I propose a new fundamental principle in ethics: everyone who makes a choice has to avoid unwanted arbitrariness as much as possible. Unwanted arbitrariness is defi ned as making a choice without following a rule, whereby the consequences of that choice cannot be consistently wanted by at least one person. Other formulations of this anti-arbitrariness principle are given and compared with very similar contractualist principles formulated by Kant, Rawls, Scanlon and Parfit. The structure of arbitrariness allows us to fi nd ways to avoid unwanted arbitrariness. The two most important implications of the anti-arbitrariness principle are discussed: non-dictatorship and non-discrimination.
{"title":"Unwanted Arbitrariness","authors":"Stijn Bruers","doi":"10.52685/cjp.23.68.5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.52685/cjp.23.68.5","url":null,"abstract":"I propose a new fundamental principle in ethics: everyone who makes a choice has to avoid unwanted arbitrariness as much as possible. Unwanted arbitrariness is defi ned as making a choice without following a rule, whereby the consequences of that choice cannot be consistently wanted by at least one person. Other formulations of this anti-arbitrariness principle are given and compared with very similar contractualist principles formulated by Kant, Rawls, Scanlon and Parfit. The structure of arbitrariness allows us to fi nd ways to avoid unwanted arbitrariness. The two most important implications of the anti-arbitrariness principle are discussed: non-dictatorship and non-discrimination.","PeriodicalId":43218,"journal":{"name":"Croatian Journal of Philosophy","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136038556","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Recently, there has been some excitement about the potential explanatory payoffs the newish metaphysical notion of grounding seems to have for metaethical non-naturalism. There has also been a recent upsurge in the debate about whether non-naturalism is implausibly committed to some acts being wrong because of some sui generis piece of ontology. It has, in response, been claimed that once we have a clear enough picture of the grounding role of moral laws on non-naturalism, this is not (objectionably) so. This move, I argue, is inconsistent with certain constraints on what non-naturalist-friendly moral laws must be for them to do the explanatory work non-naturalism requires of them elsewhere. In other words, there is tension between the grounding reply to the supervenience objection and the grounding structure implied by some responses to the normative objection.
{"title":"A Tension in Some Non-Naturalistic Explanations of Moral Truths","authors":"Maarten Van Doorn","doi":"10.52685/cjp.23.68.4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.52685/cjp.23.68.4","url":null,"abstract":"Recently, there has been some excitement about the potential explanatory payoffs the newish metaphysical notion of grounding seems to have for metaethical non-naturalism. There has also been a recent upsurge in the debate about whether non-naturalism is implausibly committed to some acts being wrong because of some sui generis piece of ontology. It has, in response, been claimed that once we have a clear enough picture of the grounding role of moral laws on non-naturalism, this is not (objectionably) so. This move, I argue, is inconsistent with certain constraints on what non-naturalist-friendly moral laws must be for them to do the explanatory work non-naturalism requires of them elsewhere. In other words, there is tension between the grounding reply to the supervenience objection and the grounding structure implied by some responses to the normative objection.","PeriodicalId":43218,"journal":{"name":"Croatian Journal of Philosophy","volume":"80 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136038552","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We present the problem of perceptual agreement (of determinate color) and submit that it proves to be a serious and long overlooked obstacle for those insisting that colors are not objective features of objects, viz., nonobjectivist theories like C. L. Hardin’s (2003) eliminativism and Jonathan Cohen’s (2009) relationalism.
{"title":"The Problem of Perceptual Agreement","authors":"Elay Shech, Michael Watkins","doi":"10.52685/cjp.23.68.1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.52685/cjp.23.68.1","url":null,"abstract":"We present the problem of perceptual agreement (of determinate color) and submit that it proves to be a serious and long overlooked obstacle for those insisting that colors are not objective features of objects, viz., nonobjectivist theories like C. L. Hardin’s (2003) eliminativism and Jonathan Cohen’s (2009) relationalism.","PeriodicalId":43218,"journal":{"name":"Croatian Journal of Philosophy","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136037498","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Cosmopolitans including Charles Beitz, David Richards, Brian Barry, Thomas Pogge and Gillian Brock propose the device of an original global position to work out global principles of justice. However, John Rawls does not agree with this kind of proposal. In this paper, I add two key original contributions, which go beyond previous arguments by cosmopolitans and advance the current debates. First, to argue against Rawls’s objection to the global original position, I demonstrate the importance of the distinction between accepting a particular substantive principle and accepting the original position procedure. Second, in order to respond to cultural pluralism, I take a unique approach to show that the idea of the person as free and equal is a fundamental part of the global public culture by examining the most fundamental legal documents: the proto-constitutional documents in international law and the constitutions of the major states. I apply Samuel Huntington’s classification of civilisations to identify the major civilisations and their core states and show that the idea of the person as free and equal is implicit in the constitutions of most influential countries even though these countries are categorised in different civilisations.
