Pub Date : 2019-10-02DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2020.1768014
William Peden
ABSTRACT Philosophers such as Goodman (1954), Scheffler (1963) and Glymour (1983) aim to answer the Paradox of the Ravens by distinguishing between confirmation simpliciter and selective confirmation. The latter evidential relation occurs when data not only confirms a hypothesis, but also disconfirms one of its ‘rival’ hypotheses. The appearance of paradox is allegedly due to a conflation of valid intuitions about selective confirmation with our intuitions about confirmation simpliciter. Theories of evidence, like the standard Bayesian analysis, should only be understood as explications of confirmation simpliciter; when we disambiguate between selective confirmation and confirmation simpliciter, there is no longer a paradox from these theories. Bandyopadhyay and Brittan (2006) have revived this answer within a sophisticated Bayesian analysis of confirmation and severe testing. I argue that, despite the attractive features of the Selective Confirmation Answer, there is no analysis of this evidential relation that satisfactorily answers the Paradox of the Ravens, and the prospects for any answer along these lines are bleak. We must look elsewhere.
{"title":"The Selective Confirmation Answer to the Paradox of the Ravens","authors":"William Peden","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2020.1768014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2020.1768014","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Philosophers such as Goodman (1954), Scheffler (1963) and Glymour (1983) aim to answer the Paradox of the Ravens by distinguishing between confirmation simpliciter and selective confirmation. The latter evidential relation occurs when data not only confirms a hypothesis, but also disconfirms one of its ‘rival’ hypotheses. The appearance of paradox is allegedly due to a conflation of valid intuitions about selective confirmation with our intuitions about confirmation simpliciter. Theories of evidence, like the standard Bayesian analysis, should only be understood as explications of confirmation simpliciter; when we disambiguate between selective confirmation and confirmation simpliciter, there is no longer a paradox from these theories. Bandyopadhyay and Brittan (2006) have revived this answer within a sophisticated Bayesian analysis of confirmation and severe testing. I argue that, despite the attractive features of the Selective Confirmation Answer, there is no analysis of this evidential relation that satisfactorily answers the Paradox of the Ravens, and the prospects for any answer along these lines are bleak. We must look elsewhere.","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2019-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/02698595.2020.1768014","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47874240","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-10-02DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2020.1788347
C. DesRoches
ABSTRACT Ecological economics is an interdisciplinary science that is primarily concerned with developing interventions to achieve sustainable ecological and economic systems. While ecological economists have, over the last few decades, made various empirical, theoretical, and conceptual advancements, there is one concept in particular that remains subject to confusion: critical natural capital. While critical natural capital denotes parts of the environment that are essential for the continued existence of our species, the meaning of terms commonly associated with this concept, such as ‘non-substitutable’ and ‘impossible to substitute,’ require a clearer formulation then they tend to receive. With the help of equations and graphs, this article develops new definite account of critical natural capital that makes explicit what it means for objective environmental conditions to be essential for continued existence. The second main part of this article turns to the question of formally modelling the priority of conserving critical natural capital. While some ecological economists have maintained that, beyond a certain threshold, critical natural capital possesses absolute infinite value, absolute infinite utility models encounter significant problems. This article shows that a relative infinite utility model provides a better way to model the priority of conserving critical natural capital.
{"title":"On the Concept and Conservation of Critical Natural Capital","authors":"C. DesRoches","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2020.1788347","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2020.1788347","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Ecological economics is an interdisciplinary science that is primarily concerned with developing interventions to achieve sustainable ecological and economic systems. While ecological economists have, over the last few decades, made various empirical, theoretical, and conceptual advancements, there is one concept in particular that remains subject to confusion: critical natural capital. While critical natural capital denotes parts of the environment that are essential for the continued existence of our species, the meaning of terms commonly associated with this concept, such as ‘non-substitutable’ and ‘impossible to substitute,’ require a clearer formulation then they tend to receive. With the help of equations and graphs, this article develops new definite account of critical natural capital that makes explicit what it means for objective environmental conditions to be essential for continued existence. The second main part of this article turns to the question of formally modelling the priority of conserving critical natural capital. While some ecological economists have maintained that, beyond a certain threshold, critical natural capital possesses absolute infinite value, absolute infinite utility models encounter significant problems. This article shows that a relative infinite utility model provides a better way to model the priority of conserving critical natural capital.","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2019-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/02698595.2020.1788347","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47535359","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-10-02DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2019.1704615
Manuel Pérez Otero
ABSTRACT I present some puzzling cases regarding knowledge and its relation to rational credence. They seem to entail a failure of an apparently correct principle: (a) if S knows P, then the epistemic justification S has for believing Not-P is not greater than her epistemic justification for believing P. The cases at issue involve the following two conflicting facts, relative to a given subject S and a proposition P in a determinate context. Firstly, some people have a very strong intuition that: (b) S has perceptual knowledge of P. Secondly, all of us, when reflecting on the relevant data, have a very strong intuition for this other thesis: (c) the epistemic justification S has for believing Not-P is much greater than her epistemic justification for believing P. The cases seem to be instances of the base-rate fallacy, so that—apparently—the subject would be irrational if she believed proposition P. My main aim here is to present the puzzle. But, I also provide a solution for it that preserves thesis (b) without renouncing Bayesian epistemology, which is the basis for thesis (c).
