Pub Date : 2023-06-26DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2023.2225962
H. Khademi, R. Hesari
ABSTRACT Some scholars showed that Mīrdāmād believed in the ‘primacy of quiddity’ by adducing his theory of ‘the simple act of creation’ in which an entity’s quiddity is the ‘object‘ of the act of creation, and by adducing his belief that ‘existence‘ is constructed. Some other passages in Mīrdāmād’s work reinforce such attribution, made by his prominent student, Mullā Ṣadrā and his followers. This article offers a careful account of Mīrdāmād’s theory of ‘simple act of creation’ to assess the accuracy or inaccuracy of this attribution, and to provide a precise picture of quiddity in his philosophical system. The authors concluded that Mīrdāmād’s idea about ‘quiddity’ as the ‘object’ of creation by no means implies the primacy of quiddity as understood by Mullā Ṣadrā.By explicating his theory of ‘the simple act of creation’, they showed that it does’ imply the primacy of quiddity.
{"title":"Did Mīrdāmād believe in the primacy of quiddity?","authors":"H. Khademi, R. Hesari","doi":"10.1080/09552367.2023.2225962","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2023.2225962","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Some scholars showed that Mīrdāmād believed in the ‘primacy of quiddity’ by adducing his theory of ‘the simple act of creation’ in which an entity’s quiddity is the ‘object‘ of the act of creation, and by adducing his belief that ‘existence‘ is constructed. Some other passages in Mīrdāmād’s work reinforce such attribution, made by his prominent student, Mullā Ṣadrā and his followers. This article offers a careful account of Mīrdāmād’s theory of ‘simple act of creation’ to assess the accuracy or inaccuracy of this attribution, and to provide a precise picture of quiddity in his philosophical system. The authors concluded that Mīrdāmād’s idea about ‘quiddity’ as the ‘object’ of creation by no means implies the primacy of quiddity as understood by Mullā Ṣadrā.By explicating his theory of ‘the simple act of creation’, they showed that it does’ imply the primacy of quiddity.","PeriodicalId":44358,"journal":{"name":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49009855","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-20DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2023.2226784
T. Lim
ABSTRACT Three main themes emerge in Confucius’ response to the Ji family, reflecting the core tenets of his zeitgeist philosophy. Firstly, by criticizing the usurpation of Ji Shi 季氏 (the Ji family), he emphasized the moral principle of ‘overcoming oneself to return to ritual propriety’. Secondly, as a political philosopher, he stressed the importance of utility, emphasizing the concept of quandao 權道 (the way of the changeable), which implies that deviating from established principles can be valid in certain circumstances. Lastly, as an educator and reformer running the Confucian private school, he emphasized the importance of political realism. This educational goal stems from the specificity of the feudal era, and Confucius believed that governing the state and bringing peace to the world can only be achieved and advanced through public affairs.
{"title":"The multifaceted perspective: Confucius’ political philosophy as manifested in his perception and engagement with Ji Shi 季氏 (the Ji family)","authors":"T. Lim","doi":"10.1080/09552367.2023.2226784","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2023.2226784","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Three main themes emerge in Confucius’ response to the Ji family, reflecting the core tenets of his zeitgeist philosophy. Firstly, by criticizing the usurpation of Ji Shi 季氏 (the Ji family), he emphasized the moral principle of ‘overcoming oneself to return to ritual propriety’. Secondly, as a political philosopher, he stressed the importance of utility, emphasizing the concept of quandao 權道 (the way of the changeable), which implies that deviating from established principles can be valid in certain circumstances. Lastly, as an educator and reformer running the Confucian private school, he emphasized the importance of political realism. This educational goal stems from the specificity of the feudal era, and Confucius believed that governing the state and bringing peace to the world can only be achieved and advanced through public affairs.","PeriodicalId":44358,"journal":{"name":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-06-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45731561","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-07DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2023.2220245
Yuhan Liang
ABSTRACT When we face a choice between two incompatible actions, is there a universal priority? The early Confucians used the notion of quan 權 to navigate conflicts. On the one hand, quan can be a mean of weighing or assessing. Through quan, agents should be able to recognize the most valuable action and arrive at a universal priority. Thus, quan entails impersonal reasoning. On the other hand, quan means balancing, and its aim is to seek the most appropriate response. What is appropriate depends on each individual’s personal factors. Thus, quan implies personal reasoning. I argue that quan represents a holistic thinking process that includes both impersonal and personal reasoning. But agents cannot engage in these two types of reasoning simultaneously. By reverse engineering how exemplars would implement quan, I show that these two types of reasoning are primarily used in different kinds of value conflicts.
