This study investigates how collaboration between design research and technological philosophy can benefit both fields. More emphasis must be placed on the quality and quantity of philosophical education and its application within the framework of "workmanship philosophy," given the available tools for artistic expression. In expressions instruction, several tactics and approaches should be utilized, and students should be capable of analyzing and comprehending works of art using a variety of approaches. Is it required to utilize philosophical terminology in the illustration of handicraft philosophy? Is it feasible, on the other hand, that philosophical terminology provides a vulnerability for these problems to be examined and multiple answers to be found? Nonetheless, we must be interested in Plato's discourse and the significance of Aristotle's poetics to create even more appealing statements. Instead of emphasizing a complete education in philosophy, art students must learn and comprehend the properties of knowledge that form the foundation of philosophy. This assists in determining the placement and significance of philosophy in speech. Based on three contextual studies employing technology philosophy hypotheses and methodologies in a planning setting, we will explain how these businesses profited from a more reflective viewpoint. Aside from contemplating and debating, one may argue that the Philosophy of Technology is still functioning. As well as technology philosophy with the mind, there is also technology philosophy with the hands. About the prior experimental shift in Philosophy of Technology, we refer to this partnership as the "Useful Approach in Philosophy of Technology." Based on three contextual studies using technology philosophy hypotheses and methods in a planning environment, we will explain how these companies benefited from a more reflective perspective. Other than thinking and discussing, one may claim that the Philosophy of Technology is still active. Technology philosophy with the head, as well as technology philosophy with the hands As a result, we refer to this collaboration as the 'Useful Approach in Philosophy of Technology,' in reference to the preceding experimental turn in Philosophy of Technology.
{"title":"The design turn and its philosophical reflections","authors":"Yuan-Ho Huang","doi":"10.24204/ejpr.2021.3839","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.2021.3839","url":null,"abstract":"This study investigates how collaboration between design research and technological philosophy can benefit both fields. More emphasis must be placed on the quality and quantity of philosophical education and its application within the framework of \"workmanship philosophy,\" given the available tools for artistic expression. In expressions instruction, several tactics and approaches should be utilized, and students should be capable of analyzing and comprehending works of art using a variety of approaches. Is it required to utilize philosophical terminology in the illustration of handicraft philosophy? Is it feasible, on the other hand, that philosophical terminology provides a vulnerability for these problems to be examined and multiple answers to be found? Nonetheless, we must be interested in Plato's discourse and the significance of Aristotle's poetics to create even more appealing statements. Instead of emphasizing a complete education in philosophy, art students must learn and comprehend the properties of knowledge that form the foundation of philosophy. This assists in determining the placement and significance of philosophy in speech.\u0000Based on three contextual studies employing technology philosophy hypotheses and methodologies in a planning setting, we will explain how these businesses profited from a more reflective viewpoint. Aside from contemplating and debating, one may argue that the Philosophy of Technology is still functioning. As well as technology philosophy with the mind, there is also technology philosophy with the hands. About the prior experimental shift in Philosophy of Technology, we refer to this partnership as the \"Useful Approach in Philosophy of Technology.\"\u0000Based on three contextual studies using technology philosophy hypotheses and methods in a planning environment, we will explain how these companies benefited from a more reflective perspective. Other than thinking and discussing, one may claim that the Philosophy of Technology is still active. Technology philosophy with the head, as well as technology philosophy with the hands As a result, we refer to this collaboration as the 'Useful Approach in Philosophy of Technology,' in reference to the preceding experimental turn in Philosophy of Technology.\u0000 ","PeriodicalId":43251,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Religion","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46696244","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In the present study, the emphasis is on Dewey's explanation of experience. Three dimensions, namely Art as Experiences, Psychology, and Democracy & Education, are chosen for this purpose. As an individual in-world experience, the actual world is composed of vibrant, rich experiences. While living is expansive and communal, there is a clear distinction between activity, sensation, and consciousness that permits study and choice. On the other hand, consideration implies a more solitary and abstracted knowledge of the world, with a more significant separation between actions, emotions, and perception. This distinction facilitates a more transparent comprehension of the scope of training. It avoids the traps of retrograde tendencies in the concept of engagement and facilitates the incorporation of imagining into the sphere of involvement. The traditional adult education theory is the antecedent of experiential learning. The fundamental illustration of the system is the four-step experiential learning model developed by David Kolb. Kolb says in his book "Experiential Learning" that this system was created by John Dewey, Kurt Lewin, and Jean Piaget. This article outlines Kolb's approach to constructing models of experiential learning. It focuses on how Kolb presents and implements the John Dewey-developed Ruwinian tradition of activity research to test his concept. Kolb appears to have condensed a corrupt and one-sided technique into a broad learning model, primarily in response to the conference of critics regarding the preparation of Tbunch. Contrast Dewey's notion of reflexive perception and activity with Korbu's interpretation of John Dewey's ideas. Kolb misinterprets Dewey's theory and concludes that the concept of quick and substantial experience in the experiential learning approach is problematic from an epidemiological standpoint. This article uses a hypothesis-based method to address two fundamental difficulties in adult education: experiential learning and the diversion, development, and application of ideas.
