Pub Date : 2021-04-03DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2021.1885493
Hye-kyung Kim
ABSTRACT The received view is that Yunjidang’s feminist philosophy focuses on female sagehood, drawing on the theory of the equal human nature of women and men. I argue that there is much more to it than that, and that her views are anchored in and a development of Mengzi’s philosophy. She creatively interpreted and extended his philosophy, adopting the neo-Confucian metaphysics of the One and the Many. She argued not just for the potential but for the actual gender equality of women and men. In addition, she laid the groundwork for a gender inclusive virtue ethics. Showing as much requires understanding the historical place of Yunjidang in Joseon dynasty, the neo-Confucian metaphysics that informs her arguments, and her views on gender essentialism and virtue ethics. This article exposes and explains Yunjidang’s comprehensive feminist philosophy and her bold theses: the actual gender equality of embodied women and men and a gender inclusive virtue ethics.
{"title":"Yunjidang’s feminism and gender equality","authors":"Hye-kyung Kim","doi":"10.1080/09552367.2021.1885493","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2021.1885493","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The received view is that Yunjidang’s feminist philosophy focuses on female sagehood, drawing on the theory of the equal human nature of women and men. I argue that there is much more to it than that, and that her views are anchored in and a development of Mengzi’s philosophy. She creatively interpreted and extended his philosophy, adopting the neo-Confucian metaphysics of the One and the Many. She argued not just for the potential but for the actual gender equality of women and men. In addition, she laid the groundwork for a gender inclusive virtue ethics. Showing as much requires understanding the historical place of Yunjidang in Joseon dynasty, the neo-Confucian metaphysics that informs her arguments, and her views on gender essentialism and virtue ethics. This article exposes and explains Yunjidang’s comprehensive feminist philosophy and her bold theses: the actual gender equality of embodied women and men and a gender inclusive virtue ethics.","PeriodicalId":44358,"journal":{"name":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":"31 1","pages":"143 - 159"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/09552367.2021.1885493","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43037716","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-03DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2021.1886632
Jieqiong Li
ABSTRACT The aesthetic appreciation of animals in China is different from that in the West. In this paper, I identify these differences by tracing the various definitions of the word ‘animal’ in Chinese, and by illustrating the special aesthetic values advocated within Chinese aesthetics. Further, I argue that, when animals are aesthetically appreciated against the background of Chinese culture, they may be viewed as both physical and spiritual objects, and as symbolizing the harmony between humanity and nature. At the same time, many Chinese animal images are shaped and appreciated in an ever-changing and interdependent pattern. I conclude by noting differences between China and the West in the aesthetic appreciation of animals with respect to the importance of physical attractiveness, the roles of interaction and imagination, and the aesthetic context of appreciation.
{"title":"Aesthetic appreciation of animals in China: a vision out of Western Aesthetics","authors":"Jieqiong Li","doi":"10.1080/09552367.2021.1886632","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2021.1886632","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The aesthetic appreciation of animals in China is different from that in the West. In this paper, I identify these differences by tracing the various definitions of the word ‘animal’ in Chinese, and by illustrating the special aesthetic values advocated within Chinese aesthetics. Further, I argue that, when animals are aesthetically appreciated against the background of Chinese culture, they may be viewed as both physical and spiritual objects, and as symbolizing the harmony between humanity and nature. At the same time, many Chinese animal images are shaped and appreciated in an ever-changing and interdependent pattern. I conclude by noting differences between China and the West in the aesthetic appreciation of animals with respect to the importance of physical attractiveness, the roles of interaction and imagination, and the aesthetic context of appreciation.","PeriodicalId":44358,"journal":{"name":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":"31 1","pages":"160 - 177"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/09552367.2021.1886632","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49272987","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-03DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2021.1881232
Gabriel Andrus
ABSTRACT Mohism has been called the most religious of all Chinese philosophies. Living up to that name, it developed unique proofs for the existence of the spiritual realm within a distinctly Chinese context. The Mozi uses testimonies from China’s mythic history to prove the existence of spirits. But beyond these cultural proofs, the Mozi also introduces a logical argument that is very similar to Pascal’s wager. Beyond these four explicit arguments, the Mozi also contains a fifth proof based on the existence of a supernatural order that exists in the structure of the world.
