Pub Date : 2021-04-30DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2021.1911384
Kaili Wang
ABSTRACT In order to construct a satisfactory theory of cheng-yi 誠意 (making thoughts sincere), Zhu Xi 朱熹 develops an account of how self-deception (zi-qi 自欺) is possible—a profound problem that has puzzled many philosophers. In Zhu’s opinion, zhi 知 (knowing) can be divided into two categories: a priori knowing and empirical knowing. The further division of empirical knowing defines three sorts of self-deception: (1) the self-deception caused by one’s ignorance (wu-zhi 無知), (2) the self-deception caused by one’s superficial knowing (qian-zhi 淺知), and (3) the self-deception that may occur when one acquires genuine knowledge (zhen-zhi 真知). In this paper, I will construct a theoretical model of self-deception that follows Zhu’s criterial definition of self-deception in Daxue Zhangju 大學章句 (Interpretation of The Great Learning), thereby accounting for the possibility of these three sorts of self-deception. Better understanding of Zhu’s conception of self-deception could, moreover, open fruitful avenues for further work on his metaphysics and moral psychology.
{"title":"On self-deception: from the perspective of Zhu Xi’s moral psychology","authors":"Kaili Wang","doi":"10.1080/09552367.2021.1911384","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2021.1911384","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In order to construct a satisfactory theory of cheng-yi 誠意 (making thoughts sincere), Zhu Xi 朱熹 develops an account of how self-deception (zi-qi 自欺) is possible—a profound problem that has puzzled many philosophers. In Zhu’s opinion, zhi 知 (knowing) can be divided into two categories: a priori knowing and empirical knowing. The further division of empirical knowing defines three sorts of self-deception: (1) the self-deception caused by one’s ignorance (wu-zhi 無知), (2) the self-deception caused by one’s superficial knowing (qian-zhi 淺知), and (3) the self-deception that may occur when one acquires genuine knowledge (zhen-zhi 真知). In this paper, I will construct a theoretical model of self-deception that follows Zhu’s criterial definition of self-deception in Daxue Zhangju 大學章句 (Interpretation of The Great Learning), thereby accounting for the possibility of these three sorts of self-deception. Better understanding of Zhu’s conception of self-deception could, moreover, open fruitful avenues for further work on his metaphysics and moral psychology.","PeriodicalId":44358,"journal":{"name":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/09552367.2021.1911384","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42253254","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-29DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2021.1918367
R. Lau
ABSTRACT In the ‘Cook Ding cutting up an ox’ parable, Zhuangzi advanced a doctrine on craft and its relationship with Dao. With reference to Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy in conjunction with an analysis of Zhuangzi’s epistemological position, we argue that Zhuangzi understood craft as involving the supersession of the cognitive. In craft, the relationship between human and world is non-cognitive and ‘pre-objective’, the living of this kind of relationship gives rise to a non-cognitive ‘practical sense’ which enables the craftsman’s movements to spontaneously constitute wuwei. Zhuangzi’s ideal is that this kind of relationship is generalized to life as a whole, thereby enabling human actions to spontaneously constitute wuwei generally. This is why he stipulated ‘doing away with knowing’ as a self-cultivation technique required for attaining Dao. Thus, craft constitutes an embodiment of Dao in the double-sense of wuwei and the non-cognitive and ‘pre-objective’ relationship between human and world which enables wuwei.
{"title":"Re-visiting the role of craft in Zhuangzi’s philosophy","authors":"R. Lau","doi":"10.1080/09552367.2021.1918367","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2021.1918367","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In the ‘Cook Ding cutting up an ox’ parable, Zhuangzi advanced a doctrine on craft and its relationship with Dao. With reference to Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy in conjunction with an analysis of Zhuangzi’s epistemological position, we argue that Zhuangzi understood craft as involving the supersession of the cognitive. In craft, the relationship between human and world is non-cognitive and ‘pre-objective’, the living of this kind of relationship gives rise to a non-cognitive ‘practical sense’ which enables the craftsman’s movements to spontaneously constitute wuwei. Zhuangzi’s ideal is that this kind of relationship is generalized to life as a whole, thereby enabling human actions to spontaneously constitute wuwei generally. This is why he stipulated ‘doing away with knowing’ as a self-cultivation technique required for attaining Dao. Thus, craft constitutes an embodiment of Dao in the double-sense of wuwei and the non-cognitive and ‘pre-objective’ relationship between human and world which enables wuwei.","PeriodicalId":44358,"journal":{"name":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-04-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/09552367.2021.1918367","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41501036","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-03DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2021.1882724
Ady van Den Stock
ABSTRACT The aim of this paper is to offer a new interpretation of the controversial concept of ‘immanent transcendence’ (neizai chaoyue 内在超越) in the work of the Confucian philosopher Mou Zongsan 牟宗三 (1909–1995). After a series of introductory remarks on the semantic and conceptual range of the terms ‘immanence’ and ‘transcendence’ in comparative philosophy, I go on to provide a historically sensitive analysis of the origins of thenotion of ‘immanent transcendence’ in Mou’s work. In doing so, I argue that rather than merely reflecting a blanket ontological or epistemological claim serving todifferentiate Chinese from Western culture and thought, the paradoxical concept of ‘immanent transcendence’ has a profoundly socio-political dimension and testifies Mou’s efforts to maintain a form of continuity between the normative and the factual in the face of the unprecedented challenges faced by the Confucian tradition in the modern era.
