This article examines the attempts at legislation in Ireland made by an elected assembly known as ‘Dáil Éireann’ in the revolutionary years between 1919 and 1922. These attempts at legislation, popularly known as ‘Dáil decrees’, have not been published or used as sources of law since the foundation of the Irish state on 6 December 1922. This analysis builds on a pioneering article on this subject published in 1975 by Brian Farrell and attempts to provide additional information on the final fate of the Dáil decrees. The conclusion argues that the fate of this legislation was not, as has been suggested, dictated by divisions created by the Irish civil war of 1922–23. Instead, this analysis concludes that the Dáil decrees faced insuperable practical barriers that could not be overcome after the foundation of the state in 1922.
{"title":"The Strange Fate of the Dáil Decrees of Revolutionary Ireland, 1919–22","authors":"T. Mohr","doi":"10.1093/slr/hmaa015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/slr/hmaa015","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This article examines the attempts at legislation in Ireland made by an elected assembly known as ‘Dáil Éireann’ in the revolutionary years between 1919 and 1922. These attempts at legislation, popularly known as ‘Dáil decrees’, have not been published or used as sources of law since the foundation of the Irish state on 6 December 1922. This analysis builds on a pioneering article on this subject published in 1975 by Brian Farrell and attempts to provide additional information on the final fate of the Dáil decrees. The conclusion argues that the fate of this legislation was not, as has been suggested, dictated by divisions created by the Irish civil war of 1922–23. Instead, this analysis concludes that the Dáil decrees faced insuperable practical barriers that could not be overcome after the foundation of the state in 1922.","PeriodicalId":43737,"journal":{"name":"Statute Law Review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-10-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/slr/hmaa015","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42093002","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The article examines the interpretation of the word ‘scientist’ under Instrument IMMI 13/056 made pursuant to section 22B(1) of the Citizenship Act. The article considers the literal interpretation of the word scientist and the objective of the Instrument. The article provides a critique of the cases that have gone to the Australian Administrative Appeals Tribunal and argues that the interpretation favoured by the Tribunal is misconceived. The article contends that the Tribunal seems to be giving undue support to an arbitrary or haphazardly serendipitous exercise of ministerial power under the special residence framework in a manner that runs afoul of the tenour of section 22B(1) of the Citizenship Act.
{"title":"Appraising the Interpretation of the Word ‘Scientist’ under the Special Residence Requirements for Australian Citizenship","authors":"O. Owoeye","doi":"10.1093/slr/hmaa016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/slr/hmaa016","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The article examines the interpretation of the word ‘scientist’ under Instrument IMMI 13/056 made pursuant to section 22B(1) of the Citizenship Act. The article considers the literal interpretation of the word scientist and the objective of the Instrument. The article provides a critique of the cases that have gone to the Australian Administrative Appeals Tribunal and argues that the interpretation favoured by the Tribunal is misconceived. The article contends that the Tribunal seems to be giving undue support to an arbitrary or haphazardly serendipitous exercise of ministerial power under the special residence framework in a manner that runs afoul of the tenour of section 22B(1) of the Citizenship Act.","PeriodicalId":43737,"journal":{"name":"Statute Law Review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/slr/hmaa016","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47850037","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Speciesism is a bias that causes humans to accord themselves moral superiority in their dealings with non-humans. When speciesism permeates legislative thought, it leads to statutes that sacrifice the interests of non-humans to those of humans. The Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960 (‘PCA Act’) is no exception. Section 11 of this Act enumerates specific instances that qualify as animal cruelty and prescribes punishment for the same. However, this section is riddled with statutory flaws, some owing their origin to speciesism: inadequate and sweeping punishments, the defective incorporation of the ‘Doctrine of Necessity’, and the limited recognition of cruel acts. This article seeks to analyse each of the aforementioned faults and prescribe solutions which would strengthen the animal welfare regime as a whole. While stressing on broadening the scope of punishable acts under section 11, along with the need for statutory language to reflect ‘severity’ of punishment, the article also argues for differentiated punishment drawn from a consequence-based model which acknowledges the trauma and suffering of the animal. The intention is to prompt a discourse on the ideal drafting of animal welfare legislation.
