Pub Date : 2003-02-01DOI: 10.1080/1090377032000063306
J. B. Callicott
Mountains were once no less feared and loathed than wetlands. Mountains, however, were aesthetically rehabilitated (in part by modern landscape painting), but wetlands remain aesthetically reviled. The three giants of American environmental philosophy--Thoreau, Muir, and Leopold--all expressed aesthetic appreciation of wetlands. For Thoreau and Muir--both of whom were a bit misanthropic and contrarian--the beauty of wetlands was largely a matter of their floral interest and wildness (freedom from human inhabitation and economic exploitation). Leopold's aesthetic appreciation of wetlands was better informed by evolutionary natural history and ecology. For example, cranes--wetland denizens--are more ancient than other large American avifauna and this evolutionary information and perspective enhances our aesthetic experience of them; and the ecological relationships between wetland species--such as sphagnum moss, tamaracks, and pitcher plants--informs our aesthetic experience of the wetlands biotic community. The Leopold land aesthetic involves all sensory modalities, emphasizes cognition as well as sensation (in this regard it may fruitfully be compared to the philosophy of Kant), and is more akin to an aesthetic of muisic than to an aesthetic of painting.
{"title":"Wetland gloom and wetland glory","authors":"J. B. Callicott","doi":"10.1080/1090377032000063306","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1090377032000063306","url":null,"abstract":"Mountains were once no less feared and loathed than wetlands. Mountains, however, were aesthetically rehabilitated (in part by modern landscape painting), but wetlands remain aesthetically reviled. The three giants of American environmental philosophy--Thoreau, Muir, and Leopold--all expressed aesthetic appreciation of wetlands. For Thoreau and Muir--both of whom were a bit misanthropic and contrarian--the beauty of wetlands was largely a matter of their floral interest and wildness (freedom from human inhabitation and economic exploitation). Leopold's aesthetic appreciation of wetlands was better informed by evolutionary natural history and ecology. For example, cranes--wetland denizens--are more ancient than other large American avifauna and this evolutionary information and perspective enhances our aesthetic experience of them; and the ecological relationships between wetland species--such as sphagnum moss, tamaracks, and pitcher plants--informs our aesthetic experience of the wetlands biotic community. The Leopold land aesthetic involves all sensory modalities, emphasizes cognition as well as sensation (in this regard it may fruitfully be compared to the philosophy of Kant), and is more akin to an aesthetic of muisic than to an aesthetic of painting.","PeriodicalId":431617,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Geography","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133581702","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2003-02-01DOI: 10.1080/1090377032000063298
Wayne Ouderkirk
Wilderness has always been a problematic concept, and now even some environmental philosophers question its value. Using Mount Marcy, the highest peak in New York State, the views from its summit, and the wilderness areas that surround it as heuristic devices, I examine four historically important concepts of wilderness. Even the most recently developed of those concepts has its philosophical problems, especially its implicit dualism, which many environmental thinkers regard negatively. I join those who reject dualism, but I disagree with the call to jettison the concept of wilderness. Instead, I argue that we need to develop an environmental philsophy that acknowledges both our differences from and our unity with wild nature.
{"title":"On wilderness and people: A view from Mount Marcy 1","authors":"Wayne Ouderkirk","doi":"10.1080/1090377032000063298","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1090377032000063298","url":null,"abstract":"Wilderness has always been a problematic concept, and now even some environmental philosophers question its value. Using Mount Marcy, the highest peak in New York State, the views from its summit, and the wilderness areas that surround it as heuristic devices, I examine four historically important concepts of wilderness. Even the most recently developed of those concepts has its philosophical problems, especially its implicit dualism, which many environmental thinkers regard negatively. I join those who reject dualism, but I disagree with the call to jettison the concept of wilderness. Instead, I argue that we need to develop an environmental philsophy that acknowledges both our differences from and our unity with wild nature.","PeriodicalId":431617,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Geography","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115818529","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2003-02-01DOI: 10.1080/1090377032000063324
J. Voss, S. Sarkar
Habitat dioramas depicting ecological relations between organisms and their natural environments have become the preferred mode of museum display in most natural history museums in North America and Europe. Dioramas emerged in the late nineteenth century as an alternative mode of museum installation from taxonomically arranged cases. We suggest that this change was closely connected to the emergence of a biogeographical framework rooted in evolutionary theory and positing the existence of distinct biogeographical zones. We tie the history of dioramas to earlier visual resources such as the thematic images that Wallace introduced to illustrate his 1876 Geographical Distribution of Animals. These images were unique in their time because each of them simultaneously depicted animals from several different taxa, rather than only one, as well as the ecological relations between animals and their habitats. Both, visually and with respect to their function within biogeography, these images presaged the habitat dioramas that came shortly afterwards. Not coincidentally, Wallace explicitly advocated the use of dioramas for museum display in ongoing debates on museum reform. Wallace's suggestions were put into practice by committed evolutionists such as Gottlieb von Koch who pioneered the diorama installation in the Grand Ducal Museum in Darmstadt (Germany) in 1906. As in Wallace's illustrations, Koch's dioramas were designed to respresent biogeographical zones. This paper explores the function of these visual displays of biogeographical relations. It argues that, in both the scientific and public realms, biogeogaphical zones were defined and constructed by visual means; recourse to visual representation was more than a method of communication.
