Abstract The article traces the relationship between what is called surface, aesthetic interpretation and deep, semantic, theory-driven interpretation of literature. The former is identified with how interpretation is typically understood in analytic philosophy of art, whereas the latter as belonging to continental literary theory, thus framing the discussion within the relevant debates that the two eminent philosophical schools engage in. Specifically, the article argues in favor of a number of claims. It discusses the notion of surface interpretation, understood as the informed practice involved in general attention to a literary work with an aim of attaining an aesthetically rewarding experience (appreciation). Surface interpretation locates a literary work in a specific art-historical context and at minimum acknowledges the author’s categorial intentions pertinent to genre, general aims and representational content of the work. The article also argues against the notion that appreciation, which is supposed to be the main aim of surface interpretation, is purely perceptual (Carroll, Lamarque) and that consequently aesthetic experience does not involve affective experiences. Grounding appreciation in affective experiences (Levinson) leads me to acknowledge an important continuity between fully formed aesthetic experience and more instinctive or »effortless« ways of attending to a work, such as when one »just enjoys« the emotions afforded by, say, a horror story rather than with full aesthetic attention to the work, where the affective component dominates, but which are less structured to be properly called aesthetic within the conceptual framework I offer here. As a result, I divide the pleasures of attending to an artwork into the instinctive, hedonic ones and the properly aesthetic ones, which both constitute two basic modes of reading. The aesthetic mode is not fully separate from the hedonic one, but on the contrary, by tapping directly into the hardwired human cognitive-affective architecture, it provides a general framework and parameters for the emergence of the higher-order aesthetic mode where more prominence is given to art-historical knowledge and more attention to the design and form/content interrelation. Importantly, aesthetic mode does not operate with the absence of the hedonic one, though they can simultaneously produce different evaluations (e. g. hedonically positive, aesthetically/artistically negative). The two modes could be said to have distinct model readers with corresponding levels of competence. The hedonic reader, as opposed to the aesthetic one, would be largely oblivious to art-historical contexts and would be more selective in terms of attention to the work, relying on direct affect-triggering textual cues. Interpretive effort would be reduced, too. I also discuss my model with reference to the psycho-historical framework for the study of art appreciation as developed by Bullot and Reber which attempts to explain
{"title":"Aesthetic Appreciation and the Dependence Between Deep and Surface Interpretation","authors":"Bartosz Stopel","doi":"10.1515/jlt-2020-0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jlt-2020-0006","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The article traces the relationship between what is called surface, aesthetic interpretation and deep, semantic, theory-driven interpretation of literature. The former is identified with how interpretation is typically understood in analytic philosophy of art, whereas the latter as belonging to continental literary theory, thus framing the discussion within the relevant debates that the two eminent philosophical schools engage in. Specifically, the article argues in favor of a number of claims. It discusses the notion of surface interpretation, understood as the informed practice involved in general attention to a literary work with an aim of attaining an aesthetically rewarding experience (appreciation). Surface interpretation locates a literary work in a specific art-historical context and at minimum acknowledges the author’s categorial intentions pertinent to genre, general aims and representational content of the work. The article also argues against the notion that appreciation, which is supposed to be the main aim of surface interpretation, is purely perceptual (Carroll, Lamarque) and that consequently aesthetic experience does not involve affective experiences. Grounding appreciation in affective experiences (Levinson) leads me to acknowledge an important continuity between fully formed aesthetic experience and more instinctive or »effortless« ways of attending to a work, such as when one »just enjoys« the emotions afforded by, say, a horror story rather than with full aesthetic attention to the work, where the affective component dominates, but which are less structured to be properly called aesthetic within the conceptual framework I offer here. As a result, I divide the pleasures of attending to an artwork into the instinctive, hedonic ones and the properly aesthetic ones, which both constitute two basic modes of reading. The aesthetic mode is not fully separate from the hedonic one, but on the contrary, by tapping directly into the hardwired human cognitive-affective architecture, it provides a general framework and parameters for the emergence of the higher-order aesthetic mode where more prominence is given to art-historical knowledge and more attention to the design and form/content interrelation. Importantly, aesthetic mode does not operate with the absence of the hedonic one, though they can simultaneously produce different evaluations (e. g. hedonically positive, aesthetically/artistically negative). The two modes could be said to have distinct model readers with corresponding levels of competence. The hedonic reader, as opposed to the aesthetic one, would be largely oblivious to art-historical contexts and would be more selective in terms of attention to the work, relying on direct affect-triggering textual cues. Interpretive effort would be reduced, too. I also discuss my model with reference to the psycho-historical framework for the study of art appreciation as developed by Bullot and Reber which attempts to explain ","PeriodicalId":42872,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Literary Theory","volume":"14 1","pages":"94 - 119"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/jlt-2020-0006","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49132002","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract It is sometimes suggested that deductive reasoning has no place in literary studies, particularly when it comes to the justification of literary interpretations. The thesis is that deductive arguments (almost) never occur and deductive reasoning plays no or at most a marginal role in the actual practice of interpretation. In this essay I will argue that this thesis is false. Using counterexamples, it can be shown that deductive arguments are de facto used in the practice of literary interpretation. Although only an exemplary and not comprehensive investigation of argumentative practices in literary studies can be made here, it can also be made plausible that deductive arguments are not exceptions, but a normal, regularly encountered and legitimate phenomenon of this practice. Furthermore, it can be shown that the thesis criticized here is based on a too narrow understanding of deductive reasoning. Finally, I will argue that (from a methodological point of view) it would be an unnecessary restriction to exclude deductions from our methodological toolbox: to abandon deductive reasoning from the practice of interpretation would be tantamount to renouncing a useful method of justifying (and refuting) interpretive hypotheses. Therefore, a fundamental methodological scepticism about deductive reasoning is unfounded. The essay is structured as follows: First, I will present a current example of how the sceptical attitude towards deductions in literary studies is motivated (Section 1). I will show that the concept of deduction underlying this scepticism is usually based on the assumption that deductive arguments contain ›general rules‹ or ›law-like assertions‹ in their premises. Second, I will confront the concept of deduction assumed there with the understanding of deductive arguments as it is usually assumed in logic (Section 2). It will become apparent that a conception of deductive arguments based on general rules or law-like assertions is (though not false) too narrow. After a short caveat concerning the reconstruction of ›real‹ arguments in general (Section 3), I will present some examples of deductive arguments in interpretations of literary texts (Section 4). These arguments have the logical form of arguments from modus ponens, modus tollens and disjunctive syllogism. The examples not only show that deductive reasoning actually occurs in the practice of literary interpretation, but also make it plausible that deductive arguments are an unproblematic and legitimate method of justifying and/or refuting interpretations. After considering what causes may have led to the dissemination of the thesis that deductions do not occur in practice (Section 5), I conclude with a plea to accept deductive arguments as a legitimate tool of justification among many others (Section 6).
