Abstract This article examines comparatively approaches in Hong Kong and English law on powers created by the use of subordinate legislations to combat the COVID-19 pandemic from the perspectives of legislative drafting and statutory interpretation. These powers, being wide and flexible in nature, pose a tension between two competing concerns. On the one hand, they enable law enforcement officers to be able to deal with the unique challenges posed by a public health crisis. On the other hand, they pose the potential to restrict fundamental human rights disproportionately. This article will proceed in three parts. First, the article will analyse the responsibilities of drafters in drafting subordinate legislations and the techniques therein; the discussion will be contextualized within a need for urgent public health responses to combat the pandemic. Second, the powers conferred upon law enforcement officers and restrictions on individual liberty under Hong Kong law and English law will be analysed. Third, approaches to interpreting the relevant legislations under the two jurisdictions will be examined. It will be argued that despite the need to confer wide and flexible powers to the executive to combat the pandemic, specificity of language and precision in articulating these powers remain of cardinal and overarching importance.
{"title":"Comparative Reflections on COVID-19 Responses: Drafting, Powers, and Interpretation","authors":"Thomas Yeon","doi":"10.1093/slr/hmab009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/slr/hmab009","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article examines comparatively approaches in Hong Kong and English law on powers created by the use of subordinate legislations to combat the COVID-19 pandemic from the perspectives of legislative drafting and statutory interpretation. These powers, being wide and flexible in nature, pose a tension between two competing concerns. On the one hand, they enable law enforcement officers to be able to deal with the unique challenges posed by a public health crisis. On the other hand, they pose the potential to restrict fundamental human rights disproportionately. This article will proceed in three parts. First, the article will analyse the responsibilities of drafters in drafting subordinate legislations and the techniques therein; the discussion will be contextualized within a need for urgent public health responses to combat the pandemic. Second, the powers conferred upon law enforcement officers and restrictions on individual liberty under Hong Kong law and English law will be analysed. Third, approaches to interpreting the relevant legislations under the two jurisdictions will be examined. It will be argued that despite the need to confer wide and flexible powers to the executive to combat the pandemic, specificity of language and precision in articulating these powers remain of cardinal and overarching importance.","PeriodicalId":43737,"journal":{"name":"Statute Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2021-03-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/slr/hmab009","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44889061","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Enacted to regulate the incubus of organized crime, India’s Prevention of Money Laundering Act has quickly degenerated into interpretative chaos, with conflicting judicial opinions straining its otherwise sound provisions. Instead of chastening statutory mercuriality, close to eleven amendments to the Act have only fuelled incertitude further. The most damaging feature of the PMLA’s disarray is that the interpretive conflict eclipses the most basic punitive machinery of the Act. Part 2 of the article clarifies the relationship between the offence of money laundering and its predicate offences in the realm of how the latter ought to influence property attachment and prosecution proceedings for the former. Part 3 dissects the complication of Indian Criminal Procedure’s applicability to investigations under the PMLA and proposes an inventive two-step enquiry to determine the extent of said applicability in view of the provisions of both statutes. Part 4 chronicles the peculiar acquiescence of some Indian courts in not insisting upon furnishing written grounds of arrest to a detenu and explains why that jurisprudential course deserves to be abandoned. Lastly, Part 5 addresses the topical disputation of the effect of recent amendments on the potential revival of sui generis bail conditions under the PMLA that had previously been declared unconstitutional. The article presents a syncretism of recommended interpretative paths that the judiciary must take to remedy the recognized flaws.