{"title":"‘Immanent transcendence’: Toward a genealogical analysis of a key concept in the philosophy of Mou Zongsan (1909–1995)","authors":"Ady van Den Stock","doi":"10.1080/09552367.2021.1882724","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2021.1882724","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The aim of this paper is to offer a new interpretation of the controversial concept of ‘immanent transcendence’ (neizai chaoyue 内在超越) in the work of the Confucian philosopher Mou Zongsan 牟宗三 (1909–1995). After a series of introductory remarks on the semantic and conceptual range of the terms ‘immanence’ and ‘transcendence’ in comparative philosophy, I go on to provide a historically sensitive analysis of the origins of thenotion of ‘immanent transcendence’ in Mou’s work. In doing so, I argue that rather than merely reflecting a blanket ontological or epistemological claim serving todifferentiate Chinese from Western culture and thought, the paradoxical concept of ‘immanent transcendence’ has a profoundly socio-political dimension and testifies Mou’s efforts to maintain a form of continuity between the normative and the factual in the face of the unprecedented challenges faced by the Confucian tradition in the modern era.","PeriodicalId":44358,"journal":{"name":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/09552367.2021.1882724","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41573208","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-03DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2021.1882723
A. K. Jayesh
ABSTRACT The paper focuses on Nāgārjuna, the founder of the middle way school of Mahāyāna Buddhism. It argues that while Nāgārjuna’s rejection of the notion of ontological independence is justified and correct, his philosophical project is incomplete. This stems from the fact that Nāgārjuna’s rejection of the Abhidharma conception of time is not supplemented with the development of an alternative. The paper insists that Nāgārjuna’s endorsement of the doctrine of impermanence without first developing a non-foundationalist conception of time is indefensible. The paper concludes by offering a description of the nature of time which, it submits, will complete the Madhyamaka project.
{"title":"Nāgārjuna and the concept of time","authors":"A. K. Jayesh","doi":"10.1080/09552367.2021.1882723","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2021.1882723","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The paper focuses on Nāgārjuna, the founder of the middle way school of Mahāyāna Buddhism. It argues that while Nāgārjuna’s rejection of the notion of ontological independence is justified and correct, his philosophical project is incomplete. This stems from the fact that Nāgārjuna’s rejection of the Abhidharma conception of time is not supplemented with the development of an alternative. The paper insists that Nāgārjuna’s endorsement of the doctrine of impermanence without first developing a non-foundationalist conception of time is indefensible. The paper concludes by offering a description of the nature of time which, it submits, will complete the Madhyamaka project.","PeriodicalId":44358,"journal":{"name":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/09552367.2021.1882723","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41370452","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-03DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2021.1886632
Jieqiong Li
ABSTRACT The aesthetic appreciation of animals in China is different from that in the West. In this paper, I identify these differences by tracing the various definitions of the word ‘animal’ in Chinese, and by illustrating the special aesthetic values advocated within Chinese aesthetics. Further, I argue that, when animals are aesthetically appreciated against the background of Chinese culture, they may be viewed as both physical and spiritual objects, and as symbolizing the harmony between humanity and nature. At the same time, many Chinese animal images are shaped and appreciated in an ever-changing and interdependent pattern. I conclude by noting differences between China and the West in the aesthetic appreciation of animals with respect to the importance of physical attractiveness, the roles of interaction and imagination, and the aesthetic context of appreciation.