{"title":"Deduktive Schlüsse in der literaturwissenschaftlichen Praxis","authors":"Stefan Descher","doi":"10.1515/jlt-2019-0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jlt-2019-0005","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract It is sometimes suggested that deductive reasoning has no place in literary studies, particularly when it comes to the justification of literary interpretations. The thesis is that deductive arguments (almost) never occur and deductive reasoning plays no or at most a marginal role in the actual practice of interpretation. In this essay I will argue that this thesis is false. Using counterexamples, it can be shown that deductive arguments are de facto used in the practice of literary interpretation. Although only an exemplary and not comprehensive investigation of argumentative practices in literary studies can be made here, it can also be made plausible that deductive arguments are not exceptions, but a normal, regularly encountered and legitimate phenomenon of this practice. Furthermore, it can be shown that the thesis criticized here is based on a too narrow understanding of deductive reasoning. Finally, I will argue that (from a methodological point of view) it would be an unnecessary restriction to exclude deductions from our methodological toolbox: to abandon deductive reasoning from the practice of interpretation would be tantamount to renouncing a useful method of justifying (and refuting) interpretive hypotheses. Therefore, a fundamental methodological scepticism about deductive reasoning is unfounded. The essay is structured as follows: First, I will present a current example of how the sceptical attitude towards deductions in literary studies is motivated (Section 1). I will show that the concept of deduction underlying this scepticism is usually based on the assumption that deductive arguments contain ›general rules‹ or ›law-like assertions‹ in their premises. Second, I will confront the concept of deduction assumed there with the understanding of deductive arguments as it is usually assumed in logic (Section 2). It will become apparent that a conception of deductive arguments based on general rules or law-like assertions is (though not false) too narrow. After a short caveat concerning the reconstruction of ›real‹ arguments in general (Section 3), I will present some examples of deductive arguments in interpretations of literary texts (Section 4). These arguments have the logical form of arguments from modus ponens, modus tollens and disjunctive syllogism. The examples not only show that deductive reasoning actually occurs in the practice of literary interpretation, but also make it plausible that deductive arguments are an unproblematic and legitimate method of justifying and/or refuting interpretations. After considering what causes may have led to the dissemination of the thesis that deductions do not occur in practice (Section 5), I conclude with a plea to accept deductive arguments as a legitimate tool of justification among many others (Section 6).","PeriodicalId":42872,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Literary Theory","volume":"13 1","pages":"145 - 160"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2019-09-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/jlt-2019-0005","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48453043","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This essay examines the question of whether and under what conditions a fictitious character can be an epistemic authority for (real) readers; more precisely: it asks whether and under what conditions readers can acquire (propositional) knowledge from the character, thus learning something from it. In answering this question, the essay brings together two debates that have so far hardly been related to each other: an epistemological debate on the concept of epistemic authority and a literary-theoretical debate on aesthetic cognitivism, i. e., the discourse about what can be learned from the reception of fictional texts. In order for a person to be an epistemic authority for another person, two conditions must be met: 1) the first person must have an advantage in knowledge over the second person that the second person recognizes and acknowledges as such; and 2) the second person must have appropriate access to this knowledge. In order to clarify to what extent a fictitious character and a real reader can be related in this way, I first examine what it means to attribute knowledge to a fictitious character. To do so, I suggest the following analysis: In story S, character C knows that p if and only if C believes in S that p; p is true in S; and C is justified in S to believe that p (this suggestion, based on the classical definition of knowledge, can easily be adapted for other suggested analyses: all that is required is that all conditions in the analysis – whatever they might be – lie inside the scope of the fiction operator). Furthermore, a knowledge attribution of the form »In S, C knows whether p« is true if and only if in S, C knows that p or knows that not-p. On the question of the correctness-conditions for knowledge attributions of the form »In S, C knows that p« and »In S, C knows whether p«, I will then enter the debate about fictional truths. This is necessary for two reasons. On the one hand, the attribution of knowledge is nothing but the assertion of a particular fictional truth. And on the other hand, an attribution of knowledge involves another fictional fact, namely the fact p (which I call the »underlying fact«). The view that is largely held in the discussion about fictional truth following Lewis is that what is true in a story does not result solely from the explicit assertions in the text, but also from plausible consequences [Plausibilitätsschlüssen] that we can be further justified in drawing. More precisely, the following possibilities arise for both facts – the underlying fact as well as the attribution of knowledge: Either the text explicitly contains a reference to the fact. Or it does not contain such an explicit reference, but the question of whether the fact obtains can still be answered on the basis of plausibility conclusions. Or there are no explicit references and plausibility conclusions cannot be drawn. In this case, there is a point of indeterminacy. These distinctions result in a number of possible co