{"title":"Is there a universal priority in cases of value conflicts? —Reverse engineering Quan 權","authors":"Yuhan Liang","doi":"10.1080/09552367.2023.2220245","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2023.2220245","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT When we face a choice between two incompatible actions, is there a universal priority? The early Confucians used the notion of quan 權 to navigate conflicts. On the one hand, quan can be a mean of weighing or assessing. Through quan, agents should be able to recognize the most valuable action and arrive at a universal priority. Thus, quan entails impersonal reasoning. On the other hand, quan means balancing, and its aim is to seek the most appropriate response. What is appropriate depends on each individual’s personal factors. Thus, quan implies personal reasoning. I argue that quan represents a holistic thinking process that includes both impersonal and personal reasoning. But agents cannot engage in these two types of reasoning simultaneously. By reverse engineering how exemplars would implement quan, I show that these two types of reasoning are primarily used in different kinds of value conflicts.","PeriodicalId":44358,"journal":{"name":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":"33 1","pages":"281 - 297"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-06-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48450107","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-08DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2023.2210008
H. M. Arani
ABSTRACT Lyric poetry, often regarded as the epitome of subjectivity in the realm of artistic expression, emerges from the depths of the poet’s personal emotions. Hence, in the aesthetic landscape of the nineteenth-century Germany, it was excluded from the inventory of genuine art forms, all of which were deemed to be objective and disinterested. Associating lyric poetry with music in its origin and essence, Nietzsche extends his Schopenhauerian metaphysics of music to the lyric, making it a highly objective art reverberating from the abyss of existence, the Ur-Eine, expressing its intrinsic self-contradictory and agonizing nature. A similar understanding of the creative process of poetic composition in the lyric, which this article aims to elucidate, can also be found in some of Rūmī’s ghazals and observations. These include a metaphysics of the unseen, a reunion through ecstasy and rapture, and a reflection and mirroring, initially through music and then through the lyric.
{"title":"The silent speaker: A Nietzschean reading of Rūmī’s aesthetics of lyric poetry","authors":"H. M. Arani","doi":"10.1080/09552367.2023.2210008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2023.2210008","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Lyric poetry, often regarded as the epitome of subjectivity in the realm of artistic expression, emerges from the depths of the poet’s personal emotions. Hence, in the aesthetic landscape of the nineteenth-century Germany, it was excluded from the inventory of genuine art forms, all of which were deemed to be objective and disinterested. Associating lyric poetry with music in its origin and essence, Nietzsche extends his Schopenhauerian metaphysics of music to the lyric, making it a highly objective art reverberating from the abyss of existence, the Ur-Eine, expressing its intrinsic self-contradictory and agonizing nature. A similar understanding of the creative process of poetic composition in the lyric, which this article aims to elucidate, can also be found in some of Rūmī’s ghazals and observations. These include a metaphysics of the unseen, a reunion through ecstasy and rapture, and a reflection and mirroring, initially through music and then through the lyric.","PeriodicalId":44358,"journal":{"name":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":"33 1","pages":"263 - 280"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-05-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42319706","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-05DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2023.2202545
Lunan Li
ABSTRACT By the late Ming, the concept of ‘the mind/heart-cum-principle’ 心即理 had generated confusion in the relations between xing (human nature) and xin (mind/heart). Moreover, with the increasing interpenetration of the three teachings of Confucianism, Buddhism and Daoism, some scholars became gravely concerned that the perversion of traditional Confucian thinking had resulted in the degeneration of the moral and social order. Li Cai (1529–1607) was one of these concerned scholars. Wielding the two concepts of ‘zhizhi’ (knowing the ultimate end) and ‘xiushen’ (self-cultivation) in the Great Learning, Li wrestled with Wang Yangming’s teachings by reasserting the primacy of xing, insisting that moral reality must involve direct individual action in order to preserve the unity of substance and effort. Li’s keen awareness of the inner tension between the mind/heart and xing not only prompted his critical reflections on Wang ’s thought but also on Zhu Xi’s. In so doing, he sought to address the fundamental question of what Confucianism is by clarifying the boundaries between the three teachings, and reshaping the spiritual values of Confucianism.