{"title":"Ancient Chinese proofs for the existence of gods: The case of Mohism","authors":"Gabriel Andrus","doi":"10.1080/09552367.2021.1881232","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2021.1881232","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Mohism has been called the most religious of all Chinese philosophies. Living up to that name, it developed unique proofs for the existence of the spiritual realm within a distinctly Chinese context. The Mozi uses testimonies from China’s mythic history to prove the existence of spirits. But beyond these cultural proofs, the Mozi also introduces a logical argument that is very similar to Pascal’s wager. Beyond these four explicit arguments, the Mozi also contains a fifth proof based on the existence of a supernatural order that exists in the structure of the world.","PeriodicalId":44358,"journal":{"name":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":"31 1","pages":"105 - 120"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/09552367.2021.1881232","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43534084","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-03-19DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2021.1902095
Lan Yu
ABSTRACT I approach the person in the context of ren (being-humane) and li (ritual propriety) in dialogue with role ethics and the issue of autonomy. The hypotheses are as follows: first, even if the person is committed to dao, the person is to enjoy uncoerced freedom of choice, or at least some measure of it in the case of early Confucianism; second, the sentimental and rational dimensions are unified and make up a judgment as a whole in the Chinese context, whereas the functioning of reason is more elevated in the West; third, ren and li are mutually constitutive, requiring and complementing one another as internal awareness and external practice respectively. Even though ren and li both share an orientation to social order, they differ with respect to internalized recognition and simply following norms. If relationships are constitutive of persons and the focus of relational autonomy is on cultivation, then there is no conflict between self-completion and autonomy.
{"title":"Relational autonomy: where Confucius and Mencius stand on freedom","authors":"Lan Yu","doi":"10.1080/09552367.2021.1902095","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2021.1902095","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT I approach the person in the context of ren (being-humane) and li (ritual propriety) in dialogue with role ethics and the issue of autonomy. The hypotheses are as follows: first, even if the person is committed to dao, the person is to enjoy uncoerced freedom of choice, or at least some measure of it in the case of early Confucianism; second, the sentimental and rational dimensions are unified and make up a judgment as a whole in the Chinese context, whereas the functioning of reason is more elevated in the West; third, ren and li are mutually constitutive, requiring and complementing one another as internal awareness and external practice respectively. Even though ren and li both share an orientation to social order, they differ with respect to internalized recognition and simply following norms. If relationships are constitutive of persons and the focus of relational autonomy is on cultivation, then there is no conflict between self-completion and autonomy.","PeriodicalId":44358,"journal":{"name":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":"31 1","pages":"320 - 335"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-03-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/09552367.2021.1902095","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48280401","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-03-12DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2021.1899433
Fan He
ABSTRACT This article investigates a central yet perplexing term yiming in the ‘Qiwulun’ chapter of the Zhuangzi. Yiming describes a crucial way to detach from epistemic distinctions and debates. This term is often explained as ‘using ming’ or contradictorily as ‘stopping ming’. Yet neither of the two explanations can provide a full understanding of how yiming is adopted. I take three steps to explain yiming. First, taking an etymological approach, I argue that ming can be formulated as ‘X shining on Y’. Second, I use the formula of ‘X shining on Y’ to account for yiming and argue that this term refers specifically to ‘using tian to shine on everything’. Third, I unpack a cluster of tian-associated metaphors, which provides a deep understanding of yiming as an ideal way to mental tranquility.
{"title":"Epistemic detachment from distinctions and debates: an investigation of yiming in the ‘qiwulun’ of the Zhuangzi","authors":"Fan He","doi":"10.1080/09552367.2021.1899433","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2021.1899433","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article investigates a central yet perplexing term yiming in the ‘Qiwulun’ chapter of the Zhuangzi. Yiming describes a crucial way to detach from epistemic distinctions and debates. This term is often explained as ‘using ming’ or contradictorily as ‘stopping ming’. Yet neither of the two explanations can provide a full understanding of how yiming is adopted. I take three steps to explain yiming. First, taking an etymological approach, I argue that ming can be formulated as ‘X shining on Y’. Second, I use the formula of ‘X shining on Y’ to account for yiming and argue that this term refers specifically to ‘using tian to shine on everything’. Third, I unpack a cluster of tian-associated metaphors, which provides a deep understanding of yiming as an ideal way to mental tranquility.","PeriodicalId":44358,"journal":{"name":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":"31 1","pages":"240 - 253"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-03-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/09552367.2021.1899433","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48664646","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-03-10DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2021.1899436
Javier Hidalgo
ABSTRACT Do Buddhist philosophical commitments support a particular theory of well-being? Most authors who have examined this question argue that Buddhist ideas are compatible with multiple theories of well-being. In this paper, I contend that one tradition of Buddhist philosophy—Abhidharma—does imply a specific theory of welfare. In particular, Abhidharma supports hedonism. Most Ābhidharmikas claim that only property-particulars called dharmas ultimately exist and I argue that an Abhidharmic theory of well-being should only refer to these properties. Yet the only dharmas that could plausibly be intrinsically good are phenomenal properties that are good in virtue of how they feel. Thus, the only intrinsically good things are pleasures. I defend this surprising conclusion from various interpretative objections and show that my argument can also inform contemporary philosophical debates about welfare.