{"title":"Fiktive Figuren als Träger von Wissen und als epistemische Autoritäten","authors":"Rico Hauswald","doi":"10.1515/jlt-2019-0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jlt-2019-0006","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This essay examines the question of whether and under what conditions a fictitious character can be an epistemic authority for (real) readers; more precisely: it asks whether and under what conditions readers can acquire (propositional) knowledge from the character, thus learning something from it. In answering this question, the essay brings together two debates that have so far hardly been related to each other: an epistemological debate on the concept of epistemic authority and a literary-theoretical debate on aesthetic cognitivism, i. e., the discourse about what can be learned from the reception of fictional texts. In order for a person to be an epistemic authority for another person, two conditions must be met: 1) the first person must have an advantage in knowledge over the second person that the second person recognizes and acknowledges as such; and 2) the second person must have appropriate access to this knowledge. In order to clarify to what extent a fictitious character and a real reader can be related in this way, I first examine what it means to attribute knowledge to a fictitious character. To do so, I suggest the following analysis: In story S, character C knows that p if and only if C believes in S that p; p is true in S; and C is justified in S to believe that p (this suggestion, based on the classical definition of knowledge, can easily be adapted for other suggested analyses: all that is required is that all conditions in the analysis – whatever they might be – lie inside the scope of the fiction operator). Furthermore, a knowledge attribution of the form »In S, C knows whether p« is true if and only if in S, C knows that p or knows that not-p. On the question of the correctness-conditions for knowledge attributions of the form »In S, C knows that p« and »In S, C knows whether p«, I will then enter the debate about fictional truths. This is necessary for two reasons. On the one hand, the attribution of knowledge is nothing but the assertion of a particular fictional truth. And on the other hand, an attribution of knowledge involves another fictional fact, namely the fact p (which I call the »underlying fact«). The view that is largely held in the discussion about fictional truth following Lewis is that what is true in a story does not result solely from the explicit assertions in the text, but also from plausible consequences [Plausibilitätsschlüssen] that we can be further justified in drawing. More precisely, the following possibilities arise for both facts – the underlying fact as well as the attribution of knowledge: Either the text explicitly contains a reference to the fact. Or it does not contain such an explicit reference, but the question of whether the fact obtains can still be answered on the basis of plausibility conclusions. Or there are no explicit references and plausibility conclusions cannot be drawn. In this case, there is a point of indeterminacy. These distinctions result in a number of possible co","PeriodicalId":42872,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Literary Theory","volume":"13 1","pages":"161 - 184"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2019-09-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/jlt-2019-0006","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48367980","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The discussion of genre theory since the middle of the twentieth century has been marked, among other things, by two conflicting endeavors: on the one hand, there are attempts to semantically regulate generic terms for the purpose of a clear scientific language by defining them as types of texts (cf. Fricke 2010, Fishelov 1991, Zymner 2003); and on the other hand, there are attempts to accustom literary studies to the factual indeterminacy of generic terms and to comprehend this indeterminacy by adapting Wittgenstein’s concept of family resemblance or the semantics of prototypes (cf. Strube 1986, Hempfer 2010a). The essay is intended to show that both positions – that of strictly regulating and of merely descriptively comprehending practice – as they have been advocated so far hinder the foundation of genre-historical research. This essay aims to more precisely formulate the productive ideas from both positions and thus to provide a robust foundation for the historical study of genres. This foundation is to be structured by two core questions that until now have not been clearly separated: first, how one ought to define, before and during historiographic and empirical work, the concept of the genre that is to be examined; and second, how one can synthesize the historically changing semantics of a genre at the end of this empirical work. Answering these two questions becomes a problem when one is dealing with historically discontinuous and heterogeneous genres. This essay pursues this problem using the example of novella history, because research here is particularly divided