Pub Date : 2022-12-01DOI: 10.1177/14648849221127629
Marina Morani, Stephen Cushion, Maria Kyriakidou, Nikki Soo
The study examines the role of experts in UK television news at the start of the coronavirus pandemic by analysing both how they were used in coverage and perceived by news audiences. Our systematic content analysis of sources (N = 2300) used in the UK's flagship evening news bulletins found a reliance on political sources, principally from the government's perspective. We also discovered health and scientific experts received limited coverage and were only occasionally used to scrutinise public health policy. Yet, our six-week online diary study with 175 participants identified a strong preference for expert views about how the pandemic was being handled. It showed audiences favoured a range of expert sources in routine reporting - balancing government appointed and independent experts - to provide evidence-based scrutiny of the executive's decision-making. Overall, our findings contribute to a greater understanding of audience expectations, opinions, and experiences with broadcast news during a major public health crisis.
{"title":"Expert voices in the news reporting of the coronavirus pandemic: A study of UK television news bulletins and their audiences.","authors":"Marina Morani, Stephen Cushion, Maria Kyriakidou, Nikki Soo","doi":"10.1177/14648849221127629","DOIUrl":"10.1177/14648849221127629","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>The study examines the role of experts in UK television news at the start of the coronavirus pandemic by analysing both how they were used in coverage and perceived by news audiences. Our systematic content analysis of sources (<i>N</i> = 2300) used in the UK's flagship evening news bulletins found a reliance on political sources, principally from the government's perspective. We also discovered health and scientific experts received limited coverage and were only occasionally used to scrutinise public health policy. Yet, our six-week online diary study with 175 participants identified a strong preference for expert views about how the pandemic was being handled. It showed audiences favoured a range of expert sources in routine reporting - balancing government appointed and independent experts - to provide evidence-based scrutiny of the executive's decision-making. Overall, our findings contribute to a greater understanding of audience expectations, opinions, and experiences with broadcast news during a major public health crisis.</p>","PeriodicalId":44358,"journal":{"name":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":"26 1","pages":"2513-2532"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9510961/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81511628","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-23DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2023.2150384
Jana S. Rošker
ABSTRACT This paper introduces the philosophical theory of Feng Qi, an important modern Chinese philosopher, who is practically unknown in the West. I argue that his theory of knowledge is not limited to epistemology in the strict and narrow sense, but also refers to ontological and metaphysical issues. The paper shows how Feng Qi integrated ontological and ethical suppositions into the framework of what he called ‘expanded epistemology’. In this way, he offers an innovative solution to several problems, linked to the dichotomous relations of substance and phenomena. The article analyses and interprets his theoretical system in order to highlight that it represents an important contribution to comparative epistemology and its underlying methodology.
{"title":"Transforming knowledge to wisdom: Feng Qi and the new Neo-Marxist humanism","authors":"Jana S. Rošker","doi":"10.1080/09552367.2023.2150384","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2023.2150384","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This paper introduces the philosophical theory of Feng Qi, an important modern Chinese philosopher, who is practically unknown in the West. I argue that his theory of knowledge is not limited to epistemology in the strict and narrow sense, but also refers to ontological and metaphysical issues. The paper shows how Feng Qi integrated ontological and ethical suppositions into the framework of what he called ‘expanded epistemology’. In this way, he offers an innovative solution to several problems, linked to the dichotomous relations of substance and phenomena. The article analyses and interprets his theoretical system in order to highlight that it represents an important contribution to comparative epistemology and its underlying methodology.","PeriodicalId":44358,"journal":{"name":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":"33 1","pages":"29 - 49"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-11-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46672104","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-12DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2022.2120675
Neil Dalal
ABSTRACT This article analyzes Śaṅkara’s use of dreaming in Advaita Vedānta. For Śaṅkara, dreaming functions philosophically as a direct phenomenal inquiry into mind and consciousness. Dreaming also functions as a syllogistic illustration. While dreaming, we experience unreal objects that do not exist apart from our minds. Dreaming thus illustrates the waking world’s nonrealism despite perceiving it as real, and that waking objects are consciousness alone. However, the dream illustration raises several questions: In what ways does illusory dream reality extend to waking objects? And does Śaṅkara view the objective waking world as the individual’s cognitive construction similar to the dream, or as īśvara’s cosmological construction? This article argues that for Śaṅkara, the individual’s waking cognitive construction is primarily epistemological rather than an external ontological power akin to a creator deity; however, distinctions between individual and īśvara are ultimately indeterminable and lose meaning from the standpoint of nondual brahman.
