Pub Date : 2022-06-13DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2022.2084329
L. Gurova
ABSTRACT One of the most lively debates on scientific understanding is standardly presented as a controversy between the so-called factivists, who argue that understanding implies truth, and the non-factivists whose position is that truth is neither necessary nor sufficient for understanding. A closer look at the debate, however, reveals that the borderline between factivism and non-factivism is not as clear-cut as it looks at first glance. Some of those who claim to be quasi-factivists come suspiciously close to the position of their opponents, the non-factivist, from whom they pretend to differ. The non-factivist, in turn, acknowledges that some sort of ‘answering to the facts’ is indispensable for understanding. This paper discusses an example of convergence of the initially rival positions in the debate on understanding and truth: the use of the same substitute for truth by the quasi-factivist Kareem Khalifa and the non-factivists Henk de Regt and Victor Gijsbers. It is argued that the use of ‘effectiveness’ as a substitute for truth by both parties is not an occasional coincidence of terms, it rather speaks about a deeper similarity which have important implications for understanding the essential features of scientific understanding.
{"title":"The Uses of Truth: Is There Room for Reconciliation of Factivist and Non-Factivist Accounts of Scientific Understanding?","authors":"L. Gurova","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2022.2084329","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2022.2084329","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT One of the most lively debates on scientific understanding is standardly presented as a controversy between the so-called factivists, who argue that understanding implies truth, and the non-factivists whose position is that truth is neither necessary nor sufficient for understanding. A closer look at the debate, however, reveals that the borderline between factivism and non-factivism is not as clear-cut as it looks at first glance. Some of those who claim to be quasi-factivists come suspiciously close to the position of their opponents, the non-factivist, from whom they pretend to differ. The non-factivist, in turn, acknowledges that some sort of ‘answering to the facts’ is indispensable for understanding. This paper discusses an example of convergence of the initially rival positions in the debate on understanding and truth: the use of the same substitute for truth by the quasi-factivist Kareem Khalifa and the non-factivists Henk de Regt and Victor Gijsbers. It is argued that the use of ‘effectiveness’ as a substitute for truth by both parties is not an occasional coincidence of terms, it rather speaks about a deeper similarity which have important implications for understanding the essential features of scientific understanding.","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-06-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48839773","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-03DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2022.2130661
D. Maltrana, M. Herrera, Federico Benitez
ABSTRACT One of the most important contributions of Einstein to the philosophy of science is the distinction between two types of scientific theories: ‘principle’ and ‘constructive’ theories. More recently, Flores proposed a more general distinction, classifying scientific theories by their functional role into ‘framework’ and ‘interaction’ theories, attempting to solve some inadequacies in Einstein’s proposal. Here, based on an epistemic criterion, we present a generalised distinction which is an improvement over Flores approach. In this work (i) we evaluate the shortcomings related to Flores’s proposal, (ii) we present an epistemological criterion that opens the door for a more general classification of any scientific theory in all of the natural science into two distinct groups, which we call ‘mechanistic theories’ and ‘structural theories’, and (iii) we show that such a criterion is connected to Flores’ proposal while overcoming issues of all previous approaches.