{"title":"All Bark, No Bite: Section 11 of India’s Animal Welfare Legislation","authors":"Aakarsh Banyal, Atmaram Shelke","doi":"10.1093/slr/hmaa017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/slr/hmaa017","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Speciesism is a bias that causes humans to accord themselves moral superiority in their dealings with non-humans. When speciesism permeates legislative thought, it leads to statutes that sacrifice the interests of non-humans to those of humans. The Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960 (‘PCA Act’) is no exception. Section 11 of this Act enumerates specific instances that qualify as animal cruelty and prescribes punishment for the same. However, this section is riddled with statutory flaws, some owing their origin to speciesism: inadequate and sweeping punishments, the defective incorporation of the ‘Doctrine of Necessity’, and the limited recognition of cruel acts. This article seeks to analyse each of the aforementioned faults and prescribe solutions which would strengthen the animal welfare regime as a whole. While stressing on broadening the scope of punishable acts under section 11, along with the need for statutory language to reflect ‘severity’ of punishment, the article also argues for differentiated punishment drawn from a consequence-based model which acknowledges the trauma and suffering of the animal. The intention is to prompt a discourse on the ideal drafting of animal welfare legislation.","PeriodicalId":43737,"journal":{"name":"Statute Law Review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/slr/hmaa017","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47165263","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This note considers Re: A Company (Injunction to Restrain Presentation of Petition) [2020] EWHC 1406 (Ch) and Travelodge Ltd v Prime Aesthetics Ltd [2020] EWHC 1217 (Ch) in the context of earlier case law and looks at the circumstances in which the courts have shown a willingness to have regard to the likelihood of future legislation
{"title":"Judicial Anticipation of Legislation","authors":"D. Bailey","doi":"10.1093/slr/hmaa014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/slr/hmaa014","url":null,"abstract":"This note considers Re: A Company (Injunction to Restrain Presentation of Petition) [2020] EWHC 1406 (Ch) and Travelodge Ltd v Prime Aesthetics Ltd [2020] EWHC 1217 (Ch) in the context of earlier case law and looks at the circumstances in which the courts have shown a willingness to have regard to the likelihood of future legislation","PeriodicalId":43737,"journal":{"name":"Statute Law Review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-08-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/slr/hmaa014","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43792921","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 (hereinafter referred to as RTE Act) enacted by the Indian Parliament in 2009 has been a kernel of constitutional controversies. There are spate of controversies emerging from polemical provisions under the RTE Act. In this article, the rabid principle slating out free education for children for economically weaker section and disadvantaged category has been dissected in its design, content, function, and perception. The first part of the article explores different state-private welfare function models and locates the 25 per cent reservation clause under the gamut of one of its classifications. The second part of the article evaluates the Formalist and Realist arguments, and while mapping the role played by objective purpose of the education statute, it argues for the suitability of Holmesian approach to interpreting the 25 per cent reservation clause. In the backdrop of the debate between formal interpretation and Holmesian interpretation, the third part of the article sets out the approaches adopted by different High Courts in interpreting 25 per cent reservation clause and argues for adopting a coherent approach across different courts in India. The final part of the article concludes.
{"title":"Interpretive Principles in Reading the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009","authors":"Sushant Chandra","doi":"10.1093/slr/hmaa013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/slr/hmaa013","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 (hereinafter referred to as RTE Act) enacted by the Indian Parliament in 2009 has been a kernel of constitutional controversies. There are spate of controversies emerging from polemical provisions under the RTE Act. In this article, the rabid principle slating out free education for children for economically weaker section and disadvantaged category has been dissected in its design, content, function, and perception. The first part of the article explores different state-private welfare function models and locates the 25 per cent reservation clause under the gamut of one of its classifications. The second part of the article evaluates the Formalist and Realist arguments, and while mapping the role played by objective purpose of the education statute, it argues for the suitability of Holmesian approach to interpreting the 25 per cent reservation clause. In the backdrop of the debate between formal interpretation and Holmesian interpretation, the third part of the article sets out the approaches adopted by different High Courts in interpreting 25 per cent reservation clause and argues for adopting a coherent approach across different courts in India. The final part of the article concludes.","PeriodicalId":43737,"journal":{"name":"Statute Law Review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-07-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/slr/hmaa013","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47841443","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Tomas Girdenis, M. Laurinaitis, Irmantas Rotomskis, R. Jurka
Cases, where operations of legal entities entail unfair income through the malpractice of improving financial reports, are quite frequent. Such behaviour is unacceptable and deserves a stern response from the state, not only against persons involved in illegal activities but also against particular legal entities resorting to such behaviour. The purpose of this article is to analyse the elements of corporate criminal liability in the legislation of Lithuania. The article investigates the fundamentals of corporate criminal liability with the major focus on the problems of distinction and applicability of relevant elements of the latter. The analysis emphasizes the assurance of the inevitability of corporate criminal liability. The article also discusses the method of criminalizing the liability of legal entities, chosen by the Lithuanian legislator, according to which criminal liability can arise only for a limited scope of criminal offences. Presumably, the current legal regulation enables an unreasonable avoidance of criminal liability in cases where the criminal offence falls outside the aforementioned limited scope, even though it was committed to gain a material advantage over the affected party. The article also addresses the guilt of legal entities. In this regard, the article criticizes the approach of the Supreme Court of Lithuania for its evident limitation of corporate criminal liability, especially in the context of large corporations owned by many shareholders. As a possible solution, it was proposed to lay criminal responsibility on corporate governance bodies instead of the shareholders.
