Pub Date : 2023-09-19DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2023.2259189
Raquel Ferrández Formoso
ABSTRACTBoth the itihāsa-s of the Mahābhārata and the Platonic philosophical ‘epode’ are often used to persuade in conditions where emotion threatens to incapacitate the person for argumentative discourse. Narrative reason has its own conditions of success and failure, opening up a discursive arena in which all kinds of utterances are welcome. Emphasizing the psychagogic function of the ‘once-upon-a-time’ reason, it is worth asking who the real protagonist of the story is and whether the story has a duty or a dharma of its own to fulfill. Dharma and all the dilemmas it brings along with it constitute one of the fundamental problems that make up the whole Mahābhārata. In this essay I wonder about the dharma of the Mahābhārata itself—a literary work which gives itself the name ‘triumph’ (jaya)—and the cultural mission it fulfills in the lives of those who hear it, read it, study it, and share it with others.KEYWORDS: PersuasiondharmaPlatoimaginationmythallegory Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1. Wilhelm Halbfass warns against the misunderstanding of associating the Vedic concept of ṛta, which refers to a natural, cosmic and transcendent law, with the concept of dharma. ‘The fact that the sun does rise with regularity does not mean that the sun is following or fulfilling its own dharma. […] Dharma it is the continuous maintaining of the social and cosmic order and norm which is achieved by the Aryan through the performance of his Vedic rites and traditional duties’ (Halbfass, Citation1988, pp. 315–316). In his study of the notion of dharma in the Mahābhārata, James L Fitzgerald (Citation2004b, p. 673) agrees with Halbfass: “In particular I agree with Halbfass’ emphasizing that the word dharma is not a descendent of Vedic ṛta and does not refer to some kind of free-standing, overarching cosmic natural law. I see little or no basis in the Mahābhārata justifying this wide-spread understanding of dharma”.2. All the translations in this essay of the Śāntiparvan are taken from James L. Fitzgerald (Citation2004a), The Mahābhārata. 11. The Book of Women. 12. The Book of Peace. Chicago University Press.3. In the context of this collective attempt at persuasion, Vyāsa (MBh, 12.34.5) will remind Yudhiṣṭhira that war has only been ‘an instrument of Time’, therefore, neither he nor his brothers have killed anyone, they have only carried out the designs of Time expressing itself through living beings.4. Thus, in MBh 12.11.1 Arjuna tells him the story of Śakra (i.e. Indra) and some ascetics, but Yuddhiṣṭhira remains indifferent and in MBh 12.18.1 Arjuna tries to persuade him with another ‘ancient story’ (purāvṛttam itihāsam…) about the conversation the king of Videha had with his wife. After a long attempt at persuasion through this story, Yudhiṣṭhira answers his younger brother with condescending words, stressing that he knows well the ‘two paths’ prescribed by the Vedas, that of renunciation and that of de
摘要Mahābhārata的itihāsa-s和柏拉图哲学的“epode”都经常被用于在情感威胁到人无法进行辩论的情况下进行说服。叙事理性有其成功和失败的条件，它打开了一个欢迎各种话语的话语舞台。在强调“从前”理性的心理功能时，有必要问一下这个故事的真正主角是谁，以及这个故事是否有自己的责任或法则要实现。佛法及其带来的所有困境构成了构成整个Mahābhārata的基本问题之一。在这篇文章中，我想知道Mahābhārata本身的佛法——一部给自己取名为“胜利”(jaya)的文学作品——以及它在那些听它、读它、研究它并与他人分享它的人的生活中所履行的文化使命。关键词:说服法柏拉图想象神话寓言披露声明作者未发现潜在的利益冲突。威廉·哈尔法斯(Wilhelm Halbfass)警告不要误解将吠陀的ṛta概念与佛法概念联系在一起。ṛta指的是一种自然的、宇宙的、超越的法律。“太阳确实有规律地升起，这并不意味着太阳遵循或完成了它自己的法。[…]佛法是雅利安人通过履行吠陀仪式和传统职责而实现的对社会和宇宙秩序和规范的持续维护”(Halbfass, Citation1988, pp. 315-316)。詹姆斯·L·菲茨杰拉德(James L . Fitzgerald, Citation2004b, p. 673)在对Mahābhārata中佛法概念的研究中同意哈尔法斯的观点:“我特别同意哈尔法斯强调佛法一词不是吠陀ṛta的衍生词，也不是指某种独立的、至高无上的宇宙自然法则。”我认为在Mahābhārata中很少或根本没有根据来证明这种对佛法的广泛理解。这篇文章中Śāntiparvan的所有翻译都摘自James L. Fitzgerald (Citation2004a)， the Mahābhārata。11. 《女人之书》。和平之书。芝加哥大学出版社。