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Launched in 1982, the so-called Berliner Wissenschaftsladen e. V. (WILAB) belonged to the scattered West-German ventures in "counter-science". This article situates the origins of the "Laden" (~ workshop)-an "alternative" spin-off of sorts, spawned from the Technical University of Berlin-in the context of contemporary advances in regional science policy. In this connection, the ailing, de-industrializing "island city" arguably even played a certain pioneering role: elements of its multipronged "innovation offensive", which peaked in the early-to-mid 1980s, were visible beyond city limits, including the trade show BIG TECH and, notably, the Berlin Center for Innovation and New Enterprises (BIG), the FRG's first start-up "incubator", which opened in 1983.In other words, politically-minded scientists in tendency now had to deal with conditions that were less and less conducive to dreams of a "socially engaged" and "non-alienated" (counter-)science. Indeed, while hardly opposed to the new gospel of innovation, it's not surprising that ventures such as WILAB, committed as they were to the production of "socially useful" science, found themselves increasingly marginalized. It's as such a marginal venture, my argument goes, that WILAB's prima facie hopeless attempt to initiate a different, more "humane" information technology sheds an instructive light on the emergence of "entrepreneurial" science in the FRG during the 1970s and 1980s.

Using the example of the American motivational psychologist David C. McClelland, this article analyses how psychologists in the long 1960s acted as generous purveyors of knowledge in order to bring about far reaching social change, without having to enter the field of institutionalised politics. The article thus explores a supposedly passive form of activism beyond lobbying and consultating that was intended to encourage citizens to self-direct in order to bring about changes that were supposedly beyond the reach of structural planning policy. Using two case studies, it is argued that the principle of self-direction often associated with neoliberalism developed in parallel with planning policy in the long 1960s, rather than as a consequence of its failure in the 1970s and 1980s. Since this was often done in an entrepreneurial way, it led to the emergence of the entrepreneurial scientist who ran science, educational training and social reform as a business. Unlike political influence through lobbying, this form of scientific political activism was direct in that it directly impacted individual social groups, but it was also precarious in its chances of success, because whether those approached were willing to accept what was offered to them depended on conditions over which the scientists involved had no control. As early as the long 1960s, it is concluded, privately run programmes aimed at activating the individual were part of what we know as state-directed welfare policy.

In March 1986, a public symposium took place in Heidelberg about the "unresolved potential dangers of genetic engineering". The event was organized by institutions affiliated with the environmental movement. Choosing this symposium as an example, the article shows how the public appearance of scientists can be understood as a form of political activism. The article shows how specialists from fields as diverse as biology, chemistry, physics, law and political sciences tried to place political messages by putting themselves in the limelight as independent scientists. I argue that the symposium was both: a place of science communication intertwined with political agitation that, as should be noted, happened in a time when the West German government was working on the legislation of genetic engineering, legitimated by relying on independent expertise. It can be concluded that the discourse of scientific independence became a strategic tool in the controversial debate about the uses and dangers of genetic engineering. Thus, it draws attention to a dimension of political-scientific activity which cannot be fully grasped by the concept of 'the expert' that is established in the history of science.

The Stiftung Ökologischer Landbau (SÖL), founded in the mid-1970s, set out to promote organic farming in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). To this end, it brought together protagonists from the scientific community and the environmental movement to build a knowledge base for organic agriculture by drawing on the science-based concepts of natural and organic farming of the 1920s and 1930s. Based on the history of its founding, its structure, and work, this article demonstrates that temporality played an essential role in the establishment of alternative bodies of knowledge. Contrary to the established model of linear scientific-technological progress, the aim was to return to bodies of knowledge and practices that had largely disappeared from the scientific canon of knowledge, but also from agricultural practice, in previous processes of forgetting and marginalization. This is exemplified by the so-called "spade diagnosis," a method developed in the 1930s by soil biologists to assess arable soil. Concepts and practice of counter-knowledge amounted to a model of conservative modernization in organic farming.

Around 1970, high numbers of traffic casualties among cyclists led to the creation of numerous local protest movements in the Netherlands. While activists employed protest strategies, their main interest lie in the way they exemplify a highly successful instance of "lay expertise"; the idea that users of a technology have a fundamentally different and valuable perspective on a technology than experts or system-builders. Specifically, cyclists claimed to be more knowledgeable about cycling conditions and safety than the state-employed engineers and traffic experts who built the roads and cycling path network. A key actor in this story is the Dutch Cyclists' Union (Fietsersbond), a national platform of local action groups formed in 1975. These activists used the cycling experience of everyday utilitarian cyclists to compile maps and blacklists of locations where cycling was dangerous, unpleasant, uncomfortable, or otherwise discouraging. In doing so, they successfully claimed legitimacy as a valuable knowledge partner for local engineers and policymakers. As a result, they gained some level of influence within local governments, a relation which in the intervening years has only grown stronger. This case study shows how users can shape socio-technical systems bottom-up, and can therefore to an extent be seen as a successful example of co-construction of technology.