在北美和欧洲的大多数自然历史博物馆中，描绘生物与其自然环境之间生态关系的栖息地立体模型已经成为博物馆展示的首选模式。立体模型出现在19世纪后期，作为博物馆装置的另一种模式，从分类安排的情况下。我们认为，这种变化与生物地理框架的出现密切相关，该框架植根于进化理论，并假设存在不同的生物地理区域。我们将立体模型的历史与早期的视觉资源联系在一起，比如华莱士在1876年的《动物地理分布》中引入的主题图像。这些图像在当时是独一无二的，因为它们同时描绘了来自几个不同分类群的动物，而不是只有一个分类群，以及动物与栖息地之间的生态关系。无论是从视觉上还是从它们在生物地理学中的功能上来说，这些图像都预示着不久之后出现的栖息地立体模型。并非巧合的是，华莱士在正在进行的关于博物馆改革的辩论中明确主张使用立体模型进行博物馆展示。华莱士的建议被坚定的进化论者付诸实践，比如戈特利布·冯·科赫(Gottlieb von Koch)，他在1906年率先在达姆施塔特(德国)的大公博物馆安装了立体模型。和华莱士的插图一样，科赫的立体模型被设计成代表生物地理区域。本文探讨了这些生物地理关系视觉展示的功能。它认为，在科学领域和公共领域，生物地理区域是通过视觉手段定义和构建的;诉诸视觉表现不仅仅是一种交流方法。
{"title":"Depictions as surrogates for places: From Wallace's biogeography to Koch's dioramas","authors":"J. Voss, S. Sarkar","doi":"10.1080/1090377032000063324","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1090377032000063324","url":null,"abstract":"Habitat dioramas depicting ecological relations between organisms and their natural environments have become the preferred mode of museum display in most natural history museums in North America and Europe. Dioramas emerged in the late nineteenth century as an alternative mode of museum installation from taxonomically arranged cases. We suggest that this change was closely connected to the emergence of a biogeographical framework rooted in evolutionary theory and positing the existence of distinct biogeographical zones. We tie the history of dioramas to earlier visual resources such as the thematic images that Wallace introduced to illustrate his 1876 Geographical Distribution of Animals. These images were unique in their time because each of them simultaneously depicted animals from several different taxa, rather than only one, as well as the ecological relations between animals and their habitats. Both, visually and with respect to their function within biogeography, these images presaged the habitat dioramas that came shortly afterwards. Not coincidentally, Wallace explicitly advocated the use of dioramas for museum display in ongoing debates on museum reform. Wallace's suggestions were put into practice by committed evolutionists such as Gottlieb von Koch who pioneered the diorama installation in the Grand Ducal Museum in Darmstadt (Germany) in 1906. As in Wallace's illustrations, Koch's dioramas were designed to respresent biogeographical zones. This paper explores the function of these visual displays of biogeographical relations. It argues that, in both the scientific and public realms, biogeogaphical zones were defined and constructed by visual means; recourse to visual representation was more than a method of communication.","PeriodicalId":431617,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Geography","volume":"175 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114156118","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2003-02-01DOI: 10.1080/1090377032000063333
R. Sundstrom
Recent discussions of human categories have suffered from an over emphasis on intention and language, and have not paid enough attention to the role of material conditions, and, specifically, of social space in the construction of human categories. The relationship between human categories and social spaces is vital, especially with the categories of class, race, and gender. This paper argues that social space is not merely the consequent of the division of the world into social categories; it is constitutive of social categories. To put it more bluntly, if who we are is bound up with place, then not only do we inhabit a divided America; divided America inhabits us. The second, and equally dramatic, conclusion is that attempts to transform social categories must involve the transformation of social space. When we sort people by categories, we do so spatially: with race come racialized spaces. And because our place comes to inhabit us, when we divide spatially we cannot help but to inscribe and produce categories and identities associated with our spatial divisions: with racialized spaces come race. Recognition of this dialectic is a direct challenge to the one-way considerations of social identity and social space that occurs in much urban sociology and history. Moreover, it demonstrates that there is an internal contradiction in policies--often based in urban sociology and history--that assume that integration can be accomplished along with the conservation of ethnic and racial identity.