{"title":"Einstein’s Theory of Theories and Mechanicism","authors":"D. Maltrana, M. Herrera, Federico Benitez","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2022.2130661","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2022.2130661","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT One of the most important contributions of Einstein to the philosophy of science is the distinction between two types of scientific theories: ‘principle’ and ‘constructive’ theories. More recently, Flores proposed a more general distinction, classifying scientific theories by their functional role into ‘framework’ and ‘interaction’ theories, attempting to solve some inadequacies in Einstein’s proposal. Here, based on an epistemic criterion, we present a generalised distinction which is an improvement over Flores approach. In this work (i) we evaluate the shortcomings related to Flores’s proposal, (ii) we present an epistemological criterion that opens the door for a more general classification of any scientific theory in all of the natural science into two distinct groups, which we call ‘mechanistic theories’ and ‘structural theories’, and (iii) we show that such a criterion is connected to Flores’ proposal while overcoming issues of all previous approaches.","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43073870","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-03DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2022.2144436
Gareth Fuller
ABSTRACT In this paper, I defend an updated account of functional kinds, initially presented by Daniel Weiskopf, from the criticism that functional kinds will not qualify as scientific kinds. An important part of Weiskopf’s account is that functional kinds are multiply realisable. The criticisms I consider avoid discussion of multiple realisability. Instead, it is argued that functional kinds carry inferior counterfactual profiles when compared to other accounts of kinds. I respond to this charge by arguing that this criticism fails to take into consideration the role that multiple realisability can play in providing important explanatory counterfactuals. I do so by highlighting some points made by Lauren Ross that highlight where multiple realisability is explanatorily pertinent. I then argue that the criticisms of Weiskopf’s account fail to establish the explanatory inferiority of functional kinds.
{"title":"A Defence of Functional Kinds: Multiple Realisability and Explanatory Counterfactuals","authors":"Gareth Fuller","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2022.2144436","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2022.2144436","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In this paper, I defend an updated account of functional kinds, initially presented by Daniel Weiskopf, from the criticism that functional kinds will not qualify as scientific kinds. An important part of Weiskopf’s account is that functional kinds are multiply realisable. The criticisms I consider avoid discussion of multiple realisability. Instead, it is argued that functional kinds carry inferior counterfactual profiles when compared to other accounts of kinds. I respond to this charge by arguing that this criticism fails to take into consideration the role that multiple realisability can play in providing important explanatory counterfactuals. I do so by highlighting some points made by Lauren Ross that highlight where multiple realisability is explanatorily pertinent. I then argue that the criticisms of Weiskopf’s account fail to establish the explanatory inferiority of functional kinds.","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44906019","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-03DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2022.2149050
D. Bolton, Predrag Šustar
ABSTRACT The concept of regulation pervades biology, for example in models of genetic regulatory networks and the endocrine system. Regulation has a normative opposite, dysregulation, which figures prominently in biomedical models of disease. The use of normative concepts in biology, however, has been thought to present some challenges for the physicalist view of the world, and various resolutions have been proposed. Up to now the problem of biological normativity has been debated largely in connection with the concept of biological information. In this paper we shift focus to the concept of biological regulation, proposing that it provides a promising new approach to these issues. Models of regulatory systems have several features: they are causal, but they do not deal with the energy exchanges and transformations covered by physics and chemistry; further, and entirely connected, regulatory systems can break down, and this is because they and their causal-regulatory properties are dependent on fragile molecular structures. Biological regulatory systems exhibit normativity, because they are not determined by physical and chemical laws, but their close relationship with physical laws and physicalist ontology is transparent.
{"title":"Regulation and the Normativity Problem","authors":"D. Bolton, Predrag Šustar","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2022.2149050","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2022.2149050","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The concept of regulation pervades biology, for example in models of genetic regulatory networks and the endocrine system. Regulation has a normative opposite, dysregulation, which figures prominently in biomedical models of disease. The use of normative concepts in biology, however, has been thought to present some challenges for the physicalist view of the world, and various resolutions have been proposed. Up to now the problem of biological normativity has been debated largely in connection with the concept of biological information. In this paper we shift focus to the concept of biological regulation, proposing that it provides a promising new approach to these issues. Models of regulatory systems have several features: they are causal, but they do not deal with the energy exchanges and transformations covered by physics and chemistry; further, and entirely connected, regulatory systems can break down, and this is because they and their causal-regulatory properties are dependent on fragile molecular structures. Biological regulatory systems exhibit normativity, because they are not determined by physical and chemical laws, but their close relationship with physical laws and physicalist ontology is transparent.","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49397185","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-03DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2022.2144457
Aboutorab Yaghmaie, Bijan Ahmadi Kakavandi, S. Masoumi, Morteza Moniri
ABSTRACT Ladyman and Presnell have recently argued that the Hole argument is naturally resolved when spacetime is represented within homotopy type theory rather than set theory. The core idea behind their proposal is that the argument does not confront us with any indeterminism, since the set-theoretically different representations of spacetime involved in the argument are homotopy type-theoretically identical. In this article, we will offer a new resolution based on ZFC set theory to the argument. It neither relies on a constructive-intuitionistic form of mathematics, as used by Ladyman and Presnell, nor is foundationally problematic, such as the existing set-theoretic suggestions.
