New audit rules targeting sophisticated tax partnerships unnecessarily burden small, unsophisticated taxpayers. This is a familiar narrative in partnership tax. This time, the story takes place in the rules that prescribe the process by which the IRS audits and collects tax from partnerships and partners. Designed to limit abuse, the rules are highly complex and needlessly saddle small, simple businesses with increased compliance costs and potentially excessive tax liability. Ironically, at the same time the rules leave loopholes for sophisticated organizations able to exploit them. This article explains these disparate consequences and suggests solutions to both limit the loopholes for large taxpayers and simplify the rules for small businesses.
{"title":"Simple Audits for Simple Tax Partnerships","authors":"A. Lawson","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3555982","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3555982","url":null,"abstract":"New audit rules targeting sophisticated tax partnerships unnecessarily burden small, unsophisticated taxpayers. This is a familiar narrative in partnership tax. This time, the story takes place in the rules that prescribe the process by which the IRS audits and collects tax from partnerships and partners. Designed to limit abuse, the rules are highly complex and needlessly saddle small, simple businesses with increased compliance costs and potentially excessive tax liability. Ironically, at the same time the rules leave loopholes for sophisticated organizations able to exploit them. This article explains these disparate consequences and suggests solutions to both limit the loopholes for large taxpayers and simplify the rules for small businesses.","PeriodicalId":431495,"journal":{"name":"Public Economics: Taxation","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122147500","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We study the non-linear propagation mechanism of tax policy in a heterogeneous agent equilibrium business cycle model with search frictions in the labor market and an extensive margin of employment adjustment. The model exhibits endogenous job destruction and endogenous hiring standards in the form of occasionally-binding zero-surplus constraints. After parameterizing the model using U.S. data, we find that the dynamic response of employment to a temporary change in the labor income tax is highly non-linear, displaying sizable asymmetries and state-dependence. Notably, the response to a tax rate cut is at least twice as large in a recession as in an expansion.
{"title":"Non-Linear Employment Effects of Tax Policy","authors":"D. Ferraro, G. Fiori","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3740242","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3740242","url":null,"abstract":"We study the non-linear propagation mechanism of tax policy in a heterogeneous agent equilibrium business cycle model with search frictions in the labor market and an extensive margin of employment adjustment. The model exhibits endogenous job destruction and endogenous hiring standards in the form of occasionally-binding zero-surplus constraints. After parameterizing the model using U.S. data, we find that the dynamic response of employment to a temporary change in the labor income tax is highly non-linear, displaying sizable asymmetries and state-dependence. Notably, the response to a tax rate cut is at least twice as large in a recession as in an expansion.","PeriodicalId":431495,"journal":{"name":"Public Economics: Taxation","volume":"74 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126335006","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
India follows the dualist model in its legal system wherein international treaties are not automatically incorporated in domestic law but require transformation through implementing legislation. The equalization levy was brought in the statute books in India in 2016 and its scope substantially expanded in 2020. Since the levy was brought in, not in the Income-tax Act, 1961 ("ITA") but through separate legislation, whether the levy is an income-tax and whether a tax covered by the tax treaties has been hotly debated. This paper examines whether, in the absence of an implementing provision in the EL law similar to section 90 of the ITA, tax treaties can impact the levy. The paper explores various constitutional provisions and jurisprudence in India on implementing international conventions and attempts to identify the various possible arguments for and against the proposition that EL is impacted by the tax treaties which may aid the reader to discern the correct legal position on the subject.
{"title":"Implementing Tax Treaties in the Equalisation Levy Law in India","authors":"Ganesh Rajgopalan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3668716","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3668716","url":null,"abstract":"India follows the dualist model in its legal system wherein international treaties are not automatically incorporated in domestic law but require transformation through implementing legislation. The equalization levy was brought in the statute books in India in 2016 and its scope substantially expanded in 2020. Since the levy was brought in, not in the Income-tax Act, 1961 (\"ITA\") but through separate legislation, whether the levy is an income-tax and whether a tax covered by the tax treaties has been hotly debated. \u0000 \u0000This paper examines whether, in the absence of an implementing provision in the EL law similar to section 90 of the ITA, tax treaties can impact the levy. The paper explores various constitutional provisions and jurisprudence in India on implementing international conventions and attempts to identify the various possible arguments for and against the proposition that EL is impacted by the tax treaties which may aid the reader to discern the correct legal position on the subject.","PeriodicalId":431495,"journal":{"name":"Public Economics: Taxation","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125669771","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Adopting the geometric concepts of a tangent line and a secant ray allows for determining the curvature (convex, concave, or linear) and the behavior of the marginal and average tax rates of an income increasing tax function. Such information helps to determine whether the tax function is progressive, regressive, or proportional, as well as the possibility that it pro-pends to equity in the distribution of the social tax burden. Thus, several issues of public policy can be rigorously analyzed specifying different income tax functions that satisfy determinate graphical shapes, circumventing the need to use the traditional approach of differential calculus.
