Pub Date : 2020-11-24DOI: 10.1163/18756735-00000124
R. Waller
In this article the author makes the case for a hybrid sourcehood–leeway compatibilist account of free will. To do so, she draws upon Lehrer’s writing on free will, including his preference-based compatibilist account and Frankfurt-style cases from the perspective of the cognizant agent. The author explores what distinguishes kinds of intentional influence in manipulation cases and applies this distinction to a new perspectival variant of Frankfurt cases, those from the perspective of the counterfactual intervenor. She argues that it matters what kind of intentional influence is at issue in the counterfactual intervention and, further, that our judgments about desert of praise (and blame) are affected by occupying the POV of the counterfactual intervenor. The author concludes that such attention to perspectival variants of Frankfurt cases supports the view that compatibilist sourcehood accounts of moral responsibility require an additional compatibilist could-have-done-otherwise condition to capture a more robust sense of moral responsibility.
{"title":"A Case for Classical Compatibilism","authors":"R. Waller","doi":"10.1163/18756735-00000124","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-00000124","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000In this article the author makes the case for a hybrid sourcehood–leeway compatibilist account of free will. To do so, she draws upon Lehrer’s writing on free will, including his preference-based compatibilist account and Frankfurt-style cases from the perspective of the cognizant agent. The author explores what distinguishes kinds of intentional influence in manipulation cases and applies this distinction to a new perspectival variant of Frankfurt cases, those from the perspective of the counterfactual intervenor. She argues that it matters what kind of intentional influence is at issue in the counterfactual intervention and, further, that our judgments about desert of praise (and blame) are affected by occupying the POV of the counterfactual intervenor. The author concludes that such attention to perspectival variants of Frankfurt cases supports the view that compatibilist sourcehood accounts of moral responsibility require an additional compatibilist could-have-done-otherwise condition to capture a more robust sense of moral responsibility.","PeriodicalId":43873,"journal":{"name":"Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2020-11-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42334126","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-11-24DOI: 10.1163/18756735-00000126
Adriano Mannino
Why take individual action against collectively caused evils such as climate change? Prima facie, one’s individual contribution may seem to make a negligible difference at best. Consequentialists as well as consequence-sensitive nonconsequentialists should be interested in whether a consequence-based justification for taking individual climate action can be found nonetheless. The author argues that even though individual agents are able to make a non-zero difference in expectation, the altruistic expected value may be so small as to be insufficiently worthwhile, given the agents’ opportunity cost. In this case, altruistic agents may face a Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD), i.e. an altruistic public goods problem. Hence, the consequence-based account of why to leave one’s car at home could be vindicated if the PD can be solved in a consequence-based way. The author offers tentative grounds for optimism about solving the PD in a consequence-based way, and for acting accordingly.
{"title":"Why Leave the Car at Home, If That Doesn’t Save the Climate?","authors":"Adriano Mannino","doi":"10.1163/18756735-00000126","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-00000126","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000Why take individual action against collectively caused evils such as climate change? Prima facie, one’s individual contribution may seem to make a negligible difference at best. Consequentialists as well as consequence-sensitive nonconsequentialists should be interested in whether a consequence-based justification for taking individual climate action can be found nonetheless. The author argues that even though individual agents are able to make a non-zero difference in expectation, the altruistic expected value may be so small as to be insufficiently worthwhile, given the agents’ opportunity cost. In this case, altruistic agents may face a Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD), i.e. an altruistic public goods problem. Hence, the consequence-based account of why to leave one’s car at home could be vindicated if the PD can be solved in a consequence-based way. The author offers tentative grounds for optimism about solving the PD in a consequence-based way, and for acting accordingly.","PeriodicalId":43873,"journal":{"name":"Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2020-11-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48330459","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-11-24DOI: 10.1163/18756735-00000123
J. Corlett
Professor Keith Lehrer has recently argued for what this author shall refer to as his “preference compatibilism,” according to which, among other things, knowledge of S’s preferences is what a counterfactual intervener uses to decide when S will depart from the counterfactual intervener’s plan. Lehrer assumes, among other things, Harry G. Frankfurt’s notion of “effective wants,” which are what Lehrer calls “preferences that reveal themselves in choice given the opportunity to act” (Lehrer 2016, 36). While the author here generally concurs with Lehrer’s preference compatibilism, he shall make some suggestions with the intention of increasing its plausibility even further, especially with regard to its conception of free will when it is considered in light of certain matters of philosophy of law in particular and the ethics of responsibility (moral responsibility) more generally.