{"title":"Representation and Spacetime: The Hole Argument Revisited","authors":"Aboutorab Yaghmaie, Bijan Ahmadi Kakavandi, S. Masoumi, Morteza Moniri","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2022.2144457","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2022.2144457","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Ladyman and Presnell have recently argued that the Hole argument is naturally resolved when spacetime is represented within homotopy type theory rather than set theory. The core idea behind their proposal is that the argument does not confront us with any indeterminism, since the set-theoretically different representations of spacetime involved in the argument are homotopy type-theoretically identical. In this article, we will offer a new resolution based on ZFC set theory to the argument. It neither relies on a constructive-intuitionistic form of mathematics, as used by Ladyman and Presnell, nor is foundationally problematic, such as the existing set-theoretic suggestions.","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48662241","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-03DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2023.2208416
James Robert Brown, C. Misak
William (Bill) Newton-Smith was a renowned Canadian philosopher of science who spent his career largely in Oxford and then at the Central European University in Hungary. Newton-Smith was born in Orillia, Ontario and completed a B.A. in mathematics and philosophy at Queen’s University, Canada. In his second year as an undergraduate, he decided he was a logical positivist. In the interview for an exchange scholarship with St Andrews, in which he would be successful and at which he would spend his third year, the head of the Queen’s philosophy Department remarked that he had thought logical positivism was dead. With the confidence of youth Newton-Smith replied that the fact that it may not be popular was no reason to think it wasn’t true! During his year at St Andrews he fell under the spell of the later Wittgenstein. Upon graduating from Queen’s in 1966, he went to Cornell to do a PhD, as Norman Malcolm had photocopies of all of Wittgenstein’s unpublished works. Unimpressed with Malcolm, NewtonSmith transferred to the analytic philosopher Max Black. He thought Black a great supervisor, lively and clear—just the sort of teacher and mentor he would himself become. But NewtonSmith had already decided to transfer to Oxford. Black didn’t want him leaving Ithaca without a Cornell degree, so he secured funding for him to do an MA over the summer. Once at Oxford, Newton-Smith became a leading figure there. He finished his DPhil under the supervision of the logician Arthur Prior. In 1970 he was elected a Fellow of Balliol College. He was a pillar of the College and the University, taking on important administrative positions for both. He was a beloved undergraduate tutor, lecturer, and supervisor of an astounding number of DPhil theses. He could make logic fun and had a fine nose for what was a good (and bad!) argument in a student’s work. Newton-Smith made important contributions in several areas of philosophy, especially the nature of time and the general philosophy of science. Perhaps his two most important works are The Structure of Time (1980) and The Rationality of Science (1981). The latter appeared in the middle of the realism debate, a hot topic at any time but particularly so in the late 70s and early 80s. Even after four decades it stands up well and gives an excellent snapshot of his realistic approach to philosophy. Newton-Smith was a scientific realist; he had no qualms about the theoretical entities postulated by science, though he did have an interestingly radical solution to one problem that presses in on the realist. He was also a rationalist; he believed that science has clearly progressed and part of the philosopher’s job is to explain or make sense of that progress. As Newton-Smith saw it, there are a number of challenges which face the traditional rationalist, including: overcoming the problem of incommensurability (the same term could have different meanings in different theories); it must be shown that science does indeed have a goal