{"title":"Reasserting the primacy of xing (human nature) and self-cultivation (xiushen): Li Cai’s (1529-1607) defense of Confucianism against the interpenetration of the three teachings","authors":"Lunan Li","doi":"10.1080/09552367.2023.2202545","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2023.2202545","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT By the late Ming, the concept of ‘the mind/heart-cum-principle’ 心即理 had generated confusion in the relations between xing (human nature) and xin (mind/heart). Moreover, with the increasing interpenetration of the three teachings of Confucianism, Buddhism and Daoism, some scholars became gravely concerned that the perversion of traditional Confucian thinking had resulted in the degeneration of the moral and social order. Li Cai (1529–1607) was one of these concerned scholars. Wielding the two concepts of ‘zhizhi’ (knowing the ultimate end) and ‘xiushen’ (self-cultivation) in the Great Learning, Li wrestled with Wang Yangming’s teachings by reasserting the primacy of xing, insisting that moral reality must involve direct individual action in order to preserve the unity of substance and effort. Li’s keen awareness of the inner tension between the mind/heart and xing not only prompted his critical reflections on Wang ’s thought but also on Zhu Xi’s. In so doing, he sought to address the fundamental question of what Confucianism is by clarifying the boundaries between the three teachings, and reshaping the spiritual values of Confucianism.","PeriodicalId":44358,"journal":{"name":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":"33 1","pages":"233 - 249"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-05-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47977033","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-02DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2023.2207373
A. K. Jayesh
ABSTRACT This article offers an argument against solipsism, the view that there is only one mind that exists, my own, and that the world is a projection of my mind. In the initial sections of the article, we offer a reductio ad absurdum argument against solipsism. For context and clarification, we draw from a number of Asian and Western philosophers, including notably from the Buddhist philosopher Nāgārjuna. In subsequent sections, we proceed to address some of the objections to our argument against solipsism. We then conclude by clarifying the implications of our position for our everyday use of the concept of the mind.
{"title":"Am I the only mind that exists?","authors":"A. K. Jayesh","doi":"10.1080/09552367.2023.2207373","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2023.2207373","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article offers an argument against solipsism, the view that there is only one mind that exists, my own, and that the world is a projection of my mind. In the initial sections of the article, we offer a reductio ad absurdum argument against solipsism. For context and clarification, we draw from a number of Asian and Western philosophers, including notably from the Buddhist philosopher Nāgārjuna. In subsequent sections, we proceed to address some of the objections to our argument against solipsism. We then conclude by clarifying the implications of our position for our everyday use of the concept of the mind.","PeriodicalId":44358,"journal":{"name":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":"33 1","pages":"250 - 262"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-05-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46660067","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-30DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2023.2195215
Xiu-wei Lu
ABSTRACT Studies on Chinese nationalism in Western academia have been influenced by a popular theory called ‘the culturalism-to-nationalism thesis’, a loosely formulated interpretive paradigm which emerged in late 1960s. The literature on this topic, however, reveals an inadequate understanding of traditional Chinese thinking and its influence on Chinese thought in modern history. An examination of the work of Li Dazhao (1889–1927) and his philosophical heritage not only will open up a valuable source for us to rethink about this thesis and its defects, but also will shed light on the complicated background and perspective that give rise to modern Chinese nationalism. Given the interest in Chinese nationalism in contemporary world, an understanding of its historical roots is particularly timely, since in order to understand China’s current and future actions one must understand the origins of Chinese nationalist thinking and its transformations in time. This paper makes a contribution to that historical understanding. I argue that traditional Chinese philosophy, especially the Daoist world view and Confucian ethics played a significant role in shaping Li’s patriotic and nationalist stance. It also predisposed him intellectually to accept the internationalist characteristic of Marxism.
