Pub Date : 2022-06-03DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2022.2083301
Jana S. Rošker
ABSTRACT In the final decades of the 20th century, the majority of modern Sinophone scholars believed that Confucianism was an outdated and obsolete ideology that was not only unsuitable for the development of modern science and democratic societies, but also responsible for the deep social and political crisis that had branded China for the previous two centuries. Modern New Confucians, however, never assumed that the Confucian system was responsible for such a situation. Most of them believed that Confucianism was compatible with science and democracy. Moreover, the majority of them assumed that the East Asian cultures would never be able to develop truly democratic structures of their societies unless they incorporated the appropriate elements of their own, i.e. Confucian, traditions. This paper critically analyses the theoretical models of Tang Junyi and Mou Zongsan on the possible revival and development of Confucian proto-democracies.
{"title":"Two models of Confucian democracy: A contrastive analysis of Tang Junyi’s and Mou Zongsan’s political philosophy","authors":"Jana S. Rošker","doi":"10.1080/09552367.2022.2083301","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2022.2083301","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In the final decades of the 20th century, the majority of modern Sinophone scholars believed that Confucianism was an outdated and obsolete ideology that was not only unsuitable for the development of modern science and democratic societies, but also responsible for the deep social and political crisis that had branded China for the previous two centuries. Modern New Confucians, however, never assumed that the Confucian system was responsible for such a situation. Most of them believed that Confucianism was compatible with science and democracy. Moreover, the majority of them assumed that the East Asian cultures would never be able to develop truly democratic structures of their societies unless they incorporated the appropriate elements of their own, i.e. Confucian, traditions. This paper critically analyses the theoretical models of Tang Junyi and Mou Zongsan on the possible revival and development of Confucian proto-democracies.","PeriodicalId":44358,"journal":{"name":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":"32 1","pages":"350 - 363"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44451150","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-11DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2022.2073523
Meng Zhang
ABSTRACT This paper examines the current scholarship on Mengzi’s metaethical thoughts and reconstructs Mengzi’s view to contribute to our understanding of the relation between sensibility and the apparent objectivity of morality. I first overview two features of morality that an adequate metaethical theory needs to account for—the apparent objectivity and the motivational force of moral values, highlighting the potential of Mengzi’s thought to explain both. Then I examine previous reconstructions of Mengzi’s metaethics. Both the naturalism approach and the sensibility theory approach capture important features of Mengzi’s view but have defects. I argue that Mengzi’s view may help revise a sensibility theory that models moral properties on secondary qualities like colors, and thus, preserves the alleged merit of it—being able to account for the two features of morality.
{"title":"Sensibility and moral values in Mengzi’s metaethics","authors":"Meng Zhang","doi":"10.1080/09552367.2022.2073523","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2022.2073523","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This paper examines the current scholarship on Mengzi’s metaethical thoughts and reconstructs Mengzi’s view to contribute to our understanding of the relation between sensibility and the apparent objectivity of morality. I first overview two features of morality that an adequate metaethical theory needs to account for—the apparent objectivity and the motivational force of moral values, highlighting the potential of Mengzi’s thought to explain both. Then I examine previous reconstructions of Mengzi’s metaethics. Both the naturalism approach and the sensibility theory approach capture important features of Mengzi’s view but have defects. I argue that Mengzi’s view may help revise a sensibility theory that models moral properties on secondary qualities like colors, and thus, preserves the alleged merit of it—being able to account for the two features of morality.","PeriodicalId":44358,"journal":{"name":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":"32 1","pages":"312 - 330"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-05-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46610528","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-26DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2022.2066990
K. Sun
ABSTRACT The theory of ‘Confucianization of law’ put forward by T’ung-tsu Ch’ü in his book titled Law and Society in Traditional China has a great academic influence in the world. However, ‘Confucianization of law’ is like ‘flowers in a mirror’ because its concept is too one-sided and ambiguous to describe ancient Chinese legal philosophy. Although it once has helped non-Chinese understand ancient Chinese legal philosophy, it is essentially a hypothesis of Ch’ü after reading limited historical materials and easily leading to a simple understanding of the dichotomy of Confucianism and Legalism in ancient Chinese legal philosophy. To distinguish the origin, concept, and related disputes of ‘Confucianization of law’ is helpful to discover the multicultural background of ancient Chinese legal philosophy and find the fact that Confucianism itself is alienated by politics. From the perspective of political pragmatism, there is no difference between Confucianism and Legalism in essence, but in means.