在这种集体劝说的背景下，Vyāsa (MBh, 12.34.5)将提醒Yudhiṣṭhira，战争只是“时间的工具”，因此，他和他的兄弟们都没有杀死任何人，他们只是执行了时间的设计，通过生命来表达自己。因此，在MBh 12.11.1中，阿尔诸那告诉他Śakra(即因陀罗)和一些苦行僧的故事，但Yuddhiṣṭhira仍然无动于衷，在MBh 12.18.1中，阿尔诸那试图用另一个“古老的故事”(purāvṛttam itihāsam…)来说服他，关于Videha国王与他妻子的对话。通过这个故事，Yudhiṣṭhira花了很长时间试图说服他的弟弟，Yudhiṣṭhira用居高俯下的话语回答他的弟弟，强调他很了解吠陀所规定的“两条路”，即出离和行(即nivṛtti和pravṛtti-mārga)，以及许多关于佛法的学术论文，欣赏其中的微妙之处，而阿尔诸那忽略了(MBh 12.19.1)。显然，当Kṛṣṇa、Vyāsa或Nārada用故事说服他时，这种反应不会发生。例如，在Most (Citation2012, p. 16)指出的柏拉图神话的八个特征中，第二个特征是叙述者比他的听众年龄大。然而，让我们不要忘记，轮回可以产生“反向关系”，在这种关系中，个体的年龄可能会被误导。在这些关系中，儿子比父亲更聪明，正是因为他年纪大，也就是说，因为他比他自己的父亲在现世中参与了更多的“来来去去”，经历了更多的人生。这发生在Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa(10-10-44)中，当苏门答腊请求他的父亲停止给他建议时，因为他不是孩子，他已经经历了太多的转世，知道如何行动。在这次谈话中，家庭关系被颠倒了，我们意识到生理年龄和意识或记忆年龄并不总是同步的。在Citraśala出版社出版的Mahābhārata的孟买版或通俗版中，这个神话的古代版本涵盖了Droṇaparvan的第52-54章，而在浦那关键版中，这个神话被归入Droṇaparvan的第一个附录。7 . Alf Hiltebeitel (Citation1990, p. 346)质疑编辑将这个故事归入附录的决定，因为在他看来，没有理由认为这个Vyāsa叙述是一种插入。正如我在另一篇西班牙文文章(Ferrández Formoso, Citation2022)中所讨论的，在这个神话中发生了一长串同情的和解。由于无法找到解决人口过剩问题的办法，Prajāpati让自己被愤怒(roṣa)所淹没，并以他巨大的火焰/能量(mahātejas)开始滥杀滥伤。
{"title":"Philosophical incantations ( <i>Itihāsa</i> and <i>Epode</i> ). The power of narrative reason in the <i>Mahābhārata</i>","authors":"Raquel Ferrández Formoso","doi":"10.1080/09552367.2023.2259189","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2023.2259189","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTBoth the itihāsa-s of the Mahābhārata and the Platonic philosophical ‘epode’ are often used to persuade in conditions where emotion threatens to incapacitate the person for argumentative discourse. Narrative reason has its own conditions of success and failure, opening up a discursive arena in which all kinds of utterances are welcome. Emphasizing the psychagogic function of the ‘once-upon-a-time’ reason, it is worth asking who the real protagonist of the story is and whether the story has a duty or a dharma of its own to fulfill. Dharma and all the dilemmas it brings along with it constitute one of the fundamental problems that make up the whole Mahābhārata. In this essay I wonder about the dharma of the Mahābhārata itself—a literary work which gives itself the name ‘triumph’ (jaya)—and the cultural mission it fulfills in the lives of those who hear it, read it, study it, and share it with others.KEYWORDS: PersuasiondharmaPlatoimaginationmythallegory Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1. Wilhelm Halbfass warns against the misunderstanding of associating the Vedic concept of ṛta, which refers to a natural, cosmic and transcendent law, with the concept of dharma. ‘The fact that the sun does rise with regularity does not mean that the sun is following or fulfilling its own dharma. […] Dharma it is the continuous maintaining of the social and cosmic order and norm which is achieved by the Aryan through the performance of his Vedic rites and traditional duties’ (Halbfass, Citation1988, pp. 315–316). In his study of the notion of dharma in the Mahābhārata, James L Fitzgerald (Citation2004b, p. 673) agrees with Halbfass: “In particular I agree with Halbfass’ emphasizing that the word dharma is not a descendent of Vedic ṛta and does not refer to some kind of free-standing, overarching cosmic natural law. I see little or no basis in the Mahābhārata justifying this wide-spread understanding of dharma”.2. All the translations in this essay of the Śāntiparvan are taken from James L. Fitzgerald (Citation2004a), The Mahābhārata. 11. The Book of Women. 