O presente artigo tem o objetivo de investigar como, no Supremo Tribunal Federal, o ministro relator tem se utilizado de seus poderes individuais para, de forma nao autorizada pela Constituicao, decidir monocraticamente medidas liminares, controlar o timing do processo e utilizar o poder de pauta para implementar a sua propria agenda. A pesquisa se desenvolve com base em uma linha critico-metodologica, a partir da perspectiva teorica de Richard Albert e Alec Stone Sweet, e de pesquisas quantitativas e qualitativas, a fim de investigar criticamente como ocorre o uso desse poder individual pelo ministro relator. Ao final, conclui-se que a pratica do STF, que hipertrofiou o poder individual de seus ministros, se aproxima de um verdadeiro desmembramento constitucional judicial, sobretudo pela forma como cada ministro, individualmente, se arvora na competencia do colegiado e inova na ordem juridica, muitas vezes divergindo da propria jurisprudencia da Corte. Alem disso, os ministros do STF, ao aumentarem o seu proprio poder, fragmentaram o poder da Corte e alteraram a regra de reconhecimento e a norma basica, para fazer valer uma decisao monocratica que modifica o direito constitucional objetivo, violando a Constituicao, o que constitui verdadeiro golpe de Estado juridico.
{"title":"Os poderes hipertróficos do relator no STF, o desmembramento constitucional e o golpe de Estado jurídico","authors":"Fabrício Castagna Lunardi","doi":"10.5380/rinc.v7i3.63845","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5380/rinc.v7i3.63845","url":null,"abstract":"O presente artigo tem o objetivo de investigar como, no Supremo Tribunal Federal, o ministro relator tem se utilizado de seus poderes individuais para, de forma nao autorizada pela Constituicao, decidir monocraticamente medidas liminares, controlar o timing do processo e utilizar o poder de pauta para implementar a sua propria agenda. A pesquisa se desenvolve com base em uma linha critico-metodologica, a partir da perspectiva teorica de Richard Albert e Alec Stone Sweet, e de pesquisas quantitativas e qualitativas, a fim de investigar criticamente como ocorre o uso desse poder individual pelo ministro relator. Ao final, conclui-se que a pratica do STF, que hipertrofiou o poder individual de seus ministros, se aproxima de um verdadeiro desmembramento constitucional judicial, sobretudo pela forma como cada ministro, individualmente, se arvora na competencia do colegiado e inova na ordem juridica, muitas vezes divergindo da propria jurisprudencia da Corte. Alem disso, os ministros do STF, ao aumentarem o seu proprio poder, fragmentaram o poder da Corte e alteraram a regra de reconhecimento e a norma basica, para fazer valer uma decisao monocratica que modifica o direito constitucional objetivo, violando a Constituicao, o que constitui verdadeiro golpe de Estado juridico.","PeriodicalId":43129,"journal":{"name":"Revista de Investigacoes Constitucionais-Journal of Constitutional Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48254653","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Introduction: Constitutional amendments under the lenses of Richard Albert","authors":"O. Doyle, Daniel Wunder Hachem","doi":"10.5380/rinc.v7i3.77540","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5380/rinc.v7i3.77540","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43129,"journal":{"name":"Revista de Investigacoes Constitucionais-Journal of Constitutional Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71030253","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Luís Antonio Zanotta Calçada, Janriê Rodrigues Reck
O presente artigo busca avaliar o impacto da Proposta de Emenda Constitucional 188/2019 no estado do Rio Grande do Sul. Parte-se da construcao de o que e um estado federado, discorrendo, apos, sobre a situacao do municipio como membro da federacao brasileira e, ainda, da importância desses para o desenvolvimento de politicas publicas e para a democracia. Apresentado o teor da Proposta de Emenda Constitucional, com base em informacoes extraidas do sitio Dados Abertos do Tribunal de Contas do Estado do Rio Grande do Sul, sera avaliado o impacto que a PEC tera no numero de municipios gauchos. Tal analise sera realizada a partir da revisao bibliografica e documental, utilizando o metodo indutivo.
