Pub Date : 2023-09-20DOI: 10.1163/20512996-12340416
Vilius Bartninkas
Abstract Plato in the Laws proposes a simulation of nearly ideal conditions regarding the experts’ persuasion and observes that even in these circumstances some citizens will not agree with the epistemic authorities. In this paper, such situations are labelled as exhibiting persistent dissent . Plato maintains that persistent dissenters lack the virtue of sōphrosynē , but its meaning is notoriously difficult to decipher. This paper offers to examine the role of sōphrosynē in tackling persistent dissent in light of Plato’s reflections on civic participation. This angle will not only uncover the epistemic aspect of sōphrosynē that lays the groundwork for persuasion, but it will also give a less optimistic assessment of the civic theory of the Laws , whilst simultaneously widening our own understanding of the range of disagreements between the experts and the non-experts and the difficulties in removing them.
{"title":"Persistent Dissent and Plato’s Later Theory of Civic Participation","authors":"Vilius Bartninkas","doi":"10.1163/20512996-12340416","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/20512996-12340416","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Plato in the Laws proposes a simulation of nearly ideal conditions regarding the experts’ persuasion and observes that even in these circumstances some citizens will not agree with the epistemic authorities. In this paper, such situations are labelled as exhibiting persistent dissent . Plato maintains that persistent dissenters lack the virtue of sōphrosynē , but its meaning is notoriously difficult to decipher. This paper offers to examine the role of sōphrosynē in tackling persistent dissent in light of Plato’s reflections on civic participation. This angle will not only uncover the epistemic aspect of sōphrosynē that lays the groundwork for persuasion, but it will also give a less optimistic assessment of the civic theory of the Laws , whilst simultaneously widening our own understanding of the range of disagreements between the experts and the non-experts and the difficulties in removing them.","PeriodicalId":43237,"journal":{"name":"POLIS","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136378027","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-20DOI: 10.1163/20512996-12340423
Stefano Mecci
{"title":"Les Trois Républiques. Platon, Diogène de Sinope et Zénon de Citium, edited by Suzanne Husson and Juliette Lemaire","authors":"Stefano Mecci","doi":"10.1163/20512996-12340423","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/20512996-12340423","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43237,"journal":{"name":"POLIS","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136377837","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-20DOI: 10.1163/20512996-12340420
Jonathan P. Zarecki
Abstract This article argues that Cicero laid down his imperium in Brundisium in September 47 after Caesar had, in a meeting between the two men, granted Cicero permission to retain his imperium and title of imperator for as long as Cicero wished to do so. Instead of accepting Caesar’s offer, Cicero instead immediately repudiated it, laid down his imperium in the city of Brundisium, and went immediately to Tusculum to begin a second period of political retirement. Caesar’s offer and his return to Italy in the autumn of 47 gave Cicero an excuse to consider expired the SCU of 7 January 49 and, by immediately renouncing his imperium , perform, under the cover of his now-fulfilled obligation to the Pompeians, a calculated personal statement of political independence.
{"title":"Cicero, Caesar, and the End of Cicero’s Imperium","authors":"Jonathan P. Zarecki","doi":"10.1163/20512996-12340420","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/20512996-12340420","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article argues that Cicero laid down his imperium in Brundisium in September 47 after Caesar had, in a meeting between the two men, granted Cicero permission to retain his imperium and title of imperator for as long as Cicero wished to do so. Instead of accepting Caesar’s offer, Cicero instead immediately repudiated it, laid down his imperium in the city of Brundisium, and went immediately to Tusculum to begin a second period of political retirement. Caesar’s offer and his return to Italy in the autumn of 47 gave Cicero an excuse to consider expired the SCU of 7 January 49 and, by immediately renouncing his imperium , perform, under the cover of his now-fulfilled obligation to the Pompeians, a calculated personal statement of political independence.","PeriodicalId":43237,"journal":{"name":"POLIS","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136377841","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-20DOI: 10.1163/20512996-12340421
Thomas J.B. Cole
Abstract Although Tacitus began his writing career during the Principate at the end of the first century CE , the dominant approach to thinking about political life was still guided by Republicanism, a constellation of concepts from the mid-first century BCE Roman Republic. Republicanism held that there was only one type of monarchy and that it necessarily precluded libertas . Tacitus, who was living under different iterations of monopolistic power in the Principate, questions this tenet by examining various Germanic tribes. The Germania explores different types of monarchical arrangements, showing that monarchy is not a one-size-fits-all form and that there are significant political differences among the Germanic monarchies, some of which preserve libertas . In this examination, he highlights the inapplicability of Republicanism to a system as dynamic as the Principate.