12. The Book of Peace. Chicago University Press.3. In the context of this collective attempt at persuasion, Vyāsa (MBh, 12.34.5) will remind Yudhiṣṭhira that war has only been ‘an instrument of Time’, therefore, neither he nor his brothers have killed anyone, they have only carried out the designs of Time expressing itself through living beings.4. Thus, in MBh 12.11.1 Arjuna tells him the story of Śakra (i.e. Indra) and some ascetics, but Yuddhiṣṭhira remains indifferent and in MBh 12.18.1 Arjuna tries to persuade him with another ‘ancient story’ (purāvṛttam itihāsam…) about the conversation the king of Videha had with his wife. After a long attempt at persuasion through this story, Yudhiṣṭhira answers his younger brother with condescending words, stressing that he knows well the ‘two paths’ prescribed by the Vedas, that of renunciation and that of de","PeriodicalId":44358,"journal":{"name":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135015912","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-20DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2023.2247635
Wai Wai Chiu
ABSTRACT Guo Xiang’s philosophy of life, presented in the Commentary on the Zhuangzi, is sometimes characterized as advocating that people should follow their inborn qualities and be content with their given social positions. It is thus criticized as implying a form of passivism and conformism. This paper analyzes Guo’s account of ideal personhood and argues that although Guo does not think that everyone should become a sage or mystic, he allows everyone engage in self-cultivation. This is because one is advised to attain self-fulfillment through following one’s spontaneous tendency (xing 性), which is not equal to inborn qualities and does not preclude learning. Furthermore, since only the existence of sage ruler can ensure that people attain self-fulfillment completely, in reality people are not required to conform to the status quo.
{"title":"Guo Xiang’s account of ideal personhood: Self-fulfillment without the admiration of sages","authors":"Wai Wai Chiu","doi":"10.1080/09552367.2023.2247635","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2023.2247635","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Guo Xiang’s philosophy of life, presented in the Commentary on the Zhuangzi, is sometimes characterized as advocating that people should follow their inborn qualities and be content with their given social positions. It is thus criticized as implying a form of passivism and conformism. This paper analyzes Guo’s account of ideal personhood and argues that although Guo does not think that everyone should become a sage or mystic, he allows everyone engage in self-cultivation. This is because one is advised to attain self-fulfillment through following one’s spontaneous tendency (xing 性), which is not equal to inborn qualities and does not preclude learning. Furthermore, since only the existence of sage ruler can ensure that people attain self-fulfillment completely, in reality people are not required to conform to the status quo.","PeriodicalId":44358,"journal":{"name":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-08-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44810798","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-13DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2023.2247634
Ranie B. Villaver
ABSTRACT In the English language contemporary literature, there are mainly two philosophical approaches to interpretation of the Zhuangzi’s Happy Fish debate. The two approaches to the famous passage are the logical, which focuses on analysis, and the non-analytic, which focuses on context. The approaches are in tension with one another since one implies that the other is wrong. This paper suggests that the view that Zhuangzi holds an externalist view of justification according to the debate (here abbreviated as ZE) reconciles the approaches. ZE is the interpretation that says that in the debate, Zhuangzi is an externalist, in particular, a process reliabilist, because he takes sense perception as means to attaining knowledge. ZE reconciles the two approaches in that in each of them ZE is implicit. Ultimately, this paper not only offers a perspective about the two approaches, it also offers a view about the debate.