{"title":"Śaṅkara’s philosophy of dreaming: Constructing an unreal world","authors":"Neil Dalal","doi":"10.1080/09552367.2022.2120675","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2022.2120675","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article analyzes Śaṅkara’s use of dreaming in Advaita Vedānta. For Śaṅkara, dreaming functions philosophically as a direct phenomenal inquiry into mind and consciousness. Dreaming also functions as a syllogistic illustration. While dreaming, we experience unreal objects that do not exist apart from our minds. Dreaming thus illustrates the waking world’s nonrealism despite perceiving it as real, and that waking objects are consciousness alone. However, the dream illustration raises several questions: In what ways does illusory dream reality extend to waking objects? And does Śaṅkara view the objective waking world as the individual’s cognitive construction similar to the dream, or as īśvara’s cosmological construction? This article argues that for Śaṅkara, the individual’s waking cognitive construction is primarily epistemological rather than an external ontological power akin to a creator deity; however, distinctions between individual and īśvara are ultimately indeterminable and lose meaning from the standpoint of nondual brahman.","PeriodicalId":44358,"journal":{"name":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":"32 1","pages":"398 - 419"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-09-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42825950","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-08DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2022.2119674
Tsering Nurboo
ABSTRACT The concept of reflexive awareness (Sanskrit svasaṃvedana or svasaṃvitti, Tibetan rang rig) is considered an important epistemological notion in the Dignāga tradition of Buddhist pramāṇa theory. The traditionally accepted view is that Dignāga advocates Yogācāra’s notion of reflexive awareness in the Pramāṇasamuccaya and Candrakīrti rejects it altogether. By contrast, the present paper revisits Dignāga and Candrakīrti in the context of svasaṃvedana and argues that Dignāga endorses the antarjñeyavādic notion of svasaṃvedana and Candrakīrti does not negate it at the conventional level. Candrakīrti attacks Dignāga by attributing him as an exponent of Sautrāntrika-Yogācāra notion of reflexive awareness, but his critique does not fundamentally affect Dignāga’s notion of reflexive awareness propounded in the Pramāṇasamuccaya. The submission of the paper is that the fundamental epistemic agenda of reflexive awareness in Dignāga and Candrakīrti is identical, though they diverge methodologically, and it is shown by reexamining Padma dkar po’s interpretation.
{"title":"The concept of svasaṃvedana in Dignāga and Candrakīrti","authors":"Tsering Nurboo","doi":"10.1080/09552367.2022.2119674","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2022.2119674","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The concept of reflexive awareness (Sanskrit svasaṃvedana or svasaṃvitti, Tibetan rang rig) is considered an important epistemological notion in the Dignāga tradition of Buddhist pramāṇa theory. The traditionally accepted view is that Dignāga advocates Yogācāra’s notion of reflexive awareness in the Pramāṇasamuccaya and Candrakīrti rejects it altogether. By contrast, the present paper revisits Dignāga and Candrakīrti in the context of svasaṃvedana and argues that Dignāga endorses the antarjñeyavādic notion of svasaṃvedana and Candrakīrti does not negate it at the conventional level. Candrakīrti attacks Dignāga by attributing him as an exponent of Sautrāntrika-Yogācāra notion of reflexive awareness, but his critique does not fundamentally affect Dignāga’s notion of reflexive awareness propounded in the Pramāṇasamuccaya. The submission of the paper is that the fundamental epistemic agenda of reflexive awareness in Dignāga and Candrakīrti is identical, though they diverge methodologically, and it is shown by reexamining Padma dkar po’s interpretation.","PeriodicalId":44358,"journal":{"name":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":"32 1","pages":"448 - 465"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-09-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41469523","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-08-05DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2022.2108108
Xudong Hao
ABSTRACT The debate between Zhuangzi and Huizi has profound epistemological significance, however, the main body of their debate comprises logical inferences and refutations. Therefore, this paper mainly focuses on the logical aspects of the debate. Some scholars have suggested that Huizi’s argument is self-contradictory; however, in fact, based on such evaluations of Huizi’s argument, we can conclude that Zhuangzi’s logic is also self-contradictory. By utilizing modern logical analysis tools, this study reveals what and how the propositions and inferences contained in the language of the debate are articulated accurately and strictly. Moreover, by elaborating on the implicit premises omitted by Zhuangzi and Huizi, the actual logical process of the debate can be restored, and the logical fallacy of clandestine change of argumentative issue are revealed. This study presents clear modern logic analysis of the debate; it can also provide a more reliable logical basis for the discussions of Zhuangzi and Huizi’s related philosophical thoughts.