{"title":"Tacitus’ Critique of Republicanism in His Germania","authors":"Thomas J.B. Cole","doi":"10.1163/20512996-12340421","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/20512996-12340421","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Although Tacitus began his writing career during the Principate at the end of the first century CE , the dominant approach to thinking about political life was still guided by Republicanism, a constellation of concepts from the mid-first century BCE Roman Republic. Republicanism held that there was only one type of monarchy and that it necessarily precluded libertas . Tacitus, who was living under different iterations of monopolistic power in the Principate, questions this tenet by examining various Germanic tribes. The Germania explores different types of monarchical arrangements, showing that monarchy is not a one-size-fits-all form and that there are significant political differences among the Germanic monarchies, some of which preserve libertas . In this examination, he highlights the inapplicability of Republicanism to a system as dynamic as the Principate.","PeriodicalId":43237,"journal":{"name":"POLIS","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136378026","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-25DOI: 10.1163/20512996-12340410
S. McConnell
In the proposed law-code in De legibus there is a law that votes are to be known by the best citizens (the optimates) but free to the common people (the plebs) (3.10). This law, Cicero claims, grants ‘the appearance of liberty’ (libertatis species), preserves the authority (auctoritas) of the optimates, and promotes harmony between the classes (3.39). The law and the precise meaning of libertatis species remain opaque even with the lengthy commentary (3.33–39), and much scholarly debate and discussion has arisen as a result – most of it very critical of Cicero’s proposal and the arguments supporting it. This paper offers a fresh analysis of the voting law that is more charitable to Cicero. It unpacks the full details of the voting system that is developed in De legibus and sheds new light on developments in Cicero’s thinking about the best state.
{"title":"The Model of Voting in Cicero’s Best State","authors":"S. McConnell","doi":"10.1163/20512996-12340410","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/20512996-12340410","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000In the proposed law-code in De legibus there is a law that votes are to be known by the best citizens (the optimates) but free to the common people (the plebs) (3.10). This law, Cicero claims, grants ‘the appearance of liberty’ (libertatis species), preserves the authority (auctoritas) of the optimates, and promotes harmony between the classes (3.39). The law and the precise meaning of libertatis species remain opaque even with the lengthy commentary (3.33–39), and much scholarly debate and discussion has arisen as a result – most of it very critical of Cicero’s proposal and the arguments supporting it. This paper offers a fresh analysis of the voting law that is more charitable to Cicero. It unpacks the full details of the voting system that is developed in De legibus and sheds new light on developments in Cicero’s thinking about the best state.","PeriodicalId":43237,"journal":{"name":"POLIS","volume":"62 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2023-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86913695","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-25DOI: 10.1163/20512996-12340405
M. Knoll
This short article is a response to Douglas Cairns, Mirko Canevaro, and Kleanthis Mantzouranis, who in Polis 39 (2022) explicitly criticize both of my previous interpretations of Aristotle’s view of democratic justice and of the relation of proportional and numerical equality. Against Cairns et al., I argue that there is no tension or contradiction between Aristotle’s statements on these two kinds of equality and on democratic justice. The paper suggests a new reading of Aristotle’s texts that strictly distinguishes between Aristotle’s own views and his references to ‘respected opinions’ (endoxa). It concludes that Aristotle consistently identifies democratic justice with ‘numerical’ or ‘arithmetic’ equality and not with proportional equality, which he usually identifies with equality ‘according to worth or merit’ (kat’ axian).