{"title":"PMLA 2002’s Gremlins: Anatomizing the Labyrinth of Recent Amendments and Precedent","authors":"Jaideep Singh Lalli, N. Garg","doi":"10.1093/SLR/HMAB002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/SLR/HMAB002","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Enacted to regulate the incubus of organized crime, India’s Prevention of Money Laundering Act has quickly degenerated into interpretative chaos, with conflicting judicial opinions straining its otherwise sound provisions. Instead of chastening statutory mercuriality, close to eleven amendments to the Act have only fuelled incertitude further. The most damaging feature of the PMLA’s disarray is that the interpretive conflict eclipses the most basic punitive machinery of the Act. Part 2 of the article clarifies the relationship between the offence of money laundering and its predicate offences in the realm of how the latter ought to influence property attachment and prosecution proceedings for the former. Part 3 dissects the complication of Indian Criminal Procedure’s applicability to investigations under the PMLA and proposes an inventive two-step enquiry to determine the extent of said applicability in view of the provisions of both statutes. Part 4 chronicles the peculiar acquiescence of some Indian courts in not insisting upon furnishing written grounds of arrest to a detenu and explains why that jurisprudential course deserves to be abandoned. Lastly, Part 5 addresses the topical disputation of the effect of recent amendments on the potential revival of sui generis bail conditions under the PMLA that had previously been declared unconstitutional. The article presents a syncretism of recommended interpretative paths that the judiciary must take to remedy the recognized flaws.","PeriodicalId":43737,"journal":{"name":"Statute Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2021-02-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/SLR/HMAB002","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46989774","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Manifest Arbitrariness Doctrine is perhaps the most important legal development of the decade for India. It is a standard that includes anything done by the legislature capriciously, irrationally and/or without adequate determining principle, excessively or disproportionately. It is being increasingly used to strike down plenary legislation under Article 14. However, there is no clarity on its application, and no literature addressing the same. Without this clarity, law-makers may inadvertently pass legislations that fail the test; and adjudicators may fail to determine when the legislations fail the test. More importantly, the Doctrine may empower judges to substitute legislative wisdom for their own. This paper alleviates these concerns by finding consistency in its application while restricting the scope of judicial scrutiny. By employing the framework of “Rules versus Standard”, this paper analyses six instances of application of the Doctrine and develops a four-step test. It evinces that the Doctrine has been used in a restrictive sense to strike down plenary legislation only when first, the legislation in question is a rule as against a standard; second, it is overinclusive/underinclusive; third, due to overinclusive/underinclusive nature, it yields socially undesirable results; and fourth, these socially undesirable results are worse than the competing social results.
{"title":"Manifesting the Consistency in the Application of ‘Manifest Arbitrariness Doctrine’","authors":"Vasu Aggarwal","doi":"10.1093/SLR/HMAB001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/SLR/HMAB001","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Manifest Arbitrariness Doctrine is perhaps the most important legal development of the decade for India. It is a standard that includes anything done by the legislature capriciously, irrationally and/or without adequate determining principle, excessively or disproportionately. It is being increasingly used to strike down plenary legislation under Article 14. However, there is no clarity on its application, and no literature addressing the same. Without this clarity, law-makers may inadvertently pass legislations that fail the test; and adjudicators may fail to determine when the legislations fail the test. More importantly, the Doctrine may empower judges to substitute legislative wisdom for their own. This paper alleviates these concerns by finding consistency in its application while restricting the scope of judicial scrutiny. By employing the framework of “Rules versus Standard”, this paper analyses six instances of application of the Doctrine and develops a four-step test. It evinces that the Doctrine has been used in a restrictive sense to strike down plenary legislation only when first, the legislation in question is a rule as against a standard; second, it is overinclusive/underinclusive; third, due to overinclusive/underinclusive nature, it yields socially undesirable results; and fourth, these socially undesirable results are worse than the competing social results.","PeriodicalId":43737,"journal":{"name":"Statute Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2021-01-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43515427","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Modern aspirations of Ukraine for European integration, the impact of globalization, and innovative technologies are the driving force on the path of reforming the national legal system. In this regard, issues concerning the modernization of the civil liability have recently become of significant importance. This article is aimed at analysing modernization of Ukrainian civil liability and forecasting tendencies of further reform of the civil liability institution in Ukraine. The methodological basis of the article includes the comparative law method, normative-dogmatic method, method of terminological analysis, method of operationalization of concepts, classification method, methods of analysis and synthesis, statistical method, legal modelling method, and complex method. In the course of the research-leading scientific and legal approaches to civil liability were analysed, and the most typical approaches were unified. A conditional list of the leading directions of modernization of legal regulation of the civil liability institution is proposed. The relevance of the subject matter is amplified by the fact that at present the scope of the most important and reforming issues of civil liability is expanding and remains either understudied or entirely disregarded by the representatives of academia and legislators.
