The paper reviews literature generating the conclusion that a Gini Index of income inequality weights each income by the proportion of people receiving more. The result is derived graphically by rotating the Lorenz Curve clockwise by 90 degrees and by a variant of integration by parts. The result has applications to taxation, transfers and income increments, and yields a weighting of incomes intuitively relevant to inequality.
{"title":"The Gini Index Weights Income by the Proportion of People Receiving More","authors":"M. Sattinger","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3948144","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3948144","url":null,"abstract":"The paper reviews literature generating the conclusion that a Gini Index of income inequality weights each income by the proportion of people receiving more. The result is derived graphically by rotating the Lorenz Curve clockwise by 90 degrees and by a variant of integration by parts. The result has applications to taxation, transfers and income increments, and yields a weighting of incomes intuitively relevant to inequality.","PeriodicalId":431495,"journal":{"name":"Public Economics: Taxation","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124807044","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This comment letter addresses Senate Finance Committee Chair Ron Wyden’s International Tax Reform Framework Discussion Draft released August 25, 2021 (with Senators Brown and Warner) (the WBW Draft). The comment discusses why U.S. multinationals have competitive advantages compared to international competitors because of access to a favorable cost of capital in U.S. capital markets and other benefits of being based in the United States. Accordingly, it supports adopting the Biden Administration’s proposed international tax reforms. The comment explains why the United States should not wait for completion of the G20/OECD global minimum tax agreement. Finally, the letter makes comments directed at strengthening the WBW draft.
{"title":"Comment on International Tax Reform Framework Discussion Draft by Senate Committee on Finance Chair Ron Wyden and Senators Sherrod Brown and Mark Warner","authors":"Stephen E. Shay","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3918037","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3918037","url":null,"abstract":"This comment letter addresses Senate Finance Committee Chair Ron Wyden’s International Tax Reform Framework Discussion Draft released August 25, 2021 (with Senators Brown and Warner) (the WBW Draft). The comment discusses why U.S. multinationals have competitive advantages compared to international competitors because of access to a favorable cost of capital in U.S. capital markets and other benefits of being based in the United States. Accordingly, it supports adopting the Biden Administration’s proposed international tax reforms. The comment explains why the United States should not wait for completion of the G20/OECD global minimum tax agreement. Finally, the letter makes comments directed at strengthening the WBW draft.","PeriodicalId":431495,"journal":{"name":"Public Economics: Taxation","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133600479","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper considers the design of a VAT where the economy is not at full capacity, as is the case in most developing countries. It critically examines the importance of efficiency and how tax policy can raise the stock of productive resources in an economy. Against this background, policy recommendations for the Ethiopian VAT are provided.
{"title":"The VAT under Excess Capacity: The Case of Ethiopia","authors":"Marius van Oordt","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3899061","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3899061","url":null,"abstract":"This paper considers the design of a VAT where the economy is not at full capacity, as is the case in most developing countries. It critically examines the importance of efficiency and how tax policy can raise the stock of productive resources in an economy. Against this background, policy recommendations for the Ethiopian VAT are provided.","PeriodicalId":431495,"journal":{"name":"Public Economics: Taxation","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133365645","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The value-added tax (VAT) has one major weakness: its collection mechanism requires governments to refund tax. Many developing countries find this requirement hard to abide by, with Zambia nearly discarding its VAT as a result. This chapter asks and answers four questions. One, should developing countries with a VAT consider an alternative broad-based consumption tax that does not require refunds? Two, what policy options can be recommended to decrease VAT refund claims? Three, what administrative options can improve developing countries’ VAT refund practices? And four, why should developing countries prioritize the prompt payment of VAT refunds? I conclude that it is possible and in the best interest of developing countries to pay VAT refunds promptly.