{"title":"William H. Newton-Smith (1943–2023)","authors":"James Robert Brown, C. Misak","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2023.2208416","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2023.2208416","url":null,"abstract":"William (Bill) Newton-Smith was a renowned Canadian philosopher of science who spent his career largely in Oxford and then at the Central European University in Hungary. Newton-Smith was born in Orillia, Ontario and completed a B.A. in mathematics and philosophy at Queen’s University, Canada. In his second year as an undergraduate, he decided he was a logical positivist. In the interview for an exchange scholarship with St Andrews, in which he would be successful and at which he would spend his third year, the head of the Queen’s philosophy Department remarked that he had thought logical positivism was dead. With the confidence of youth Newton-Smith replied that the fact that it may not be popular was no reason to think it wasn’t true! During his year at St Andrews he fell under the spell of the later Wittgenstein. Upon graduating from Queen’s in 1966, he went to Cornell to do a PhD, as Norman Malcolm had photocopies of all of Wittgenstein’s unpublished works. Unimpressed with Malcolm, NewtonSmith transferred to the analytic philosopher Max Black. He thought Black a great supervisor, lively and clear—just the sort of teacher and mentor he would himself become. But NewtonSmith had already decided to transfer to Oxford. Black didn’t want him leaving Ithaca without a Cornell degree, so he secured funding for him to do an MA over the summer. Once at Oxford, Newton-Smith became a leading figure there. He finished his DPhil under the supervision of the logician Arthur Prior. In 1970 he was elected a Fellow of Balliol College. He was a pillar of the College and the University, taking on important administrative positions for both. He was a beloved undergraduate tutor, lecturer, and supervisor of an astounding number of DPhil theses. He could make logic fun and had a fine nose for what was a good (and bad!) argument in a student’s work. Newton-Smith made important contributions in several areas of philosophy, especially the nature of time and the general philosophy of science. Perhaps his two most important works are The Structure of Time (1980) and The Rationality of Science (1981). The latter appeared in the middle of the realism debate, a hot topic at any time but particularly so in the late 70s and early 80s. Even after four decades it stands up well and gives an excellent snapshot of his realistic approach to philosophy. Newton-Smith was a scientific realist; he had no qualms about the theoretical entities postulated by science, though he did have an interestingly radical solution to one problem that presses in on the realist. He was also a rationalist; he believed that science has clearly progressed and part of the philosopher’s job is to explain or make sense of that progress. As Newton-Smith saw it, there are a number of challenges which face the traditional rationalist, including: overcoming the problem of incommensurability (the same term could have different meanings in different theories); it must be shown that science does indeed have a goal","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46750888","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-03DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2022.2119492
E. Schliesser
This slender and very clearly written book challenges an influential view that seems to be supported by social and cognitive science: that outside domains where there is familiarity and effective feedback, people are by and large rather irrational. This irrationality is said to be hardwired in our cognition and, say, makes us receptive to demagogues and explains why many of us are scandalously politically ignorant. This popular view is supported not just by survey data, but also by large number of experiments that provide purported evidence for so-called rationality deficit models of human nature. By contrast, Neil Levy, argues that what he calls ‘bad beliefs’ are caused by ‘polluted’ epistemic environments in which the proper functioning of higher order evidence and cues is undermined or corroded. Often this epistemic pollution is the work of strategic (even manipulative) political agents. But cues are generally sources of information and, thus, reasons, not necessarily manipulation. In fact, they can be manipulated in virtue of the fact that they are treated as reasons or reliable sources. In order to make this position plausible, Levy offers a novel account of belief formation and its nature. In particular, many very important beliefs result from the (rational) practice of deference and are often largely off-loaded on the environment. Levy is especially interested in explaining the widespread existence of bad beliefs and drawing solutions