{"title":"Rawls and the Global Original Position","authors":"Jinghua Chen","doi":"10.52685/cjp.23.67.6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.52685/cjp.23.67.6","url":null,"abstract":"Cosmopolitans including Charles Beitz, David Richards, Brian Barry, Thomas Pogge and Gillian Brock propose the device of an original global position to work out global principles of justice. However, John Rawls does not agree with this kind of proposal. In this paper, I add two key original contributions, which go beyond previous arguments by cosmopolitans and advance the current debates. First, to argue against Rawls’s objection to the global original position, I demonstrate the importance of the distinction between accepting a particular substantive principle and accepting the original position procedure. Second, in order to respond to cultural pluralism, I take a unique approach to show that the idea of the person as free and equal is a fundamental part of the global public culture by examining the most fundamental legal documents: the proto-constitutional documents in international law and the constitutions of the major states. I apply Samuel Huntington’s classification of civilisations to identify the major civilisations and their core states and show that the idea of the person as free and equal is implicit in the constitutions of most influential countries even though these countries are categorised in different civilisations.","PeriodicalId":43218,"journal":{"name":"Croatian Journal of Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2023-05-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42043688","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Interdisciplinary research is becoming more and more popular. Many funding bodies encourage interdisciplinarity, as a criterion that promises scientific progress. Traditionally this has been linked to the idea of integrating or unifying disciplines. Using evolutionary game theory as a case study, Till Grüne-Yanoff (2016) argued that there is no such necessary link between interdisciplinary success and integration. Contrary to this, this paper argues that evolutionary game theory is a genuine case of successful integration between economics and biology, shedding lights on the many dimensions along which integration can take place.
跨学科研究正变得越来越流行。许多资助机构鼓励跨学科研究，将其作为保证科学进步的标准。传统上，这与整合或统一学科的想法有关。Till gr ne- yanoff(2016)以进化博弈论为例，认为跨学科的成功与整合之间没有这种必要的联系。与此相反，本文认为进化博弈论是经济学和生物学之间成功整合的真正案例，揭示了整合可以发生的许多维度。
{"title":"Evolutionary Game Theory and Interdisciplinary Integration","authors":"Walter Friedrich Veit","doi":"10.52685/cjp.23.67.2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.52685/cjp.23.67.2","url":null,"abstract":"Interdisciplinary research is becoming more and more popular. Many funding bodies encourage interdisciplinarity, as a criterion that promises scientific progress. Traditionally this has been linked to the idea of integrating or unifying disciplines. Using evolutionary game theory as a case study, Till Grüne-Yanoff (2016) argued that there is no such necessary link between interdisciplinary success and integration. Contrary to this, this paper argues that evolutionary game theory is a genuine case of successful integration between economics and biology, shedding lights on the many dimensions along which integration can take place.","PeriodicalId":43218,"journal":{"name":"Croatian Journal of Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2023-05-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46325704","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper argues—contra some Austro-libertarians—that whether a given exchange is welfare-enhancing or welfare-diminishing does not depend on whether that exchange is just or unjust, respectively. Rather, we suggest that in light of our two thought experiments, Austro-libertarianism has at least a pro tanto reason to conceive of justice and welfare as two logically distinct ideals. This would in turn, most interestingly, predict the possibility of (a) just but welfare-diminishing exchanges and (b) unjust but welfare-enhancing ones. Upon considering possible rejoinders to our points, we suggest that Austro-libertarians abandon a justice-based notion of welfare.