{"title":"Aristotle’s Understanding of Democratic Justice and His Distinction between Two Kinds of Equality: A Response","authors":"M. Knoll","doi":"10.1163/20512996-12340405","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/20512996-12340405","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000This short article is a response to Douglas Cairns, Mirko Canevaro, and Kleanthis Mantzouranis, who in Polis 39 (2022) explicitly criticize both of my previous interpretations of Aristotle’s view of democratic justice and of the relation of proportional and numerical equality. Against Cairns et al., I argue that there is no tension or contradiction between Aristotle’s statements on these two kinds of equality and on democratic justice. The paper suggests a new reading of Aristotle’s texts that strictly distinguishes between Aristotle’s own views and his references to ‘respected opinions’ (endoxa). It concludes that Aristotle consistently identifies democratic justice with ‘numerical’ or ‘arithmetic’ equality and not with proportional equality, which he usually identifies with equality ‘according to worth or merit’ (kat’ axian).","PeriodicalId":43237,"journal":{"name":"POLIS","volume":"33 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2023-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86045222","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-25DOI: 10.1163/20512996-12340412
A. Trott
In Aristotle on Sexual Difference, Marguerite Deslauriers showcases the ways that the biological treatises invite consideration of major themes and debates in Aristotle scholarship: the relation of the theoretical to the practical texts, of the soul to the body, of eidos to morphē, of the status and operation of species form, of material’s ability to affect form, of the directionality of influence of the psychological and the physiological, of the structure of deliberation, the extent to which practical reason can be divided from choice and action, and more. Many scholars of Aristotle treat both Politics and Generation of Animals as minor works that shouldn’t be consulted for insight into the central questions of Aristotle’s corpus. This book makes the emphatic case that both texts are indeed fertile domains for investigating concerns that pervade his work – a case that Deslauriers supports with wide-ranging references including but not limited to Posterior Analytics, De Anima, Metaphysics, Nicomachean Ethics and Rhetoric. More than drawing together particular pieces of her reading of Aristotle’s view of sexual difference and its place in political life that she has made in other work (for example, that sexual difference is in the matter, not the form), Deslauriers argue for a coherent case of Aristotle’s treatment of female animals and of women citizens across his corpus. This monograph is the work of a scholar who has been thinking over these matters for decades, and it shows. The book is precise in its argumentation and its self-understanding of the stakes: to defend the importance of sexual difference for Aristotle. Deslauriers foresees objections and has replies grounded in specific passages that are not
{"title":"The Difference Sexual Difference Makes in Aristotle’s Corpus","authors":"A. Trott","doi":"10.1163/20512996-12340412","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/20512996-12340412","url":null,"abstract":"In Aristotle on Sexual Difference, Marguerite Deslauriers showcases the ways that the biological treatises invite consideration of major themes and debates in Aristotle scholarship: the relation of the theoretical to the practical texts, of the soul to the body, of eidos to morphē, of the status and operation of species form, of material’s ability to affect form, of the directionality of influence of the psychological and the physiological, of the structure of deliberation, the extent to which practical reason can be divided from choice and action, and more. Many scholars of Aristotle treat both Politics and Generation of Animals as minor works that shouldn’t be consulted for insight into the central questions of Aristotle’s corpus. This book makes the emphatic case that both texts are indeed fertile domains for investigating concerns that pervade his work – a case that Deslauriers supports with wide-ranging references including but not limited to Posterior Analytics, De Anima, Metaphysics, Nicomachean Ethics and Rhetoric. More than drawing together particular pieces of her reading of Aristotle’s view of sexual difference and its place in political life that she has made in other work (for example, that sexual difference is in the matter, not the form), Deslauriers argue for a coherent case of Aristotle’s treatment of female animals and of women citizens across his corpus. This monograph is the work of a scholar who has been thinking over these matters for decades, and it shows. The book is precise in its argumentation and its self-understanding of the stakes: to defend the importance of sexual difference for Aristotle. Deslauriers foresees objections and has replies grounded in specific passages that are not","PeriodicalId":43237,"journal":{"name":"POLIS","volume":"228 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2023-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87199997","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-25DOI: 10.1163/20512996-12340406
Cătălin Enache
At the beginning of Book 9 of the Politeia (571cd), Platon suggests that all people bear in themselves unlawful desires like the desire to have sex with their own mother or with any other human, god, or beast, the desire to murder anyone, or the desire to eat anything. Modern scholars take it for granted that by the desire to eat anything, Platon means cannibalism. This view is based on the fact that Platon discusses unlawful desires in connection with the tyrannical man and that the tyrant is, elsewhere in the Politeia, twice connected with anthropophagy (at 8.565d–566a and 10.619c). This paper challenges this communis opinio and argues that we have no reason to assume that at Politeia 9.571d Platon claims that every one of us has the hidden desire to consume human flesh. Also, the alleged cannibalism of the Platonic tyrant is questioned. A close reading of the passages 8.565d–566a and 10.619c reveals that in the depiction of the tyrant Platon makes use of mythological motifs and literary topoi but never literally claims that the tyrant has cannibalistic desires.