as to how the concept of the novella can best be understood. The guiding idea of the essay is to reverse the usual sequence of steps: in genre theory, the dogma is often advocated that the concept of genre must be defined a priori, i. e., before the investigation begins and independently of empirical work. The first section of this essay rejects this dogma and recommends that we make the use of the concept of a specific genre dependent on the concrete epistemological interest of the investigation. With the help of an argument by Kendall L. Walton, the essay shows that aesthetic innovations and the historical development of literary procedures can only be understood if a hermeneutic interest in the references of individual texts to historically established generic expectations is at the forefront of the investigation (cf. Walton 1970). The essay recommends that generic historiography serve this hermeneutic interest. It aims to answer the first core question of how the concept of genre ought be used before and during historiographic work for two central procedures: for reconstruction from, on the one hand, historical poetics (second section); and, on the other hand, from text groups (third section). In both procedures, the thesis is that the concept of the genre to be examined should not be regulated before or independently of empirical work by defining a concept of a t
{"title":"Gattungsgeschichte und ihr Gattungsbegriff am Beispiel der Novellen","authors":"Juliane Schröter","doi":"10.1515/jlt-2019-0009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jlt-2019-0009","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The discussion of genre theory since the middle of the twentieth century has been marked, among other things, by two conflicting endeavors: on the one hand, there are attempts to semantically regulate generic terms for the purpose of a clear scientific language by defining them as types of texts (cf. Fricke 2010, Fishelov 1991, Zymner 2003); and on the other hand, there are attempts to accustom literary studies to the factual indeterminacy of generic terms and to comprehend this indeterminacy by adapting Wittgenstein’s concept of family resemblance or the semantics of prototypes (cf. Strube 1986, Hempfer 2010a). The essay is intended to show that both positions – that of strictly regulating and of merely descriptively comprehending practice – as they have been advocated so far hinder the foundation of genre-historical research. This essay aims to more precisely formulate the productive ideas from both positions and thus to provide a robust foundation for the historical study of genres. This foundation is to be structured by two core questions that until now have not been clearly separated: first, how one ought to define, before and during historiographic and empirical work, the concept of the genre that is to be examined; and second, how one can synthesize the historically changing semantics of a genre at the end of this empirical work. Answering these two questions becomes a problem when one is dealing with historically discontinuous and heterogeneous genres. This essay pursues this problem using the example of novella history, because research here is particularly divided as to how the concept of the novella can best be understood. The guiding idea of the essay is to reverse the usual sequence of steps: in genre theory, the dogma is often advocated that the concept of genre must be defined a priori, i. e., before the investigation begins and independently of empirical work. The first section of this essay rejects this dogma and recommends that we make the use of the concept of a specific genre dependent on the concrete epistemological interest of the investigation. With the help of an argument by Kendall L. Walton, the essay shows that aesthetic innovations and the historical development of literary procedures can only be understood if a hermeneutic interest in the references of individual texts to historically established generic expectations is at the forefront of the investigation (cf. Walton 1970). The essay recommends that generic historiography serve this hermeneutic interest. It aims to answer the first core question of how the concept of genre ought be used before and during historiographic work for two central procedures: for reconstruction from, on the one hand, historical poetics (second section); and, on the other hand, from text groups (third section). In both procedures, the thesis is that the concept of the genre to be examined should not be regulated before or independently of empirical work by defining a concept of a t","PeriodicalId":42872,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Literary Theory","volume":"13 1","pages":"227 - 257"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2019-09-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/jlt-2019-0009","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44443718","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The use of past tense in narrative discourse at first glance seems to imply that the narrated events are lying in the past as compared to the act of narration. However, this intuitive notion was doubted by several scholars in the mid 20th century, among them Käte Hamburger, Harald Weinrich, Émile Benveniste, and Ann Banfield. This article investigates the temporal constitution of literary narratives from a perspective of the biological evolution of Human cognition. My analysis begins with Hamburger’s most disputed claim that in epic fiction the past tense »loses its grammatical function of designating what is past« and proceeds by testing a derived hypothesis against a cross-cultural sample of (mostly oral) folklore. Hamburger denied any temporal relation between the speaker and that which he speaks