Pub Date : 2019-04-03DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2019.1623502
G. Cevolani, Luca Tambolo
ABSTRACT In a recent paper in this journal, entitled ‘Scientific Progress: Why Getting Closer to Truth is Not Enough’ (2017), Moti Mizrahi argues that the view of progress as approximation to the truth or increasing verisimilitude is plainly false. The key premise of his argument is that on such a view of progress, in order to get closer to the truth one only needs to arbitrarily add a true disjunct to a hypothesis or theory. Since quite clearly scientific progress is not a matter of adding true disjuncts to theories, the argument goes, the view of progress as approximation to the truth is untenable. We show that the key premise of Mizrahi’s argument is false: according to verisimilitude-based accounts of progress, adding arbitrary true disjuncts to existing theories is just not enough to get closer to the truth.
{"title":"Why Adding Truths Is Not Enough: A Reply to Mizrahi on Progress as Approximation to the Truth","authors":"G. Cevolani, Luca Tambolo","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2019.1623502","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2019.1623502","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In a recent paper in this journal, entitled ‘Scientific Progress: Why Getting Closer to Truth is Not Enough’ (2017), Moti Mizrahi argues that the view of progress as approximation to the truth or increasing verisimilitude is plainly false. The key premise of his argument is that on such a view of progress, in order to get closer to the truth one only needs to arbitrarily add a true disjunct to a hypothesis or theory. Since quite clearly scientific progress is not a matter of adding true disjuncts to theories, the argument goes, the view of progress as approximation to the truth is untenable. We show that the key premise of Mizrahi’s argument is false: according to verisimilitude-based accounts of progress, adding arbitrary true disjuncts to existing theories is just not enough to get closer to the truth.","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":"32 1","pages":"129 - 135"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2019-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/02698595.2019.1623502","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43262237","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-04-03DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2019.1682773
María Caamaño-Alegre, J. Caamaño-Alegre
ABSTRACT This article examines how problems of validity in empirical social research differ from those in natural science. Specifically, we focus on how some ontological peculiarities of the object of study in social science bear on validity requirements. We consider these issues in experimental validity as well as in test validity because, while both fields hold large intellectual traditions, research tests or questionnaires are less closely connected to natural science methodology than experiments.
{"title":"From Ontological Traits to Validity Challenges in Social Science: The Cases of Economic Experiments and Research Questionnaires","authors":"María Caamaño-Alegre, J. Caamaño-Alegre","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2019.1682773","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2019.1682773","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article examines how problems of validity in empirical social research differ from those in natural science. Specifically, we focus on how some ontological peculiarities of the object of study in social science bear on validity requirements. We consider these issues in experimental validity as well as in test validity because, while both fields hold large intellectual traditions, research tests or questionnaires are less closely connected to natural science methodology than experiments.","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":"32 1","pages":"101 - 127"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2019-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/02698595.2019.1682773","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43508130","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-04-03DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2019.1704616
Andrew Buskell
{"title":"What’s Left of Human Nature? A Post-Essentialist, Pluralist, and Interactive Account of a C","authors":"Andrew Buskell","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2019.1704616","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2019.1704616","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":"32 1","pages":"137 - 140"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2019-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/02698595.2019.1704616","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47146633","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-02DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2019.1615663
Mohammad Reza Haghighi Fard
Carrara, M., D. Chiffi, and C. De Florio. 2017. “Assertions and Hypotheses: A Logical Framework for Their Opposition Relations.” Logic Journal of the IGPL 25: 131–144. Peirce, C. S. 1931–1958. Collected Papers of Charles S. Peirce. Edited by P. Weiss and A. Burks. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. References are to CP by volume and paragraph number. Rescher, N. 1976. “Peirce and the Economy of Research.” Philosophy of Science 43: 71–98. Woods, J. 2013. Errors of Reasoning: Naturalizing the Logic of Inference. London: College Publications.