{"title":"Flowers in a mirror: Critique of ‘Confucianization of law’","authors":"K. Sun","doi":"10.1080/09552367.2022.2066990","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2022.2066990","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The theory of ‘Confucianization of law’ put forward by T’ung-tsu Ch’ü in his book titled Law and Society in Traditional China has a great academic influence in the world. However, ‘Confucianization of law’ is like ‘flowers in a mirror’ because its concept is too one-sided and ambiguous to describe ancient Chinese legal philosophy. Although it once has helped non-Chinese understand ancient Chinese legal philosophy, it is essentially a hypothesis of Ch’ü after reading limited historical materials and easily leading to a simple understanding of the dichotomy of Confucianism and Legalism in ancient Chinese legal philosophy. To distinguish the origin, concept, and related disputes of ‘Confucianization of law’ is helpful to discover the multicultural background of ancient Chinese legal philosophy and find the fact that Confucianism itself is alienated by politics. From the perspective of political pragmatism, there is no difference between Confucianism and Legalism in essence, but in means.","PeriodicalId":44358,"journal":{"name":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":"32 1","pages":"289 - 311"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-04-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42604236","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-25DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2022.2066283
Liang Liu
ABSTRACT Shi is fundamental and indispensable in understanding Han Fei’s political philosophy. Han Feizi presents a political term with different meanings such as power, status, and situation. Han Fei’s doctrine of Shi attempts to consolidate and strengthen the prince’s Shi by limiting the subjects’ status and power. Any knighthood or government position must be granted by following suitable inheritance principles or appointment rules. The actual dominance of any person must be strictly matched with their rank of nobility or seniority of position. This hierarchy of dominance puts the prince at the top with unmatched power, who can then engage in coercion to eliminate anyone who is not submissive, and create terror to effectively control the subjects.
{"title":"The art of setting up authority: Han Fei’s doctrine of Shi","authors":"Liang Liu","doi":"10.1080/09552367.2022.2066283","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2022.2066283","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Shi is fundamental and indispensable in understanding Han Fei’s political philosophy. Han Feizi presents a political term with different meanings such as power, status, and situation. Han Fei’s doctrine of Shi attempts to consolidate and strengthen the prince’s Shi by limiting the subjects’ status and power. Any knighthood or government position must be granted by following suitable inheritance principles or appointment rules. The actual dominance of any person must be strictly matched with their rank of nobility or seniority of position. This hierarchy of dominance puts the prince at the top with unmatched power, who can then engage in coercion to eliminate anyone who is not submissive, and create terror to effectively control the subjects.","PeriodicalId":44358,"journal":{"name":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":"32 1","pages":"270 - 288"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47078783","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-19DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2022.2066282
Yu Jiang-xia
ABSTRACT The significant role of skill in Zhuangzi’s good life has been argued by most Zhuangzi scholars. However, there is ongoing debate concerning the psychological and behavioral mechanisms that underwrite the skillful activity and the way it contributes to a good life. Based on previous research, this paper makes a comparative study between Buddhism, Daoism, and Stoicism. The aim is to prove that practical wisdom, which involves both reflection and spontaneity, plays a helpful role in understanding Zhuangzian skillful activity by connecting skilled performance to the wise way of living. Importantly, this can be compared to the Buddhist teachings of skillful (kusala) action and skillful means (upāya) as well as the Stoic account of skill (technē) and art of life. A three-way comparison shows that skillful activity is deeply bound up with practical wisdom in the three traditions, which enables one to act appropriately and live skillfully.
{"title":"The skillful living in the Zhuangzi, Buddhism, and Stoicism","authors":"Yu Jiang-xia","doi":"10.1080/09552367.2022.2066282","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2022.2066282","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The significant role of skill in Zhuangzi’s good life has been argued by most Zhuangzi scholars. However, there is ongoing debate concerning the psychological and behavioral mechanisms that underwrite the skillful activity and the way it contributes to a good life. Based on previous research, this paper makes a comparative study between Buddhism, Daoism, and Stoicism. The aim is to prove that practical wisdom, which involves both reflection and spontaneity, plays a helpful role in understanding Zhuangzian skillful activity by connecting skilled performance to the wise way of living. Importantly, this can be compared to the Buddhist teachings of skillful (kusala) action and skillful means (upāya) as well as the Stoic account of skill (technē) and art of life. A three-way comparison shows that skillful activity is deeply bound up with practical wisdom in the three traditions, which enables one to act appropriately and live skillfully.","PeriodicalId":44358,"journal":{"name":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":"32 1","pages":"251 - 269"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-04-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49135343","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-03DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2022.2044453
T. Botz-Bornstein
ABSTRACT I compare the Japanese philosopher Nishida Kitaro (1870–1945) with the Egyptian philosopher and reformer Muhammad ‘Abduh (1849–1905). Both philosophies emerged within similar cultural contexts. Both thinkers attempt to think relationships between the individual and the universal through organic models. In parallel, both philosophies produce paradoxical positions regarding the integration of reason and religion. Like ‘Abduh, Nishida is interested in the unity of God. How do we have to think the unity of God when every unity is only composed of individuals? ‘Abduh avoids Aristotelian substances by claiming that the physical world emerges. Similarly, Nishida thinks that the world emerges as a place (basho). Both conceptions contradict Aristotelian logic because both avoid the idea of identity, which is necessary for any abstract logic.
