“The A2 is Light,” Schelling explains to us in the Presentation of My System of Philosophy (1801) (SW 4, 151). Is such a statement meaningful, so that its truth value can be asked? Is it an empirical statement, which can be tested and possibly confirmed through observations? Or is it a synthetic a priori judgment independent of observations? Such questions are not easy to answer, and they are related to the logical status of Schelling’s theory as a whole. That such questions became important stems from the peculiarity of the philosophical systems that were developed in Jena after 1800. They were called “systems of absolute idealism,” but it is not clear what this means. These systems include not only Schelling’s but also Hegel’s and Krause’s. In the following, some commonalities, as well as specific particularities, of these systems will be examined in more detail from the standpoint of methodology.
{"title":"Remarks on the Conceptions of Philosophical Method of Schelling, Hegel, and Krause","authors":"Peter Rohs","doi":"10.24204/ejpr.2022.3694","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.2022.3694","url":null,"abstract":"“The A2 is Light,” Schelling explains to us in the Presentation of My System of Philosophy (1801) (SW 4, 151). Is such a statement meaningful, so that its truth value can be asked? Is it an empirical statement, which can be tested and possibly confirmed through observations? Or is it a synthetic a priori judgment independent of observations? Such questions are not easy to answer, and they are related to the logical status of Schelling’s theory as a whole. \u0000That such questions became important stems from the peculiarity of the philosophical systems that were developed in Jena after 1800. They were called “systems of absolute idealism,” but it is not clear what this means. These systems include not only Schelling’s but also Hegel’s and Krause’s. In the following, some commonalities, as well as specific particularities, of these systems will be examined in more detail from the standpoint of methodology.","PeriodicalId":43251,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Religion","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44737621","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I express some reservations about Hart and Hill's attempt to show that certain Scriptural passages show that God sometimes intends that sins occur, though I express sympathy for the view that God sometimes intends that sins occur.
{"title":"Does God Ever Intend Sins to Occur?","authors":"Christena F. Hughes","doi":"10.24204/ejpr.2022.3645","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.2022.3645","url":null,"abstract":"I express some reservations about Hart and Hill's attempt to show that certain Scriptural passages show that God sometimes intends that sins occur, though I express sympathy for the view that God sometimes intends that sins occur.","PeriodicalId":43251,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Religion","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47763247","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Review of: Julian Perlmutter, \"Sacred Music, Religious Desire and Knowledge of God: The Music of Human Longing\"","authors":"Joshua Cockayne","doi":"10.24204/ejpr.2022.3822","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.2022.3822","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:p>-</jats:p>","PeriodicalId":43251,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Religion","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43174375","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Krause’s philosophy deserves to be memorized as the first link in a chain of thinking on animal rights that is still on the way today. Though Krause was not the first to talk of animal rights in the history of animal ethics, his theory of animal rights is pathbreaking in embedding a conception of animal rights in an all-encompassing metaphysical system. The essay situates Krause’s theory of animal rights in the framework of his general theory of rights and points to the challenges Krause’s theory faces by the inevitability of trade-offs between animal and human rights.
{"title":"Karl Christian Friedrich Krause On Animal Rights","authors":"Dieter Birnbacher","doi":"10.24204/ejpr.2022.3590","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.2022.3590","url":null,"abstract":"Krause’s philosophy deserves to be memorized as the first link in a chain of thinking on animal rights that is still on the way today. Though Krause was not the first to talk of animal rights in the history of animal ethics, his theory of animal rights is pathbreaking in embedding a conception of animal rights in an all-encompassing metaphysical system. The essay situates Krause’s theory of animal rights in the framework of his general theory of rights and points to the challenges Krause’s theory faces by the inevitability of trade-offs between animal and human rights.","PeriodicalId":43251,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Religion","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48189950","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Karl Christian Friedrich Krause (1781-1832) and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) are two representatives of German Idealism, both of whom developed impressing category systems. At the core of both systems is the question of the relation of the Absolute to its determinations and the determinations of finite beings. Both idealists try to deduce their respective category systems from the immediacy of the Absolute. Both use combinatorial methods to get from known to new categories or constellations in the system, which then unfold in the world (in creation, in world history etc.). Krause is thereby considered the eponym of so-called panentheism, the doctrine that “Everything is in God.” Hegel is also often referred to as a panentheist. Through a (necessarily superficial) comparison of the two systems of categories, in this essay the thesis will be advocated that Hegel was in no sense a panentheist. Krause is and remains the gold standard of panentheism.