{"title":"Race and place: Social space in the production of human kinds","authors":"R. Sundstrom","doi":"10.1080/1090377032000063333","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1090377032000063333","url":null,"abstract":"Recent discussions of human categories have suffered from an over emphasis on intention and language, and have not paid enough attention to the role of material conditions, and, specifically, of social space in the construction of human categories. The relationship between human categories and social spaces is vital, especially with the categories of class, race, and gender. This paper argues that social space is not merely the consequent of the division of the world into social categories; it is constitutive of social categories. To put it more bluntly, if who we are is bound up with place, then not only do we inhabit a divided America; divided America inhabits us. The second, and equally dramatic, conclusion is that attempts to transform social categories must involve the transformation of social space. When we sort people by categories, we do so spatially: with race come racialized spaces. And because our place comes to inhabit us, when we divide spatially we cannot help but to inscribe and produce categories and identities associated with our spatial divisions: with racialized spaces come race. Recognition of this dialectic is a direct challenge to the one-way considerations of social identity and social space that occurs in much urban sociology and history. Moreover, it demonstrates that there is an internal contradiction in policies--often based in urban sociology and history--that assume that integration can be accomplished along with the conservation of ethnic and racial identity.","PeriodicalId":431617,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Geography","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128380073","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2003-02-01DOI: 10.1080/1090377032000063289
R. King
This essay articulates the importance of the domesticated landscape for a mature environmental ethics. Human beings are spatial beings, deeply implicated in their relationships to places, both wild and domesticated. Human identity evolves contextually through interaction with a "world." If this world obscures our perception of wild nature, it will be difficult to motivate the social and psychological will to imagine, let alone participate in, a culture that values environmentally responsible conduct. My argument is informed by a pragmatist suspicion of fixed dualisms separating humans from nature, the wild from the domesticated, and the natural from the artificial. Drawing on a variety of sources, the essay calls for greater attention to the ways in which the making of our domesticated worlds can contribute to or undermine our ability to take the intrinsic value of nature seriously.
{"title":"Toward an ethics of the domesticated environment","authors":"R. King","doi":"10.1080/1090377032000063289","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1090377032000063289","url":null,"abstract":"This essay articulates the importance of the domesticated landscape for a mature environmental ethics. Human beings are spatial beings, deeply implicated in their relationships to places, both wild and domesticated. Human identity evolves contextually through interaction with a \"world.\" If this world obscures our perception of wild nature, it will be difficult to motivate the social and psychological will to imagine, let alone participate in, a culture that values environmentally responsible conduct. My argument is informed by a pragmatist suspicion of fixed dualisms separating humans from nature, the wild from the domesticated, and the natural from the artificial. Drawing on a variety of sources, the essay calls for greater attention to the ways in which the making of our domesticated worlds can contribute to or undermine our ability to take the intrinsic value of nature seriously.","PeriodicalId":431617,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Geography","volume":"122 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121474233","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2003-02-01DOI: 10.1080/1090377032000063351
T. Koska
{"title":"Transiting the familiar and the strange","authors":"T. Koska","doi":"10.1080/1090377032000063351","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1090377032000063351","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":431617,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Geography","volume":"55 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123051268","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2003-02-01DOI: 10.1080/1090377032000063342
L. Guelke
The suitability of a new philosophical paradigm for geography needs to be assessed in the context of the questions it was designed to address and on the basis of clearly articulated criteria. Postmodernism, the latest contender for the attention of geographers, is here assessed in relation to Collingwoodian idealism. As an intellectual movement postmodernism arose in the unique circumstances of academic life in post Second World War France. In this rigidly structured academic environment a new generation of French scholars, well schooled in the philosophies of Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger and the ideas of Marx and Freud, discovered the radical nineteenth century German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche and drew upon his ethical and philosophical writings to address contemporary issues of power, knowledge, truth and modernity. All the central anti-humanist ideas of what was to become postmodernism are to be found in Nietzsche: a distrust of science and knowledge truth claims, the notion of multiple interpretations and the subordination of knowledge to power. This situated knowledge, set in the traditions of Continental thought, is not easily incorporated into the empiricist philosophies that have hitherto defined the mainstream of Anglo-American science and humanist scholarship including geography. Geographers need to retain a commitment to the foundational value of science, recognize human agency in the form of the conscious, thinking individual, and continue to affirm the empirical nature of human geographical research.