{"title":"Civil Liability Institution in Ukraine through the Lens of Reform and European Integration Processes","authors":"N. Kuznietsova, O. Kot, M. M. Khomenko","doi":"10.1093/SLR/HMAA024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/SLR/HMAA024","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Modern aspirations of Ukraine for European integration, the impact of globalization, and innovative technologies are the driving force on the path of reforming the national legal system. In this regard, issues concerning the modernization of the civil liability have recently become of significant importance. This article is aimed at analysing modernization of Ukrainian civil liability and forecasting tendencies of further reform of the civil liability institution in Ukraine. The methodological basis of the article includes the comparative law method, normative-dogmatic method, method of terminological analysis, method of operationalization of concepts, classification method, methods of analysis and synthesis, statistical method, legal modelling method, and complex method. In the course of the research-leading scientific and legal approaches to civil liability were analysed, and the most typical approaches were unified. A conditional list of the leading directions of modernization of legal regulation of the civil liability institution is proposed. The relevance of the subject matter is amplified by the fact that at present the scope of the most important and reforming issues of civil liability is expanding and remains either understudied or entirely disregarded by the representatives of academia and legislators.","PeriodicalId":43737,"journal":{"name":"Statute Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2021-01-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48668395","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article uses the US Supreme Court’s line of cases beginning with Apprendi v. New Jersey to illuminate territory in which English law, in comparison to American law, is comparatively underdeveloped—currently affording a Newton-style hearing only where a guilty plea obliterates any previous evidence. This need not be so. Both before and after Apprendi, US federal and state courts have implemented post-trial fact-finding procedures for sentencing purposes, and we could do the same. The Davies case, where the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt was imported from the trial phase, into consideration of the statutory starting points for murder sentencing, will, for reasons to be given, be doubted.
{"title":"A Thankfully Wide Sea between England and Apprendi-Land","authors":"T. Curr","doi":"10.1093/slr/hmaa023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/slr/hmaa023","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This article uses the US Supreme Court’s line of cases beginning with Apprendi v. New Jersey to illuminate territory in which English law, in comparison to American law, is comparatively underdeveloped—currently affording a Newton-style hearing only where a guilty plea obliterates any previous evidence. This need not be so. Both before and after Apprendi, US federal and state courts have implemented post-trial fact-finding procedures for sentencing purposes, and we could do the same. The Davies case, where the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt was imported from the trial phase, into consideration of the statutory starting points for murder sentencing, will, for reasons to be given, be doubted.","PeriodicalId":43737,"journal":{"name":"Statute Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-12-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/slr/hmaa023","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41361944","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Recent judgements of the Supreme Court of India have done away with presumption of constitutionality for pre-constitutional laws in India. Regarded as one of the core principles in the study of interpretation of statutes, presumption of constitutionality assumes great significance when constitutionality of any law is under challenge. Removal of this presumption for pre-constitutional laws has far-reaching potential on judicial scrutiny of vires of pre-constitutional laws. However, the implications of such removal on pre-constitutional laws have not been studied. This article is an attempt to study such implications. I shall take example of Indian law on sedition, which is a pre-constitutional law, to demonstrate the impact of removal of the presumption.