of, assuming instead a fictitious neverland in which the narrated events are situated and to which the preterit refers. If Hamburger’s model is correct, so the derived hypothesis goes, then the use of past tense in fictional narratives is merely a cultural convention, and different narrative traditions should expose different conventions. Indeed it can be shown that in other cultures stories are told in the present tense, in infinitive verb forms, or in forms indicating abstractness or remoteness. It can be followed that Hamburger was right at least in presuming that reference to the past is not a necessary constituent of verbal storytelling. Actually, instead of referring to the past, the epic preterit rather seems to indicate a change in the modality of speaking, thus adhering to the category of grammatical mood rather than tense. In some languages of oral cultures, however, this presumed mood shows up instead as a way of indicating the source of information. This kind of source information – fully grammaticalized in a quarter of the world’s languages – is called ›evidentiality‹ by linguists. In a phylogenetic perspective on the evolution of cognition, source information only becomes necessary with extended inferential and communicative capabilities and may thus have emerged as a cognitive tool in early humans when entering the ›cognitive niche‹. Evidentiality markers in language may thus be the linguistic reflex of a very ancient cognitive scope category in the innate architecture of the human mind, one which served to separate first-hand experience from reported knowledge. In oral storytelling, evidentiality is marked not only by specific verb forms but also by specific formulas (›they say‹/›it is said‹), intonations, or rhetorical devices. From this perspective, the phenomenon observed by Hamburger and others can be said to originate in the beginning of Tradition – that is, of verbal transmission of cultural knowledge. My hypothesis is that literary narratives in literate cultures still use this ancient cognitive scope operator of ›tradition‹ when employing the epic preterit. Admittedly, in literate cultures it often suffices to put »A n
摘要叙事性话语中过去时的使用乍一看似乎暗示着所叙述的事件与叙述行为相比是在过去。然而，这种直观的观念在20世纪中期受到了一些学者的质疑，其中包括Käte Hamburger, Harald Weinrich， Émile Benveniste和Ann Banfield。本文从人类认知的生物进化角度考察文学叙事的时间构成。我的分析从汉堡最有争议的主张开始，即在史诗小说中，过去时“失去了表示过去的语法功能”，然后通过对跨文化(主要是口头)民间传说样本的检验来验证一个衍生的假设。汉堡包否认说话者和他所说的事物之间有任何时间上的关系，而是假设一个虚构的梦幻岛，叙述的事件发生在那里，而偏爱者所指的是这个梦幻岛。如果Hamburger的模型是正确的，那么由此衍生出的假设就是，在小说叙事中使用过去时仅仅是一种文化惯例，不同的叙事传统应该暴露出不同的惯例。事实上，在其他文化中，故事是用现在时、动词不定式或表示抽象或遥远的形式讲述的。可以这样说，至少在假定对过去的提及不是口头讲故事的必要组成部分这一点上，Hamburger是正确的。实际上，史诗的先行词并不是指过去，而是指说话语气的变化，因此属于语法语气的范畴，而不是时态的范畴。然而，在一些口头文化的语言中，这种假定的情绪反而作为一种表明信息来源的方式出现。这种来源信息——被世界上四分之一的语言完全语法化——被语言学家称为“证据性”。从认知进化的系统发育角度来看，源信息只有在扩展推理和交流能力时才成为必要，因此可能在早期人类进入“认知生态位”时作为一种认知工具出现。因此，语言中的证据性标记可能是人类思维固有架构中一个非常古老的认知范围类别的语言反射，它有助于将第一手经验与报告的知识分开。在口述故事中，证据性不仅通过特定的动词形式，而且通过特定的公式(他们说/据说)、语调或修辞手段来标记。从这个角度来看，汉堡包和其他人观察到的现象可以说起源于传统的开始-即文化知识的口头传播。我的假设是，文学文化中的文学叙事在使用史诗偏好时仍然使用“传统”这个古老的认知范围算子。诚然，在文学文化中，为了表明叙事性小说的绝对差异性，在标题页上写上“作者”往往就足够了。然而，作者仍然采用了额外的手段来唤起一种“喃喃低语”的气氛——正如托马斯·曼(Thomas Mann)曾经所说的那样——这种气氛创造了一种印象，即在所讲述的个人故事背后有一个客观的传统世界。我以文学第一人称叙事为例，因为同叙事叙事——与汉堡的异叙事叙事的经典案例相反——显示了说话者和他所说的对象之间的连续时空关系，因此需要额外的手段或努力来表明第一手经验的普通世界和文学世界之间的断裂。由于Hamburger曾经将史诗般的偏好视为虚构的信号，所以我在论文的最后几段简要地讨论了虚构的概念。我认为“虚构性”是文学社会中较晚的文化概念，它与“传统”的认知范畴并不相同，但最终由于后者的存在而成为可能。
{"title":"On the Origin of the Epic Preterit","authors":"Katja Mellmann","doi":"10.1515/jlt-2019-0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jlt-2019-0008","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The use of past tense in narrative discourse at first glance seems to imply that the narrated events are lying in the past as compared to the act of narration. However, this intuitive notion was doubted by several scholars in the mid 20th century, among them Käte Hamburger, Harald Weinrich, Émile Benveniste, and Ann Banfield. This article investigates the temporal constitution of literary narratives from a perspective of the biological evolution of Human cognition. My analysis begins with Hamburger’s most disputed claim that in epic fiction the past tense »loses its grammatical function of designating what is past« and proceeds by testing a derived hypothesis against a cross-cultural sample of (mostly oral) folklore. Hamburger denied any temporal relation between the speaker and that which he speaks of, assuming instead a fictitious neverland in which the narrated events are situated and to which the preterit refers. If Hamburger’s model is correct, so the derived hypothesis goes, then the use of past tense in fictional narratives is merely a cultural convention, and different narrative traditions should expose different conventions. Indeed it can be shown that in other cultures stories are told in the present tense, in infinitive verb forms, or in forms indicating abstractness or remoteness. It can be followed that Hamburger was right at least in presuming that reference to the past is not a necessary constituent of verbal storytelling. Actually, instead of referring to the past, the epic preterit rather seems to indicate a change in the modality of speaking, thus adhering to the category of grammatical mood rather than tense. In some languages of oral cultures, however, this presumed mood shows up instead as a way of indicating the source of information. This kind of source information – fully grammaticalized in a quarter of the world’s languages – is called ›evidentiality‹ by linguists. In a phylogenetic perspective on the evolution of cognition, source information only becomes necessary with extended inferential and communicative capabilities and may thus have emerged as a cognitive tool in early humans when entering the ›cognitive niche‹. Evidentiality markers in language may