{"title":"VAT Refunds in Developing Countries","authors":"Marius van Oordt","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3899056","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3899056","url":null,"abstract":"The value-added tax (VAT) has one major weakness: its collection mechanism requires governments to refund tax. Many developing countries find this requirement hard to abide by, with Zambia nearly discarding its VAT as a result. This chapter asks and answers four questions. One, should developing countries with a VAT consider an alternative broad-based consumption tax that does not require refunds? Two, what policy options can be recommended to decrease VAT refund claims? Three, what administrative options can improve developing countries’ VAT refund practices? And four, why should developing countries prioritize the prompt payment of VAT refunds? I conclude that it is possible and in the best interest of developing countries to pay VAT refunds promptly.","PeriodicalId":431495,"journal":{"name":"Public Economics: Taxation","volume":"90 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133676138","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
James Matonte, Robert K. Parker, Benjamin Y. Clark
The 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act created a new place-based economic development tool to induce economic activity in identified low-income census tracts throughout the US. In response, the State of Oregon established 86 Opportunity Zones (OZs) at the direction of Governor Kate Brown (Business Oregon 2020). This article examines the rollout of Opportunity Zones in Oregon and what policymakers can learn from its implementation. It looks at how well Opportunity Zones are understood in Oregon by local governments and economic development agencies, and how local governments, local economic development agencies, and the private sector are using and marketing OZs. To assess these questions, we surveyed individuals in the public sector in areas with Opportunity Zones across the state to assess these actions. To supplement the survey, we conducted interviews with private sector actors and shadowed developers in the Portland area to assess their engagement with Opportunity Zones. We used the policy tools and networked implementation literatures as a theoretical foundation. We conclude that Oregon lacks a hierarchal system to implement OZs, so the network has to take a more substantial role in implementation. Opportunity Zones are a clear example of third-party implementation; as the government funds economic development activity through tax expenditures, the private sector is taking the leading role in implementing these projects.
2017年的《减税和就业法案》创造了一种新的基于地方的经济发展工具，以促进美国各地确定的低收入人口普查区的经济活动。作为回应，俄勒冈州在州长Kate Brown (Business Oregon 2020)的指导下建立了86个机会区(OZs)。本文考察了俄勒冈州“机会区”的推出，以及政策制定者可以从实施中学到什么。它考察了俄勒冈州地方政府和经济发展机构对机会区了解的程度，以及地方政府、地方经济发展机构和私营部门如何使用和营销机会区。为了评估这些问题，我们调查了全州有机会区的公共部门的个人，以评估这些行动。为了补充调查，我们采访了波特兰地区的私营部门参与者和影子开发商，以评估他们与机会区域的合作情况。我们使用政策工具和网络化的实施文献作为理论基础。我们得出的结论是，俄勒冈州缺乏一个层级系统来实施OZs，因此网络必须在实施中发挥更大的作用。机会区是第三方执行的明显例子;由于政府通过税收支出为经济发展活动提供资金，私营部门在实施这些项目方面起着主导作用。
{"title":"The Failure of Opportunity Zones in Oregon: Lifeless Place-Based Economic Development Implementation through a Policy Network","authors":"James Matonte, Robert K. Parker, Benjamin Y. Clark","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3897757","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3897757","url":null,"abstract":"The 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act created a new place-based economic development tool to induce economic activity in identified low-income census tracts throughout the US. In response, the State of Oregon established 86 Opportunity Zones (OZs) at the direction of Governor Kate Brown (Business Oregon 2020). This article examines the rollout of Opportunity Zones in Oregon and what policymakers can learn from its implementation. It looks at how well Opportunity Zones are understood in Oregon by local governments and economic development agencies, and how local governments, local economic development agencies, and the private sector are using and marketing OZs. To assess these questions, we surveyed individuals in the public sector in areas with Opportunity Zones across the state to assess these actions. To supplement the survey, we conducted interviews with private sector actors and shadowed developers in the Portland area to assess their engagement with Opportunity Zones. We used the policy tools and networked implementation literatures as a theoretical foundation. We conclude that Oregon lacks a hierarchal system to implement OZs, so the network has to take a more substantial role in implementation. Opportunity Zones are a clear example of third-party implementation; as the government funds economic development activity through tax expenditures, the private sector is taking the leading role in implementing these projects.","PeriodicalId":431495,"journal":{"name":"Public Economics: Taxation","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127393373","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Canada’ Registered Retirement Savings Plan (RRSP) is a tax-deferred account intended to help workers save for retirement. It has existed for so many decades that professionals feel certain they know everything there is to know about the account. Its rules and mechanics are well known not only by professionals but also by the public.This article presents an analysis of the RRSP’s net benefit that contradicts the received wisdom. It provides the math proof and conceptual model supporting a claim that the RRSP's net benefit comes from five separate and independent factors that add together. 1. Profits are never taxed. Not while in the account and not on withdrawal. 2. A bonus (or penalty) comes from lower (or higher) tax rates on withdrawal. Both are possibilities. 3. The loss (gain) of benefits from other income-tested programs in retirement (when young). 4. A growing penalty from any delay in claiming the contribution’s tax deduction. 5. Profits earned by the withdrawal tax not paid on Home Buyer’s Plan (HBP) draws. In contrast, the commonly believed benefits and conceptual model are shown to be contradictory and fail to explain outcomes.