{"title":"Writing and Expression: Philosophical Reflections on Art Prompted by Dewey's View of Expression","authors":"Aoran Cui","doi":"10.24204/ejpr.2021.3840","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.2021.3840","url":null,"abstract":"In the present study, the emphasis is on Dewey's explanation of experience. Three dimensions, namely Art as Experiences, Psychology, and Democracy & Education, are chosen for this purpose. As an individual in-world experience, the actual world is composed of vibrant, rich experiences. While living is expansive and communal, there is a clear distinction between activity, sensation, and consciousness that permits study and choice. On the other hand, consideration implies a more solitary and abstracted knowledge of the world, with a more significant separation between actions, emotions, and perception. This distinction facilitates a more transparent comprehension of the scope of training. It avoids the traps of retrograde tendencies in the concept of engagement and facilitates the incorporation of imagining into the sphere of involvement.\u0000The traditional adult education theory is the antecedent of experiential learning. The fundamental illustration of the system is the four-step experiential learning model developed by David Kolb. Kolb says in his book \"Experiential Learning\" that this system was created by John Dewey, Kurt Lewin, and Jean Piaget. This article outlines Kolb's approach to constructing models of experiential learning. It focuses on how Kolb presents and implements the John Dewey-developed Ruwinian tradition of activity research to test his concept. Kolb appears to have condensed a corrupt and one-sided technique into a broad learning model, primarily in response to the conference of critics regarding the preparation of Tbunch. Contrast Dewey's notion of reflexive perception and activity with Korbu's interpretation of John Dewey's ideas. Kolb misinterprets Dewey's theory and concludes that the concept of quick and substantial experience in the experiential learning approach is problematic from an epidemiological standpoint. This article uses a hypothesis-based method to address two fundamental difficulties in adult education: experiential learning and the diversion, development, and application of ideas.\u0000 ","PeriodicalId":43251,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Religion","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41513679","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In recent years the doctrine of divine simplicity has become a topic of interest in the philosophical theological community. In particular, the modal collapse argument against divine simplicity has garnered various responses from proponents of divine simplicity. Some even claiming that the modal collapse argument is invalid. It is our contention that these responses have either misunderstood or misstated the argument, and have thus missed the force of the objection. Our main aim is to clarify what the modal collapse argument in fact says, and explain why the recent responses do not succeed. In order to argue our case, we will proceed in several steps. First, we aim to systematically articulate the doctrine of divine simplicity. Second, articulate the Christian conviction that God is free to create any feasible world or no world at all. Third, argue that divine simplicity suffers a modal collapse and thus undermines God's freedom. Fourth, respond to potential objections to modal collapse. Fifth, we offer some concluding remarks.