{"title":"Nietzsche and postmodernism in geography: An idealist critique","authors":"L. Guelke","doi":"10.1080/1090377032000063342","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1090377032000063342","url":null,"abstract":"The suitability of a new philosophical paradigm for geography needs to be assessed in the context of the questions it was designed to address and on the basis of clearly articulated criteria. Postmodernism, the latest contender for the attention of geographers, is here assessed in relation to Collingwoodian idealism. As an intellectual movement postmodernism arose in the unique circumstances of academic life in post Second World War France. In this rigidly structured academic environment a new generation of French scholars, well schooled in the philosophies of Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger and the ideas of Marx and Freud, discovered the radical nineteenth century German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche and drew upon his ethical and philosophical writings to address contemporary issues of power, knowledge, truth and modernity. All the central anti-humanist ideas of what was to become postmodernism are to be found in Nietzsche: a distrust of science and knowledge truth claims, the notion of multiple interpretations and the subordination of knowledge to power. This situated knowledge, set in the traditions of Continental thought, is not easily incorporated into the empiricist philosophies that have hitherto defined the mainstream of Anglo-American science and humanist scholarship including geography. Geographers need to retain a commitment to the foundational value of science, recognize human agency in the form of the conscious, thinking individual, and continue to affirm the empirical nature of human geographical research.","PeriodicalId":431617,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Geography","volume":"138 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124335857","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2002-08-01DOI: 10.1080/10903770220152380
Lori Gruen
Establishing that nature has intrinsic value has been the primary goal of environmental philosophers. This goal has generated tremendous confusion. Part of the confusion stems from a conflation of two quite distinct concerns. The first concern is with establishing the moral considerability of the natural world which is captured by what I call "intrinsic value p ." The second concern attempts to address a perceived problem with the way nature has traditionally been valued, or as many environmentalists would suggest, undervalued, what I call "intrinsic value v ." In this paper I argue against further development of both types of theories of the intrinsic value of nature. There are, I believe, intermediate valuations that have been almost entirely overlooked in discussions of value. Much of the confusion currently plaguing environmental ethics can be avoided by abandoning intrinsic value and refocusing environmental ethics.
{"title":"Refocusing environmental ethics: From intrinsic value to endorsable valuations","authors":"Lori Gruen","doi":"10.1080/10903770220152380","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10903770220152380","url":null,"abstract":"Establishing that nature has intrinsic value has been the primary goal of environmental philosophers. This goal has generated tremendous confusion. Part of the confusion stems from a conflation of two quite distinct concerns. The first concern is with establishing the moral considerability of the natural world which is captured by what I call \"intrinsic value p .\" The second concern attempts to address a perceived problem with the way nature has traditionally been valued, or as many environmentalists would suggest, undervalued, what I call \"intrinsic value v .\" In this paper I argue against further development of both types of theories of the intrinsic value of nature. There are, I believe, intermediate valuations that have been almost entirely overlooked in discussions of value. Much of the confusion currently plaguing environmental ethics can be avoided by abandoning intrinsic value and refocusing environmental ethics.","PeriodicalId":431617,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Geography","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132994487","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2002-08-01DOI: 10.1080/10903770220152371
Jonathan Aldred
Most applications of cost-benefit analysis in environmental policy, and almost all the controversial cases, involve the use of contingent valuation (CV) surveys. There is now a relatively well-developed critique of CV as a method of public consultation on environmental issues. Theories of deliberative democracy have been invoked which question the individualistic, preference-based calculus of CV. A particular deliberative institution which has recently received much attention is the citizens' jury (CJ). While CJs and other deliberative institutions have come to be regarded as alternatives to CV, it is far from obvious in what sense this is true. The discussion begins by exploring the extent to which CV and CJ can be meaningfully compared. After specifying a limited sense in which this is possible, the paper goes on to assess the virtues of deliberation by reference to this comparison. Much of the assessment is made from the perspective of rational choice theory, because that approach has been influential amongst critics of deliberative democracy. The main aim is to develop an argument for the merits of deliberation, in terms which its critics must acknowledge.