{"title":"Corporate Criminal Liability for the Criminal Offences in Lithuania","authors":"Tomas Girdenis, M. Laurinaitis, Irmantas Rotomskis, R. Jurka","doi":"10.1093/slr/hmaa010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/slr/hmaa010","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Cases, where operations of legal entities entail unfair income through the malpractice of improving financial reports, are quite frequent. Such behaviour is unacceptable and deserves a stern response from the state, not only against persons involved in illegal activities but also against particular legal entities resorting to such behaviour. The purpose of this article is to analyse the elements of corporate criminal liability in the legislation of Lithuania. The article investigates the fundamentals of corporate criminal liability with the major focus on the problems of distinction and applicability of relevant elements of the latter. The analysis emphasizes the assurance of the inevitability of corporate criminal liability. The article also discusses the method of criminalizing the liability of legal entities, chosen by the Lithuanian legislator, according to which criminal liability can arise only for a limited scope of criminal offences. Presumably, the current legal regulation enables an unreasonable avoidance of criminal liability in cases where the criminal offence falls outside the aforementioned limited scope, even though it was committed to gain a material advantage over the affected party. The article also addresses the guilt of legal entities. In this regard, the article criticizes the approach of the Supreme Court of Lithuania for its evident limitation of corporate criminal liability, especially in the context of large corporations owned by many shareholders. As a possible solution, it was proposed to lay criminal responsibility on corporate governance bodies instead of the shareholders.","PeriodicalId":43737,"journal":{"name":"Statute Law Review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-07-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/slr/hmaa010","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42984607","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Legislative erosion of basic human rights is not uncommon in Southeast Asia. The Malaysian government’s recent detention of 12 people under Security Offenses (Special Measures) Act 2012 for their alleged links to Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam has renewed extensive calls from civil society groups for its total repealment. It targets security offenses by creating the powers of arrest without warrant followed by pre-charge detention for up to 28 days. It also removes the courts’ exclusive authority of adjudicating bail applications. To evaluate its value and relevance, this article reviews its fundamental operation and specifically looks at how the courts have attempted to interpret its most controversial provision. This article in the end suggests that while there is clearly the need for reforms, the main focus has to be on implementing safeguards that can help avert its misuse while also cautioning against its broad ambit.
{"title":"Arbitrary Detention in Malaysia: Security Offenses (Special Measures) Act 2012","authors":"Eden H B Chua","doi":"10.1093/slr/hmaa011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/slr/hmaa011","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Legislative erosion of basic human rights is not uncommon in Southeast Asia. The Malaysian government’s recent detention of 12 people under Security Offenses (Special Measures) Act 2012 for their alleged links to Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam has renewed extensive calls from civil society groups for its total repealment. It targets security offenses by creating the powers of arrest without warrant followed by pre-charge detention for up to 28 days. It also removes the courts’ exclusive authority of adjudicating bail applications. To evaluate its value and relevance, this article reviews its fundamental operation and specifically looks at how the courts have attempted to interpret its most controversial provision. This article in the end suggests that while there is clearly the need for reforms, the main focus has to be on implementing safeguards that can help avert its misuse while also cautioning against its broad ambit.","PeriodicalId":43737,"journal":{"name":"Statute Law Review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-07-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/slr/hmaa011","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46083414","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Unlike the US First Amendment, Article 19 of the Indian Constitution expressly enumerates eight grounds on which free speech may be restricted. Despite being a fundamental issue of constitutional interpretation, the question of whether Article 19 provides for an exhaustive list of restrictions has largely been neglected in academic literature and Indian jurisprudence. The latest site of contestations on the scope of the free speech clause has been the case of Kaushal Kishor, where the Supreme Court is currently hearing arguments on whether speech can be restricted by invoking fundamental rights beyond Article 19. This Article seeks to develop a principled answer by excavating the meaning of constitutional silences on the relationships between fundamental rights under the Indian Constitution. It argues that a strict textualist approach leads to a distinct form of rights absolutism that is both doctrinally incoherent and inconsistent with Indian jurisprudence. Examining the shift in the Supreme Court’s interpretive outlook from strict textualism to interpretive holism, it finds that the Court’s rich fundamental rights jurisprudence allows importing restrictions on speech from beyond Article 19. Such an approach also provides a meaningful framework for resolving intra-right, inter-right, and right-interest conflicts in the constitutional adjudication of free speech issues.