{"title":"Rethinking the RRSP's Benefits","authors":"C. Reed","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2636609","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2636609","url":null,"abstract":"Canada’ Registered Retirement Savings Plan (RRSP) is a tax-deferred account intended to help workers save for retirement. It has existed for so many decades that professionals feel certain they know everything there is to know about the account. Its rules and mechanics are well known not only by professionals but also by the public.This article presents an analysis of the RRSP’s net benefit that contradicts the received wisdom. It provides the math proof and conceptual model supporting a claim that the RRSP's net benefit comes from five separate and independent factors that add together. 1. Profits are never taxed. Not while in the account and not on withdrawal. 2. A bonus (or penalty) comes from lower (or higher) tax rates on withdrawal. Both are possibilities. 3. The loss (gain) of benefits from other income-tested programs in retirement (when young). 4. A growing penalty from any delay in claiming the contribution’s tax deduction. 5. Profits earned by the withdrawal tax not paid on Home Buyer’s Plan (HBP) draws. In contrast, the commonly believed benefits and conceptual model are shown to be contradictory and fail to explain outcomes.","PeriodicalId":431495,"journal":{"name":"Public Economics: Taxation","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116756581","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
When workers are not aware of a mandated benefit, they cannot take it into account in their employment decision, leading to deadweight loss. On the other hand, lack of awareness of a benefit reduces moral hazard, decreasing deadweight loss. I incorporate these trade-offs into a model of mandated benefits and apply the model to Temporary Disability Insurance, an employment benefit mandated in five states. First, I provide evidence on low awareness of this benefit using data collected through an original survey. Then I use the updated mandated benefits model to show that over a broad range of reasonable assumptions, the additional employee valuation of the benefit outweighs the additional program cost from moral hazard, and thus a public information campaign would increase employment.
{"title":"The Tradeoff between Knowledge of Mandated Benefits and Moral Hazard","authors":"Jessica H. Brown","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3872876","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3872876","url":null,"abstract":"When workers are not aware of a mandated benefit, they cannot take it into account in their employment decision, leading to deadweight loss. On the other hand, lack of awareness of a benefit reduces moral hazard, decreasing deadweight loss. I incorporate these trade-offs into a model of mandated benefits and apply the model to Temporary Disability Insurance, an employment benefit mandated in five states. First, I provide evidence on low awareness of this benefit using data collected through an original survey. Then I use the updated mandated benefits model to show that over a broad range of reasonable assumptions, the additional employee valuation of the benefit outweighs the additional program cost from moral hazard, and thus a public information campaign would increase employment.","PeriodicalId":431495,"journal":{"name":"Public Economics: Taxation","volume":"59 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130257961","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract In a model with a continuum of imperfectly substitutable laborers and endogenous skill premiums, this paper derives optimal tax formulas as functions of social welfare weights and a small set of estimable statistics. It first demonstrates that differential capital tax, based on capital’s effect on skill premiums, is desirable even in the steady state, while nonlinear capital tax is not desirable under an additively separable utility function. It then explores both uniform and sector-specific capital income tax (UCIT and SCIT), with a sector corresponding to a type of laborer. Numerical application to U.S. taxation delivers an inverted U-shaped relationship between the SCIT rate and sectoral wage. The optimal SCIT rate on the top-income sectors increases with the elasticity of substitution between the sectoral products and amounts to a net return tax of 45.9 % . Reform from UCIT to SCIT compresses wage gaps between the top ten percent and others considerably. It especially favors the median-income individuals whose wages are increased as high as 3.8 % . Due to production inefficiency, switching from UCIT to SCIT implies small welfare gains ( 0.07 % ~ 0.22 % in consumption-equivalent terms).