{"title":"A logical analysis of the debate on Hao River","authors":"Xudong Hao","doi":"10.1080/09552367.2022.2108108","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2022.2108108","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The debate between Zhuangzi and Huizi has profound epistemological significance, however, the main body of their debate comprises logical inferences and refutations. Therefore, this paper mainly focuses on the logical aspects of the debate. Some scholars have suggested that Huizi’s argument is self-contradictory; however, in fact, based on such evaluations of Huizi’s argument, we can conclude that Zhuangzi’s logic is also self-contradictory. By utilizing modern logical analysis tools, this study reveals what and how the propositions and inferences contained in the language of the debate are articulated accurately and strictly. Moreover, by elaborating on the implicit premises omitted by Zhuangzi and Huizi, the actual logical process of the debate can be restored, and the logical fallacy of clandestine change of argumentative issue are revealed. This study presents clear modern logic analysis of the debate; it can also provide a more reliable logical basis for the discussions of Zhuangzi and Huizi’s related philosophical thoughts.","PeriodicalId":44358,"journal":{"name":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":"32 1","pages":"439 - 447"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-08-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48060791","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-08-01DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2022.2107791
Emerson R. Bodde
ABSTRACT In this paper, drawing upon Tosaka Jun’s response to Interwar debates on historicism and his account of everydayness, I offer an explanation for why contemporary secular apocalyptic claims lack convergence by focusing on the historical dimension of such claims. Everydayness, organized the routines of work and rest, is shown to be the basis for a sense of historical time, and theoretical journalism is outlined as the kind of collective epistemic procedure needed to produce a collective sense of a community’s place in historical time. I defend the claim that the cause of starkly opposed responses to apocalyptic claims is due to qualitative differences in the work and rest that organize the everyday temporality. In the absence of a theoretical journalism, whether one subscribes to an apocalyptic claim will be contingent on heterogeneous personal circumstance. I conclude by outlining a limit case of indigenous post-apocalyptic claims under settler-colonialism.