{"title":"Pre-constitutional Laws in India: Beyond Presumption of Constitutionality","authors":"S. Singh","doi":"10.1093/slr/hmaa022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/slr/hmaa022","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Recent judgements of the Supreme Court of India have done away with presumption of constitutionality for pre-constitutional laws in India. Regarded as one of the core principles in the study of interpretation of statutes, presumption of constitutionality assumes great significance when constitutionality of any law is under challenge. Removal of this presumption for pre-constitutional laws has far-reaching potential on judicial scrutiny of vires of pre-constitutional laws. However, the implications of such removal on pre-constitutional laws have not been studied. This article is an attempt to study such implications. I shall take example of Indian law on sedition, which is a pre-constitutional law, to demonstrate the impact of removal of the presumption.","PeriodicalId":43737,"journal":{"name":"Statute Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-12-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/slr/hmaa022","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46997846","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Indian Companies Act, 2013 addresses the director’s responsibility through specific statutory provisions. While highlighting certain nuances in the legislative design, the article argues for more clarification for the director’s responsibility, specifically for non-executive and independent directors. The normative contribution of this article stresses the need to reform the existing statutory framework for according protection to directors of a company. Operationalization of fiduciary responsibility based on common law principles, along with section 166, Companies Act, 2013 is not clear in the statutory design. Emerging concerns of the director’s responsibility include lack of adequate protection for non-executive and independent directors which deserve more policy deliberations. The recently introduced Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 poses evolving responsibility on directors, forming yet another emerging concern in the Indian context.
{"title":"Legislative Design of Director’s Responsibility in India: In Search of Clarity","authors":"M. Deva Prasad, Salamah Ansari, S. Narayan","doi":"10.1093/slr/hmaa021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/slr/hmaa021","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Indian Companies Act, 2013 addresses the director’s responsibility through specific statutory provisions. While highlighting certain nuances in the legislative design, the article argues for more clarification for the director’s responsibility, specifically for non-executive and independent directors. The normative contribution of this article stresses the need to reform the existing statutory framework for according protection to directors of a company. Operationalization of fiduciary responsibility based on common law principles, along with section 166, Companies Act, 2013 is not clear in the statutory design. Emerging concerns of the director’s responsibility include lack of adequate protection for non-executive and independent directors which deserve more policy deliberations. The recently introduced Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 poses evolving responsibility on directors, forming yet another emerging concern in the Indian context.","PeriodicalId":43737,"journal":{"name":"Statute Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/slr/hmaa021","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43522344","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Sir John Laws, the originator of the principle of constitutional statutes, suggests that the protection accorded to them has its roots in the protection from implied repeal given to the European Communities Act 1972 and to constitutional fundamentals. We argue that this suggestion is more convincing with regard to the latter than it is with the former. Further, we contend that founding constitutional statutes on the protection afforded to constitutional fundamentals rather than the 1972 Act may provide a stronger basis for the principle of such statutes if the United Kingdom leaves the European Union. We then provide evidence that the idea of constitutional statutes has been accepted across the three arms of state and argue that, as a consequence, the rule of recognition may be taken to have changed to encompass the amendment to the implied repeal rule that such statutes represent.
{"title":"Constitutional Statutes—Roots and Recognition","authors":"J. Mcgarry, Samantha Spence","doi":"10.1093/SLR/HMZ015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/SLR/HMZ015","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Sir John Laws, the originator of the principle of constitutional statutes, suggests that the protection accorded to them has its roots in the protection from implied repeal given to the European Communities Act 1972 and to constitutional fundamentals. We argue that this suggestion is more convincing with regard to the latter than it is with the former. Further, we contend that founding constitutional statutes on the protection afforded to constitutional fundamentals rather than the 1972 Act may provide a stronger basis for the principle of such statutes if the United Kingdom leaves the European Union. We then provide evidence that the idea of constitutional statutes has been accepted across the three arms of state and argue that, as a consequence, the rule of recognition may be taken to have changed to encompass the amendment to the implied repeal rule that such statutes represent.","PeriodicalId":43737,"journal":{"name":"Statute Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/SLR/HMZ015","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43766789","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
On 19 July 2018, the Automated and Electric Vehicles Act 2018 (AEVA) received Royal Assent. As motor vehicles are becoming increasingly technologically based, with driving aids having taken over many of the more mundane (and possibly dangerous) aspects of driving from the driver, it is imperative that legislation keeps pace to determine the responsibilities of the parties. Motor insurance provides protection for those involved with vehicles and who may suffer harm, injury, and loss due to the negligence of the actors. This is most frequently driver error, but may also include manufacturing defects, which result in deaths and less serious injuries. It is also here where the intersection between torts and insurance laws needs careful management. It would be particularly unfair to ask drivers or third-party victims of motor vehicle accidents to seek redress from a manufacturer for losses incurred during the actions of an autonomous vehicle. Consumer law has historically removed this burden from affected consumers and it is entirely sensible for the law to protect individuals in an emerging field—and perhaps even more so given the trajectory of vehicles with driver-enabled qualities and the numbers of vehicles currently featuring such innovations. Yet, the AEVA consists of aspects which are troubling in respect of the motor insurance industry’s dominance of this market, the application of compulsory insurance, and exclusions and limitations to responsibility which expose policy holders and victims to EU-breaching levels of risk.