Keith Lehrer教授最近为作者所称的“偏好相容主义”辩护，根据该理论，除其他外，对S偏好的了解是反事实干预者用来决定S何时偏离反事实干预的计划的。Lehrer假设了Harry G.Frankfurt的“有效需求”概念，即Lehrer所说的“在有机会采取行动的情况下，在选择中展现自己的偏好”（Lehrer 2016，36）。虽然作者在这里普遍同意Lehrer的偏好相容主义，但他将提出一些建议，以进一步提高其合理性，特别是在考虑自由意志的概念时，特别是从法律哲学的某些问题和更普遍的责任伦理（道德责任）来考虑。
{"title":"Free Will and Responsibility","authors":"J. Corlett","doi":"10.1163/18756735-00000123","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-00000123","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000Professor Keith Lehrer has recently argued for what this author shall refer to as his “preference compatibilism,” according to which, among other things, knowledge of S’s preferences is what a counterfactual intervener uses to decide when S will depart from the counterfactual intervener’s plan. Lehrer assumes, among other things, Harry G. Frankfurt’s notion of “effective wants,” which are what Lehrer calls “preferences that reveal themselves in choice given the opportunity to act” (Lehrer 2016, 36). While the author here generally concurs with Lehrer’s preference compatibilism, he shall make some suggestions with the intention of increasing its plausibility even further, especially with regard to its conception of free will when it is considered in light of certain matters of philosophy of law in particular and the ethics of responsibility (moral responsibility) more generally.","PeriodicalId":43873,"journal":{"name":"Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2020-11-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47891326","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-11-24DOI: 10.1163/18756735-00000122
Michael McKenna
In this article, the author examines Keith Lehrer’s response to the Consequence Argument. He argues that his response has advantages over David Lewis’s. Contrary to what Lewis suggests in a footnote, Lehrer’s assessment of an ability to affect the laws of nature in deterministic settings is largely the same as Lewis’s. However, Lehrer’s position has an advantage that Lewis’s lacks. Lehrer integrates his proposal within a positive account of freedom, and this helps to explain how it could be that an agent is able to do otherwise in deterministic settings in such a way that if she did, some law of nature would be different.
{"title":"A Lost Lesson in Keith Lehrer’s Reply to the Consequence Argument","authors":"Michael McKenna","doi":"10.1163/18756735-00000122","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-00000122","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000In this article, the author examines Keith Lehrer’s response to the Consequence Argument. He argues that his response has advantages over David Lewis’s. Contrary to what Lewis suggests in a footnote, Lehrer’s assessment of an ability to affect the laws of nature in deterministic settings is largely the same as Lewis’s. However, Lehrer’s position has an advantage that Lewis’s lacks. Lehrer integrates his proposal within a positive account of freedom, and this helps to explain how it could be that an agent is able to do otherwise in deterministic settings in such a way that if she did, some law of nature would be different.","PeriodicalId":43873,"journal":{"name":"Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy","volume":"97 1","pages":"545-558"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2020-11-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48202777","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-11-24DOI: 10.1163/18756735-00000117
Simon Hollnaicher
According to a well-known problem in climate ethics, individual actions cannot be wrong due to their impact on climate change since the individual act does not make a difference. By referring to the practical interpretation of the categorical imperative, the author argues that certain actions lead to a contradiction in conception in light of the climate crisis. Universalizing these actions would cause foreseeable climate impacts, making it impossible to pursue the original maxim effectively. According to the practical interpretation, such actions are morally wrong. The wrongness of these actions does not depend on making a difference, rather these actions are wrong because they make it impossible for others to act accordingly. Thus, apart from imperfect duties, for which has been argued convincingly elsewhere (Henning 2016; Alberzart 2019), we also have perfect duties to refrain from certain actions in the face of the climate crisis.