{"title":"Divine Simplicity and Modal Collapse: A Persistent Problem","authors":"R. Mullins, Shannon Byrd","doi":"10.24204/ejpr.2022.3414","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.2022.3414","url":null,"abstract":"In recent years the doctrine of divine simplicity has become a topic of interest in the philosophical theological community. In particular, the modal collapse argument against divine simplicity has garnered various responses from proponents of divine simplicity. Some even claiming that the modal collapse argument is invalid. It is our contention that these responses have either misunderstood or misstated the argument, and have thus missed the force of the objection. Our main aim is to clarify what the modal collapse argument in fact says, and explain why the recent responses do not succeed. In order to argue our case, we will proceed in several steps. First, we aim to systematically articulate the doctrine of divine simplicity. Second, articulate the Christian conviction that God is free to create any feasible world or no world at all. Third, argue that divine simplicity suffers a modal collapse and thus undermines God's freedom. Fourth, respond to potential objections to modal collapse. Fifth, we offer some concluding remarks.","PeriodicalId":43251,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Religion","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44941437","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The German philosopher K.C.F. Krause (1781–1832) found deep conceptual parallels between his panentheistic system and the Indian philosophy of Vedānta. This article critically examines Krause’s understanding of Vedānta and popular Hindu religion. I argue that while Krause was correct in viewing the mystical panentheistic doctrine of Vedānta as a precursor to his own philosophy, he was also frequently misled by unreliable translations and secondary texts. Krause, I suggest, was mistaken in characterizing the Hindu practice of image worship as “polytheism” and “idolatry,” and I contend, from a Vedāntic standpoint, that Krause’s denial of the divinity of Jesus is inconsistent with his own panentheistic metaphysics.
{"title":"Panentheism and the “Most Nonsensical Superstition” of Polytheism","authors":"S. Medhananda","doi":"10.24204/ejpr.2022.3638","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.2022.3638","url":null,"abstract":"The German philosopher K.C.F. Krause (1781–1832) found deep conceptual parallels between his panentheistic system and the Indian philosophy of Vedānta. This article critically examines Krause’s understanding of Vedānta and popular Hindu religion. I argue that while Krause was correct in viewing the mystical panentheistic doctrine of Vedānta as a precursor to his own philosophy, he was also frequently misled by unreliable translations and secondary texts. Krause, I suggest, was mistaken in characterizing the Hindu practice of image worship as “polytheism” and “idolatry,” and I contend, from a Vedāntic standpoint, that Krause’s denial of the divinity of Jesus is inconsistent with his own panentheistic metaphysics.","PeriodicalId":43251,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Religion","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46300738","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In a time which it is not amiss to term “the Dark Ages of logic”, Karl Christian Friedrich Krause stayed not only true to logic but actually did something for its advancement. Besides making systematic use of Venn-diagrams long before Venn, Krause — once more taking his inspiration from Leibniz — propounded what appears to be the first completely symbolic systematic representation of logical forms, strongly suggestive of the powerful symbolic languages that have become the mainstay of logic since the beginning of the 20th century. However, Krause’s limits in logic are also clearly visible: Krause’s method in logic is, in the main, not axiomatic; it is combinatorial (in other words, it consists in systematically producing finite lists of logical laws, following some organizational principle). More importantly, Krause remained entirely within the confines of traditional syllogistics (his flirt with “quantification of the predicate” notwithstanding), neglecting propositional logic and, of course, first-order relational terms.
{"title":"K. C. F. Krause: The Combinatorian as Logician","authors":"U. Meixner","doi":"10.24204/ejpr.2022.3589","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.2022.3589","url":null,"abstract":"In a time which it is not amiss to term “the Dark Ages of logic”, Karl Christian Friedrich Krause stayed not only true to logic but actually did something for its advancement. Besides making systematic use of Venn-diagrams long before Venn, Krause — once more taking his inspiration from Leibniz — propounded what appears to be the first completely symbolic systematic representation of logical forms, strongly suggestive of the powerful symbolic languages that have become the mainstay of logic since the beginning of the 20th century. However, Krause’s limits in logic are also clearly visible: Krause’s method in logic is, in the main, not axiomatic; it is combinatorial (in other words, it consists in systematically producing finite lists of logical laws, following some organizational principle). More importantly, Krause remained entirely within the confines of traditional syllogistics (his flirt with “quantification of the predicate” notwithstanding), neglecting propositional logic and, of course, first-order relational terms.","PeriodicalId":43251,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Religion","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47195011","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
All previous solutions to the problem of evil have attempted to resolve the issue by showing that God permits them in order for a greater good. However, some contest that there are some instances in which there is no greater good, while in other cases good and evil have been distributed unjustly. I intend, in this paper, to show that if God compensates the harms of evil in the afterlife, any sort of good is enough to resolve the problem of evil; even if the good is not greater than the evil nor distributed appropriately. To attain this end, I have divided the theory of compensation into a weak and a more effective account. The weak account alleges that the goodness of evils is merely based upon their compensation in the afterlife. I have proposed, in this article, a new, strong account of this theory, which considers both primary goods of evils and afterlife compensation as combined elements that can justify evils. After distinguishing the weak and strong versions of compensation, the idea is explained, and the advantages of the theory are pointed out. Finally, there are two chief objections raised against the validity of this theory, both have been mentioned and answered in this paper.