{"title":"How Does Justice Relate to Economic Welfare?","authors":"I. Wysocki, Łukasz M. Dominiak","doi":"10.52685/cjp.23.67.3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.52685/cjp.23.67.3","url":null,"abstract":"This paper argues—contra some Austro-libertarians—that whether a given exchange is welfare-enhancing or welfare-diminishing does not depend on whether that exchange is just or unjust, respectively. Rather, we suggest that in light of our two thought experiments, Austro-libertarianism has at least a pro tanto reason to conceive of justice and welfare as two logically distinct ideals. This would in turn, most interestingly, predict the possibility of (a) just but welfare-diminishing exchanges and (b) unjust but welfare-enhancing ones. Upon considering possible rejoinders to our points, we suggest that Austro-libertarians abandon a justice-based notion of welfare.","PeriodicalId":43218,"journal":{"name":"Croatian Journal of Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2023-05-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45019768","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article informally presents a solution to the paradoxes of truth and shows how the solution solves classical paradoxes (such as the original Liar) as well as the paradoxes that were invented as counterarguments for various proposed solutions (“the revenge of the Liar”). This solution complements the classical procedure of determining the truth values of sentences by its own failure and, when the procedure fails, through an appropriate semantic shift allows us to express the failure in a classical two-valued language. Formally speaking, the solution is a language with one meaning of symbols and two valuations of the truth values of sentences. The primary valuation is a classical valuation that is partial in the presence of the truth predicate. It enables us to determine the classical truth value of a sentence or leads to the failure of that determination. The language with the primary valuation is precisely the largest intrinsic fixed point of the strong Kleene three-valued semantics (LIFPSK3). The semantic shift that allows us to express the failure of the primary valuation is precisely the classical closure of LIFPSK3: it extends LIFPSK3 to a classical language in parts where LIFPSK3 is undetermined. Thus, this article provides an argumentation, which has not been present in contemporary debates so far, for the choice of LIFPSK3 and its classical closure as the right model for the truth predicate. In the end, an erroneous critique of Kripke-Feferman axiomatic theory of truth, which is present in contemporary literature, is pointed out.
{"title":"How to Conquer the Liar and Enthrone the Logical Concept of Truth","authors":"Boris Čulina","doi":"10.52685/cjp.23.67.1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.52685/cjp.23.67.1","url":null,"abstract":"This article informally presents a solution to the paradoxes of truth and shows how the solution solves classical paradoxes (such as the original Liar) as well as the paradoxes that were invented as counterarguments for various proposed solutions (“the revenge of the Liar”). This solution complements the classical procedure of determining the truth values of sentences by its own failure and, when the procedure fails, through an appropriate semantic shift allows us to express the failure in a classical two-valued language. Formally speaking, the solution is a language with one meaning of symbols and two valuations of the truth values of sentences. The primary valuation is a classical valuation that is partial in the presence of the truth predicate. It enables us to determine the classical truth value of a sentence or leads to the failure of that determination. The language with the primary valuation is precisely the largest intrinsic fixed point of the strong Kleene three-valued semantics (LIFPSK3). The semantic shift that allows us to express the failure of the primary valuation is precisely the classical closure of LIFPSK3: it extends LIFPSK3 to a classical language in parts where LIFPSK3 is undetermined. Thus, this article provides an argumentation, which has not been present in contemporary debates so far, for the choice of LIFPSK3 and its classical closure as the right model for the truth predicate. In the end, an erroneous critique of Kripke-Feferman axiomatic theory of truth, which is present in contemporary literature, is pointed out.","PeriodicalId":43218,"journal":{"name":"Croatian Journal of Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2023-05-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45821592","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Should we descry the nature of the self from thought experiments? Shaun Nichols says ‘maybe,’ but only if we use thought experiments that do not recruit the indexical “I” (non-I-recruiting). His reason is that the psychology of “I” perforce mandates that imagination responds to thought experiments that recruit it (I-recruiting) peculiarly. Here, I consider whether he is correct about non-I-recruiting personal identity thought experiments. I argue positively using the same framework, i.e., considering the underlying psychology.
{"title":"Imagination, Thought Experiments, and Personal Identity","authors":"Michael Omoge","doi":"10.52685/cjp.23.67.4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.52685/cjp.23.67.4","url":null,"abstract":"Should we descry the nature of the self from thought experiments? Shaun Nichols says ‘maybe,’ but only if we use thought experiments that do not recruit the indexical “I” (non-I-recruiting). His reason is that the psychology of “I” perforce mandates that imagination responds to thought experiments that recruit it (I-recruiting) peculiarly. Here, I consider whether he is correct about non-I-recruiting personal identity thought experiments. I argue positively using the same framework, i.e., considering the underlying psychology.","PeriodicalId":43218,"journal":{"name":"Croatian Journal of Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2023-05-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48646374","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The supporters of the neurodiversity movement contend that autism is not a mental disorder, but rather a natural human variation. In a recent paper Jerome Wakefi eld, David Wasserman and Jordan Conrad (2020) argued against this view relying on Wakefi eld’s harmful dysfunction theory of mental disorder (the HD theory). Although I argue that the HD theory is problematic, I contend that arguments offered by Wakefi eld et al. (2020) against those of the neurodiversity movement are plausible, except in one respect: their claim that high functioning autism in general is not a disorder is not well supported. I argue instead that the disorder status of high-functioning autistic persons should be judged on a case-by-case basis, depending on the harmfulness of the condition. In this regard, I maintain that the list of basic psychological capacities provided by George Graham (2010) provides an adequate conceptualization of harm. Moreover, I show how this framework may offer an appropriate tool for a case-by-case assessment of harm associated with high-functioning autism.