Carrara, M.， D. Chiffi和C. De Florio. 2017。断言与假设:它们对立关系的逻辑框架逻辑学报，25(2):131-144。皮尔斯1931-1958。查尔斯S.皮尔斯文集。P. Weiss和A. Burks编辑。剑桥，马萨诸塞州:哈佛大学出版社。参考文献是按卷和段落编号的CP。雷彻，N. 1976。"皮尔斯与研究经济"科学哲学43:71-98。伍兹J. 2013。推理错误:推理逻辑的自然化。伦敦:大学出版社。
{"title":"In Praise of Natural Philosophy: A Revolution for Thought and Life","authors":"Mohammad Reza Haghighi Fard","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2019.1615663","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2019.1615663","url":null,"abstract":"Carrara, M., D. Chiffi, and C. De Florio. 2017. “Assertions and Hypotheses: A Logical Framework for Their Opposition Relations.” Logic Journal of the IGPL 25: 131–144. Peirce, C. S. 1931–1958. Collected Papers of Charles S. Peirce. Edited by P. Weiss and A. Burks. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. References are to CP by volume and paragraph number. Rescher, N. 1976. “Peirce and the Economy of Research.” Philosophy of Science 43: 71–98. Woods, J. 2013. Errors of Reasoning: Naturalizing the Logic of Inference. London: College Publications.","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":"32 1","pages":"67 - 69"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2019-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/02698595.2019.1615663","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47335724","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-02DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2019.1623485
Pierrick Bourrat
ABSTRACT In Darwinian Population and Natural Selection, Peter Godfrey-Smith brought the topic of natural selection back to the forefront of philosophy of biology, highlighting different issues surrounding this concept. One such issue is whether the perfect transmission of characters from parent(s) to offspring is necessary for evolution by natural selection (ENS). Drawing on the classical summaries for ENS, Godfrey-Smith's answer is that it is not, and opposes his view to the replicator framework. In this paper, I show that Godfrey-Smith's approach to ENS is only one of two legitimate perspective on ENS. One focuses on natural selection in the context of other evolutionary processes, while the other assumes their absence. After having presented these two perspectives, which I call the ‘contextual’ and the ‘pure’ perspective respectively, I draw on a framework which conceptualises the difference between natural selection, drift, and mutation in a causal rather than statistical fashion developed elsewhere. From there, I show that following the pure rather than the contextual perspective, perfect inheritance of characters is a necessary condition for ENS. This is because, I argue, imperfect inheritance is inevitably associated with an evolutionary process conceptually distinct from natural selection, namely mutation. I conclude by proposing that the classical summaries for ENS correspond more to the contextual perspective and the replicator framework more to the pure perspective.
{"title":"In What Sense Can There Be Evolution by Natural Selection Without Perfect Inheritance?","authors":"Pierrick Bourrat","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2019.1623485","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2019.1623485","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In Darwinian Population and Natural Selection, Peter Godfrey-Smith brought the topic of natural selection back to the forefront of philosophy of biology, highlighting different issues surrounding this concept. One such issue is whether the perfect transmission of characters from parent(s) to offspring is necessary for evolution by natural selection (ENS). Drawing on the classical summaries for ENS, Godfrey-Smith's answer is that it is not, and opposes his view to the replicator framework. In this paper, I show that Godfrey-Smith's approach to ENS is only one of two legitimate perspective on ENS. One focuses on natural selection in the context of other evolutionary processes, while the other assumes their absence. After having presented these two perspectives, which I call the ‘contextual’ and the ‘pure’ perspective respectively, I draw on a framework which conceptualises the difference between natural selection, drift, and mutation in a causal rather than statistical fashion developed elsewhere. From there, I show that following the pure rather than the contextual perspective, perfect inheritance of characters is a necessary condition for ENS. This is because, I argue, imperfect inheritance is inevitably associated with an evolutionary process conceptually distinct from natural selection, namely mutation. I conclude by proposing that the classical summaries for ENS correspond more to the contextual perspective and the replicator framework more to the pure perspective.","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":"32 1","pages":"13 - 31"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2019-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/02698595.2019.1623485","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44768924","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-02DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2019.1615668
M. Simons
{"title":"The Kuhnian Image of Science: Time for a Decisive Transformation?","authors":"M. Simons","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2019.1615668","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2019.1615668","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":"32 1","pages":"78 - 80"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2019-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/02698595.2019.1615668","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47572535","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-02DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2019.1615667
Michalis Sialaros
one of his other books. This is unfortunate as it is exactly this philosophy of language that is supposed to get rid of the myth of information as a natural object. Thus, we are in principle being asked to accept a solution based on a language-philosophical foundation that we cannot properly evaluate. That is ironic in a philosophical analysis of the consequences of tacit (and misguided) philosophical foundations. However, the brilliance of What Is Information? lies in Janich’s endeavour to reconceptualise information as a cultural construct. For Janich, the ultimate mistake in philosophy of science is the decoupling of information and culture. The theorisation of information as a natural object decouples information from the cultural practice of communication that is information’s actual origin. As Janich puts it,