{"title":"Apocalyptic claims and the everyday: Tosaka Jun, history, and journalism","authors":"Emerson R. Bodde","doi":"10.1080/09552367.2022.2107791","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2022.2107791","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In this paper, drawing upon Tosaka Jun’s response to Interwar debates on historicism and his account of everydayness, I offer an explanation for why contemporary secular apocalyptic claims lack convergence by focusing on the historical dimension of such claims. Everydayness, organized the routines of work and rest, is shown to be the basis for a sense of historical time, and theoretical journalism is outlined as the kind of collective epistemic procedure needed to produce a collective sense of a community’s place in historical time. I defend the claim that the cause of starkly opposed responses to apocalyptic claims is due to qualitative differences in the work and rest that organize the everyday temporality. In the absence of a theoretical journalism, whether one subscribes to an apocalyptic claim will be contingent on heterogeneous personal circumstance. I conclude by outlining a limit case of indigenous post-apocalyptic claims under settler-colonialism.","PeriodicalId":44358,"journal":{"name":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":"32 1","pages":"383 - 397"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45261607","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-17DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2022.2099108
Kanghun Ahn
ABSTRACT This paper investigates Mencius’s notion of sympathy from the perspective of evolutionary biology. First, I point out that Mencius and evolutionary biologists concur that humans are endowed with a unique ability to sympathize with others beyond kin and friends. Subsequently, I offer an analytic account from an evolutionary perspective on how this ability emerged and developed as an innate human quality—especially referencing recent theories that state that cooperation is a crucial factor that helped foster such a quality. Further, this paper addresses in-group/out-group distinction in terms of the scope of sympathy. In particular, I respond to Donald Munro’s thesis that this distinction serves as a critical boundary for the workings of sympathy. Finally, I show that Mencius’s (and other Confucian thinkers’) thoughts on sympathy are not only compatible with modern evolutionary discourses but also contribute to the psychological mechanisms that may have enabled humans to regard others with sympathetic concern. Thus, this essay sheds light on the mechanisms of sympathy that Mencius and other Confucian thinkers illustrated as identifying oneself or one’s kin with others. I then surmise that such mechanisms most likely emerged as a fundamental psychological principle for humans initially reaching out to others.
{"title":"The origin of human morality: An evolutionary perspective on Mencius’s notion of sympathy","authors":"Kanghun Ahn","doi":"10.1080/09552367.2022.2099108","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2022.2099108","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This paper investigates Mencius’s notion of sympathy from the perspective of evolutionary biology. First, I point out that Mencius and evolutionary biologists concur that humans are endowed with a unique ability to sympathize with others beyond kin and friends. Subsequently, I offer an analytic account from an evolutionary perspective on how this ability emerged and developed as an innate human quality—especially referencing recent theories that state that cooperation is a crucial factor that helped foster such a quality. Further, this paper addresses in-group/out-group distinction in terms of the scope of sympathy. In particular, I respond to Donald Munro’s thesis that this distinction serves as a critical boundary for the workings of sympathy. Finally, I show that Mencius’s (and other Confucian thinkers’) thoughts on sympathy are not only compatible with modern evolutionary discourses but also contribute to the psychological mechanisms that may have enabled humans to regard others with sympathetic concern. Thus, this essay sheds light on the mechanisms of sympathy that Mencius and other Confucian thinkers illustrated as identifying oneself or one’s kin with others. I then surmise that such mechanisms most likely emerged as a fundamental psychological principle for humans initially reaching out to others.","PeriodicalId":44358,"journal":{"name":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":"32 1","pages":"365 - 382"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-07-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49245449","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-13DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2022.2099104
P. D’Ambrosio
ABSTRACT In philosophical interpretations of the Laozi the function of the ‘sage’ is a relatively under concentrated on topic. Although nearly every scholar does have something to say about the sage, comments are usually brief and often revolve around the sage as some particular character-type; for example highlighting the sage as a ‘sage-ruler’. In this article we will argue that the sage serves as a tool for understanding the major concepts, thinking, and logic of the Laozi. While the sage does often refer to the sage-ruler this does not mean all references are politically orientated, and even those that are can easily be applied to a host of social situations. This paper thus seeks to appreciate the context for what the Laozi says by looking at how the text itself envisions the embodiment of its ideas through reference to the sage.