{"title":"Aesthetic appreciation of animals in China: a vision out of Western Aesthetics","authors":"Jieqiong Li","doi":"10.1080/09552367.2021.1886632","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2021.1886632","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The aesthetic appreciation of animals in China is different from that in the West. In this paper, I identify these differences by tracing the various definitions of the word ‘animal’ in Chinese, and by illustrating the special aesthetic values advocated within Chinese aesthetics. Further, I argue that, when animals are aesthetically appreciated against the background of Chinese culture, they may be viewed as both physical and spiritual objects, and as symbolizing the harmony between humanity and nature. At the same time, many Chinese animal images are shaped and appreciated in an ever-changing and interdependent pattern. I conclude by noting differences between China and the West in the aesthetic appreciation of animals with respect to the importance of physical attractiveness, the roles of interaction and imagination, and the aesthetic context of appreciation.","PeriodicalId":44358,"journal":{"name":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/09552367.2021.1886632","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49272987","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-03DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2021.1881232
Gabriel Andrus
ABSTRACT Mohism has been called the most religious of all Chinese philosophies. Living up to that name, it developed unique proofs for the existence of the spiritual realm within a distinctly Chinese context. The Mozi uses testimonies from China’s mythic history to prove the existence of spirits. But beyond these cultural proofs, the Mozi also introduces a logical argument that is very similar to Pascal’s wager. Beyond these four explicit arguments, the Mozi also contains a fifth proof based on the existence of a supernatural order that exists in the structure of the world.
{"title":"Ancient Chinese proofs for the existence of gods: The case of Mohism","authors":"Gabriel Andrus","doi":"10.1080/09552367.2021.1881232","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2021.1881232","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Mohism has been called the most religious of all Chinese philosophies. Living up to that name, it developed unique proofs for the existence of the spiritual realm within a distinctly Chinese context. The Mozi uses testimonies from China’s mythic history to prove the existence of spirits. But beyond these cultural proofs, the Mozi also introduces a logical argument that is very similar to Pascal’s wager. Beyond these four explicit arguments, the Mozi also contains a fifth proof based on the existence of a supernatural order that exists in the structure of the world.","PeriodicalId":44358,"journal":{"name":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/09552367.2021.1881232","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43534084","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-03DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2021.1885493
Hye-kyung Kim
ABSTRACT The received view is that Yunjidang’s feminist philosophy focuses on female sagehood, drawing on the theory of the equal human nature of women and men. I argue that there is much more to it than that, and that her views are anchored in and a development of Mengzi’s philosophy. She creatively interpreted and extended his philosophy, adopting the neo-Confucian metaphysics of the One and the Many. She argued not just for the potential but for the actual gender equality of women and men. In addition, she laid the groundwork for a gender inclusive virtue ethics. Showing as much requires understanding the historical place of Yunjidang in Joseon dynasty, the neo-Confucian metaphysics that informs her arguments, and her views on gender essentialism and virtue ethics. This article exposes and explains Yunjidang’s comprehensive feminist philosophy and her bold theses: the actual gender equality of embodied women and men and a gender inclusive virtue ethics.
{"title":"Yunjidang’s feminism and gender equality","authors":"Hye-kyung Kim","doi":"10.1080/09552367.2021.1885493","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2021.1885493","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The received view is that Yunjidang’s feminist philosophy focuses on female sagehood, drawing on the theory of the equal human nature of women and men. I argue that there is much more to it than that, and that her views are anchored in and a development of Mengzi’s philosophy. She creatively interpreted and extended his philosophy, adopting the neo-Confucian metaphysics of the One and the Many. She argued not just for the potential but for the actual gender equality of women and men. In addition, she laid the groundwork for a gender inclusive virtue ethics. Showing as much requires understanding the historical place of Yunjidang in Joseon dynasty, the neo-Confucian metaphysics that informs her arguments, and her views on gender essentialism and virtue ethics. This article exposes and explains Yunjidang’s comprehensive feminist philosophy and her bold theses: the actual gender equality of embodied women and men and a gender inclusive virtue ethics.","PeriodicalId":44358,"journal":{"name":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/09552367.2021.1885493","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43037716","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-03-19DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2021.1902095
Lan Yu
ABSTRACT I approach the person in the context of ren (being-humane) and li (ritual propriety) in dialogue with role ethics and the issue of autonomy. The hypotheses are as follows: first, even if the person is committed to dao, the person is to enjoy uncoerced freedom of choice, or at least some measure of it in the case of early Confucianism; second, the sentimental and rational dimensions are unified and make up a judgment as a whole in the Chinese context, whereas the functioning of reason is more elevated in the West; third, ren and li are mutually constitutive, requiring and complementing one another as internal awareness and external practice respectively. Even though ren and li both share an orientation to social order, they differ with respect to internalized recognition and simply following norms. If relationships are constitutive of persons and the focus of relational autonomy is on cultivation, then there is no conflict between self-completion and autonomy.