{"title":"Did Platon (Politeia 571d) Believe That Every One of Us Is a Repressed Cannibal?","authors":"Cătălin Enache","doi":"10.1163/20512996-12340406","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/20512996-12340406","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000At the beginning of Book 9 of the Politeia (571cd), Platon suggests that all people bear in themselves unlawful desires like the desire to have sex with their own mother or with any other human, god, or beast, the desire to murder anyone, or the desire to eat anything. Modern scholars take it for granted that by the desire to eat anything, Platon means cannibalism. This view is based on the fact that Platon discusses unlawful desires in connection with the tyrannical man and that the tyrant is, elsewhere in the Politeia, twice connected with anthropophagy (at 8.565d–566a and 10.619c). This paper challenges this communis opinio and argues that we have no reason to assume that at Politeia 9.571d Platon claims that every one of us has the hidden desire to consume human flesh. Also, the alleged cannibalism of the Platonic tyrant is questioned. A close reading of the passages 8.565d–566a and 10.619c reveals that in the depiction of the tyrant Platon makes use of mythological motifs and literary topoi but never literally claims that the tyrant has cannibalistic desires.","PeriodicalId":43237,"journal":{"name":"POLIS","volume":"26 2 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2023-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80286153","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-25DOI: 10.1163/20512996-12340404
Ryan K. Balot
Scholars generally agree that, according to Aristotle, factionalizers are motivated by a sense of injustice (the ‘first cause’) to redress imbalances in wealth and honor (the ‘second cause’). Recent discussions, however, have offered a misleading interpretation of Aristotle’s third cause, which he identifies as the origin of the factionalizers’ sense of injustice. It involves, most importantly, greed, hubris, and other factors such as fear and ‘disproportionate growth’. In conversation with a recent publication in Polis, this article restores the third cause to its proper place in Aristotle’s account. Abusive power holders, driven by greed, hubris, and overreaching, oppress their fellow citizens – following in the tradition of Homer’s Agamemnon, Hesiod’s basileis, and Solon’s aristocrats. These power holders prompt a sense of anger, indignation, and injustice in their fellow citizens, who ultimately form factions and take action on their own behalf.
{"title":"Greed, Outrage, and Civil Conflict in Aristotle’s Politics","authors":"Ryan K. Balot","doi":"10.1163/20512996-12340404","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/20512996-12340404","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000Scholars generally agree that, according to Aristotle, factionalizers are motivated by a sense of injustice (the ‘first cause’) to redress imbalances in wealth and honor (the ‘second cause’). Recent discussions, however, have offered a misleading interpretation of Aristotle’s third cause, which he identifies as the origin of the factionalizers’ sense of injustice. It involves, most importantly, greed, hubris, and other factors such as fear and ‘disproportionate growth’. In conversation with a recent publication in Polis, this article restores the third cause to its proper place in Aristotle’s account. Abusive power holders, driven by greed, hubris, and overreaching, oppress their fellow citizens – following in the tradition of Homer’s Agamemnon, Hesiod’s basileis, and Solon’s aristocrats. These power holders prompt a sense of anger, indignation, and injustice in their fellow citizens, who ultimately form factions and take action on their own behalf.","PeriodicalId":43237,"journal":{"name":"POLIS","volume":"322 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2023-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76116288","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-25DOI: 10.1163/20512996-12340408
Héctor Paleo-Paz
The following paper offers a study on how contestation over the meaning of language forged the political ideology present in the second of the Epistulae ad Caesarem. ‘Ideology’ being a notoriously malleable concept, Michael Freeden’s theoretical approach is used to focus what it means, how it is manifested in the sources, and how it can be located and analysed. The political thought of the Late Republic is studied by examining the vocabulary contained in one of the disputed letters that Sallust addressed to Julius Caesar. Taking libertas as a case study of an ‘essentially contested concept’, the relation between language, meaning and ideology is dissected, outlining the morphological configuration that underlies the second Epistula. It is argued that the resulting array of political arguments is one iteration of what has been called popularis ideology.
{"title":"‘What’s in a Name?’ Ideology and Language in the Epistulae ad Caesarem","authors":"Héctor Paleo-Paz","doi":"10.1163/20512996-12340408","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/20512996-12340408","url":null,"abstract":"The following paper offers a study on how contestation over the meaning of language forged the political ideology present in the second of the Epistulae ad Caesarem. ‘Ideology’ being a notoriously malleable concept, Michael Freeden’s theoretical approach is used to focus what it means, how it is manifested in the sources, and how it can be located and analysed. The political thought of the Late Republic is studied by examining the vocabulary contained in one of the disputed letters that Sallust addressed to Julius Caesar. Taking libertas as a case study of an ‘essentially contested concept’, the relation between language, meaning and ideology is dissected, outlining the morphological configuration that underlies the second Epistula. It is argued that the resulting array of political arguments is one iteration of what has been called popularis ideology.","PeriodicalId":43237,"journal":{"name":"POLIS","volume":"103 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2023-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85851757","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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