Pub Date : 2022-07-17DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2022.2099108
Kanghun Ahn
ABSTRACT This paper investigates Mencius’s notion of sympathy from the perspective of evolutionary biology. First, I point out that Mencius and evolutionary biologists concur that humans are endowed with a unique ability to sympathize with others beyond kin and friends. Subsequently, I offer an analytic account from an evolutionary perspective on how this ability emerged and developed as an innate human quality—especially referencing recent theories that state that cooperation is a crucial factor that helped foster such a quality. Further, this paper addresses in-group/out-group distinction in terms of the scope of sympathy. In particular, I respond to Donald Munro’s thesis that this distinction serves as a critical boundary for the workings of sympathy. Finally, I show that Mencius’s (and other Confucian thinkers’) thoughts on sympathy are not only compatible with modern evolutionary discourses but also contribute to the psychological mechanisms that may have enabled humans to regard others with sympathetic concern. Thus, this essay sheds light on the mechanisms of sympathy that Mencius and other Confucian thinkers illustrated as identifying oneself or one’s kin with others. I then surmise that such mechanisms most likely emerged as a fundamental psychological principle for humans initially reaching out to others.
{"title":"The origin of human morality: An evolutionary perspective on Mencius’s notion of sympathy","authors":"Kanghun Ahn","doi":"10.1080/09552367.2022.2099108","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2022.2099108","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This paper investigates Mencius’s notion of sympathy from the perspective of evolutionary biology. First, I point out that Mencius and evolutionary biologists concur that humans are endowed with a unique ability to sympathize with others beyond kin and friends. Subsequently, I offer an analytic account from an evolutionary perspective on how this ability emerged and developed as an innate human quality—especially referencing recent theories that state that cooperation is a crucial factor that helped foster such a quality. Further, this paper addresses in-group/out-group distinction in terms of the scope of sympathy. In particular, I respond to Donald Munro’s thesis that this distinction serves as a critical boundary for the workings of sympathy. Finally, I show that Mencius’s (and other Confucian thinkers’) thoughts on sympathy are not only compatible with modern evolutionary discourses but also contribute to the psychological mechanisms that may have enabled humans to regard others with sympathetic concern. Thus, this essay sheds light on the mechanisms of sympathy that Mencius and other Confucian thinkers illustrated as identifying oneself or one’s kin with others. I then surmise that such mechanisms most likely emerged as a fundamental psychological principle for humans initially reaching out to others.","PeriodicalId":44358,"journal":{"name":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-07-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49245449","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-13DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2022.2099104
P. D’Ambrosio
ABSTRACT In philosophical interpretations of the Laozi the function of the ‘sage’ is a relatively under concentrated on topic. Although nearly every scholar does have something to say about the sage, comments are usually brief and often revolve around the sage as some particular character-type; for example highlighting the sage as a ‘sage-ruler’. In this article we will argue that the sage serves as a tool for understanding the major concepts, thinking, and logic of the Laozi. While the sage does often refer to the sage-ruler this does not mean all references are politically orientated, and even those that are can easily be applied to a host of social situations. This paper thus seeks to appreciate the context for what the Laozi says by looking at how the text itself envisions the embodiment of its ideas through reference to the sage.
{"title":"On the philosophical function of the ‘sage’ in the Laozi","authors":"P. D’Ambrosio","doi":"10.1080/09552367.2022.2099104","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2022.2099104","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In philosophical interpretations of the Laozi the function of the ‘sage’ is a relatively under concentrated on topic. Although nearly every scholar does have something to say about the sage, comments are usually brief and often revolve around the sage as some particular character-type; for example highlighting the sage as a ‘sage-ruler’. In this article we will argue that the sage serves as a tool for understanding the major concepts, thinking, and logic of the Laozi. While the sage does often refer to the sage-ruler this does not mean all references are politically orientated, and even those that are can easily be applied to a host of social situations. This paper thus seeks to appreciate the context for what the Laozi says by looking at how the text itself envisions the embodiment of its ideas through reference to the sage.","PeriodicalId":44358,"journal":{"name":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-07-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44673624","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-06-28DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2022.2079824
Chen Hsiao
ABSTRACT This paper discusses the relation between meditative practices and games, and argues that it is reasonable to see meditative practices as games based on structural features they have in common as well as the text in the 15th Assembly of the Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra, which teaches the perfection of meditative absorption and compares meditative practices to playing games implicitly. This paper then puts meditative practices seen as games in the big picture of the Buddhist Path to Enlightenment, points out in contrast to meditative practices, playing games involves two problems people face nowadays, which I call the win–lose mindset and being too emotionally invested in playing games, and develops coping strategies to cope with these problems. These coping strategies are not constructed arbitrarily but of essential features of Bodhisattvas’ meditative practices, such as non-dualistic perspectives and non-obtainment, and these features lead to a path of cessation of both problems that afflict present-day game-playing. All in all, paying more attention to mental qualities that can be engendered and cultivated in playing games is suggested in this paper.