{"title":"Federação, municípios e políticas públicas: o impacto da PEC do pacto federativo (nº 188/2019) no Rio Grande do Sul","authors":"Luís Antonio Zanotta Calçada, Janriê Rodrigues Reck","doi":"10.5380/rinc.v7i3.73284","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5380/rinc.v7i3.73284","url":null,"abstract":"O presente artigo busca avaliar o impacto da Proposta de Emenda Constitucional 188/2019 no estado do Rio Grande do Sul. Parte-se da construcao de o que e um estado federado, discorrendo, apos, sobre a situacao do municipio como membro da federacao brasileira e, ainda, da importância desses para o desenvolvimento de politicas publicas e para a democracia. Apresentado o teor da Proposta de Emenda Constitucional, com base em informacoes extraidas do sitio Dados Abertos do Tribunal de Contas do Estado do Rio Grande do Sul, sera avaliado o impacto que a PEC tera no numero de municipios gauchos. Tal analise sera realizada a partir da revisao bibliografica e documental, utilizando o metodo indutivo.","PeriodicalId":43129,"journal":{"name":"Revista de Investigacoes Constitucionais-Journal of Constitutional Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71029993","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
One of the most spectacle features anchored in Richard Albert’s Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking, and Changing Constitutions is the theory of constitutional dismemberment . In his masterpiece, Albert proposes constitutional designers who are interested in preserving legal continuity to codify procedures for not only amendment but also dismemberment, namely, a fundamental break with the core commitments or presuppositions of the constitution. This contribution questions whether the objectivist, third-person perspective of constitutional designers can be a vantage viewpoint to assesses the socially transformative irruption of constitutional dismemberment. Should the phenomenon of constitutional dismemberment be analyzed without the relative-subjective perspective of peoples who are apart from constitutional designs but actually live under the practical interest of daily life? In tackling this question, the first section reveals that the objectively observable quantum of popular support in terms of the mutuality and symmetry between original ratification and constitutional dismemberment does not necessarily corresponds to the phenomenon that is perceived from the first-person plural person perspective of population. The second section then installs the relational principle of intentionality, which is synthesized at the static, genetic and generative levels, so that the practice of constitutional dismemberment can be grasped not only from the objectively theoretical viewpoint but also from the inter-subjective phenomenological perspective.
{"title":"The theory and phenomenology of constitutional dismemberment","authors":"Yota Negishi","doi":"10.5380/rinc.v7i3.73987","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5380/rinc.v7i3.73987","url":null,"abstract":"One of the most spectacle features anchored in Richard Albert’s Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking, and Changing Constitutions is the theory of constitutional dismemberment . In his masterpiece, Albert proposes constitutional designers who are interested in preserving legal continuity to codify procedures for not only amendment but also dismemberment, namely, a fundamental break with the core commitments or presuppositions of the constitution. This contribution questions whether the objectivist, third-person perspective of constitutional designers can be a vantage viewpoint to assesses the socially transformative irruption of constitutional dismemberment. Should the phenomenon of constitutional dismemberment be analyzed without the relative-subjective perspective of peoples who are apart from constitutional designs but actually live under the practical interest of daily life? In tackling this question, the first section reveals that the objectively observable quantum of popular support in terms of the mutuality and symmetry between original ratification and constitutional dismemberment does not necessarily corresponds to the phenomenon that is perceived from the first-person plural person perspective of population. The second section then installs the relational principle of intentionality, which is synthesized at the static, genetic and generative levels, so that the practice of constitutional dismemberment can be grasped not only from the objectively theoretical viewpoint but also from the inter-subjective phenomenological perspective.","PeriodicalId":43129,"journal":{"name":"Revista de Investigacoes Constitucionais-Journal of Constitutional Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71030403","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Richard Albert’s book offers a crucial systematization of constitutional amendments, their forms, procedures and scope. In doing so, it provides important insights on the theory and the practice of constitutional amendment design, the difficulty they face and the varieties of unamendability, amongst other things. This contribution seeks to apply Richard Albert’s analysis to the case of the European Union, where the existence of a fully-fledged Constitution has long been contested. It claims that this analytical framework can help to better understand the functioning of EU “constitutional amendments”, i.e. Treaty revisions, and their limits, in a context where they have remained substantially understudied.
{"title":"Constitutional amendments’ theory and troubles at supranational level: Constitutional change in the EU from the perspective of Richard Albert’s analysis","authors":"C. Fasone","doi":"10.5380/rinc.v7i3.74848","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5380/rinc.v7i3.74848","url":null,"abstract":"Richard Albert’s book offers a crucial systematization of constitutional amendments, their forms, procedures and scope. In doing so, it provides important insights on the theory and the practice of constitutional amendment design, the difficulty they face and the varieties of unamendability, amongst other things. This contribution seeks to apply Richard Albert’s analysis to the case of the European Union, where the existence of a fully-fledged Constitution has long been contested. It claims that this analytical framework can help to better understand the functioning of EU “constitutional amendments”, i.e. Treaty revisions, and their limits, in a context where they have remained substantially understudied.","PeriodicalId":43129,"journal":{"name":"Revista de Investigacoes Constitucionais-Journal of Constitutional Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71030419","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The concept of constitution substitution is a notion that has not been developed by constituent power, and in that measure, the Colombian Constitutional Court has established a precedent for the amendment process of the Legislative Act, which is performed by congress in order to limit the power of constituted power. In spite the fact that the Court has stated that there are no clauses written in stone, it has forged some fundamental principles and consolidated the defining axes, is what resume the theory of substituting. However, constitutional amendments have some limits to what Richard Albert makes a reference and summarize in 4 fundamental characteristics, that should not exceed the constitutional scope. As was pointed out by Albert the power to amend is one above all that does not exceed the scope of what was intended in the constitution, but there may be an intermediate point which he calls dismemberment, which is more than an amendment but does not get to become a structural reform of the constitution. Let’s see how Colombia’s Constitution and the Constitutional Court have set limits to constitutional amendments and exceeded constitutional limits through dismemberment.