{"title":"Nishida Kitarō and Muhammad ‘Abduh on God and reason: Towards a theology of place","authors":"T. Botz-Bornstein","doi":"10.1080/09552367.2022.2044453","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2022.2044453","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT I compare the Japanese philosopher Nishida Kitaro (1870–1945) with the Egyptian philosopher and reformer Muhammad ‘Abduh (1849–1905). Both philosophies emerged within similar cultural contexts. Both thinkers attempt to think relationships between the individual and the universal through organic models. In parallel, both philosophies produce paradoxical positions regarding the integration of reason and religion. Like ‘Abduh, Nishida is interested in the unity of God. How do we have to think the unity of God when every unity is only composed of individuals? ‘Abduh avoids Aristotelian substances by claiming that the physical world emerges. Similarly, Nishida thinks that the world emerges as a place (basho). Both conceptions contradict Aristotelian logic because both avoid the idea of identity, which is necessary for any abstract logic.","PeriodicalId":44358,"journal":{"name":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":"32 1","pages":"105 - 125"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"59491629","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-07DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2021.1977456
Yujian Zheng
ABSTRACT I bring a new thesis of historical holism to bear on the well-known Mencius-Xunzi dispute about xing/性. The significance of doing so seems bi-directional: in the first direction, i.e. applying the thesis to the dispute, my reconstruction of both Mencius’s and Xunzi’s views aims at revealing a largely neglected but important aspect of Confucian thought. While in the second direction, whoever is otherwise convinced by the Mencian insight may find its successful reconstruction as a case of historical holism good evidence for the thesis itself, which seems ground-breaking in certain areas of contemporary analytic philosophy. The paper largely focuses on the first direction, with quite detailed exposition of key analytic elements for understanding historical holism. A notion of retrospective necessity stands out in the exposition, supporting the main idea of path-bound normativity which turns out to be, for our present case, a notion of implicit and endogenous normativity.
{"title":"Path-bound normativity and a Confucian case of historical holism","authors":"Yujian Zheng","doi":"10.1080/09552367.2021.1977456","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2021.1977456","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT I bring a new thesis of historical holism to bear on the well-known Mencius-Xunzi dispute about xing/性. The significance of doing so seems bi-directional: in the first direction, i.e. applying the thesis to the dispute, my reconstruction of both Mencius’s and Xunzi’s views aims at revealing a largely neglected but important aspect of Confucian thought. While in the second direction, whoever is otherwise convinced by the Mencian insight may find its successful reconstruction as a case of historical holism good evidence for the thesis itself, which seems ground-breaking in certain areas of contemporary analytic philosophy. The paper largely focuses on the first direction, with quite detailed exposition of key analytic elements for understanding historical holism. A notion of retrospective necessity stands out in the exposition, supporting the main idea of path-bound normativity which turns out to be, for our present case, a notion of implicit and endogenous normativity.","PeriodicalId":44358,"journal":{"name":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":"32 1","pages":"215 - 235"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-03-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45010075","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-04DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2021.1983951
Yunwoo Song
ABSTRACT The idea of the Confucian sage-king can be politically dangerous if the implication is that anyone can become a sage through learning. But Confucians after the Han dynasty generally saw the task of becoming a sage practically impossible, while Neo-Confucians after the Song distinguished between the moral and the political authorities. Zhang Zai of the Northern Song dynasty, however, maintained both that anyone can become a sage through learning and that a sage should necessarily receive Heaven’s mandate. But Zhang had a unique concept of a ‘great person,’ which enabled him to escape the seemingly inevitable conclusion that anyone can become a king. For Zhang, a great person is practically indistinguishable from a sage, meaning that no one can testify to another person’s sagehood. This makes any claim to the political authority based on virtue groundless. Thus, despite preserving the ideal of a sage-king, Zhang Zai could deny virtually all means of replacing the current king.