{"title":"It's good to talk: Deliberative institutions for environmental policy","authors":"Jonathan Aldred","doi":"10.1080/10903770220152371","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10903770220152371","url":null,"abstract":"Most applications of cost-benefit analysis in environmental policy, and almost all the controversial cases, involve the use of contingent valuation (CV) surveys. There is now a relatively well-developed critique of CV as a method of public consultation on environmental issues. Theories of deliberative democracy have been invoked which question the individualistic, preference-based calculus of CV. A particular deliberative institution which has recently received much attention is the citizens' jury (CJ). While CJs and other deliberative institutions have come to be regarded as alternatives to CV, it is far from obvious in what sense this is true. The discussion begins by exploring the extent to which CV and CJ can be meaningfully compared. After specifying a limited sense in which this is possible, the paper goes on to assess the virtues of deliberation by reference to this comparison. Much of the assessment is made from the perspective of rational choice theory, because that approach has been influential amongst critics of deliberative democracy. The main aim is to develop an argument for the merits of deliberation, in terms which its critics must acknowledge.","PeriodicalId":431617,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Geography","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125519745","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2002-08-01DOI: 10.1080/10903770220152434
Janet Donohoe
In the past twenty years we have seen images of weeping mothers and soldiers at the Vietnam War Memorial in Washington, DC. We have seen images of statues of Lenin toppled from their platforms in the former Soviet Union, and the destruction of Buddhist mountain carvings in Afghanistan. These images involve monuments and memorials, but what role do the monuments play in these kinds of events? How do monuments participate in our public activities and our interactions with fellow human beings? We all encounter monuments. They grace public squares, or tower over cities, or mark a quiet corner where an important event transpired. We perhaps do not notice some of them and yet they can play a galvanizing role in our societies. How do monuments contribute to our dwelling on this earth? Is it possible to claim that some monuments contribute positively to human existence while others are oppressive or coercive? In this comment I will explore these questions by drawing upon Martin Heidegger’s understanding of “dwelling” and Hannah Arendt’s understanding of public action. My aim is to provide some suggestions for an analysis of what monuments achieve in our world and how we might evaluate the monuments we encounter. What is a monument? The word monument is derived from the Latin monumentum meaning memorial, coming from the root monere which means “to remind.” But is a monument merely that which reminds us of those who have died, or of an important historical event? And if it is called a memorial is there a difference between a memorial and a monument? A memorial need not be a monument. Memorial comes from the Latin memor meaning “mindful.” These de nitions imply that a monument, which often serves as a memorial, is meant to call us both to be reminded and to be mindful. But reminded and mindful of what? There are possible answers to this question, but rst some further clari cations must be made. In addition to calling us to be reminded and mindful, monuments have a privileged position among the things we build with respect to the organization of common space. They often serve as a focal point around which space is organized. They invoke a shared past in a complex and complicated way. They contribute physically to the world, but can also make a less concrete contribution in making human beings mindful of themselves and their relationships to their communities. Not all monuments are equally successful at these tasks, however, and it is important to be able to distinguish the monuments that call us to be mindful of the complexities of our existence and the
{"title":"Dwelling with monuments","authors":"Janet Donohoe","doi":"10.1080/10903770220152434","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10903770220152434","url":null,"abstract":"In the past twenty years we have seen images of weeping mothers and soldiers at the Vietnam War Memorial in Washington, DC. We have seen images of statues of Lenin toppled from their platforms in the former Soviet Union, and the destruction of Buddhist mountain carvings in Afghanistan. These images involve monuments and memorials, but what role do the monuments play in these kinds of events? How do monuments participate in our public activities and our interactions with fellow human beings? We all encounter monuments. They grace public squares, or tower over cities, or mark a quiet corner where an important event transpired. We perhaps do not notice some of them and yet they can play a galvanizing role in our societies. How do monuments contribute to our dwelling on this earth? Is it possible to claim that some monuments contribute positively to human existence while others are oppressive or coercive? In this comment I will explore these questions by drawing upon Martin Heidegger’s understanding of “dwelling” and Hannah Arendt’s understanding of public action. My aim is to provide some suggestions for an analysis of what monuments achieve in our world and how we might evaluate the monuments we encounter. What is a monument? The word monument is derived from the Latin monumentum meaning memorial, coming from the root monere which means “to remind.” But is a monument merely that which reminds us of those who have died, or of an important historical event? And if it is called a memorial is there a difference between a memorial and a monument? A memorial need not be a monument. Memorial comes from the Latin memor meaning “mindful.” These de nitions imply that a monument, which often serves as a memorial, is meant to call us both to be reminded and to be mindful. But reminded and mindful of what? There are possible answers to this question, but rst some further clari cations must be made. In addition to calling us to be reminded and mindful, monuments have a privileged position among the things we build with respect to the organization of common space. They often serve as a focal point around which space is organized. They invoke a shared past in a complex and complicated way. They contribute physically to the world, but can also make a less concrete contribution in making human beings mindful of themselves and their relationships to their communities. Not all monuments are equally successful at these tasks, however, and it is important to be able to distinguish the monuments that call us to be mindful of the complexities of our existence and the","PeriodicalId":431617,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Geography","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129769140","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：