{"title":"Panentheism and the Combinatorics of the Determinations of the Absolute","authors":"Ruben Schneider","doi":"10.24204/ejpr.2022.3080","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.2022.3080","url":null,"abstract":"Karl Christian Friedrich Krause (1781-1832) and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) are two representatives of German Idealism, both of whom developed impressing category systems. At the core of both systems is the question of the relation of the Absolute to its determinations and the determinations of finite beings. Both idealists try to deduce their respective category systems from the immediacy of the Absolute. Both use combinatorial methods to get from known to new categories or constellations in the system, which then unfold in the world (in creation, in world history etc.). Krause is thereby considered the eponym of so-called panentheism, the doctrine that “Everything is in God.” Hegel is also often referred to as a panentheist. Through a (necessarily superficial) comparison of the two systems of categories, in this essay the thesis will be advocated that Hegel was in no sense a panentheist. Krause is and remains the gold standard of panentheism.","PeriodicalId":43251,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Religion","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49395785","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
With this article, I seek to examine Krause’s analysis of the self in Analitische Philosophie, and in particular in Vorlesungen über die Psychische Anthropologie (1836/1848). But I do so through the texts that the Spanish Krausists devoted either to translating or to discussing and disseminating Krause’s ideas in dialogue with the philosophies of the time. In my exposition and examination of the doctrine of the self, I focus on its embedding in a particular existence through embodiment, and argue that these are aspects with which Krausism can still illuminate the debate about human subjectivity.
{"title":"The Embodied and Embedded Self in Krause’s Analytische Philosophie as Translated and Explained by the Spanish Krausists","authors":"Daniel Rueda Garrido","doi":"10.24204/ejpr.2022.3661","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.2022.3661","url":null,"abstract":"With this article, I seek to examine Krause’s analysis of the self in Analitische Philosophie, and in particular in Vorlesungen über die Psychische Anthropologie (1836/1848). But I do so through the texts that the Spanish Krausists devoted either to translating or to discussing and disseminating Krause’s ideas in dialogue with the philosophies of the time. In my exposition and examination of the doctrine of the self, I focus on its embedding in a particular existence through embodiment, and argue that these are aspects with which Krausism can still illuminate the debate about human subjectivity.","PeriodicalId":43251,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Religion","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46240137","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Philosophy of religion is dominated by Christianity and by Christians. This, in conjunction with the historically anti-LGBTQIA bent of Christian thinking, has resulted in the exclusion of less dominant and often marginalized perspectives, including queer ones. This essay charts a normative direction for Christian philosophers and for philosophy of religion, a subfield they dominate. First, given some of the unique ways Christian philosophy and philosophers have unjustly harmed queers, Christian philosophers as a group have a responsibility to communities their group has oppressed to prioritize the interests of the oppressed. Second, Christian philosophers must prioritize queer voices by creating or furthering academic space (e.g., at conferences, in journals and books, and in academic posts) for those who publicly and professionally identify as queer. Third, Christian philosophers must mitigate their criticisms of queers and queerness where such criticisms would undermine their efforts toward compensatory/reparative justice.