{"title":"Relational autonomy: where Confucius and Mencius stand on freedom","authors":"Lan Yu","doi":"10.1080/09552367.2021.1902095","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2021.1902095","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT I approach the person in the context of ren (being-humane) and li (ritual propriety) in dialogue with role ethics and the issue of autonomy. The hypotheses are as follows: first, even if the person is committed to dao, the person is to enjoy uncoerced freedom of choice, or at least some measure of it in the case of early Confucianism; second, the sentimental and rational dimensions are unified and make up a judgment as a whole in the Chinese context, whereas the functioning of reason is more elevated in the West; third, ren and li are mutually constitutive, requiring and complementing one another as internal awareness and external practice respectively. Even though ren and li both share an orientation to social order, they differ with respect to internalized recognition and simply following norms. If relationships are constitutive of persons and the focus of relational autonomy is on cultivation, then there is no conflict between self-completion and autonomy.","PeriodicalId":44358,"journal":{"name":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-03-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/09552367.2021.1902095","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48280401","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-03-12DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2021.1899433
Fan He
ABSTRACT This article investigates a central yet perplexing term yiming in the ‘Qiwulun’ chapter of the Zhuangzi. Yiming describes a crucial way to detach from epistemic distinctions and debates. This term is often explained as ‘using ming’ or contradictorily as ‘stopping ming’. Yet neither of the two explanations can provide a full understanding of how yiming is adopted. I take three steps to explain yiming. First, taking an etymological approach, I argue that ming can be formulated as ‘X shining on Y’. Second, I use the formula of ‘X shining on Y’ to account for yiming and argue that this term refers specifically to ‘using tian to shine on everything’. Third, I unpack a cluster of tian-associated metaphors, which provides a deep understanding of yiming as an ideal way to mental tranquility.
{"title":"Epistemic detachment from distinctions and debates: an investigation of yiming in the ‘qiwulun’ of the Zhuangzi","authors":"Fan He","doi":"10.1080/09552367.2021.1899433","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2021.1899433","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article investigates a central yet perplexing term yiming in the ‘Qiwulun’ chapter of the Zhuangzi. Yiming describes a crucial way to detach from epistemic distinctions and debates. This term is often explained as ‘using ming’ or contradictorily as ‘stopping ming’. Yet neither of the two explanations can provide a full understanding of how yiming is adopted. I take three steps to explain yiming. First, taking an etymological approach, I argue that ming can be formulated as ‘X shining on Y’. Second, I use the formula of ‘X shining on Y’ to account for yiming and argue that this term refers specifically to ‘using tian to shine on everything’. Third, I unpack a cluster of tian-associated metaphors, which provides a deep understanding of yiming as an ideal way to mental tranquility.","PeriodicalId":44358,"journal":{"name":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-03-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/09552367.2021.1899433","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48664646","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-03-10DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2021.1899436
Javier Hidalgo
ABSTRACT Do Buddhist philosophical commitments support a particular theory of well-being? Most authors who have examined this question argue that Buddhist ideas are compatible with multiple theories of well-being. In this paper, I contend that one tradition of Buddhist philosophy—Abhidharma—does imply a specific theory of welfare. In particular, Abhidharma supports hedonism. Most Ābhidharmikas claim that only property-particulars called dharmas ultimately exist and I argue that an Abhidharmic theory of well-being should only refer to these properties. Yet the only dharmas that could plausibly be intrinsically good are phenomenal properties that are good in virtue of how they feel. Thus, the only intrinsically good things are pleasures. I defend this surprising conclusion from various interpretative objections and show that my argument can also inform contemporary philosophical debates about welfare.
{"title":"An Abhidharmic theory of welfare","authors":"Javier Hidalgo","doi":"10.1080/09552367.2021.1899436","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2021.1899436","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Do Buddhist philosophical commitments support a particular theory of well-being? Most authors who have examined this question argue that Buddhist ideas are compatible with multiple theories of well-being. In this paper, I contend that one tradition of Buddhist philosophy—Abhidharma—does imply a specific theory of welfare. In particular, Abhidharma supports hedonism. Most Ābhidharmikas claim that only property-particulars called dharmas ultimately exist and I argue that an Abhidharmic theory of well-being should only refer to these properties. Yet the only dharmas that could plausibly be intrinsically good are phenomenal properties that are good in virtue of how they feel. Thus, the only intrinsically good things are pleasures. I defend this surprising conclusion from various interpretative objections and show that my argument can also inform contemporary philosophical debates about welfare.","PeriodicalId":44358,"journal":{"name":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-03-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/09552367.2021.1899436","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41285149","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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