{"title":"Zhuangzi as externalist: Reconciling two interpretations of the Happy Fish debate","authors":"Ranie B. Villaver","doi":"10.1080/09552367.2023.2247634","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2023.2247634","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In the English language contemporary literature, there are mainly two philosophical approaches to interpretation of the Zhuangzi’s Happy Fish debate. The two approaches to the famous passage are the logical, which focuses on analysis, and the non-analytic, which focuses on context. The approaches are in tension with one another since one implies that the other is wrong. This paper suggests that the view that Zhuangzi holds an externalist view of justification according to the debate (here abbreviated as ZE) reconciles the approaches. ZE is the interpretation that says that in the debate, Zhuangzi is an externalist, in particular, a process reliabilist, because he takes sense perception as means to attaining knowledge. ZE reconciles the two approaches in that in each of them ZE is implicit. Ultimately, this paper not only offers a perspective about the two approaches, it also offers a view about the debate.","PeriodicalId":44358,"journal":{"name":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-08-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43879885","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-11DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2023.2234202
Jacob L. Bender
ABSTRACT This study clarifies how and why Daoist philosophers critique desires. For the Daoists, desires perceptually obstruct the capacity for people to understand and interpret situations. In particular, desires also obstruct the ability to understand that all things are interdependent and do not exist as independent ‘things’. Contrary to recent claims by scholars that Daoist philosophy encourages people to develop certain desires, in reality, the Daoist insists that we stick with our basic animal needs and do not depart from them.
{"title":"On being “without-desire” in Lao-Zhuang Daoism","authors":"Jacob L. Bender","doi":"10.1080/09552367.2023.2234202","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2023.2234202","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This study clarifies how and why Daoist philosophers critique desires. For the Daoists, desires perceptually obstruct the capacity for people to understand and interpret situations. In particular, desires also obstruct the ability to understand that all things are interdependent and do not exist as independent ‘things’. Contrary to recent claims by scholars that Daoist philosophy encourages people to develop certain desires, in reality, the Daoist insists that we stick with our basic animal needs and do not depart from them.","PeriodicalId":44358,"journal":{"name":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46700235","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-11DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2023.2235166
Yuzhou Yang
ABSTRACT The theme of ren nei yi wai (rnyw) 仁內義外 in the Mencius has been crucial for the understanding of traditional Confucian/Mencian xin-xing theory. However, contemporary studies inspired by new discoveries in the Guo Dian Chu Jian and/or Western analytical tradition pose challenges to the conventional understanding of rnyw and/or xin-xing. Despite their innovativeness, these discoveries and/or interpretations appear to be divorced from the original text. Through a contextual review of both those relevant studies and the debate of rnyw/xin-xing in the original (con)text, this study uncovers a hitherto neglected ‘inclusive methodology’ in Mencius’ philosophy. Mencius’ inclusive vision provides invaluable insights into a means of not only creatively reading the Mencius in close connection with the original text, but also fostering an effective comparative study between Chinese and Western cultures/philosophies.