{"title":"Sage and great person in Zhang Zai’s thought","authors":"Yunwoo Song","doi":"10.1080/09552367.2021.1983951","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2021.1983951","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The idea of the Confucian sage-king can be politically dangerous if the implication is that anyone can become a sage through learning. But Confucians after the Han dynasty generally saw the task of becoming a sage practically impossible, while Neo-Confucians after the Song distinguished between the moral and the political authorities. Zhang Zai of the Northern Song dynasty, however, maintained both that anyone can become a sage through learning and that a sage should necessarily receive Heaven’s mandate. But Zhang had a unique concept of a ‘great person,’ which enabled him to escape the seemingly inevitable conclusion that anyone can become a king. For Zhang, a great person is practically indistinguishable from a sage, meaning that no one can testify to another person’s sagehood. This makes any claim to the political authority based on virtue groundless. Thus, despite preserving the ideal of a sage-king, Zhang Zai could deny virtually all means of replacing the current king.","PeriodicalId":44358,"journal":{"name":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":"32 1","pages":"189 - 200"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43357775","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-02-24DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2022.2044524
John R. Williams
ABSTRACT To advance our understanding of both the Book of Zhuāngzǐ 莊子 (c. fourth to third century BCE) and Qián Mù 錢穆 (1895–1990)’s Zhuāngzǐ studies 莊學, I aim to squarely face one of the more obscure passages in the former with recourse to an explanation from the latter. The passage in question is that from the second chapter beginning with the claim ‘there is a beginning’ (有始也者) and culminating with the claim that ‘there has not yet begun to be a “there has not yet begun to be nothing”’ (有未始有夫未始有無也者). I hope to show that Qián offers a compelling and novel interpretation of this difficult passage worthy of our consideration.
{"title":"Qian Mu reads Zhuangzi: Regarding ‘there has not yet begun to be a “there has not yet begun to be nothing”’","authors":"John R. Williams","doi":"10.1080/09552367.2022.2044524","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2022.2044524","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT To advance our understanding of both the Book of Zhuāngzǐ 莊子 (c. fourth to third century BCE) and Qián Mù 錢穆 (1895–1990)’s Zhuāngzǐ studies 莊學, I aim to squarely face one of the more obscure passages in the former with recourse to an explanation from the latter. The passage in question is that from the second chapter beginning with the claim ‘there is a beginning’ (有始也者) and culminating with the claim that ‘there has not yet begun to be a “there has not yet begun to be nothing”’ (有未始有夫未始有無也者). I hope to show that Qián offers a compelling and novel interpretation of this difficult passage worthy of our consideration.","PeriodicalId":44358,"journal":{"name":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":"32 1","pages":"164 - 171"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-02-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47931422","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-02-03DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2022.2034279
Fernando Wirtz
ABSTRACT In this paper, I argue that Miki’s concept of myth offers a continuation and consolidation of his Philosophy of History (1932), providing an important conceptual tool to comprehend his philosophical project. To understand Miki’s originality, it is important to contrast his conception of history with that of Rickert’s, one of Miki’s professors during his stay in Germany. Although scholarship about the Kyōto School does not mention these texts, between 1932 and 1935, Miki’s writing focuses on the importance of myth as a manifestation of the historical consciousness during periods of social crisis. Thus, myth, as a form of knowledge tied to the most fundamental ontological level of human existence (that Miki calls ‘fact’), was able to serve as an operationalization of social change.
{"title":"Miki Kiyoshi’s Philosophy of History and the historical role of myth","authors":"Fernando Wirtz","doi":"10.1080/09552367.2022.2034279","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2022.2034279","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In this paper, I argue that Miki’s concept of myth offers a continuation and consolidation of his Philosophy of History (1932), providing an important conceptual tool to comprehend his philosophical project. To understand Miki’s originality, it is important to contrast his conception of history with that of Rickert’s, one of Miki’s professors during his stay in Germany. Although scholarship about the Kyōto School does not mention these texts, between 1932 and 1935, Miki’s writing focuses on the importance of myth as a manifestation of the historical consciousness during periods of social crisis. Thus, myth, as a form of knowledge tied to the most fundamental ontological level of human existence (that Miki calls ‘fact’), was able to serve as an operationalization of social change.","PeriodicalId":44358,"journal":{"name":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":"32 1","pages":"172 - 188"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-02-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49238866","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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