{"title":"Constitutional interpretation and Constitution substitution: oscillating between the juridical and the political","authors":"Luísa Fernanda García López","doi":"10.5380/rinc.v7i3.74332","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5380/rinc.v7i3.74332","url":null,"abstract":"The concept of constitution substitution is a notion that has not been developed by constituent power, and in that measure, the Colombian Constitutional Court has established a precedent for the amendment process of the Legislative Act, which is performed by congress in order to limit the power of constituted power. In spite the fact that the Court has stated that there are no clauses written in stone, it has forged some fundamental principles and consolidated the defining axes, is what resume the theory of substituting. However, constitutional amendments have some limits to what Richard Albert makes a reference and summarize in 4 fundamental characteristics, that should not exceed the constitutional scope. As was pointed out by Albert the power to amend is one above all that does not exceed the scope of what was intended in the constitution, but there may be an intermediate point which he calls dismemberment, which is more than an amendment but does not get to become a structural reform of the constitution. Let’s see how Colombia’s Constitution and the Constitutional Court have set limits to constitutional amendments and exceeded constitutional limits through dismemberment.","PeriodicalId":43129,"journal":{"name":"Revista de Investigacoes Constitucionais-Journal of Constitutional Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71030146","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper aims to rethink the idea of constitutional renewal through a dissection of Richard Albert’s ground-breaking concept of constitutional dismemberment. It is contended that under the rubric of constitutional dismemberment are two exceptional constitutional phenomena: the ought-to-be declared nullity of unconstitutional constitutional amendments and the legal unity-defying, extraconstitutional expression of what Hannah Arendt called “natality” in political action. The thesis is that attempts to tame revolutionary constitutional alteration with designed rules as to formal constitutional change as Albert’s illustrates are missing the meaning of constitution-making for a natality-driven constitutional renewal characteristically defies designed constitutional form. The concept of constitutional dismemberment is first dissected in light of Arendt’s idea of natality. With constitutional dismemberment unpacked, it is further observed that the constitution-making transmutes into the formal pronouncement of a new codified constitution in Albert’s rigid tripartite classification of constitutional changes into amendment, dismemberment, and enactment. Albert therefore inadvertently reduces constitution-making to the formal enactment of a new codified constitution with constitutional natality dismembered and constitutional renewal hollowed out. It is concluded that Albert’s formalistic conceptual framework of constitutional change reflects the centrality of comparative written constitutions in the place of comparative constitutional phenomena in current comparative constitutional studies.
{"title":"Disaggregating dismemberment: nullity, natality, and the hollowing of constitutional renewal in designed written constitutionalism","authors":"Ming‐Sung Kuo","doi":"10.5380/rinc.v7i3.72831","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5380/rinc.v7i3.72831","url":null,"abstract":"This paper aims to rethink the idea of constitutional renewal through a dissection of Richard Albert’s ground-breaking concept of constitutional dismemberment. It is contended that under the rubric of constitutional dismemberment are two exceptional constitutional phenomena: the ought-to-be declared nullity of unconstitutional constitutional amendments and the legal unity-defying, extraconstitutional expression of what Hannah Arendt called “natality” in political action. The thesis is that attempts to tame revolutionary constitutional alteration with designed rules as to formal constitutional change as Albert’s illustrates are missing the meaning of constitution-making for a natality-driven constitutional renewal characteristically defies designed constitutional form. The concept of constitutional dismemberment is first dissected in light of Arendt’s idea of natality. With constitutional dismemberment unpacked, it is further observed that the constitution-making transmutes into the formal pronouncement of a new codified constitution in Albert’s rigid tripartite classification of constitutional changes into amendment, dismemberment, and enactment. Albert therefore inadvertently reduces constitution-making to the formal enactment of a new codified constitution with constitutional natality dismembered and constitutional renewal hollowed out. It is concluded that Albert’s formalistic conceptual framework of constitutional change reflects the centrality of comparative written constitutions in the place of comparative constitutional phenomena in current comparative constitutional studies.","PeriodicalId":43129,"journal":{"name":"Revista de Investigacoes Constitucionais-Journal of Constitutional Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48531211","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Constitutional dismemberment is one of the main consequences attached to constitutional amendments that Albert's book analyses. After having analyzed Albert’s definition, the present essay focuses on the practice of constitutional dismemberment via referendum and discusses whether, in times of populism and democratic decay, the constitutional design should provide for specific measures in order to protect the political opposition from the allegiance between the populist leadership and the majority of the population. Building on the existing literature and on a comparative analysis, the essay concludes by highlighting the pros and cons of introducing special protections for political minorities during constitutional referenda to protect democracy against populist deviations, suggesting the need to provide further studies in this field.