{"title":"An Abhidharmic theory of welfare","authors":"Javier Hidalgo","doi":"10.1080/09552367.2021.1899436","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2021.1899436","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Do Buddhist philosophical commitments support a particular theory of well-being? Most authors who have examined this question argue that Buddhist ideas are compatible with multiple theories of well-being. In this paper, I contend that one tradition of Buddhist philosophy—Abhidharma—does imply a specific theory of welfare. In particular, Abhidharma supports hedonism. Most Ābhidharmikas claim that only property-particulars called dharmas ultimately exist and I argue that an Abhidharmic theory of well-being should only refer to these properties. Yet the only dharmas that could plausibly be intrinsically good are phenomenal properties that are good in virtue of how they feel. Thus, the only intrinsically good things are pleasures. I defend this surprising conclusion from various interpretative objections and show that my argument can also inform contemporary philosophical debates about welfare.","PeriodicalId":44358,"journal":{"name":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":"63 20","pages":"254 - 270"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-03-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/09552367.2021.1899436","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41285149","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-03-07DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2021.1896067
Chiu Wai Wai
ABSTRACT This paper articulates the relationship between knowledge and qing 情 in the Zhuangzi. I argue that Zhuangzi has a twofold view of qing, which is structurally similar to his view of knowledge. I start with Zhuangzi’s critique of Confucianism and Mohism, whose doctrines of learning generate emotional turbulence. Then I read Zhuangzi’s statement that ‘humans are without qing’ as avoiding emotional turbulence as well as rigid responses to the reality. Finally, I propose that Zhuangzi’s authentic emotions are attained by ceasing to be obsessed in inauthentic emotions, but this does not mean that ordinary emotions should be eliminated. This is like great knowledge is attained by ceasing to be obsessed in petty knowledge, but it does not prevent one from seeing and grasping things from ordinary perspectives. I conclude by pointing out the relationship between the twofold view of qing to Zhuangzi’s idea of detachment and indeterminacy.
{"title":"Zhuangzi’s evaluation of qing and its relationship to knowledge","authors":"Chiu Wai Wai","doi":"10.1080/09552367.2021.1896067","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2021.1896067","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This paper articulates the relationship between knowledge and qing 情 in the Zhuangzi. I argue that Zhuangzi has a twofold view of qing, which is structurally similar to his view of knowledge. I start with Zhuangzi’s critique of Confucianism and Mohism, whose doctrines of learning generate emotional turbulence. Then I read Zhuangzi’s statement that ‘humans are without qing’ as avoiding emotional turbulence as well as rigid responses to the reality. Finally, I propose that Zhuangzi’s authentic emotions are attained by ceasing to be obsessed in inauthentic emotions, but this does not mean that ordinary emotions should be eliminated. This is like great knowledge is attained by ceasing to be obsessed in petty knowledge, but it does not prevent one from seeing and grasping things from ordinary perspectives. I conclude by pointing out the relationship between the twofold view of qing to Zhuangzi’s idea of detachment and indeterminacy.","PeriodicalId":44358,"journal":{"name":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":"31 1","pages":"288 - 304"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-03-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/09552367.2021.1896067","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45608019","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-03-04DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2021.1892300
Quan Wang
ABSTRACT Zhuang Zi has a seminal influence on Jacques Lacan. Seeing enables an observer to penetrate into the nature of the examined thing so that he will have a potential mastery over the observed object. Zhuang Zi encourages us to go beyond human vision and to look at the world from the perspective of the gaze of things. The transition from the eye to the gaze ushers us into a posthumanist world in which multiple species constitute a symbiotic existence. Likewise, Lacan rewrites the triple functions of seeing into scientific discourse as “the moment of seeing,” “the stage of understanding,” and “the moment to conclude.” Unlike Zhuang Zi, Lacan confines the gaze within linguistic signifiers and ascribes its elusiveness to castration. This central lack (castration) could only be observed from an oblique perspective, otherwise it will produce anamorphosis. The trajectory from the eye to the gaze constitutes the Lacanian desire.