from this explanation to prevent or undermine the prevalence of bad beliefs. The previous two paragraphs do not convey how the book is animated by great concern over unfolding human-induced climate change. Levy seems to hold that because the populace holds a number of bad beliefs ‘in defiance of the scientific authorities’, (xi) political decisionmakers are unwilling or unable to act on the dire warnings of climate science. There is, thus, a real urgency to Levy’s writing which is peppered with illustrations from recent political life. In what follows, I first explain what Levy means by ‘bad belief’. In order to facilitate discussion, I also introduce a further term, ‘authoritated belief’. I then provide a critical survey of each chapter followed by a discussion of Levy’s methodology. I conclude with reflections that put Levy’s project in a wider historical and methodological perspective. A bad belief
{"title":"Bad Beliefs: Why They Happen to Good People","authors":"E. Schliesser","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2022.2119492","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2022.2119492","url":null,"abstract":"This slender and very clearly written book challenges an influential view that seems to be supported by social and cognitive science: that outside domains where there is familiarity and effective feedback, people are by and large rather irrational. This irrationality is said to be hardwired in our cognition and, say, makes us receptive to demagogues and explains why many of us are scandalously politically ignorant. This popular view is supported not just by survey data, but also by large number of experiments that provide purported evidence for so-called rationality deficit models of human nature. By contrast, Neil Levy, argues that what he calls ‘bad beliefs’ are caused by ‘polluted’ epistemic environments in which the proper functioning of higher order evidence and cues is undermined or corroded. Often this epistemic pollution is the work of strategic (even manipulative) political agents. But cues are generally sources of information and, thus, reasons, not necessarily manipulation. In fact, they can be manipulated in virtue of the fact that they are treated as reasons or reliable sources. In order to make this position plausible, Levy offers a novel account of belief formation and its nature. In particular, many very important beliefs result from the (rational) practice of deference and are often largely off-loaded on the environment. Levy is especially interested in explaining the widespread existence of bad beliefs and drawing solutions from this explanation to prevent or undermine the prevalence of bad beliefs. The previous two paragraphs do not convey how the book is animated by great concern over unfolding human-induced climate change. Levy seems to hold that because the populace holds a number of bad beliefs ‘in defiance of the scientific authorities’, (xi) political decisionmakers are unwilling or unable to act on the dire warnings of climate science. There is, thus, a real urgency to Levy’s writing which is peppered with illustrations from recent political life. In what follows, I first explain what Levy means by ‘bad belief’. In order to facilitate discussion, I also introduce a further term, ‘authoritated belief’. I then provide a critical survey of each chapter followed by a discussion of Levy’s methodology. I conclude with reflections that put Levy’s project in a wider historical and methodological perspective. A bad belief","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43000150","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-02DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2022.2123099
M. Collodel
ABSTRACT This paper introduces and reproduces a document from Feyerabend’s Nachlass including: (i) Feyerabend’s 1967 tentative translation into English of an original German typescript reporting the lecture notes of an academic course on magnetic monopoles delivered by physicist Felix Ehrenhaft (1879-1952) at the University of Vienna in the 1947 summer semester; and (ii) Feyerabend’s memoir focusing on Ehrenhaft in postwar Vienna. In addition to making available to a larger audience Ehrenhaft’s lectures on a highly controversial topic, the publication of Feyerabend’s typescript offers the opportunity to reconsider, delve deeper into and cast a brighter light on a rather neglected aspect in the growing literature on Feyerabend’s thought: the significance of Ehrenhaft for the development of Feyerabend’s intellectual biography.