{"title":"The Automated and Electric Vehicles Act 2018 Part 1 and Beyond: A Critical Review","authors":"James Marson, K. Ferris, Jill Dickinson","doi":"10.1093/slr/hmz021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/slr/hmz021","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 On 19 July 2018, the Automated and Electric Vehicles Act 2018 (AEVA) received Royal Assent. As motor vehicles are becoming increasingly technologically based, with driving aids having taken over many of the more mundane (and possibly dangerous) aspects of driving from the driver, it is imperative that legislation keeps pace to determine the responsibilities of the parties. Motor insurance provides protection for those involved with vehicles and who may suffer harm, injury, and loss due to the negligence of the actors. This is most frequently driver error, but may also include manufacturing defects, which result in deaths and less serious injuries. It is also here where the intersection between torts and insurance laws needs careful management. It would be particularly unfair to ask drivers or third-party victims of motor vehicle accidents to seek redress from a manufacturer for losses incurred during the actions of an autonomous vehicle. Consumer law has historically removed this burden from affected consumers and it is entirely sensible for the law to protect individuals in an emerging field—and perhaps even more so given the trajectory of vehicles with driver-enabled qualities and the numbers of vehicles currently featuring such innovations. Yet, the AEVA consists of aspects which are troubling in respect of the motor insurance industry’s dominance of this market, the application of compulsory insurance, and exclusions and limitations to responsibility which expose policy holders and victims to EU-breaching levels of risk.","PeriodicalId":43737,"journal":{"name":"Statute Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/slr/hmz021","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45769225","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
It is a common arrangement in different legislatures that individual members who are not ministers can bring forward bills (private members’ bills), but the drafting of a bill may involve certain technicalities that are usually outside their knowledge. How, then, do legislators prepare the text of private members’ bills? This article presents the way in which support is provided to those members who seek to introduce their bills in the UK Parliament, the Scottish Parliament, the National Assembly for Wales, the Northern Ireland Assembly, and the National Diet of Japan. It then discusses two common challenges for such support: how to avoid the risk that demand will outstrip supply and how to make sure that the drafting of private members’ bills meets the quality standards (if any).
{"title":"Support for Private Members’ Bills in the United Kingdom and Japan","authors":"Shota Moriue","doi":"10.1093/SLR/HMY037","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/SLR/HMY037","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 It is a common arrangement in different legislatures that individual members who are not ministers can bring forward bills (private members’ bills), but the drafting of a bill may involve certain technicalities that are usually outside their knowledge. How, then, do legislators prepare the text of private members’ bills? This article presents the way in which support is provided to those members who seek to introduce their bills in the UK Parliament, the Scottish Parliament, the National Assembly for Wales, the Northern Ireland Assembly, and the National Diet of Japan. It then discusses two common challenges for such support: how to avoid the risk that demand will outstrip supply and how to make sure that the drafting of private members’ bills meets the quality standards (if any).","PeriodicalId":43737,"journal":{"name":"Statute Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/SLR/HMY037","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48250398","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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