{"title":"Queer Advice to Christian Philosophers","authors":"Blake Hereth","doi":"10.24204/ejpr.2022.3291","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.2022.3291","url":null,"abstract":"Philosophy of religion is dominated by Christianity and by Christians. This, in conjunction with the historically anti-LGBTQIA bent of Christian thinking, has resulted in the exclusion of less dominant and often marginalized perspectives, including queer ones. This essay charts a normative direction for Christian philosophers and for philosophy of religion, a subfield they dominate. First, given some of the unique ways Christian philosophy and philosophers have unjustly harmed queers, Christian philosophers as a group have a responsibility to communities their group has oppressed to prioritize the interests of the oppressed. Second, Christian philosophers must prioritize queer voices by creating or furthering academic space (e.g., at conferences, in journals and books, and in academic posts) for those who publicly and professionally identify as queer. Third, Christian philosophers must mitigate their criticisms of queers and queerness where such criticisms would undermine their efforts toward compensatory/reparative justice.","PeriodicalId":43251,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Religion","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48315905","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Recently, we co-edited a volume of essays (Draper & Schellenberg 2017) dedicated to the proposition that our field, the philosophy of religion, is not all that it could be. The new set of essays we’re joining here shows that this sentiment is, at the least, not going away. That’s encouraging, but how can we get beyond sentiment? In this our own essay we hope to do so by focusing very precisely and persuasively on problems and solutions: on why our field needs renewal and how to achieve it. More specifically, we hope to get every reader to recognize and accept at least one problem from the range of problems in the field as it exists today that we propose to identify, and to select for special thought and supportive effort at least one solution from the range of solutions we’ll be promoting. Let’s adjust that slightly: one extra problem and one extra solution – for we’re going to start by setting the right mood with some thoughts about a very basic problem/solution pair that we should all be able to recognize/support.
{"title":"The Why and the How of Renewal in Philosophy of Religion","authors":"P. Draper, J. Schellenberg","doi":"10.24204/ejpr.2022.3289","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.2022.3289","url":null,"abstract":"Recently, we co-edited a volume of essays (Draper & Schellenberg 2017) dedicated to the proposition that our field, the philosophy of religion, is not all that it could be. The new set of essays we’re joining here shows that this sentiment is, at the least, not going away. That’s encouraging, but how can we get beyond sentiment? In this our own essay we hope to do so by focusing very precisely and persuasively on problems and solutions: on why our field needs renewal and how to achieve it. More specifically, we hope to get every reader to recognize and accept at least one problem from the range of problems in the field as it exists today that we propose to identify, and to select for special thought and supportive effort at least one solution from the range of solutions we’ll be promoting. Let’s adjust that slightly: one extra problem and one extra solution – for we’re going to start by setting the right mood with some thoughts about a very basic problem/solution pair that we should all be able to recognize/support.","PeriodicalId":43251,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Religion","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44569839","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Cosmological arguments for God typically have two stages. The first stage argues for a first cause or a necessary being, and the second stage argues from there to God. T. Ryan Byerly offers a simple, abductive argument for the second stage where the best explanation for why the being is found to have necessary existence is that it is a perfect being. The reasoning behind this argument is that universal generalizations explain observations of their instances; for example, the universal generalization that all ravens are black explains why some particular raven is observed to be black. Similarly, the fact that a being has all perfections explains why we find the being to have necessary existence. I distinguish between two readings of Byerly’s proposed theistic explanation, and conclude that his explanation does not offer an advantage to the theist in either case.
{"title":"From a Necessary Being to a Perfect Being: A Reply to Byerly","authors":"T. Anderson","doi":"10.24204/ejpr.2022.3446","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.2022.3446","url":null,"abstract":"Cosmological arguments for God typically have two stages. The first stage argues for a first cause or a necessary being, and the second stage argues from there to God. T. Ryan Byerly offers a simple, abductive argument for the second stage where the best explanation for why the being is found to have necessary existence is that it is a perfect being. The reasoning behind this argument is that universal generalizations explain observations of their instances; for example, the universal generalization that all ravens are black explains why some particular raven is observed to be black. Similarly, the fact that a being has all perfections explains why we find the being to have necessary existence. I distinguish between two readings of Byerly’s proposed theistic explanation, and conclude that his explanation does not offer an advantage to the theist in either case.","PeriodicalId":43251,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Religion","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49589933","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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