{"title":"Supply-side Optimal Capital Taxation with Endogenous Wage Inequality","authors":"Xiaoyong Cui, L. Gong, Wenjian Li","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3829706","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3829706","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In a model with a continuum of imperfectly substitutable laborers and endogenous skill premiums, this paper derives optimal tax formulas as functions of social welfare weights and a small set of estimable statistics. It first demonstrates that differential capital tax, based on capital’s effect on skill premiums, is desirable even in the steady state, while nonlinear capital tax is not desirable under an additively separable utility function. It then explores both uniform and sector-specific capital income tax (UCIT and SCIT), with a sector corresponding to a type of laborer. Numerical application to U.S. taxation delivers an inverted U-shaped relationship between the SCIT rate and sectoral wage. The optimal SCIT rate on the top-income sectors increases with the elasticity of substitution between the sectoral products and amounts to a net return tax of 45.9 % . Reform from UCIT to SCIT compresses wage gaps between the top ten percent and others considerably. It especially favors the median-income individuals whose wages are increased as high as 3.8 % . Due to production inefficiency, switching from UCIT to SCIT implies small welfare gains ( 0.07 % ~ 0.22 % in consumption-equivalent terms).","PeriodicalId":431495,"journal":{"name":"Public Economics: Taxation","volume":"370 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115474574","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Taxes designed to counter unsustainable behaviours that lead to environmental destruction are usually styled as surtaxes on purchase prices. It makes more sense to locate the source of the profits derived from such behaviours and tax them in order to internalize the environmental costs that are currently externalized to current and future societies. Since profit extracted by externalizing environmental risks constitutes economic rent, it could be taxed at high rates without creating inefficiencies. We propose a method for doing so in the form of a “sustainable excess profits tax”—a SEP tax. The tax base of a SEP tax can be constructed by using life cycle analysis methods to identify the portion of corporate profit that is attributable to the externalized environmental costs of production and distribution at all stages of supply chains. We establish the core elements of a SEP tax, demonstrate its theoretical justification, and examine its practical feasibility.
{"title":"The Case for a Sustainable Excess Profits Tax","authors":"Allison Christians, Tarcísio Diniz Magalhães","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3811709","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3811709","url":null,"abstract":"Taxes designed to counter unsustainable behaviours that lead to environmental destruction are usually styled as surtaxes on purchase prices. It makes more sense to locate the source of the profits derived from such behaviours and tax them in order to internalize the environmental costs that are currently externalized to current and future societies. Since profit extracted by externalizing environmental risks constitutes economic rent, it could be taxed at high rates without creating inefficiencies. We propose a method for doing so in the form of a “sustainable excess profits tax”—a SEP tax. The tax base of a SEP tax can be constructed by using life cycle analysis methods to identify the portion of corporate profit that is attributable to the externalized environmental costs of production and distribution at all stages of supply chains. We establish the core elements of a SEP tax, demonstrate its theoretical justification, and examine its practical feasibility.","PeriodicalId":431495,"journal":{"name":"Public Economics: Taxation","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131738842","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
My comment to OECD Blueprint Pillar One Comments to OECD/G20 the Reports on Pillar One and Pillar Two Blueprints OECD Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to comment on the Reports on Pillar One and Pillar Two Blueprints. My comment which is part of my manuscript focuses on a new nexus suggested by me.
{"title":"An Economic, Political, Social and Virtual Permanent Establishment – New Nexus","authors":"Wei Zhang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3802039","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3802039","url":null,"abstract":"My comment to OECD Blueprint Pillar One Comments to OECD/G20 the Reports on Pillar One and Pillar Two Blueprints OECD Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to comment on the Reports on Pillar One and Pillar Two Blueprints. My comment which is part of my manuscript focuses on a new nexus suggested by me.","PeriodicalId":431495,"journal":{"name":"Public Economics: Taxation","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124328152","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：