{"title":"The Sound of Constitutional Silences: Interpretive Holism and Free Speech under Article 19 of the Indian Constitution","authors":"R. Kohli","doi":"10.1093/slr/hmaa012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/slr/hmaa012","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Unlike the US First Amendment, Article 19 of the Indian Constitution expressly enumerates eight grounds on which free speech may be restricted. Despite being a fundamental issue of constitutional interpretation, the question of whether Article 19 provides for an exhaustive list of restrictions has largely been neglected in academic literature and Indian jurisprudence. The latest site of contestations on the scope of the free speech clause has been the case of Kaushal Kishor, where the Supreme Court is currently hearing arguments on whether speech can be restricted by invoking fundamental rights beyond Article 19. This Article seeks to develop a principled answer by excavating the meaning of constitutional silences on the relationships between fundamental rights under the Indian Constitution. It argues that a strict textualist approach leads to a distinct form of rights absolutism that is both doctrinally incoherent and inconsistent with Indian jurisprudence. Examining the shift in the Supreme Court’s interpretive outlook from strict textualism to interpretive holism, it finds that the Court’s rich fundamental rights jurisprudence allows importing restrictions on speech from beyond Article 19. Such an approach also provides a meaningful framework for resolving intra-right, inter-right, and right-interest conflicts in the constitutional adjudication of free speech issues.","PeriodicalId":43737,"journal":{"name":"Statute Law Review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/slr/hmaa012","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45159993","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In a time where many constitutions are as frequently amended as ordinary statutes, purposive constitutional interpretation is both commonplace and normatively justifiable. However, as recent Singaporean decisions demonstrate, a common purpose-related problem arising in statutory interpretation—the existence of conflicting purposes at different levels of abstraction—takes on an additional dimension of complexity in constitutional interpretation. While courts prefer specific over general purposes in statutory interpretation, on grounds that this upholds Parliament’s most precise intent, they hesitate to consistently do the same in constitutional interpretation. This article rationalizes this difference between statutory and constitutional interpretation, taking as its point of departure a unique dual function that all constitutions, even oft-amended constitutions, must discharge: the creation of efficient government and the legitimation of political systems. It develops a dual approach to constitutional interpretation in response to this dual function, which requires courts to prefer specific over general constitutional purposes in the event of conflict, except when those general purposes reflect norms which legitimate the constitution in society’s eyes. In doing so, this article develops an understanding of purposive constitutional interpretation that preserves a constitution’s essence, while accommodating the reality of frequent amendments.
{"title":"Interpreting Frequently Amended Constitutions: Singapore’s Dual Approach","authors":"Marcus Teo","doi":"10.1093/slr/hmaa009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/slr/hmaa009","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In a time where many constitutions are as frequently amended as ordinary statutes, purposive constitutional interpretation is both commonplace and normatively justifiable. However, as recent Singaporean decisions demonstrate, a common purpose-related problem arising in statutory interpretation—the existence of conflicting purposes at different levels of abstraction—takes on an additional dimension of complexity in constitutional interpretation. While courts prefer specific over general purposes in statutory interpretation, on grounds that this upholds Parliament’s most precise intent, they hesitate to consistently do the same in constitutional interpretation. This article rationalizes this difference between statutory and constitutional interpretation, taking as its point of departure a unique dual function that all constitutions, even oft-amended constitutions, must discharge: the creation of efficient government and the legitimation of political systems. It develops a dual approach to constitutional interpretation in response to this dual function, which requires courts to prefer specific over general constitutional purposes in the event of conflict, except when those general purposes reflect norms which legitimate the constitution in society’s eyes. In doing so, this article develops an understanding of purposive constitutional interpretation that preserves a constitution’s essence, while accommodating the reality of frequent amendments.","PeriodicalId":43737,"journal":{"name":"Statute Law Review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/slr/hmaa009","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43644260","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Legislation by Wishful Thinking","authors":"D. Greenberg","doi":"10.1093/slr/hmaa008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/slr/hmaa008","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43737,"journal":{"name":"Statute Law Review","volume":"41 1","pages":"5-7"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/slr/hmaa008","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42763473","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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