{"title":"On the philosophical function of the ‘sage’ in the Laozi","authors":"P. D’Ambrosio","doi":"10.1080/09552367.2022.2099104","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2022.2099104","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In philosophical interpretations of the Laozi the function of the ‘sage’ is a relatively under concentrated on topic. Although nearly every scholar does have something to say about the sage, comments are usually brief and often revolve around the sage as some particular character-type; for example highlighting the sage as a ‘sage-ruler’. In this article we will argue that the sage serves as a tool for understanding the major concepts, thinking, and logic of the Laozi. While the sage does often refer to the sage-ruler this does not mean all references are politically orientated, and even those that are can easily be applied to a host of social situations. This paper thus seeks to appreciate the context for what the Laozi says by looking at how the text itself envisions the embodiment of its ideas through reference to the sage.","PeriodicalId":44358,"journal":{"name":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":"32 1","pages":"420 - 438"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-07-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44673624","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-06-28DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2022.2079824
Chen Hsiao
ABSTRACT This paper discusses the relation between meditative practices and games, and argues that it is reasonable to see meditative practices as games based on structural features they have in common as well as the text in the 15th Assembly of the Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra, which teaches the perfection of meditative absorption and compares meditative practices to playing games implicitly. This paper then puts meditative practices seen as games in the big picture of the Buddhist Path to Enlightenment, points out in contrast to meditative practices, playing games involves two problems people face nowadays, which I call the win–lose mindset and being too emotionally invested in playing games, and develops coping strategies to cope with these problems. These coping strategies are not constructed arbitrarily but of essential features of Bodhisattvas’ meditative practices, such as non-dualistic perspectives and non-obtainment, and these features lead to a path of cessation of both problems that afflict present-day game-playing. All in all, paying more attention to mental qualities that can be engendered and cultivated in playing games is suggested in this paper.
{"title":"Some suggestions on playing games through reading the 15th Assembly of the Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra","authors":"Chen Hsiao","doi":"10.1080/09552367.2022.2079824","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2022.2079824","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This paper discusses the relation between meditative practices and games, and argues that it is reasonable to see meditative practices as games based on structural features they have in common as well as the text in the 15th Assembly of the Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra, which teaches the perfection of meditative absorption and compares meditative practices to playing games implicitly. This paper then puts meditative practices seen as games in the big picture of the Buddhist Path to Enlightenment, points out in contrast to meditative practices, playing games involves two problems people face nowadays, which I call the win–lose mindset and being too emotionally invested in playing games, and develops coping strategies to cope with these problems. These coping strategies are not constructed arbitrarily but of essential features of Bodhisattvas’ meditative practices, such as non-dualistic perspectives and non-obtainment, and these features lead to a path of cessation of both problems that afflict present-day game-playing. All in all, paying more attention to mental qualities that can be engendered and cultivated in playing games is suggested in this paper.","PeriodicalId":44358,"journal":{"name":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":"165 1","pages":"331 - 349"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41259114","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-06-11DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2022.2063541
Amirhossein Zadyousefi
ABSTRACT (i) God is omniscient; therefore, for any two propositions, P1 and P2, God knows both that P1 and P2. (ii) If God knows multiple things, then God is not simple. (iii) But, God is supposed to be a simple being. As is clear, propositions (i)–(iii) form an inconsistent triad. This is the general form of one of the problems, which I call the Problem of Plurality (PP), with which Avicenna was engaged concerning God’s knowledge and especially God’s knowledge of particulars. In the secondary literature around Avicenna’s theory of God’s knowledge of particulars PP has not been scrutinized. But, in this paper, without discussing Avicenna’s theory of God’s knowledge of particulars, I will explain exactly what this problem is.
{"title":"Avicenna on the problem of God’s knowledge of multiple things","authors":"Amirhossein Zadyousefi","doi":"10.1080/09552367.2022.2063541","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2022.2063541","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT (i) God is omniscient; therefore, for any two propositions, P1 and P2, God knows both that P1 and P2. (ii) If God knows multiple things, then God is not simple. (iii) But, God is supposed to be a simple being. As is clear, propositions (i)–(iii) form an inconsistent triad. This is the general form of one of the problems, which I call the Problem of Plurality (PP), with which Avicenna was engaged concerning God’s knowledge and especially God’s knowledge of particulars. In the secondary literature around Avicenna’s theory of God’s knowledge of particulars PP has not been scrutinized. But, in this paper, without discussing Avicenna’s theory of God’s knowledge of particulars, I will explain exactly what this problem is.","PeriodicalId":44358,"journal":{"name":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":"32 1","pages":"237 - 250"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-06-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48004398","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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