{"title":"On Progressivity, Regressivity, and Proportionality: A Graphical Approach to the Teaching of the Income Tax Structure","authors":"Horacio Matos-Díaz","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3667948","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3667948","url":null,"abstract":"Adopting the geometric concepts of a tangent line and a secant ray allows for determining the curvature (convex, concave, or linear) and the behavior of the marginal and average tax rates of an income increasing tax function. Such information helps to determine whether the tax function is progressive, regressive, or proportional, as well as the possibility that it pro-pends to equity in the distribution of the social tax burden. Thus, several issues of public policy can be rigorously analyzed specifying different income tax functions that satisfy determinate graphical shapes, circumventing the need to use the traditional approach of differential calculus.","PeriodicalId":431495,"journal":{"name":"Public Economics: Taxation","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134264093","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Prior studies show stock liquidity improves price informativeness and strengthens governance. Stock price informativeness offers an incentive for managers with equity-based compensation to avoid tax. Strengthening governance, by contrast, reduces tax avoidance if diverting corporate profits for private benefits complements tax avoidance. Using an exogenous shock that drastically increased the liquidity of stocks listed in China, we find robust evidence that higher liquidity significantly increases the overall level of tax avoidance. The increase is more substantial when controlling shareholders own more shares, and when diversion is less complementary to tax avoidance. Liquidity has no significant impact on tax evasion—the most aggressive and risky tax avoidance—and at the higher ends of the tax avoidance distribution. The positive and significant effects are observed only at lower levels of tax avoidance. We attribute the weaker impact of liquidity on aggressive tax avoidance to diversion being more complementary to higher-risk tax avoidance.
{"title":"How Does Stock Liquidity Affect Corporate Tax Avoidance? Evidence from China","authors":"E. H. Kim, Yao Lu, Xinzheng Shi, Dengjin Zheng","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3409700","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3409700","url":null,"abstract":"Prior studies show stock liquidity improves price informativeness and strengthens governance. Stock price informativeness offers an incentive for managers with equity-based compensation to avoid tax. Strengthening governance, by contrast, reduces tax avoidance if diverting corporate profits for private benefits complements tax avoidance. Using an exogenous shock that drastically increased the liquidity of stocks listed in China, we find robust evidence that higher liquidity significantly increases the overall level of tax avoidance. The increase is more substantial when controlling shareholders own more shares, and when diversion is less complementary to tax avoidance. Liquidity has no significant impact on tax evasion—the most aggressive and risky tax avoidance—and at the higher ends of the tax avoidance distribution. The positive and significant effects are observed only at lower levels of tax avoidance. We attribute the weaker impact of liquidity on aggressive tax avoidance to diversion being more complementary to higher-risk tax avoidance.","PeriodicalId":431495,"journal":{"name":"Public Economics: Taxation","volume":"450 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116074950","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Russian Abstract: Льготные экономические условия для резидентов предоставляются не только в вопросах налогообложения, таможенного регулирования, а также к категории льгот относятся: упрощенные стандарты на создание рабочих мест, регулирования вопросов по оплате труда, минимальные или оптимальные расходы по аренде земельных участков, предоставление субсидии на электроэнергию, коммунальные услуги, сниженные стандарты охраны и загрязнения окружающей среды, открытые доступы к рынкам сбыта - как внешним, так и внешним; проведение таможенных процедур прямо на территории предприятия; долгосрочное отсутствие налога на прибыль.
English Abstract: Favourable economic conditions for residents are provided not only in matters of taxation, customs regulation, but also in the category of benefits include: simplified standards for job creation, regulation of pay issues, minimum or optimal costs of renting land, providing a subsidy for electricity, utilities, reduced standards of protection and pollution of the environment, open access to markets - both external and external; Customs procedures are carried out directly on the premises of the enterprise; long-term absence of income tax.