{"title":"Constitutional dismemberment via referenda: a comparative overview","authors":"V. Scotti","doi":"10.5380/rinc.v7i3.74334","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5380/rinc.v7i3.74334","url":null,"abstract":"Constitutional dismemberment is one of the main consequences attached to constitutional amendments that Albert's book analyses. After having analyzed Albert’s definition, the present essay focuses on the practice of constitutional dismemberment via referendum and discusses whether, in times of populism and democratic decay, the constitutional design should provide for specific measures in order to protect the political opposition from the allegiance between the populist leadership and the majority of the population. Building on the existing literature and on a comparative analysis, the essay concludes by highlighting the pros and cons of introducing special protections for political minorities during constitutional referenda to protect democracy against populist deviations, suggesting the need to provide further studies in this field.","PeriodicalId":43129,"journal":{"name":"Revista de Investigacoes Constitucionais-Journal of Constitutional Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71030241","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
O artigo pretende apresentar solucoes para a forma com que o Supremo Tribunal Federal pratica o consequencialismo, constituindo-se de uma pesquisa do tipo qualitativa, com objetivos descritivo-explicativos e propositivos, utilizando para tal o procedimento de pesquisa bibliografico. Partindo de uma exposicao sobre o pragmatismo, destacam-se o consequencialismo e o empirismo. Para confrontacao e critica, explica-se o significado de consequenciachismo. Apos isso, estudam-se casos julgados pelo Supremo Tribunal Federal com a finalidade de construir-se uma linha argumentativa a favor de um valor fundamental de nao surpresa. Para tanto, alicerca-se o texto na seguranca juridica e no contraditorio. Assim, entra-se na parte propositiva, na qual a nao surpresa visa testar o consequencialismo e impedir o consequenciachismo. Com essa intencao, a explicacao das propostas divide-se em processo subjetivo e processo objetivo.
{"title":"Consequencialismo no Supremo Tribunal Federal: uma solução pela não surpresa","authors":"R. Brandão, André Farah","doi":"10.5380/rinc.v7i3.71771","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5380/rinc.v7i3.71771","url":null,"abstract":"O artigo pretende apresentar solucoes para a forma com que o Supremo Tribunal Federal pratica o consequencialismo, constituindo-se de uma pesquisa do tipo qualitativa, com objetivos descritivo-explicativos e propositivos, utilizando para tal o procedimento de pesquisa bibliografico. Partindo de uma exposicao sobre o pragmatismo, destacam-se o consequencialismo e o empirismo. Para confrontacao e critica, explica-se o significado de consequenciachismo. Apos isso, estudam-se casos julgados pelo Supremo Tribunal Federal com a finalidade de construir-se uma linha argumentativa a favor de um valor fundamental de nao surpresa. Para tanto, alicerca-se o texto na seguranca juridica e no contraditorio. Assim, entra-se na parte propositiva, na qual a nao surpresa visa testar o consequencialismo e impedir o consequenciachismo. Com essa intencao, a explicacao das propostas divide-se em processo subjetivo e processo objetivo.","PeriodicalId":43129,"journal":{"name":"Revista de Investigacoes Constitucionais-Journal of Constitutional Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47557310","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Constitutional law and Democracy are two domains that are inevitably in tension. Nevertheless, there have been theories and proposals to improve the necessary coexistence of both elements in modern constitutional democratic systems. Richard Albert's work distinguishes between constitutional changes (amendments and dismemberments) and introduces a non-merely symbolic role to the people in terms of legitimacy, can be qualified as one of these theories. This paper focuses on the democratic input that Albert proposes along with his book.
{"title":"The inexorableness of constitutional amendments and its democratic potentiality","authors":"Antoni Abat Ninet","doi":"10.5380/rinc.v7i3.73540","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5380/rinc.v7i3.73540","url":null,"abstract":"Constitutional law and Democracy are two domains that are inevitably in tension. Nevertheless, there have been theories and proposals to improve the necessary coexistence of both elements in modern constitutional democratic systems. Richard Albert's work distinguishes between constitutional changes (amendments and dismemberments) and introduces a non-merely symbolic role to the people in terms of legitimacy, can be qualified as one of these theories. This paper focuses on the democratic input that Albert proposes along with his book.","PeriodicalId":43129,"journal":{"name":"Revista de Investigacoes Constitucionais-Journal of Constitutional Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71029838","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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