{"title":"A contextual review of the Nei 內 (internality) / Wai 外 (externality) debate in the Mencius","authors":"Yuzhou Yang","doi":"10.1080/09552367.2023.2235166","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2023.2235166","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The theme of ren nei yi wai (rnyw) 仁內義外 in the Mencius has been crucial for the understanding of traditional Confucian/Mencian xin-xing theory. However, contemporary studies inspired by new discoveries in the Guo Dian Chu Jian and/or Western analytical tradition pose challenges to the conventional understanding of rnyw and/or xin-xing. Despite their innovativeness, these discoveries and/or interpretations appear to be divorced from the original text. Through a contextual review of both those relevant studies and the debate of rnyw/xin-xing in the original (con)text, this study uncovers a hitherto neglected ‘inclusive methodology’ in Mencius’ philosophy. Mencius’ inclusive vision provides invaluable insights into a means of not only creatively reading the Mencius in close connection with the original text, but also fostering an effective comparative study between Chinese and Western cultures/philosophies.","PeriodicalId":44358,"journal":{"name":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41958448","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-26DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2023.2225962
H. Khademi, R. Hesari
ABSTRACT Some scholars showed that Mīrdāmād believed in the ‘primacy of quiddity’ by adducing his theory of ‘the simple act of creation’ in which an entity’s quiddity is the ‘object‘ of the act of creation, and by adducing his belief that ‘existence‘ is constructed. Some other passages in Mīrdāmād’s work reinforce such attribution, made by his prominent student, Mullā Ṣadrā and his followers. This article offers a careful account of Mīrdāmād’s theory of ‘simple act of creation’ to assess the accuracy or inaccuracy of this attribution, and to provide a precise picture of quiddity in his philosophical system. The authors concluded that Mīrdāmād’s idea about ‘quiddity’ as the ‘object’ of creation by no means implies the primacy of quiddity as understood by Mullā Ṣadrā.By explicating his theory of ‘the simple act of creation’, they showed that it does’ imply the primacy of quiddity.
{"title":"Did Mīrdāmād believe in the primacy of quiddity?","authors":"H. Khademi, R. Hesari","doi":"10.1080/09552367.2023.2225962","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2023.2225962","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Some scholars showed that Mīrdāmād believed in the ‘primacy of quiddity’ by adducing his theory of ‘the simple act of creation’ in which an entity’s quiddity is the ‘object‘ of the act of creation, and by adducing his belief that ‘existence‘ is constructed. Some other passages in Mīrdāmād’s work reinforce such attribution, made by his prominent student, Mullā Ṣadrā and his followers. This article offers a careful account of Mīrdāmād’s theory of ‘simple act of creation’ to assess the accuracy or inaccuracy of this attribution, and to provide a precise picture of quiddity in his philosophical system. The authors concluded that Mīrdāmād’s idea about ‘quiddity’ as the ‘object’ of creation by no means implies the primacy of quiddity as understood by Mullā Ṣadrā.By explicating his theory of ‘the simple act of creation’, they showed that it does’ imply the primacy of quiddity.","PeriodicalId":44358,"journal":{"name":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49009855","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-20DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2023.2226784
T. Lim
ABSTRACT Three main themes emerge in Confucius’ response to the Ji family, reflecting the core tenets of his zeitgeist philosophy. Firstly, by criticizing the usurpation of Ji Shi 季氏 (the Ji family), he emphasized the moral principle of ‘overcoming oneself to return to ritual propriety’. Secondly, as a political philosopher, he stressed the importance of utility, emphasizing the concept of quandao 權道 (the way of the changeable), which implies that deviating from established principles can be valid in certain circumstances. Lastly, as an educator and reformer running the Confucian private school, he emphasized the importance of political realism. This educational goal stems from the specificity of the feudal era, and Confucius believed that governing the state and bringing peace to the world can only be achieved and advanced through public affairs.
{"title":"The multifaceted perspective: Confucius’ political philosophy as manifested in his perception and engagement with Ji Shi 季氏 (the Ji family)","authors":"T. Lim","doi":"10.1080/09552367.2023.2226784","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2023.2226784","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Three main themes emerge in Confucius’ response to the Ji family, reflecting the core tenets of his zeitgeist philosophy. Firstly, by criticizing the usurpation of Ji Shi 季氏 (the Ji family), he emphasized the moral principle of ‘overcoming oneself to return to ritual propriety’. Secondly, as a political philosopher, he stressed the importance of utility, emphasizing the concept of quandao 權道 (the way of the changeable), which implies that deviating from established principles can be valid in certain circumstances. Lastly, as an educator and reformer running the Confucian private school, he emphasized the importance of political realism. This educational goal stems from the specificity of the feudal era, and Confucius believed that governing the state and bringing peace to the world can only be achieved and advanced through public affairs.","PeriodicalId":44358,"journal":{"name":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-06-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45731561","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-07DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2023.2220245
Yuhan Liang
ABSTRACT When we face a choice between two incompatible actions, is there a universal priority? The early Confucians used the notion of quan 權 to navigate conflicts. On the one hand, quan can be a mean of weighing or assessing. Through quan, agents should be able to recognize the most valuable action and arrive at a universal priority. Thus, quan entails impersonal reasoning. On the other hand, quan means balancing, and its aim is to seek the most appropriate response. What is appropriate depends on each individual’s personal factors. Thus, quan implies personal reasoning. I argue that quan represents a holistic thinking process that includes both impersonal and personal reasoning. But agents cannot engage in these two types of reasoning simultaneously. By reverse engineering how exemplars would implement quan, I show that these two types of reasoning are primarily used in different kinds of value conflicts.