{"title":"Some suggestions on playing games through reading the 15th Assembly of the Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra","authors":"Chen Hsiao","doi":"10.1080/09552367.2022.2079824","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2022.2079824","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This paper discusses the relation between meditative practices and games, and argues that it is reasonable to see meditative practices as games based on structural features they have in common as well as the text in the 15th Assembly of the Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra, which teaches the perfection of meditative absorption and compares meditative practices to playing games implicitly. This paper then puts meditative practices seen as games in the big picture of the Buddhist Path to Enlightenment, points out in contrast to meditative practices, playing games involves two problems people face nowadays, which I call the win–lose mindset and being too emotionally invested in playing games, and develops coping strategies to cope with these problems. These coping strategies are not constructed arbitrarily but of essential features of Bodhisattvas’ meditative practices, such as non-dualistic perspectives and non-obtainment, and these features lead to a path of cessation of both problems that afflict present-day game-playing. All in all, paying more attention to mental qualities that can be engendered and cultivated in playing games is suggested in this paper.","PeriodicalId":44358,"journal":{"name":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41259114","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-06-11DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2022.2063541
Amirhossein Zadyousefi
ABSTRACT (i) God is omniscient; therefore, for any two propositions, P1 and P2, God knows both that P1 and P2. (ii) If God knows multiple things, then God is not simple. (iii) But, God is supposed to be a simple being. As is clear, propositions (i)–(iii) form an inconsistent triad. This is the general form of one of the problems, which I call the Problem of Plurality (PP), with which Avicenna was engaged concerning God’s knowledge and especially God’s knowledge of particulars. In the secondary literature around Avicenna’s theory of God’s knowledge of particulars PP has not been scrutinized. But, in this paper, without discussing Avicenna’s theory of God’s knowledge of particulars, I will explain exactly what this problem is.
{"title":"Avicenna on the problem of God’s knowledge of multiple things","authors":"Amirhossein Zadyousefi","doi":"10.1080/09552367.2022.2063541","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2022.2063541","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT (i) God is omniscient; therefore, for any two propositions, P1 and P2, God knows both that P1 and P2. (ii) If God knows multiple things, then God is not simple. (iii) But, God is supposed to be a simple being. As is clear, propositions (i)–(iii) form an inconsistent triad. This is the general form of one of the problems, which I call the Problem of Plurality (PP), with which Avicenna was engaged concerning God’s knowledge and especially God’s knowledge of particulars. In the secondary literature around Avicenna’s theory of God’s knowledge of particulars PP has not been scrutinized. But, in this paper, without discussing Avicenna’s theory of God’s knowledge of particulars, I will explain exactly what this problem is.","PeriodicalId":44358,"journal":{"name":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-06-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48004398","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-06-03DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2022.2083301
Jana S. Rošker
ABSTRACT In the final decades of the 20th century, the majority of modern Sinophone scholars believed that Confucianism was an outdated and obsolete ideology that was not only unsuitable for the development of modern science and democratic societies, but also responsible for the deep social and political crisis that had branded China for the previous two centuries. Modern New Confucians, however, never assumed that the Confucian system was responsible for such a situation. Most of them believed that Confucianism was compatible with science and democracy. Moreover, the majority of them assumed that the East Asian cultures would never be able to develop truly democratic structures of their societies unless they incorporated the appropriate elements of their own, i.e. Confucian, traditions. This paper critically analyses the theoretical models of Tang Junyi and Mou Zongsan on the possible revival and development of Confucian proto-democracies.