{"title":"Eine Kantische Begründung individueller Klimapflichten","authors":"Simon Hollnaicher","doi":"10.1163/18756735-00000117","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-00000117","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000According to a well-known problem in climate ethics, individual actions cannot be wrong due to their impact on climate change since the individual act does not make a difference. By referring to the practical interpretation of the categorical imperative, the author argues that certain actions lead to a contradiction in conception in light of the climate crisis. Universalizing these actions would cause foreseeable climate impacts, making it impossible to pursue the original maxim effectively. According to the practical interpretation, such actions are morally wrong. The wrongness of these actions does not depend on making a difference, rather these actions are wrong because they make it impossible for others to act accordingly. Thus, apart from imperfect duties, for which has been argued convincingly elsewhere (Henning 2016; Alberzart 2019), we also have perfect duties to refrain from certain actions in the face of the climate crisis.","PeriodicalId":43873,"journal":{"name":"Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy","volume":"97 1","pages":"679-692"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2020-11-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46004395","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-11-17DOI: 10.1163/18756735-00000119
Mariela Aguilera, Federico Castellano
To make the case for non-conceptualism, Heck (2007) draws on an apparent dichoto-my between linguistic and iconic representations. According to Heck, whereas linguistic representations have conceptual content, the content of iconic representations is non-conceptual. Based on the case of cartographic systems, the authors criticize Heck’s dichotomous distinction. They argue that maps are composed of semantically arbitrary elements that play different syntactic roles. Based on this, they claim that maps have a predicative structure and convey conceptual content. Finally, the authors argue that, despite their differences, maps and sentences can logically interact with each other through heterogeneous inferences. These considerations not only challenge the view that conceptual content and inferential processes necessarily involve linguistic representations; furthermore, they provide a new perspective for thinking about maps, their semantics and syntax, and their interaction with linguistic systems.
{"title":"Maps, Language, and the Conceptual–Non-Conceptual Distinction","authors":"Mariela Aguilera, Federico Castellano","doi":"10.1163/18756735-00000119","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-00000119","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000To make the case for non-conceptualism, Heck (2007) draws on an apparent dichoto-my between linguistic and iconic representations. According to Heck, whereas linguistic representations have conceptual content, the content of iconic representations is non-conceptual. Based on the case of cartographic systems, the authors criticize Heck’s dichotomous distinction. They argue that maps are composed of semantically arbitrary elements that play different syntactic roles. Based on this, they claim that maps have a predicative structure and convey conceptual content. Finally, the authors argue that, despite their differences, maps and sentences can logically interact with each other through heterogeneous inferences. These considerations not only challenge the view that conceptual content and inferential processes necessarily involve linguistic representations; furthermore, they provide a new perspective for thinking about maps, their semantics and syntax, and their interaction with linguistic systems.","PeriodicalId":43873,"journal":{"name":"Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":"1-29"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2020-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1163/18756735-00000119","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48104658","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-29DOI: 10.1163/18756735-00000120
Arnaud Pelletier
Leibniz’s metaphysics is often interpreted as being based solely on reason, so that experience would not provide a true foundation but only an analogy to it. Against this reading, this article first recalls that, according to Leibniz, experiences are necessarily implied by the demonstrative nature of metaphysics, for they take the place of an infinite chain of demonstrative steps that we cannot explain. It then argues that what he calls the two “first experiences” – namely, that “I think” and “a variety of things are always thought by me” – play a decisive role in justifying the Monadology’s key propositions that “there are substances” and “there are composites”. Although Leibniz never uses the term induction in this context, this – often neglected – role of singular first-person experiences in the grasping of universal propositions constitutes a real inductive moment in his metaphysics.
{"title":"Leibniz’s Inductive Challenge","authors":"Arnaud Pelletier","doi":"10.1163/18756735-00000120","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-00000120","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000Leibniz’s metaphysics is often interpreted as being based solely on reason, so that experience would not provide a true foundation but only an analogy to it. Against this reading, this article first recalls that, according to Leibniz, experiences are necessarily implied by the demonstrative nature of metaphysics, for they take the place of an infinite chain of demonstrative steps that we cannot explain. It then argues that what he calls the two “first experiences” – namely, that “I think” and “a variety of things are always thought by me” – play a decisive role in justifying the Monadology’s key propositions that “there are substances” and “there are composites”. Although Leibniz never uses the term induction in this context, this – often neglected – role of singular first-person experiences in the grasping of universal propositions constitutes a real inductive moment in his metaphysics.","PeriodicalId":43873,"journal":{"name":"Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":"1-19"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2020-10-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41698073","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this article the author analyzes the problem stated by Ingarden in his ontology: under what conditions can the subject−properties structure and the whole−parts structure coexist in one object? After the presentation of Ingarden’s doctrines concerning both structures, the author argues that for Ingarden a whole is nothing over and above a plurality of objects linked by relations. However, Ingarden was convinced that a compound object is not identical with a whole which is associated with it. Then the author analyzes the difference between the two types of compound objects: higher-order objects and compound, primarily individual objects. The former are founded on parts while the latter are such that their parts are founded on them. Finally, the author considers Ingarden’s theory as an answer to the one–many problem. The author argues that Ingarden’s conception of a higher-order object cannot solve this problem, and he also points to some difficulties concerning primarily individual compound objects.