俄罗斯Abstract:不仅在税收、关税管制和类别方面提供了居民的经济优惠条件:简单的创造就业标准、劳动力管理、最低或最优的土地租赁成本、电力补贴、公用设施、降低的保护和污染标准、开放的市场准入、外包和外包;直接在企业领土上进行海关程序;长期未缴纳所得税。抽象:Favourable economic条件English for residents are provided not only in matters of taxation文清楚regulation, but also in the a类of benefits child: simplified standards for job creation regulation of pay issues, providing a minimum or最优成本of renting land subsidy for电力实用,reduced standards of protection and pollution of the environment, open access to markets both对外合作与对外合作;在企业的前言中有一种特殊的关心;这是一种长期存在的状态。
{"title":"К ВОПРОСУ О СВОБОДНЫХ ЭКОНОМИЧЕСКИХ ЗОНАХ (On the Issue of Free Economic Zone)","authors":"L. Pushkareva","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3666856","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3666856","url":null,"abstract":"<b>Russian Abstract:</b> Льготные экономические условия для резидентов предоставляются не<br>только в вопросах налогообложения, таможенного регулирования, а также к категории льгот<br>относятся: упрощенные стандарты на создание рабочих мест, регулирования вопросов по<br>оплате труда, минимальные или оптимальные расходы по аренде земельных участков,<br>предоставление субсидии на электроэнергию, коммунальные услуги, сниженные стандарты<br>охраны и загрязнения окружающей среды, открытые доступы к рынкам сбыта - как внешним,<br>так и внешним; проведение таможенных процедур прямо на территории предприятия;<br>долгосрочное отсутствие налога на прибыль.<br><br><b>English Abstract:</b> Favourable economic conditions for residents are provided not only in matters of taxation, customs regulation, but also in the category of benefits include: simplified standards for job creation, regulation of pay issues, minimum or optimal costs of renting land, providing a subsidy for electricity, utilities, reduced standards of protection and pollution of the environment, open access to markets - both external and external; Customs procedures are carried out directly on the premises of the enterprise; long-term absence of income tax.","PeriodicalId":431495,"journal":{"name":"Public Economics: Taxation","volume":"79 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114729301","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The so-called Johnson Amendment is that portion of Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code that prohibits charities from "intervening" in electoral campaigns. Intervention has long been understood to include both contributing charitable funds to campaign coffers and communicating the charity's views about candidates' qualifications for office. The breadth of the Johnson Amendment potentially brings two important values into conflict: the government's interest in preventing tax-deductible contributions to be used for electoral purposes (called "non-subvention") and the speech rights or interests of charities. For many years, the IRS has taken the position that the Johnson Amendment's prohibition on electoral communications includes the content of a religious leader's speech in an official religious service — a minister may not express support or opposition to a candidate from the pulpit. For at least as many years, some commentators and legislators have found this application of the Johnson Amendment especially problematic, since it implicates directly the freedom of houses of worship speech and religious exercise. These Johnson Amendment critics sought to provide some carve-out from the Johnson Amendment's general application to permit speech that includes ministers' pulpit speech without creating a massive loophole for the Johnson Amendment's general prohibition on campaign intervention. Other commentators have long argued that a limited carve-out for certain types of speech is not possible — that permitting any communication of the organization's views, even in pulpit speech, would provide a massive loophole in the overall treatment of campaign contributions and expenditures. This Article reviews the leading proposals to fix the Johnson Amendment, and finds them all lacking. It then proposes four types of modifications that could be used to properly balance the speech interests of charities (especially churches) with the government's interest in a level playing field for campaign expenditures (non-subvention). These proposed modifications include: (i) a non-incremental expenditure tax, (ii) a reporting regime, (iii) a disclosure regime, and (iv) a governance regime. The Article concludes that in order to properly balance non-subvention with speech interests of charities, a modification of the Johnson Amendment should include some version of all four types of interventions.