thus be the linguistic reflex of a very ancient cognitive scope category in the innate architecture of the human mind, one which served to separate first-hand experience from reported knowledge. In oral storytelling, evidentiality is marked not only by specific verb forms but also by specific formulas (›they say‹/›it is said‹), intonations, or rhetorical devices. From this perspective, the phenomenon observed by Hamburger and others can be said to originate in the beginning of Tradition – that is, of verbal transmission of cultural knowledge. My hypothesis is that literary narratives in literate cultures still use this ancient cognitive scope operator of ›tradition‹ when employing the epic preterit. Admittedly, in literate cultures it often suffices to put »A n","PeriodicalId":42872,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Literary Theory","volume":"13 1","pages":"206 - 226"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2019-09-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/jlt-2019-0008","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47796921","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The positioning in space and time of performed narration in theater poses a specific challenge to classical narratological categories of structuralist descent (developed, for example, by Gérard Genette or Wolf Schmid, for the analysis of narrative fiction). Time is the phenomenon which connects narratology and theater studies: on the one hand, it provides the basis for nearly every definition of narrativity; on the other, it grounds a number of different methodologies for the analysis of theater stagings, as well as theories of performance – with their emphasis on transience, the ephemeral, and the unrepeatable, singular or transitory nature of the technically unreproducible art of theater (e. g. by Erika Fischer-Lichte). This turn towards temporality is also present in theories of postdramatic theater (by Hans-Thies Lehman) and performance art. Narrating always takes place in time; likewise, every performance is a handling of and an encounter with time. Furthermore, performed narration gains a concrete spatial setting by virtue of its location on a stage or comparable performance area, so that the spatial structures contained in this setting exist in relation to the temporal structures of the act of theatrical telling, as well as the content of what is told. Both temporal and spatial structures of theater stagings can be systematically described and analyzed with a narratological vocabulary. With references to Seymour Chatman, Käte Hamburger and Markus Kuhn among others, the contribution discusses how narratological parameters for the analysis of temporal and spatial relations can be productively expanded in relation to theater and performance analysis. For exemplary purposes, it refers to Dimiter Gotscheff’s staging of Peter Handke’s Immer noch Sturm (which premiered in 2011 at the Thalia Theater Hamburg in cooperation with the Salzburger Festspiele), focusing on its transmedial broadening of temporal categories like order, duration, and frequency, and subsequent, prior, or simultaneous narration. The broadening itself proves feasible since all categories of temporal narration can be applied to performative narration in the theater – at times even more fruitfully than in written language, as is the case, for example, with the concept of ›duration‹. The concept of ›time of narration‹ too can be productively applied to theater. Whilst a subsequent narration is frequently considered the standard case in written-language narratives on the one hand – a conclusion that is, however, only correct if the narrator figure and narrative stand in spatiotemporal relation to one another, i. e. if a homodiegetic narrator figure is present – it is commonly held that in scenic-performed narration, on the other hand, the telling and the told take place simultaneously. The present contribution argues against this interpretation, as it stems from a misguided understanding of the ›liveness‹ of performance. ›Liveness‹ refers only to the relationship between
戏剧表演叙事在空间和时间上的定位对结构主义传统的叙述性范畴(如格姆扎尔德·杰内特或沃尔夫·施密德为分析叙事小说而发展起来的)提出了特殊的挑战。时间是将叙事学与戏剧研究联系起来的现象:一方面，它为几乎所有的叙事学定义提供了基础;另一方面，它为戏剧表演的分析提供了许多不同的方法，以及表演理论——它们强调戏剧艺术在技术上不可复制的短暂性、短暂性和不可重复性、奇异性或短暂性。埃里卡·费舍尔-利希特)。这种对时间性的转向也出现在后戏剧戏剧(汉斯-蒂斯·雷曼)和表演艺术的理论中。叙述总是发生在时间上;同样，每一场表演都是对时间的处理和遭遇。此外，表演叙事凭借其在舞台或类似表演区域的位置获得了具体的空间设置，因此，这种设置中包含的空间结构与戏剧叙事行为的时间结构以及所讲述的内容有关。剧场舞台的时间和空间结构都可以用叙事学词汇来系统地描述和分析。参考Seymour Chatman, Käte Hamburger和Markus Kuhn等人的观点，本文讨论了时间和空间关系分析的叙事学参数如何在戏剧和表演分析中得到有效扩展。举个例子，它指的是Dimiter Gotscheff在Peter Handke的Immer noch Sturm(2011年在汉堡塔利亚剧院与萨尔茨堡艺术节合作首演)的舞台，重点是它对时间类别的跨媒介拓宽，如顺序、持续时间和频率，以及随后、之前或同时叙述。扩展本身被证明是可行的，因为所有类别的时间叙事都可以应用于戏剧中的表演叙事——有时甚至比书面语言更富有成效，例如，“持续时间”的概念。“叙述时间”的概念也可以有效地应用于戏剧。一方面，随后的叙述经常被认为是书面语言叙事的标准案例——然而，只有当叙述者的形象和叙述处于彼此的时空关系中时，这个结论才是正确的。如果有一个同叙事的叙述者在场——另一方面，人们通常认为，在风景表演叙事中，讲述和被讲述是同时发生的。目前的贡献反对这种解释，因为它源于对表演的“活力”的错误理解。“生动”仅指观众和表演者之间的关系以及他们各自的存在，而不是他们与被告知者的时间和空间关系。更确切地说，下面将论证戏剧(以及电影)的叙述时间在大多数情况下是没有标记的。然而，也可以进行随后的、先前的或同时的叙述。Immer noch Sturm是表演的后续叙述的一个例子。那么，对于视听叙事，可以识别出一种特殊的迭代叙事(讲述一次发生了n次的事情)，即讲述几次(n - x)发生了n次的事情。作为对视听叙事媒介中叙事时间性分析的一个附加范畴，我冒昧地提出了我所谓的“同步叙事”，以描述表演中时空关系的特殊性。在同步叙事中，两个或两个以上的事件(发生在叙事世界的不同地点或时间)同时在舞台上呈现。这种多个事件的同步表现只能在空间叙事的视听维度中实现，而不能在基于书面语言的叙事中实现。在叙事空间关系方面，提出了“覆盖空间”、“延伸空间”和“缩减叙事空间”的范畴，以分析话语空间与故事空间的关系。当叙事性存在时，话语空间出现在表演的具体物理空间中。在这个话语空间中，可以出现任何数量的故事空间(具有任何扩展)。然而，在时间延伸叙事中，讲述的时间比被讲述的时间长，而在空间延伸叙事中，被讲述的空间比讲述的空间大。这一原则同样适用于缩短时间或缩短空间的叙述。 时间和空间叙事学参数的传播和媒介特定的扩展揭示了时间和空间如何形成一个连续体，因此应该在叙事人工制品的分析方法中相互联系和讨论。Immer noch Sturm的分期实现了一种元性结构，在这种结构中，时间边界被系统地消解，空间边界的超越成为不同时间层次融合的标志。回顾已建立的叙事学参数，并为叙事空间开发类似的概念工具，有助于对具体叙事和叙事媒介进行比较分析，从而不仅对经典叙事学参数提出了富有成果的挑战，而且允许调查和构建一个整体的——如果是文化特定的——叙事的总体观点。