{"title":"Two models of Confucian democracy: A contrastive analysis of Tang Junyi’s and Mou Zongsan’s political philosophy","authors":"Jana S. Rošker","doi":"10.1080/09552367.2022.2083301","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2022.2083301","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In the final decades of the 20th century, the majority of modern Sinophone scholars believed that Confucianism was an outdated and obsolete ideology that was not only unsuitable for the development of modern science and democratic societies, but also responsible for the deep social and political crisis that had branded China for the previous two centuries. Modern New Confucians, however, never assumed that the Confucian system was responsible for such a situation. Most of them believed that Confucianism was compatible with science and democracy. Moreover, the majority of them assumed that the East Asian cultures would never be able to develop truly democratic structures of their societies unless they incorporated the appropriate elements of their own, i.e. Confucian, traditions. This paper critically analyses the theoretical models of Tang Junyi and Mou Zongsan on the possible revival and development of Confucian proto-democracies.","PeriodicalId":44358,"journal":{"name":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44451150","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-11DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2022.2073523
Meng Zhang
ABSTRACT This paper examines the current scholarship on Mengzi’s metaethical thoughts and reconstructs Mengzi’s view to contribute to our understanding of the relation between sensibility and the apparent objectivity of morality. I first overview two features of morality that an adequate metaethical theory needs to account for—the apparent objectivity and the motivational force of moral values, highlighting the potential of Mengzi’s thought to explain both. Then I examine previous reconstructions of Mengzi’s metaethics. Both the naturalism approach and the sensibility theory approach capture important features of Mengzi’s view but have defects. I argue that Mengzi’s view may help revise a sensibility theory that models moral properties on secondary qualities like colors, and thus, preserves the alleged merit of it—being able to account for the two features of morality.
{"title":"Sensibility and moral values in Mengzi’s metaethics","authors":"Meng Zhang","doi":"10.1080/09552367.2022.2073523","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2022.2073523","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This paper examines the current scholarship on Mengzi’s metaethical thoughts and reconstructs Mengzi’s view to contribute to our understanding of the relation between sensibility and the apparent objectivity of morality. I first overview two features of morality that an adequate metaethical theory needs to account for—the apparent objectivity and the motivational force of moral values, highlighting the potential of Mengzi’s thought to explain both. Then I examine previous reconstructions of Mengzi’s metaethics. Both the naturalism approach and the sensibility theory approach capture important features of Mengzi’s view but have defects. I argue that Mengzi’s view may help revise a sensibility theory that models moral properties on secondary qualities like colors, and thus, preserves the alleged merit of it—being able to account for the two features of morality.","PeriodicalId":44358,"journal":{"name":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-05-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46610528","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-26DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2022.2066990
K. Sun
ABSTRACT The theory of ‘Confucianization of law’ put forward by T’ung-tsu Ch’ü in his book titled Law and Society in Traditional China has a great academic influence in the world. However, ‘Confucianization of law’ is like ‘flowers in a mirror’ because its concept is too one-sided and ambiguous to describe ancient Chinese legal philosophy. Although it once has helped non-Chinese understand ancient Chinese legal philosophy, it is essentially a hypothesis of Ch’ü after reading limited historical materials and easily leading to a simple understanding of the dichotomy of Confucianism and Legalism in ancient Chinese legal philosophy. To distinguish the origin, concept, and related disputes of ‘Confucianization of law’ is helpful to discover the multicultural background of ancient Chinese legal philosophy and find the fact that Confucianism itself is alienated by politics. From the perspective of political pragmatism, there is no difference between Confucianism and Legalism in essence, but in means.
{"title":"Flowers in a mirror: Critique of ‘Confucianization of law’","authors":"K. Sun","doi":"10.1080/09552367.2022.2066990","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2022.2066990","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The theory of ‘Confucianization of law’ put forward by T’ung-tsu Ch’ü in his book titled Law and Society in Traditional China has a great academic influence in the world. However, ‘Confucianization of law’ is like ‘flowers in a mirror’ because its concept is too one-sided and ambiguous to describe ancient Chinese legal philosophy. Although it once has helped non-Chinese understand ancient Chinese legal philosophy, it is essentially a hypothesis of Ch’ü after reading limited historical materials and easily leading to a simple understanding of the dichotomy of Confucianism and Legalism in ancient Chinese legal philosophy. To distinguish the origin, concept, and related disputes of ‘Confucianization of law’ is helpful to discover the multicultural background of ancient Chinese legal philosophy and find the fact that Confucianism itself is alienated by politics. From the perspective of political pragmatism, there is no difference between Confucianism and Legalism in essence, but in means.","PeriodicalId":44358,"journal":{"name":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-04-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42604236","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-25DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2022.2066283
Liang Liu
ABSTRACT Shi is fundamental and indispensable in understanding Han Fei’s political philosophy. Han Feizi presents a political term with different meanings such as power, status, and situation. Han Fei’s doctrine of Shi attempts to consolidate and strengthen the prince’s Shi by limiting the subjects’ status and power. Any knighthood or government position must be granted by following suitable inheritance principles or appointment rules. The actual dominance of any person must be strictly matched with their rank of nobility or seniority of position. This hierarchy of dominance puts the prince at the top with unmatched power, who can then engage in coercion to eliminate anyone who is not submissive, and create terror to effectively control the subjects.