{"title":"Ehrenhaft’s Experiments on Magnetic Monopoles: Reconsidering the Feyerabend-Ehrenhaft Connection","authors":"M. Collodel","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2022.2123099","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2022.2123099","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This paper introduces and reproduces a document from Feyerabend’s Nachlass including: (i) Feyerabend’s 1967 tentative translation into English of an original German typescript reporting the lecture notes of an academic course on magnetic monopoles delivered by physicist Felix Ehrenhaft (1879-1952) at the University of Vienna in the 1947 summer semester; and (ii) Feyerabend’s memoir focusing on Ehrenhaft in postwar Vienna. In addition to making available to a larger audience Ehrenhaft’s lectures on a highly controversial topic, the publication of Feyerabend’s typescript offers the opportunity to reconsider, delve deeper into and cast a brighter light on a rather neglected aspect in the growing literature on Feyerabend’s thought: the significance of Ehrenhaft for the development of Feyerabend’s intellectual biography.","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48874875","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-02DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2022.2067811
Daniel Kuby, Patrick Fraser
ABSTRACT In 1957, Feyerabend delivered a paper titled ‘On the Quantum-Theory of Measurement’ at the Colston Research Symposium in Bristol to sketch a completion of von Neumann's measurement scheme without collapse, using only unitary quantum dynamics and well-motivated statistical assumptions about macroscopic quantum systems. Feyerabend's paper has been recognised as an early contribution to quantum measurement, anticipating certain aspects of decoherence. Our paper reassesses the physical and philosophical content of Feyerabend's contribution, detailing the technical steps as well as its overall philosophical motivations and consequences. Summarising our results, Feyerabend interpreted collapse as a positivist assumption in quantum mechanics leading to a strict distinction between the uninterpreted formalism of unitary evolution in quantum mechanics and the classically interpreted observational language describing post-measurement outcomes. Thus Feyerabend took the no-collapse completion of the von Neumann measurement scheme to show the dispensability of the positivist assumption, leading the way to a realistic interpretation of quantum theory. We note, however, that there are substantial problems with his account of measurement that bring into question its viability as a legitimate foil to the orthodox view. We further argue that his dissatisfaction with the von Neumann measurement scheme is indicative of early views on theoretical pluralism.
{"title":"Feyerabend on the Quantum Theory of Measurement: A Reassessment","authors":"Daniel Kuby, Patrick Fraser","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2022.2067811","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2022.2067811","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In 1957, Feyerabend delivered a paper titled ‘On the Quantum-Theory of Measurement’ at the Colston Research Symposium in Bristol to sketch a completion of von Neumann's measurement scheme without collapse, using only unitary quantum dynamics and well-motivated statistical assumptions about macroscopic quantum systems. Feyerabend's paper has been recognised as an early contribution to quantum measurement, anticipating certain aspects of decoherence. Our paper reassesses the physical and philosophical content of Feyerabend's contribution, detailing the technical steps as well as its overall philosophical motivations and consequences. Summarising our results, Feyerabend interpreted collapse as a positivist assumption in quantum mechanics leading to a strict distinction between the uninterpreted formalism of unitary evolution in quantum mechanics and the classically interpreted observational language describing post-measurement outcomes. Thus Feyerabend