{"title":"Zeitraum und Raumzeit: Dimensionen zeitlicher und räumlicher Narration im Theater","authors":"J. Horstmann","doi":"10.1515/jlt-2019-0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jlt-2019-0007","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The positioning in space and time of performed narration in theater poses a specific challenge to classical narratological categories of structuralist descent (developed, for example, by Gérard Genette or Wolf Schmid, for the analysis of narrative fiction). Time is the phenomenon which connects narratology and theater studies: on the one hand, it provides the basis for nearly every definition of narrativity; on the other, it grounds a number of different methodologies for the analysis of theater stagings, as well as theories of performance – with their emphasis on transience, the ephemeral, and the unrepeatable, singular or transitory nature of the technically unreproducible art of theater (e. g. by Erika Fischer-Lichte). This turn towards temporality is also present in theories of postdramatic theater (by Hans-Thies Lehman) and performance art. Narrating always takes place in time; likewise, every performance is a handling of and an encounter with time. Furthermore, performed narration gains a concrete spatial setting by virtue of its location on a stage or comparable performance area, so that the spatial structures contained in this setting exist in relation to the temporal structures of the act of theatrical telling, as well as the content of what is told. Both temporal and spatial structures of theater stagings can be systematically described and analyzed with a narratological vocabulary. With references to Seymour Chatman, Käte Hamburger and Markus Kuhn among others, the contribution discusses how narratological parameters for the analysis of temporal and spatial relations can be productively expanded in relation to theater and performance analysis. For exemplary purposes, it refers to Dimiter Gotscheff’s staging of Peter Handke’s Immer noch Sturm (which premiered in 2011 at the Thalia Theater Hamburg in cooperation with the Salzburger Festspiele), focusing on its transmedial broadening of temporal categories like order, duration, and frequency, and subsequent, prior, or simultaneous narration. The broadening itself proves feasible since all categories of temporal narration can be applied to performative narration in the theater – at times even more fruitfully than in written language, as is the case, for example, with the concept of ›duration‹. The concept of ›time of narration‹ too can be productively applied to theater. Whilst a subsequent narration is frequently considered the standard case in written-language narratives on the one hand – a conclusion that is, however, only correct if the narrator figure and narrative stand in spatiotemporal relation to one another, i. e. if a homodiegetic narrator figure is present – it is commonly held that in scenic-performed narration, on the other hand, the telling and the told take place simultaneously. The present contribution argues against this interpretation, as it stems from a misguided understanding of the ›liveness‹ of performance. ›Liveness‹ refers only to the relationship between ","PeriodicalId":42872,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Literary Theory","volume":"13 1","pages":"185 - 205"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2019-09-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/jlt-2019-0007","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45491573","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"»For Thee There Is No Weight nor Measure«. The Possibilities and Limitations of »Exact« Methods in the Humanities","authors":"Maksim I. Shapir","doi":"10.1515/jlt-2019-0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jlt-2019-0004","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":42872,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Literary Theory","volume":"13 1","pages":"116 - 144"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2019-03-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/jlt-2019-0004","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42404358","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The following essay2 is methodological in the strictest sense of the word. While the study itself deals with a very narrow subject, it should demonstrate a method (methodos) for resolving a major problem in the comparison of broad literary entities, in this case, providing a scientific basis for a distinction between Classicism and Romanticism. Should this method turn out to be long and arduous, involving labour-intensive work, then I have embraced it because the quick method, which has been used up till now, is clearly not fit for purpose. True, our literary experience very often grants us the capacity to distinguish between different entities (school, authorial style, genre, epoch) through an immediate feeling; but when we try to objectify this feeling, to give it a scientific definition, we are very rarely successful. So, we can distinguish a typical work of Classicism from a typical romantic piece, but the essence of Classicism and Romanticism is still awaiting definition. The presently prevailing deductive method of definition is based on the idea that intuition can pluck out a single feature and designate it the »essence«, »nature«, das Wesen of Romanticism; at best, several intuitively selected features are elevated to the rank of »basic