{"title":"Fixing the Johnson Amendment Without Totally Destroying It","authors":"Benjamin M. Leff","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3672383","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3672383","url":null,"abstract":"The so-called Johnson Amendment is that portion of Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code that prohibits charities from \"intervening\" in electoral campaigns. Intervention has long been understood to include both contributing charitable funds to campaign coffers and communicating the charity's views about candidates' qualifications for office. The breadth of the Johnson Amendment potentially brings two important values into conflict: the government's interest in preventing tax-deductible contributions to be used for electoral purposes (called \"non-subvention\") and the speech rights or interests of charities. \u0000 \u0000For many years, the IRS has taken the position that the Johnson Amendment's prohibition on electoral communications includes the content of a religious leader's speech in an official religious service — a minister may not express support or opposition to a candidate from the pulpit. For at least as many years, some commentators and legislators have found this application of the Johnson Amendment especially problematic, since it implicates directly the freedom of houses of worship speech and religious exercise. These Johnson Amendment critics sought to provide some carve-out from the Johnson Amendment's general application to permit speech that includes ministers' pulpit speech without creating a massive loophole for the Johnson Amendment's general prohibition on campaign intervention. Other commentators have long argued that a limited carve-out for certain types of speech is not possible — that permitting any communication of the organization's views, even in pulpit speech, would provide a massive loophole in the overall treatment of campaign contributions and expenditures. \u0000 \u0000This Article reviews the leading proposals to fix the Johnson Amendment, and finds them all lacking. It then proposes four types of modifications that could be used to properly balance the speech interests of charities (especially churches) with the government's interest in a level playing field for campaign expenditures (non-subvention). These proposed modifications include: \u0000 \u0000(i) a non-incremental expenditure tax, \u0000 \u0000(ii) a reporting regime, \u0000 \u0000(iii) a disclosure regime, and \u0000 \u0000(iv) a governance regime. \u0000 \u0000The Article concludes that in order to properly balance non-subvention with speech interests of charities, a modification of the Johnson Amendment should include some version of all four types of interventions.","PeriodicalId":431495,"journal":{"name":"Public Economics: Taxation","volume":"431 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123412597","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This study examines the relationship between government subsidies and income smoothing using a sample of US listed firms. We find that subsidized firms smooth their earnings more aggressively than their unsubsidized peers, consistent with firms that receive subsidies bearing higher political costs and having more incentives to smooth earnings to avoid public attention. Smoothing by subsidized firms is more pronounced when the subsidies are granted through non-tax-related channels than tax-based channels, and for firms with more opaque information environments. In addition, smoothing by subsidized firms reduces the ability of current earnings to predict future cash flows. Using textual content analysis, we find that the MD&As of subsidized firms provide less explanatory content to explain accruals, consistent with smoothing being used to obfuscate earnings. Overall, our results shed light on how government subsidies shape the accounting and disclosure choices of firms.
{"title":"Do Government Subsidies Affect Income Smoothing?","authors":"Kostas Pappas, M. Walker, Liang Xu, C. Zeng","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3061933","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3061933","url":null,"abstract":"This study examines the relationship between government subsidies and income smoothing using a sample of US listed firms. We find that subsidized firms smooth their earnings more aggressively than their unsubsidized peers, consistent with firms that receive subsidies bearing higher political costs and having more incentives to smooth earnings to avoid public attention. Smoothing by subsidized firms is more pronounced when the subsidies are granted through non-tax-related channels than tax-based channels, and for firms with more opaque information environments. In addition, smoothing by subsidized firms reduces the ability of current earnings to predict future cash flows. Using textual content analysis, we find that the MD&As of subsidized firms provide less explanatory content to explain accruals, consistent with smoothing being used to obfuscate earnings. Overall, our results shed light on how government subsidies shape the accounting and disclosure choices of firms.","PeriodicalId":431495,"journal":{"name":"Public Economics: Taxation","volume":"392 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123252488","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The U.S. tax system has many distortions, but two triumph them all. The first is debt-over-equity. Under the current corporate double taxation mechanism, C corporations are incentivized to borrow rather than issue equity, because interest is deductible, and dividends are not. The second is foreign-over-domestic investment. Under the current U.S. international tax regime, U.S. multinationals are subject to a reduced tax rate, and in certain occasions are also exempt from U.S. tax on their foreign earnings, while their domestic earnings are subject to full corporate tax rate. In this Article, I call for the adoption of a Dividends-Paid Deduction form of tax integration and for current-base taxation of foreign earnings. The already reduced corporate tax rate (21%), combined with tax integration, will provide a significant relief from the relatively high burden of corporate double taxation, allowing U.S. multinationals to better compete in the global economy. It will eliminate (or substantially reduce) the debt-over-equity bias and the inefficient penalty on business activities carried through C corporations. Current-base taxation will eliminate the current incentive to invest and shift income abroad, while providing a very important source of revenue. It will also obliterate the need to distinguish between domestic and foreign earnings and as such will facilitate the adoption of tax integration, because all distributions of earnings that were previously taxed will give rise to the benefits of tax integration. Finally, in order to avoid a potential revenue loss as a result of this new dividends-paid deduction, a non-refundable full-rate withholding tax, or a new compensatory tax, equal to the rate of the corporate tax, should be introduced and implemented.