{"title":"Theory of Compensation and Problem of Evil; a New Defense","authors":"Seyyed Jaaber Mousavirad","doi":"10.24204/ejpr.2022.3357","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.2022.3357","url":null,"abstract":" All previous solutions to the problem of evil have attempted to resolve the issue by showing that God permits them in order for a greater good. However, some contest that there are some instances in which there is no greater good, while in other cases good and evil have been distributed unjustly. I intend, in this paper, to show that if God compensates the harms of evil in the afterlife, any sort of good is enough to resolve the problem of evil; even if the good is not greater than the evil nor distributed appropriately. To attain this end, I have divided the theory of compensation into a weak and a more effective account. The weak account alleges that the goodness of evils is merely based upon their compensation in the afterlife. I have proposed, in this article, a new, strong account of this theory, which considers both primary goods of evils and afterlife compensation as combined elements that can justify evils. After distinguishing the weak and strong versions of compensation, the idea is explained, and the advantages of the theory are pointed out. Finally, there are two chief objections raised against the validity of this theory, both have been mentioned and answered in this paper.","PeriodicalId":43251,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Religion","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43682672","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The divine purpose theory (DPT)—according to which that human life is meaningful to the extent that it fulfills some purpose or plan to which God has directed us—encounters well-known Euthyphro problems. Some theists attempt to avoid these problems by appealing to God’s essential goodness, à la the modified divine command theory (DCT) of Adams and Alston. However, recent criticisms of the modified DCT show its conception of God’s goodness to be incoherent; and these criticisms can be shown to present an analogous set of problems for the DPT. Further, the argument can be extended to any account of meaningfulness according to which the value of what humans do can only be conferred by God. Thus, it would seem that there is no tenable version of the view that meaningfulness is conferred on human life by some act or attitude of God’s.
{"title":"God’s Goodness, Divine Purpose, and the Meaning of Life","authors":"J. Koons","doi":"10.24204/ejpr.2022.3410","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.2022.3410","url":null,"abstract":"The divine purpose theory (DPT)—according to which that human life is meaningful to the extent that it fulfills some purpose or plan to which God has directed us—encounters well-known Euthyphro problems. Some theists attempt to avoid these problems by appealing to God’s essential goodness, à la the modified divine command theory (DCT) of Adams and Alston. However, recent criticisms of the modified DCT show its conception of God’s goodness to be incoherent; and these criticisms can be shown to present an analogous set of problems for the DPT. Further, the argument can be extended to any account of meaningfulness according to which the value of what humans do can only be conferred by God. Thus, it would seem that there is no tenable version of the view that meaningfulness is conferred on human life by some act or attitude of God’s.","PeriodicalId":43251,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Religion","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43246532","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper deals with the concept of religiousness and religion in the context of Krause´s panentheist metaphysics, understood as a life of union, as intimacy of and with God, particularly on the part of human beings and also in relation to the rest of the existing. An evolutionary review of this conception of religion is undertaken throughout Krause´s work, and the program of a philosophy of religion is traced, which, besides a metaphysical and anthropological substantiation, would address an understanding of the history of religions and especially of Christianity, proposing a vision of reciprocal illumination between religion, knowledge, feeling and morality, as well as the possibility of an appealing notion of religious freedom, the hallmark of Krausism in its historical development.