{"title":"Two Structures in One Object","authors":"M. Piwowarczyk","doi":"10.1163/18756735-000115","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-000115","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000In this article the author analyzes the problem stated by Ingarden in his ontology: under what conditions can the subject−properties structure and the whole−parts structure coexist in one object? After the presentation of Ingarden’s doctrines concerning both structures, the author argues that for Ingarden a whole is nothing over and above a plurality of objects linked by relations. However, Ingarden was convinced that a compound object is not identical with a whole which is associated with it. Then the author analyzes the difference between the two types of compound objects: higher-order objects and compound, primarily individual objects. The former are founded on parts while the latter are such that their parts are founded on them. Finally, the author considers Ingarden’s theory as an answer to the one–many problem. The author argues that Ingarden’s conception of a higher-order object cannot solve this problem, and he also points to some difficulties concerning primarily individual compound objects.","PeriodicalId":43873,"journal":{"name":"Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy","volume":"97 1","pages":"659-678"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2020-09-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43455043","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Exclusion Argument has been regarded as the most powerful challenge to non-reductive physicalism. This argument presupposes a crucial thesis, Causal Closure of the Physical, which asserts that every physical effect has a sufficient physical cause. Although this thesis is widely accepted in contemporary philosophy of mind, philosophers say surprisingly little about what notion of physical entities should be adopted in the context. In this article, the author distinguishes between three versions of Closure that appeal to a narrow, a moderate, and a wide notion of the physical, respectively. The author then argues that none of the three versions can challenge non-reductive physicalism.
{"title":"Three Versions of Physical Closure","authors":"Lei Zhong","doi":"10.1163/18756735-000114","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-000114","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000The Exclusion Argument has been regarded as the most powerful challenge to non-reductive physicalism. This argument presupposes a crucial thesis, Causal Closure of the Physical, which asserts that every physical effect has a sufficient physical cause. Although this thesis is widely accepted in contemporary philosophy of mind, philosophers say surprisingly little about what notion of physical entities should be adopted in the context. In this article, the author distinguishes between three versions of Closure that appeal to a narrow, a moderate, and a wide notion of the physical, respectively. The author then argues that none of the three versions can challenge non-reductive physicalism.","PeriodicalId":43873,"journal":{"name":"Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy","volume":"97 1","pages":"640-658"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2020-09-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44699372","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The main thesis of this article is that in Christian Wolff’s Deutsche Metaphysik, empirical sources of knowledge play important if not foundational roles and that inductive methods of reasoning are extensively applied. It is argued that experiential self-awareness plays a foundational role and that empirical evidence, phenomena, and scientific theories from the empirical sciences of Wolff’s time are used for inferential purposes. Wolff also makes use of inductive reasoning, i.e., abduction to hidden causes of empirical phenomena, and inferences to the best or to the only possible explanation. Wolff’s Deutsche Metaphysik is therefore a prefiguration and an interesting case of inductive metaphysics in the contemporary sense. From this contemporary perspective, Wolff draws the distinction between valid and speculative abductions in a different way – but it is also different from that of his more empirically oriented contemporaries.
{"title":"Methods and Roles of Experience in Christian Wolff’s “Deutsche Metaphysik”","authors":"K. Engelhard","doi":"10.1163/18756735-000113","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-000113","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000The main thesis of this article is that in Christian Wolff’s Deutsche Metaphysik, empirical sources of knowledge play important if not foundational roles and that inductive methods of reasoning are extensively applied. It is argued that experiential self-awareness plays a foundational role and that empirical evidence, phenomena, and scientific theories from the empirical sciences of Wolff’s time are used for inferential purposes. Wolff also makes use of inductive reasoning, i.e., abduction to hidden causes of empirical phenomena, and inferences to the best or to the only possible explanation. Wolff’s Deutsche Metaphysik is therefore a prefiguration and an interesting case of inductive metaphysics in the contemporary sense. From this contemporary perspective, Wolff draws the distinction between valid and speculative abductions in a different way – but it is also different from that of his more empirically oriented contemporaries.","PeriodicalId":43873,"journal":{"name":"Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy","volume":"98 1","pages":"146-166"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2020-09-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48730046","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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