took the no-collapse completion of the von Neumann measurement scheme to show the dispensability of the positivist assumption, leading the way to a realistic interpretation of quantum theory. We note, however, that there are substantial problems with his account of measurement that bring into question its viability as a legitimate foil to the orthodox view. We further argue that his dissatisfaction with the von Neumann measurement scheme is indicative of early views on theoretical pluralism.","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48329561","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-02DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2022.2193369
Jamie Shaw, M. Stuart
In a reference letter for Feyerabend’s application to UC Berkeley, Carl Hempel writes that ‘Mr. Feyerabend combines a forceful and penetrating analytic mind with a remarkably thorough training and high competence in theoretical physics and mathematics’ (Collodel and Oberheim, unpublished, 80). Similarly, Rudolf Carnap says of Feyerabend that he ‘knows both the physics and the philosophy thoroughly, and he is particularly well versed in the fundamental logical and epistemological problems of physics’ (83). These remarks echo a sentiment widely accepted amongst Feyerabend’s colleagues that his knowledge of physics was at an extremely high level. Feyerabend’s acumen in physics goes back to his youth, when, at the age of 13, he was offered a position as an observer at the Swiss Institute for Solar Research after building his own telescope (Feyerabend 1995, 27). It is unsurprising, therefore, that physics played an important and long-lasting role in Feyerabend’s work. More specifically, Feyerabend’s early work contains several papers engaging with technical and general issues in physics, mostly quantum mechanics. Here, he provided analyses of Bohr’s complementarity and its relationship to positivism, von Neumann’s no-go proof, Bohm’s philosophy of physics, the measurement problem, the relationship between physics and philosophy, hidden-variable theories and theoretical pluralism, and the use of threevalued logic in quantum mechanics (to name just a few topics). These continued to play important roles in his work of the 1970s, although now they appeared alongside more historical examples, such as Galileo’s work on the rotation of the earth in Against Method. While scholarship on Feyerabend’s philosophy has been burgeoning, especially over the past 10 years or so, comparatively little research has delved into his work in the philosophy of physics. This special issue seeks to ameliorate that gap. The hope is to better understand Feyerabend’s philosophy of physics, its historical impact and reception, and discern what fruits Feyerabend’s philosophy of physics may still bear. This special issue comes in two parts. Here, we introduce only the first half, which contains four contributions, touching upon different aspects of Feyerabend’s philosophy of physics. It begins with Flavio Del Santo’s paper, ‘Beyond method: the diatribe between Feyerabend and Popper over the foundations of quantum mechanics.’ Here, Del Santo looks at the relationship between Feyerabend and his mentor and eventual philosophical enemy, Karl Popper with fresh eyes. Specifically, Del Santo provides a new explanation for the fracture between Feyerabend and Popper by looking at their recently published correspondence (Collodel and Oberheim 2020) and focusing on the personal nature of their relationship. Del Santo shows how Feyerabend’s growing ‘resentment’ toward his authoritarian father-figure and Popper’s growing frustration with Feyerabend centred on disagreements concerning quantum mec