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Pub Date : 2023-05-08DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2023.2210008
H. M. Arani
ABSTRACT Lyric poetry, often regarded as the epitome of subjectivity in the realm of artistic expression, emerges from the depths of the poet’s personal emotions. Hence, in the aesthetic landscape of the nineteenth-century Germany, it was excluded from the inventory of genuine art forms, all of which were deemed to be objective and disinterested. Associating lyric poetry with music in its origin and essence, Nietzsche extends his Schopenhauerian metaphysics of music to the lyric, making it a highly objective art reverberating from the abyss of existence, the Ur-Eine, expressing its intrinsic self-contradictory and agonizing nature. A similar understanding of the creative process of poetic composition in the lyric, which this article aims to elucidate, can also be found in some of Rūmī’s ghazals and observations. These include a metaphysics of the unseen, a reunion through ecstasy and rapture, and a reflection and mirroring, initially through music and then through the lyric.
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Pub Date : 2023-05-05DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2023.2202545
Lunan Li
ABSTRACT By the late Ming, the concept of ‘the mind/heart-cum-principle’ 心即理 had generated confusion in the relations between xing (human nature) and xin (mind/heart). Moreover, with the increasing interpenetration of the three teachings of Confucianism, Buddhism and Daoism, some scholars became gravely concerned that the perversion of traditional Confucian thinking had resulted in the degeneration of the moral and social order. Li Cai (1529–1607) was one of these concerned scholars. Wielding the two concepts of ‘zhizhi’ (knowing the ultimate end) and ‘xiushen’ (self-cultivation) in the Great Learning, Li wrestled with Wang Yangming’s teachings by reasserting the primacy of xing, insisting that moral reality must involve direct individual action in order to preserve the unity of substance and effort. Li’s keen awareness of the inner tension between the mind/heart and xing not only prompted his critical reflections on Wang ’s thought but also on Zhu Xi’s. In so doing, he sought to address the fundamental question of what Confucianism is by clarifying the boundaries between the three teachings, and reshaping the spiritual values of Confucianism.
{"title":"Reasserting the primacy of xing (human nature) and self-cultivation (xiushen): Li Cai’s (1529-1607) defense of Confucianism against the interpenetration of the three teachings","authors":"Lunan Li","doi":"10.1080/09552367.2023.2202545","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2023.2202545","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT By the late Ming, the concept of ‘the mind/heart-cum-principle’ 心即理 had generated confusion in the relations between xing (human nature) and xin (mind/heart). Moreover, with the increasing interpenetration of the three teachings of Confucianism, Buddhism and Daoism, some scholars became gravely concerned that the perversion of traditional Confucian thinking had resulted in the degeneration of the moral and social order. Li Cai (1529–1607) was one of these concerned scholars. Wielding the two concepts of ‘zhizhi’ (knowing the ultimate end) and ‘xiushen’ (self-cultivation) in the Great Learning, Li wrestled with Wang Yangming’s teachings by reasserting the primacy of xing, insisting that moral reality must involve direct individual action in order to preserve the unity of substance and effort. Li’s keen awareness of the inner tension between the mind/heart and xing not only prompted his critical reflections on Wang ’s thought but also on Zhu Xi’s. In so doing, he sought to address the fundamental question of what Confucianism is by clarifying the boundaries between the three teachings, and reshaping the spiritual values of Confucianism.","PeriodicalId":44358,"journal":{"name":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-05-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47977033","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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