{"title":"Speech Distribution in Five-Act Tragedies (A Question of Classicism and Romanticism)","authors":"Boris I. Yarkho","doi":"10.1515/jlt-2019-0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jlt-2019-0002","url":null,"abstract":"The following essay2 is methodological in the strictest sense of the word. While the study itself deals with a very narrow subject, it should demonstrate a method (methodos) for resolving a major problem in the comparison of broad literary entities, in this case, providing a scientific basis for a distinction between Classicism and Romanticism. Should this method turn out to be long and arduous, involving labour-intensive work, then I have embraced it because the quick method, which has been used up till now, is clearly not fit for purpose. True, our literary experience very often grants us the capacity to distinguish between different entities (school, authorial style, genre, epoch) through an immediate feeling; but when we try to objectify this feeling, to give it a scientific definition, we are very rarely successful. So, we can distinguish a typical work of Classicism from a typical romantic piece, but the essence of Classicism and Romanticism is still awaiting definition. The presently prevailing deductive method of definition is based on the idea that intuition can pluck out a single feature and designate it the »essence«, »nature«, das Wesen of Romanticism; at best, several intuitively selected features are elevated to the rank of »basic","PeriodicalId":42872,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Literary Theory","volume":"13 1","pages":"13 - 76"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2019-03-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/jlt-2019-0002","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42435540","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The idea of producing a special volume of hitherto untranslated texts by Russian formalists owes its existence to a newly awakened interest in quantification in the (digital) literary studies. A first indication of this was the conference in Stanford in 2015, entitled »Russian Formalism and the Digital Humanities«. The reason for this interest is simple: with the manifold practices developed in the digital literary studies in the past decade, we are now able to operationalise and automatise formalist research ideas, to reproduce them, to scale them up and to further develop methods along those lines. In this volume, we present three articles by Russian scholars, Muscovite scholars, to be precise. Boris I. Yarkho (1889–1942), Mikhail L. Gasparov (1935–2005) and Maksim I. Shapir (1962–2006) come from different periods representing three generations of Russian formalism, and their works are strongly intertwined. As is well known, there was a strong tradition of formal literary studies in Russia in the 20th century (Kizhner et al. 2018). But there were not so many quantitative works – except, of course, in verse studies, which were always based on statistics and calculations (Bely 1910, Shengeli 1923, Tomashevsky 1959, Rudnev 1968, Bayevsky 1972, Zhirmunsky 1975, Shapir 1994, Taranovsky 2010, Kelih 2008). Against this backdrop, the work of Yarkho stands out. Involving modern statistics in literary studies began with Kolmogorov only years later; Yarkho relied on his own statistical handbooks to find his way.
为迄今为止尚未翻译的俄罗斯形式主义者的文本制作特别卷的想法，其存在归功于对(数字)文学研究中量化的新觉醒的兴趣。这方面的第一个迹象是2015年在斯坦福举行的题为“俄罗斯形式主义和数字人文”的会议。产生这种兴趣的原因很简单:在过去的十年里，随着数字文学研究中各种各样的实践的发展，我们现在能够将形式主义的研究思想操作化和自动化，复制它们，扩大它们的规模，并沿着这些路线进一步发展方法。在本卷中，我们提出三篇文章由俄罗斯学者，莫斯科学者，准确地说。Boris I. Yarkho (1889-1942)， Mikhail L. Gasparov(1935-2005)和Maksim I. Shapir(1962-2006)来自不同的时期，代表了三代俄罗斯形式主义，他们的作品紧密地交织在一起。众所周知，20世纪俄罗斯有很强的正式文学研究传统(Kizhner et al. 2018)。但是，定量研究的作品并不多——当然，除了诗歌研究之外，诗歌研究总是基于统计和计算(belely 1910, Shengeli 1923, Tomashevsky 1959, Rudnev 1968, Bayevsky 1972, Zhirmunsky 1975, Shapir 1994, Taranovsky 2010, Kelih 2008)。在这种背景下，Yarkho的作品脱颖而出。将现代统计学纳入文学研究始于柯尔莫哥洛夫(Kolmogorov)几年后;耶科依靠自己的统计手册找到了出路。
{"title":"Preface: Data-Driven Formalism","authors":"Frank Fischer, M. Akimova, B. Orekhov","doi":"10.1515/jlt-2019-0001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jlt-2019-0001","url":null,"abstract":"The idea of producing a special volume of hitherto untranslated texts by Russian formalists owes its existence to a newly awakened interest in quantification in the (digital) literary studies. A first indication of this was the conference in Stanford in 2015, entitled »Russian Formalism and the Digital Humanities«. The reason for this interest is simple: with the manifold practices developed in the digital literary studies in the past decade, we are now able to operationalise and automatise formalist research ideas, to reproduce them, to scale them up and to further develop methods along those lines. In this volume, we present three articles by Russian scholars, Muscovite scholars, to be precise. Boris I. Yarkho (1889–1942), Mikhail L. Gasparov (1935–2005) and Maksim I. Shapir (1962–2006) come from different periods representing three generations of Russian formalism, and their works are strongly intertwined. As is well known, there was a strong tradition of formal literary studies in Russia in the 20th century (Kizhner et al. 2018). But there were not so many quantitative works – except, of course, in verse studies, which were always based on statistics and calculations (Bely 1910, Shengeli 1923, Tomashevsky 1959, Rudnev 1968, Bayevsky 1972, Zhirmunsky 1975, Shapir 1994, Taranovsky 2010, Kelih 2008). Against this backdrop, the work of Yarkho stands out. Involving modern statistics in literary studies began with Kolmogorov only years later; Yarkho relied on his own statistical handbooks to find his way.","PeriodicalId":42872,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Literary Theory","volume":"13 1","pages":"1 - 12"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2019-03-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/jlt-2019-0001","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45343005","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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