在费耶阿本德申请加州大学伯克利分校的推荐信中，亨普尔(Carl Hempel)写道。费耶阿本德在理论物理和数学方面接受过非常全面的训练，并具有很强的分析能力”(Collodel和Oberheim，未发表，1980)。同样，鲁道夫·卡尔纳普评价费耶阿本德说他“对物理学和哲学都了如指掌，尤其精通物理学的基本逻辑和认识论问题”(83)。这些言论呼应了费耶阿本德的同事们普遍接受的观点，即他的物理知识处于极高的水平。费耶阿本德在物理学上的敏锐可以追溯到他年轻时，13岁时，他在建造了自己的望远镜后，被瑞士太阳研究所提供了一个观察员的职位(费耶阿本德1995,27)。因此，物理学在费耶阿本德的工作中发挥了重要而持久的作用也就不足为奇了。更具体地说，费耶阿本德的早期工作包括几篇涉及物理学技术和一般问题的论文，主要是量子力学。在这里，他分析了玻尔的互补性及其与实证主义的关系、冯·诺伊曼的“不去证明”、玻姆的物理哲学、测量问题、物理与哲学的关系、隐变量理论和理论多元主义，以及在量子力学中使用三值逻辑(仅举几个主题)。这些在他20世纪70年代的作品中继续扮演着重要的角色，尽管现在它们与更多的历史例子一起出现，比如伽利略在《反方法》中关于地球自转的研究。虽然关于费耶阿本德哲学的学术研究一直在蓬勃发展，尤其是在过去10年左右的时间里，但对他在物理学哲学方面的工作进行深入研究的研究相对较少。本期特刊试图缩小这一差距。希望能更好地理解费耶阿本德的物理哲学，它的历史影响和接受，并辨别费耶阿本德的物理哲学可能仍然有什么成果。本期特刊分为两部分。在这里，我们只介绍前半部分，其中包含四个贡献，涉及费耶阿本德物理哲学的不同方面。它从弗拉维奥·德尔桑托的论文《超越方法:费耶阿本德和波普尔在量子力学基础上的争论》开始。在这里，德尔·桑托以全新的视角审视了费耶阿本德和他的导师、最终的哲学敌人卡尔·波普尔之间的关系。具体来说，Del Santo通过查看他们最近发表的通信(Collodel and Oberheim 2020)并关注他们关系的个人性质，为Feyerabend和Popper之间的破裂提供了一个新的解释。德尔桑托展示了费耶阿本德对他的专制父亲形象日益增长的“怨恨”，以及波普尔对费耶阿本德日益增长的失望，这些都集中在关于量子力学的分歧上:如何解释它，如何批评它，以及如何教授它。德尔桑托的论文中有很多有趣的细节，从有趣到令人心碎，我们不禁要问，如果没有这样的冲突，科学哲学是否会失去一些东西。Matteo Collodel的论文，“Ehrenhaft的磁单极子实验:重新考虑feyerabendehrenhaft连接”，展示了一份新发现的文件，来自
{"title":"Feyerabend and the Philosophy of Physics","authors":"Jamie Shaw, M. Stuart","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2022.2193369","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2022.2193369","url":null,"abstract":"In a reference letter for Feyerabend’s application to UC Berkeley, Carl Hempel writes that ‘Mr. Feyerabend combines a forceful and penetrating analytic mind with a remarkably thorough training and high competence in theoretical physics and mathematics’ (Collodel and Oberheim, unpublished, 80). Similarly, Rudolf Carnap says of Feyerabend that he ‘knows both the physics and the philosophy thoroughly, and he is particularly well versed in the fundamental logical and epistemological problems of physics’ (83). These remarks echo a sentiment widely accepted amongst Feyerabend’s colleagues that his knowledge of physics was at an extremely high level. Feyerabend’s acumen in physics goes back to his youth, when, at the age of 13, he was offered a position as an observer at the Swiss Institute for Solar Research after building his own telescope (Feyerabend 1995, 27). It is unsurprising, therefore, that physics played an important and long-lasting role in Feyerabend’s work. More specifically, Feyerabend’s early work contains several papers engaging with technical and general issues in physics, mostly quantum mechanics. Here, he provided analyses of Bohr’s complementarity and its relationship to positivism, von Neumann’s no-go proof, Bohm’s philosophy of physics, the measurement problem, the relationship between physics and philosophy, hidden-variable theories and theoretical pluralism, and the use of threevalued logic in quantum mechanics (to name just a few topics). These continued to play important roles in his work of the 1970s, although now they appeared alongside more historical examples, such as Galileo’s work on the rotation of the earth in Against Method. While scholarship on Feyerabend’s philosophy has been burgeoning, especially over the past 10 years or so, comparatively little research has delved into his work in the philosophy of physics. This special issue seeks to ameliorate that gap. The hope is to better understand Feyerabend’s philosophy of physics, its historical impact and reception, and discern what fruits Feyerabend’s philosophy of physics may still bear. This special issue comes in two parts. Here, we introduce only the first half, which contains four contributions, touching upon different aspects of Feyerabend’s philosophy of physics. It begins with Flavio Del Santo’s paper, ‘Beyond method: the diatribe between Feyerabend and Popper over the foundations of quantum mechanics.’ Here, Del Santo looks at the relationship between Feyerabend and his mentor and eventual philosophical enemy, Karl Popper with fresh eyes. Specifically, Del Santo provides a new explanation for the fracture between Feyerabend and Popper by looking at their recently published correspondence (Collodel and Oberheim 2020) and focusing on the personal nature of their relationship. Del Santo shows how Feyerabend’s growing ‘resentment’ toward his authoritarian father-figure and Popper’s growing frustration with Feyerabend centred on disagreements concerning quantum mec","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48286303","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：