{"title":"Geometry: The Third Book of Foundations","authors":"Michalis Sialaros","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2019.1615667","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2019.1615667","url":null,"abstract":"one of his other books. This is unfortunate as it is exactly this philosophy of language that is supposed to get rid of the myth of information as a natural object. Thus, we are in principle being asked to accept a solution based on a language-philosophical foundation that we cannot properly evaluate. That is ironic in a philosophical analysis of the consequences of tacit (and misguided) philosophical foundations. However, the brilliance of What Is Information? lies in Janich’s endeavour to reconceptualise information as a cultural construct. For Janich, the ultimate mistake in philosophy of science is the decoupling of information and culture. The theorisation of information as a natural object decouples information from the cultural practice of communication that is information’s actual origin. As Janich puts it,","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":"32 1","pages":"75 - 77"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2019-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/02698595.2019.1615667","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42666310","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-02DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2019.1615665
Sille Obelitz Søe
Check-in at Ruskin Hall Breakfast Meet and Greet 9:00AM – 10:00AM IS 305 Breakfast 9:00AM – 10:00AM IS 305 Breakfast with PhD Teaching Fellows 9:00AM – 10:00AM IS 305 Orientation & Program Overview 10:00AM – 11:30AM IS 305 Workshop The Discipline of Organizing Robert Glushko 10:00AM – 11:30PM IS 305 Workshop What are the iSchools? Ryan Champagne 10:00AM – 11:00AM IS 305 Workshop Copyright & Fair Use Matters Kip Currier 10:00AM – 11:30AM IS 305 Workshop Big Data Analytics Raja Sooriamurthi 10:00AM – 11:30AM IS 305 OPTIONAL Kennywood Amusement Park
入住Ruskin Hall早餐会并问候9:00AM–10:00AM IS 305早餐9:00AM-10:00 IS 305与博士教学研究员共进早餐9:00AM–10:00 IS 305定向和课程概述10:00AM–11:30AM IS 305工作坊组织Robert Glushko的纪律10:00AM-11:30AM IS 305工作坊什么是iSchools？Ryan Champagne 10:00AM–11:00AM IS 305研讨会版权与合理使用问题Kip Currier 10:00AM-11:30AM IS 305研讨会大数据分析Raja Sooriamurthi 10:00 AM–11:30AM IS305可选肯尼伍德游乐园
{"title":"What is Information?","authors":"Sille Obelitz Søe","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2019.1615665","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2019.1615665","url":null,"abstract":"Check-in at Ruskin Hall Breakfast Meet and Greet 9:00AM – 10:00AM IS 305 Breakfast 9:00AM – 10:00AM IS 305 Breakfast with PhD Teaching Fellows 9:00AM – 10:00AM IS 305 Orientation & Program Overview 10:00AM – 11:30AM IS 305 Workshop The Discipline of Organizing Robert Glushko 10:00AM – 11:30PM IS 305 Workshop What are the iSchools? Ryan Champagne 10:00AM – 11:00AM IS 305 Workshop Copyright & Fair Use Matters Kip Currier 10:00AM – 11:30AM IS 305 Workshop Big Data Analytics Raja Sooriamurthi 10:00AM – 11:30AM IS 305 OPTIONAL Kennywood Amusement Park","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":"32 1","pages":"73 - 75"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2019-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/02698595.2019.1615665","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43939524","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-02DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2019.1630927
Jon Williamson
ABSTRACT Russo and Williamson [2007. “Interpreting Causality in the Health Sciences.” International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 21: 157–170] put forward the following thesis: in order to establish a causal claim in medicine, one normally needs to establish both that the putative cause and putative effect are appropriately correlated and that there is some underlying mechanism that can account for this correlation. I argue that, although the Russo–Williamson thesis conflicts with the tenets of present-day evidence-based medicine (EBM), it offers a better causal epistemology than that provided by present-day EBM because it better explains two key aspects of causal discovery. First, the thesis better explains the role of clinical studies in establishing causal claims. Second, it yields a better account of extrapolation.
{"title":"Establishing Causal Claims in Medicine","authors":"Jon Williamson","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2019.1630927","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2019.1630927","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Russo and Williamson [2007. “Interpreting Causality in the Health Sciences.” International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 21: 157–170] put forward the following thesis: in order to establish a causal claim in medicine, one normally needs to establish both that the putative cause and putative effect are appropriately correlated and that there is some underlying mechanism that can account for this correlation. I argue that, although the Russo–Williamson thesis conflicts with the tenets of present-day evidence-based medicine (EBM), it offers a better causal epistemology than that provided by present-day EBM because it better explains two key aspects of causal discovery. First, the thesis better explains the role of clinical studies in establishing causal claims. Second, it yields a better account of extrapolation.","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":"32 1","pages":"33 - 61"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2019-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/02698595.2019.1630927","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46795253","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-02DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2019.1615659
Julia R. S. Bursten
{"title":"Macroscopic Metaphysics: Middle-sized Objects and Longish Processes","authors":"Julia R. S. Bursten","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2019.1615659","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2019.1615659","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":"32 1","pages":"63 - 64"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2019-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/02698595.2019.1615659","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43853346","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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