{"title":"The butterfly transformation and the anamorphosis: A posthumanist reading of gaze in Zhuang Zi and Jacques Lacan","authors":"Quan Wang","doi":"10.1080/09552367.2021.1892300","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2021.1892300","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Zhuang Zi has a seminal influence on Jacques Lacan. Seeing enables an observer to penetrate into the nature of the examined thing so that he will have a potential mastery over the observed object. Zhuang Zi encourages us to go beyond human vision and to look at the world from the perspective of the gaze of things. The transition from the eye to the gaze ushers us into a posthumanist world in which multiple species constitute a symbiotic existence. Likewise, Lacan rewrites the triple functions of seeing into scientific discourse as “the moment of seeing,” “the stage of understanding,” and “the moment to conclude.” Unlike Zhuang Zi, Lacan confines the gaze within linguistic signifiers and ascribes its elusiveness to castration. This central lack (castration) could only be observed from an oblique perspective, otherwise it will produce anamorphosis. The trajectory from the eye to the gaze constitutes the Lacanian desire.","PeriodicalId":44358,"journal":{"name":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":"31 1","pages":"305 - 319"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/09552367.2021.1892300","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43392285","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-02-22DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2021.1890759
Mathew A. Foust
ABSTRACT It has recently been argued that in Analects 17.21, Confucius advises a disciple to do something that he, Confucius, believes to be morally wrong. According to Frederick Choo, despite believing that it is morally wrong to not properly observe the three-year mourning ritual for a deceased parent, Confucius tells Zai Wo that he should do so. Choo offers two justifications for Confucius’s doing this. In this essay, I argue that the justifications Choo offers for Confucius’s advising Zai Wo to do what he believes to be morally wrong are untenable. Indeed, I argue that Confucius does not, in fact, advise Zai Wo to do what he believes to be morally wrong. Instead, I argue that Confucius’s advice to Zai Wo in Analects 17.21 is best understood as an expression of exasperation and sarcasm.
{"title":"Did Confucius advise Zai Wo to do what he believed to be morally wrong? Interpreting Analects 17.21","authors":"Mathew A. Foust","doi":"10.1080/09552367.2021.1890759","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2021.1890759","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT It has recently been argued that in Analects 17.21, Confucius advises a disciple to do something that he, Confucius, believes to be morally wrong. According to Frederick Choo, despite believing that it is morally wrong to not properly observe the three-year mourning ritual for a deceased parent, Confucius tells Zai Wo that he should do so. Choo offers two justifications for Confucius’s doing this. In this essay, I argue that the justifications Choo offers for Confucius’s advising Zai Wo to do what he believes to be morally wrong are untenable. Indeed, I argue that Confucius does not, in fact, advise Zai Wo to do what he believes to be morally wrong. Instead, I argue that Confucius’s advice to Zai Wo in Analects 17.21 is best understood as an expression of exasperation and sarcasm.","PeriodicalId":44358,"journal":{"name":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":"31 1","pages":"229 - 239"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-02-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/09552367.2021.1890759","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44965401","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-02-14DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2021.1883879
Aaron Schultz
ABSTRACT This article aims to draw attention to the way in which a subset of reactive attitudes make us less free. Vasubandhu’s explanation of reactive attitudes (kleśas) shows us how they make us less free, as well as how they cause us to act wrongly. They do this by binding us and narrowing our attention. The kind of freedom that reactive attitudes take away is our ability to pay attention to what matters. When we have attentional freedom, we are free to choose amongst the options that matter; when we lack attentional freedom, we are not free to do so. According to P.F. Strawson, reactive attitudes provide us with a ground for moral responsibility because they are a part of our humanity. However, Strawson does not consider the way that reactive attitudes make us less free, nor the implications that arise from this fact. This article addresses both of these omissions.
{"title":"Vasubandhu, reactive attitudes, and attentional freedom","authors":"Aaron Schultz","doi":"10.1080/09552367.2021.1883879","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2021.1883879","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article aims to draw attention to the way in which a subset of reactive attitudes make us less free. Vasubandhu’s explanation of reactive attitudes (kleśas) shows us how they make us less free, as well as how they cause us to act wrongly. They do this by binding us and narrowing our attention. The kind of freedom that reactive attitudes take away is our ability to pay attention to what matters. When we have attentional freedom, we are free to choose amongst the options that matter; when we lack attentional freedom, we are not free to do so. According to P.F. Strawson, reactive attitudes provide us with a ground for moral responsibility because they are a part of our humanity. However, Strawson does not consider the way that reactive attitudes make us less free, nor the implications that arise from this fact. This article addresses both of these omissions.","PeriodicalId":44358,"journal":{"name":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":"31 1","pages":"178 - 194"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-02-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/09552367.2021.1883879","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44905052","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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