{"title":"The evolution of Li Dazhao’s Chinese nationalism","authors":"Xiu-wei Lu","doi":"10.1080/09552367.2023.2195215","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2023.2195215","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Studies on Chinese nationalism in Western academia have been influenced by a popular theory called ‘the culturalism-to-nationalism thesis’, a loosely formulated interpretive paradigm which emerged in late 1960s. The literature on this topic, however, reveals an inadequate understanding of traditional Chinese thinking and its influence on Chinese thought in modern history. An examination of the work of Li Dazhao (1889–1927) and his philosophical heritage not only will open up a valuable source for us to rethink about this thesis and its defects, but also will shed light on the complicated background and perspective that give rise to modern Chinese nationalism. Given the interest in Chinese nationalism in contemporary world, an understanding of its historical roots is particularly timely, since in order to understand China’s current and future actions one must understand the origins of Chinese nationalist thinking and its transformations in time. This paper makes a contribution to that historical understanding. I argue that traditional Chinese philosophy, especially the Daoist world view and Confucian ethics played a significant role in shaping Li’s patriotic and nationalist stance. It also predisposed him intellectually to accept the internationalist characteristic of Marxism.","PeriodicalId":44358,"journal":{"name":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":"33 1","pages":"191 - 207"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-03-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48015274","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-28DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2023.2196156
David Leong
ABSTRACT This paper proposes a reinterpretation of the Chinese worldview on equilibrium/nonequilibrium and yin-yang in the context of science and draws the correlative aspects with irreversible thermodynamics and quantum reality, such as instability, nonlinearity, nonequilibrium, and temporality. The paper argues that Prigogine's expressions on dissipative structures and their role in thermodynamic systems far from equilibrium, complexity, and irreversibility resonate with the principles in Yijing. Instability, far-from-equilibrium, irreversibility, probability, bifurcation, and self-organisation are intrinsic properties of nature appearing at all levels. Information is the basis of all changes. The agency of change is the human with a consciousness interpreting the information existing in the probability space between heaven and earth. The paper outlines a modelling approach with the self-organising human in the centre between heaven and earth, representing living systems as discrete dynamical systems presented with binary yin-yang choices. The concepts of yin-yang and information causality are central to Yijing’s understanding of change and are clarified in this paper.
{"title":"A new dialogue on Yijing -the book of changes in a world of changes, instability, disequilibrium and turbulence","authors":"David Leong","doi":"10.1080/09552367.2023.2196156","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2023.2196156","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This paper proposes a reinterpretation of the Chinese worldview on equilibrium/nonequilibrium and yin-yang in the context of science and draws the correlative aspects with irreversible thermodynamics and quantum reality, such as instability, nonlinearity, nonequilibrium, and temporality. The paper argues that Prigogine's expressions on dissipative structures and their role in thermodynamic systems far from equilibrium, complexity, and irreversibility resonate with the principles in Yijing. Instability, far-from-equilibrium, irreversibility, probability, bifurcation, and self-organisation are intrinsic properties of nature appearing at all levels. Information is the basis of all changes. The agency of change is the human with a consciousness interpreting the information existing in the probability space between heaven and earth. The paper outlines a modelling approach with the self-organising human in the centre between heaven and earth, representing living systems as discrete dynamical systems presented with binary yin-yang choices. The concepts of yin-yang and information causality are central to Yijing’s understanding of change and are clarified in this paper.","PeriodicalId":44358,"journal":{"name":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":"33 1","pages":"208 - 232"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41623262","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-01DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2023.2185992
Soraj Hongladarom
ABSTRACT The conceptions of three kinds of knowledge in Buddhism and in Spinoza are compared. There are both similarities and differences in the two conceptions, both of which provide interesting insights into both traditions. The similarities are that the three kinds of knowledge represent a hierarchical structure, starting from the first kind, characterized by sense perception. The second kind for Spinoza is characterized by rational knowledge, which is comparable to the Buddhist second kind, which is about thinking through what one has heard. These two kinds lead to the third kind of knowledge, which in Spinoza is intuitive knowledge, and in Buddhism is knowledge by mental cultivation. In both traditions, these three kinds of knowledge lead to soteriological aims. Among the differences is that Spinoza presents his three kinds of knowledge through a series of axioms and proofs, whereas in Buddhism they form a guideline for the practitioner.