{"title":"The art of setting up authority: Han Fei’s doctrine of Shi","authors":"Liang Liu","doi":"10.1080/09552367.2022.2066283","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2022.2066283","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Shi is fundamental and indispensable in understanding Han Fei’s political philosophy. Han Feizi presents a political term with different meanings such as power, status, and situation. Han Fei’s doctrine of Shi attempts to consolidate and strengthen the prince’s Shi by limiting the subjects’ status and power. Any knighthood or government position must be granted by following suitable inheritance principles or appointment rules. The actual dominance of any person must be strictly matched with their rank of nobility or seniority of position. This hierarchy of dominance puts the prince at the top with unmatched power, who can then engage in coercion to eliminate anyone who is not submissive, and create terror to effectively control the subjects.","PeriodicalId":44358,"journal":{"name":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47078783","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-19DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2022.2066282
Yu Jiang-xia
ABSTRACT The significant role of skill in Zhuangzi’s good life has been argued by most Zhuangzi scholars. However, there is ongoing debate concerning the psychological and behavioral mechanisms that underwrite the skillful activity and the way it contributes to a good life. Based on previous research, this paper makes a comparative study between Buddhism, Daoism, and Stoicism. The aim is to prove that practical wisdom, which involves both reflection and spontaneity, plays a helpful role in understanding Zhuangzian skillful activity by connecting skilled performance to the wise way of living. Importantly, this can be compared to the Buddhist teachings of skillful (kusala) action and skillful means (upāya) as well as the Stoic account of skill (technē) and art of life. A three-way comparison shows that skillful activity is deeply bound up with practical wisdom in the three traditions, which enables one to act appropriately and live skillfully.
{"title":"The skillful living in the Zhuangzi, Buddhism, and Stoicism","authors":"Yu Jiang-xia","doi":"10.1080/09552367.2022.2066282","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2022.2066282","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The significant role of skill in Zhuangzi’s good life has been argued by most Zhuangzi scholars. However, there is ongoing debate concerning the psychological and behavioral mechanisms that underwrite the skillful activity and the way it contributes to a good life. Based on previous research, this paper makes a comparative study between Buddhism, Daoism, and Stoicism. The aim is to prove that practical wisdom, which involves both reflection and spontaneity, plays a helpful role in understanding Zhuangzian skillful activity by connecting skilled performance to the wise way of living. Importantly, this can be compared to the Buddhist teachings of skillful (kusala) action and skillful means (upāya) as well as the Stoic account of skill (technē) and art of life. A three-way comparison shows that skillful activity is deeply bound up with practical wisdom in the three traditions, which enables one to act appropriately and live skillfully.","PeriodicalId":44358,"journal":{"name":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-04-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49135343","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-03DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2022.2044453
T. Botz-Bornstein
ABSTRACT I compare the Japanese philosopher Nishida Kitaro (1870–1945) with the Egyptian philosopher and reformer Muhammad ‘Abduh (1849–1905). Both philosophies emerged within similar cultural contexts. Both thinkers attempt to think relationships between the individual and the universal through organic models. In parallel, both philosophies produce paradoxical positions regarding the integration of reason and religion. Like ‘Abduh, Nishida is interested in the unity of God. How do we have to think the unity of God when every unity is only composed of individuals? ‘Abduh avoids Aristotelian substances by claiming that the physical world emerges. Similarly, Nishida thinks that the world emerges as a place (basho). Both conceptions contradict Aristotelian logic because both avoid the idea of identity, which is necessary for any abstract logic.
{"title":"Nishida Kitarō and Muhammad ‘Abduh on God and reason: Towards a theology of place","authors":"T. Botz-Bornstein","doi":"10.1080/09552367.2022.2044453","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2022.2044453","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT I compare the Japanese philosopher Nishida Kitaro (1870–1945) with the Egyptian philosopher and reformer Muhammad ‘Abduh (1849–1905). Both philosophies emerged within similar cultural contexts. Both thinkers attempt to think relationships between the individual and the universal through organic models. In parallel, both philosophies produce paradoxical positions regarding the integration of reason and religion. Like ‘Abduh, Nishida is interested in the unity of God. How do we have to think the unity of God when every unity is only composed of individuals? ‘Abduh avoids Aristotelian substances by claiming that the physical world emerges. Similarly, Nishida thinks that the world emerges as a place (basho). Both conceptions contradict Aristotelian logic because both avoid the idea of identity, which is necessary for any abstract logic.","PeriodicalId":44358,"journal":{"name":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"59491629","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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