{"title":"The Case for Tax Integration and Current-Base Taxation","authors":"Nir Fishbien","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3462913","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3462913","url":null,"abstract":"The U.S. tax system has many distortions, but two triumph them all. The first is debt-over-equity. Under the current corporate double taxation mechanism, C corporations are incentivized to borrow rather than issue equity, because interest is deductible, and dividends are not. The second is foreign-over-domestic investment. Under the current U.S. international tax regime, U.S. multinationals are subject to a reduced tax rate, and in certain occasions are also exempt from U.S. tax on their foreign earnings, while their domestic earnings are subject to full corporate tax rate. \u0000 \u0000In this Article, I call for the adoption of a Dividends-Paid Deduction form of tax integration and for current-base taxation of foreign earnings. The already reduced corporate tax rate (21%), combined with tax integration, will provide a significant relief from the relatively high burden of corporate double taxation, allowing U.S. multinationals to better compete in the global economy. It will eliminate (or substantially reduce) the debt-over-equity bias and the inefficient penalty on business activities carried through C corporations. Current-base taxation will eliminate the current incentive to invest and shift income abroad, while providing a very important source of revenue. It will also obliterate the need to distinguish between domestic and foreign earnings and as such will facilitate the adoption of tax integration, because all distributions of earnings that were previously taxed will give rise to the benefits of tax integration. Finally, in order to avoid a potential revenue loss as a result of this new dividends-paid deduction, a non-refundable full-rate withholding tax, or a new compensatory tax, equal to the rate of the corporate tax, should be introduced and implemented.","PeriodicalId":431495,"journal":{"name":"Public Economics: Taxation","volume":"45 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127785416","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper examines the division of taxing powers in the peculiar Federation of the Federal Republic of Nigeria with the view of enlightening stakeholders so as to reduce or eradicate the incidence of avoidable frictions that the polity and entrepreneurship in the country have persistently experienced as a result of the unabated misunderstanding of who has jurisdiction of which tax. This paper is rightly written at a time that the agitation for the amendment of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 is on the front burner. It s a notorious fact that the sharing of tax powers and revenue are prominent among the issues that have for decades now been proposed by stakeholders for constitution amendment. The methodology adopted in this research is both doctrinal, and non-doctrinal, as the work also makes use of field observations in and out of court. The paper considers the relevant provisions of the Constitution of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 and the Taxes and Levies (Approved List for Collection) Act No. 21 of 1998, among others, and underscores the need for compliance with the constitutionally and statutorily laid down division of taxing powers between the Federal Government, the State government and the local government in the country. The paper finds out that doing otherwise would remain an infringement on constitutionalism, rule of law, and the welfare of the people, which the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria describes as the primary purpose of government.
{"title":"Division of Taxing Powers in the Federation of Nigeria","authors":"Anthony Aladekomo","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3639090","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3639090","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the division of taxing powers in the peculiar Federation of the Federal Republic of Nigeria with the view of enlightening stakeholders so as to reduce or eradicate the incidence of avoidable frictions that the polity and entrepreneurship in the country have persistently experienced as a result of the unabated misunderstanding of who has jurisdiction of which tax. This paper is rightly written at a time that the agitation for the amendment of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 is on the front burner. It s a notorious fact that the sharing of tax powers and revenue are prominent among the issues that have for decades now been proposed by stakeholders for constitution amendment. The methodology adopted in this research is both doctrinal, and non-doctrinal, as the work also makes use of field observations in and out of court. The paper considers the relevant provisions of the Constitution of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 and the Taxes and Levies (Approved List for Collection) Act No. 21 of 1998, among others, and underscores the need for compliance with the constitutionally and statutorily laid down division of taxing powers between the Federal Government, the State government and the local government in the country. The paper finds out that doing otherwise would remain an infringement on constitutionalism, rule of law, and the welfare of the people, which the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria describes as the primary purpose of government.","PeriodicalId":431495,"journal":{"name":"Public Economics: Taxation","volume":"134 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134139189","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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