to new European bank insolvency rules. Yet we believe these common European rules will fail to eliminate some significant differences between national bank insolvency regimes. Moreover, the new European rules will not prevent governments from resolving big banks along territorial lines if not by nationalization.
{"title":"New National Solutions for Bank Failures: Game-changing in the UK, Germany and the Netherlands?","authors":"M. Haentjens, L.G.A. Janssen","doi":"10.1093/JFR/FJV009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JFR/FJV009","url":null,"abstract":"This article discusses the special bank insolvency laws that have been enacted in the UK, Germany and the Netherlands since the onset of the global financial crisis. By 1 January 2015, the national regimes had to be adjusted to new European bank insolvency rules. Yet we believe these common European rules will fail to eliminate some significant differences between national bank insolvency regimes. Moreover, the new European rules will not prevent governments from resolving big banks along territorial lines if not by nationalization.","PeriodicalId":42830,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Regulation","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2015-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/JFR/FJV009","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"61718268","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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