{"title":"Buddhism and Spinoza on the three kinds of knowledge","authors":"Soraj Hongladarom","doi":"10.1080/09552367.2023.2185992","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2023.2185992","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The conceptions of three kinds of knowledge in Buddhism and in Spinoza are compared. There are both similarities and differences in the two conceptions, both of which provide interesting insights into both traditions. The similarities are that the three kinds of knowledge represent a hierarchical structure, starting from the first kind, characterized by sense perception. The second kind for Spinoza is characterized by rational knowledge, which is comparable to the Buddhist second kind, which is about thinking through what one has heard. These two kinds lead to the third kind of knowledge, which in Spinoza is intuitive knowledge, and in Buddhism is knowledge by mental cultivation. In both traditions, these three kinds of knowledge lead to soteriological aims. Among the differences is that Spinoza presents his three kinds of knowledge through a series of axioms and proofs, whereas in Buddhism they form a guideline for the practitioner.","PeriodicalId":44358,"journal":{"name":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":"33 1","pages":"176 - 189"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41925185","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-02-23DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2023.2183567
Lee Oh Ryun
ABSTRACT The scholar Jin Tian-zhu (1690 ~ 1765) was a Muslim of the Hui 回 ethnic group in the Qing dynasty who adhered to Islamic traditions handed down from generation to generation. In Qing Zhen Shi Yi, Jin Tian-zhu attempts to combine Confucianism and Islam through a simple comparison of their rituals. Jin Tian-zhu expresses his respect for Allah by attesting Allah’s existence and insisting that humans should obey Allah. He admits that in reality, besides Allah, the ruler is also clearly an object of loyalty. In addition, he asserts that it is basic propriety for Muslims to be filial to their parents and that the scope of practice of filial piety must also apply to their ancestors beyond their parents. Jin Tian-zhu further expands his view of zhongxiao 忠孝 by asserting that the ultimate Muslim interest is in renlun 人倫, which he believes must be rectified.
{"title":"Chinese Islam’s understanding of Zhongxiao 忠孝: Jin Tian-zhu’s 金天柱 Qing Zhen Shi Yi 清眞釋疑","authors":"Lee Oh Ryun","doi":"10.1080/09552367.2023.2183567","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2023.2183567","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The scholar Jin Tian-zhu (1690 ~ 1765) was a Muslim of the Hui 回 ethnic group in the Qing dynasty who adhered to Islamic traditions handed down from generation to generation. In Qing Zhen Shi Yi, Jin Tian-zhu attempts to combine Confucianism and Islam through a simple comparison of their rituals. Jin Tian-zhu expresses his respect for Allah by attesting Allah’s existence and insisting that humans should obey Allah. He admits that in reality, besides Allah, the ruler is also clearly an object of loyalty. In addition, he asserts that it is basic propriety for Muslims to be filial to their parents and that the scope of practice of filial piety must also apply to their ancestors beyond their parents. Jin Tian-zhu further expands his view of zhongxiao 忠孝 by asserting that the ultimate Muslim interest is in renlun 人倫, which he believes must be rectified.","PeriodicalId":44358,"journal":{"name":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":"33 1","pages":"163 - 175"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-02-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41750182","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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