{"title":"Is Autism a Mental Disorder According to the Harmful Dysfunction View?","authors":"M. Bošnjak","doi":"10.52685/cjp.23.67.5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.52685/cjp.23.67.5","url":null,"abstract":"The supporters of the neurodiversity movement contend that autism is not a mental disorder, but rather a natural human variation. In a recent paper Jerome Wakefi eld, David Wasserman and Jordan Conrad (2020) argued against this view relying on Wakefi eld’s harmful dysfunction theory of mental disorder (the HD theory). Although I argue that the HD theory is problematic, I contend that arguments offered by Wakefi eld et al. (2020) against those of the neurodiversity movement are plausible, except in one respect: their claim that high functioning autism in general is not a disorder is not well supported. I argue instead that the disorder status of high-functioning autistic persons should be judged on a case-by-case basis, depending on the harmfulness of the condition. In this regard, I maintain that the list of basic psychological capacities provided by George Graham (2010) provides an adequate conceptualization of harm. Moreover, I show how this framework may offer an appropriate tool for a case-by-case assessment of harm associated with high-functioning autism.","PeriodicalId":43218,"journal":{"name":"Croatian Journal of Philosophy","volume":"72 5","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2023-05-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41295637","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We try not just to reconcile but to “integrate” Cognitivism and Behaviorism by a theory of different forms of purposiveness in behavior and mind. This also implies a criticism of the Dual System theory and a claim on the strong interaction and integration of Sist1 (automatic) and Sist2 (deliberative), based on reasons, preferences, and decisions. We present a theory of different kinds of teleology. Mere “functions” of the behavior: finalism not represented in the mind of the agent, not “regulating” the behavior. Two kinds of teleological mental representations: true “Goals” in control-theory, cybernetic view, with “goal-driven” behavior (intentional action); vs. Expectations in Anticipatory Classifiers: a reactive but anticipatory device, explaining the “instrumental” (finalistic) nature of Skinner’s reinforcement learning. We present different kinds of Goals and goal processing and on this ground the theory of what “intentions” are. On such basis, we can discuss Kathy Wilkes’s hint about the necessarily linguistic formulation of “intentions”; with the hypothesis that her intuition is not correct for any kind on “intention” which may be represented in sensory-motor format, but correct for “volition” and our will-strength for socially influencing ourselves.
{"title":"Purposiveness of Human Behavior. Integrating Behaviorist and Cognitivist Processes/Models","authors":"C. Castelfranchi","doi":"10.52685/cjp.22.66.8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.52685/cjp.22.66.8","url":null,"abstract":"We try not just to reconcile but to “integrate” Cognitivism and Behaviorism by a theory of different forms of purposiveness in behavior and mind. This also implies a criticism of the Dual System theory and a claim on the strong interaction and integration of Sist1 (automatic) and Sist2 (deliberative), based on reasons, preferences, and decisions. We present a theory of different kinds of teleology. Mere “functions” of the behavior: finalism not represented in the mind of the agent, not “regulating” the behavior. Two kinds of teleological mental representations: true “Goals” in control-theory, cybernetic view, with “goal-driven” behavior (intentional action); vs. Expectations in Anticipatory Classifiers: a reactive but anticipatory device, explaining the “instrumental” (finalistic) nature of Skinner’s reinforcement learning. We present different kinds of Goals and goal processing and on this ground the theory of what “intentions” are. On such basis, we can discuss Kathy Wilkes’s hint about the necessarily linguistic formulation of “intentions”; with the hypothesis that her intuition is not correct for any kind on “intention” which may be represented in sensory-motor format, but correct for “volition” and our will-strength for socially influencing ourselves.","PeriodicalId":43218,"journal":{"name":"Croatian Journal of Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-12-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45803778","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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