{"title":"Intimacy with God: K. Ch. Fr. Krause´s Philosophy of Religion","authors":"Ricardo Pinilla Burgos","doi":"10.24204/ejpr.2022.3723","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.2022.3723","url":null,"abstract":"This paper deals with the concept of religiousness and religion in the context of Krause´s panentheist metaphysics, understood as a life of union, as intimacy of and with God, particularly on the part of human beings and also in relation to the rest of the existing. An evolutionary review of this conception of religion is undertaken throughout Krause´s work, and the program of a philosophy of religion is traced, which, besides a metaphysical and anthropological substantiation, would address an understanding of the history of religions and especially of Christianity, proposing a vision of reciprocal illumination between religion, knowledge, feeling and morality, as well as the possibility of an appealing notion of religious freedom, the hallmark of Krausism in its historical development. ","PeriodicalId":43251,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Religion","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46683160","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Karl Christian Friedrich Krause (1781-1832) left an impressive oeuvre consisting of 256 books and articles, covering numerous branches of philosophy, the humanities, and science.[1] His Urbild der Menschheit, his Vorlesungen über das System der Philosophie and his Vorlesungen über die Grundwahrheiten der Wissenschaft are of particular pertinence for philosophers today. [1] See: E. M. Ureña and E. Fuchs, “Einführung in das Gesamtwerk”, in Karl Christian Friedrich Krause. Band 1: Entwurf des Systems der Philosophie, ed. T. Bach and O. Breidbach (frommann-holzboog, 2007) .
卡尔·克里斯蒂安·弗里德里希·克劳斯(1781-1832)留下了一部令人印象深刻的作品,包括256本书和文章,涵盖了哲学、人文科学和科学的许多分支。[1] 他的人性原型,他关于哲学体系的讲座和他关于科学基本真理的讲座对今天的哲学家来说特别有针对性。[1] 见:E.M.Ureña和E.Fuchs,“Einführung in das Gesamtwerk”,载于Karl Christian Friedrich Krause。第一卷:哲学体系的设计,T.Bach和O.Breidbach编辑(fromman-holzboog,2007)。
{"title":"Introduction: The Philosophy and Theology of Karl Christian Friedrich Krause","authors":"B. Göcke, C. Dierksmeier, Ricardo Pinilla Burgos","doi":"10.24204/ejpr.2022.3789","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.2022.3789","url":null,"abstract":"Karl Christian Friedrich Krause (1781-1832) left an impressive oeuvre consisting of 256 books and articles, covering numerous branches of philosophy, the humanities, and science.[1] His Urbild der Menschheit, his Vorlesungen über das System der Philosophie and his Vorlesungen über die Grundwahrheiten der Wissenschaft are of particular pertinence for philosophers today. \u0000 \u0000[1] See: E. M. Ureña and E. Fuchs, “Einführung in das Gesamtwerk”, in Karl Christian Friedrich Krause. Band 1: Entwurf des Systems der Philosophie, ed. T. Bach and O. Breidbach (frommann-holzboog, 2007) .","PeriodicalId":43251,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Religion","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44485371","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
There are striking parallels between current capability theories and the moral philosophy of Karl Christian Friedrich Krause (1781–1832). This article reconstructs central arguments of Krause’s ethics and correlates them with passages from the works of Martha Nussbaum, showing that such similarities extend not only to what, substantially, is being professed in either philosophy but also, procedurally, to the question of how the respective moral conclusions are reached. As Krause correlates responsibility with capability, the article begins with an examination of Krause’s idea of human — as compared to animal — freedom and their respective normative implications. Next, the argument is extended to the social responsibilities of personal freedom, before widening the scope to the cosmopolitan plane. The paper then briefly examines historical links between Krause and current capability theorists, before concluding.
{"title":"Krause’s Ethics as a Precursor to Capability Theory","authors":"C. Dierksmeier","doi":"10.24204/ejpr.2022.3591","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.2022.3591","url":null,"abstract":"There are striking parallels between current capability theories and the moral philosophy of Karl Christian Friedrich Krause (1781–1832). This article reconstructs central arguments of Krause’s ethics and correlates them with passages from the works of Martha Nussbaum, showing that such similarities extend not only to what, substantially, is being professed in either philosophy but also, procedurally, to the question of how the respective moral conclusions are reached. As Krause correlates responsibility with capability, the article begins with an examination of Krause’s idea of human — as compared to animal — freedom and their respective normative implications. Next, the argument is extended to the social responsibilities of personal freedom, before widening the scope to the cosmopolitan plane. The paper then briefly examines historical links between Krause and current capability theorists, before concluding.","PeriodicalId":43251,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Religion","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68778797","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}