{"title":"An Epistemic Puzzle About Knowledge and Rational Credence","authors":"Manuel Pérez Otero","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2019.1704615","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2019.1704615","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT I present some puzzling cases regarding knowledge and its relation to rational credence. They seem to entail a failure of an apparently correct principle: (a) if S knows P, then the epistemic justification S has for believing Not-P is not greater than her epistemic justification for believing P. The cases at issue involve the following two conflicting facts, relative to a given subject S and a proposition P in a determinate context. Firstly, some people have a very strong intuition that: (b) S has perceptual knowledge of P. Secondly, all of us, when reflecting on the relevant data, have a very strong intuition for this other thesis: (c) the epistemic justification S has for believing Not-P is much greater than her epistemic justification for believing P. The cases seem to be instances of the base-rate fallacy, so that—apparently—the subject would be irrational if she believed proposition P. My main aim here is to present the puzzle. But, I also provide a solution for it that preserves thesis (b) without renouncing Bayesian epistemology, which is the basis for thesis (c).","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2019-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/02698595.2019.1704615","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42287201","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-10-02DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2020.1767892
Tomoji Shogenji
{"title":"Hume’s Problem Solved: The Optimality of Meta-Induction","authors":"Tomoji Shogenji","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2020.1767892","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2020.1767892","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2019-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/02698595.2020.1767892","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47174765","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-04-03DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2019.1644722
M. Carrier, J. Lenhard
ABSTRACT The paper discusses modelling uncertainties in climate models and how they can be addressed based on physical principles as well as based on how the models perform in light of empirical data. We argue that the reliability of climate models can be judged by three kinds of standards: striking confirmation, supplementing independent causal arguments, and judging the causal core of models by establishing model robustness. We also use model robustness for delimiting confirmational holism. We survey recent results of climate modelling and identify salient results that fulfil each of the three standards. Our conclusion is that climate models can be considered reliable for some qualitative gross features and some long-term tendencies of the climate system as well as for quantitative aspects of some smaller-scale mechanisms. The adequacy of climate models for other purposes is less convincing. Among the latter are probability estimates, in particular, those concerning rare events. On the whole, climate models suffer from important deficits and are difficult to verify, but are still better confirmed and more reliable than parts of the methodological literature suggest.
{"title":"Climate Models: How to Assess Their Reliability","authors":"M. Carrier, J. Lenhard","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2019.1644722","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2019.1644722","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The paper discusses modelling uncertainties in climate models and how they can be addressed based on physical principles as well as based on how the models perform in light of empirical data. We argue that the reliability of climate models can be judged by three kinds of standards: striking confirmation, supplementing independent causal arguments, and judging the causal core of models by establishing model robustness. We also use model robustness for delimiting confirmational holism. We survey recent results of climate modelling and identify salient results that fulfil each of the three standards. Our conclusion is that climate models can be considered reliable for some qualitative gross features and some long-term tendencies of the climate system as well as for quantitative aspects of some smaller-scale mechanisms. The adequacy of climate models for other purposes is less convincing. Among the latter are probability estimates, in particular, those concerning rare events. On the whole, climate models suffer from important deficits and are difficult to verify, but are still better confirmed and more reliable than parts of the methodological literature suggest.","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2019-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/02698595.2019.1644722","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48547828","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-04-03DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2019.1623502
G. Cevolani, Luca Tambolo
ABSTRACT In a recent paper in this journal, entitled ‘Scientific Progress: Why Getting Closer to Truth is Not Enough’ (2017), Moti Mizrahi argues that the view of progress as approximation to the truth or increasing verisimilitude is plainly false. The key premise of his argument is that on such a view of progress, in order to get closer to the truth one only needs to arbitrarily add a true disjunct to a hypothesis or theory. Since quite clearly scientific progress is not a matter of adding true disjuncts to theories, the argument goes, the view of progress as approximation to the truth is untenable. We show that the key premise of Mizrahi’s argument is false: according to verisimilitude-based accounts of progress, adding arbitrary true disjuncts to existing theories is just not enough to get closer to the truth.
{"title":"Why Adding Truths Is Not Enough: A Reply to Mizrahi on Progress as Approximation to the Truth","authors":"G. Cevolani, Luca Tambolo","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2019.1623502","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2019.1623502","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In a recent paper in this journal, entitled ‘Scientific Progress: Why Getting Closer to Truth is Not Enough’ (2017), Moti Mizrahi argues that the view of progress as approximation to the truth or increasing verisimilitude is plainly false. The key premise of his argument is that on such a view of progress, in order to get closer to the truth one only needs to arbitrarily add a true disjunct to a hypothesis or theory. Since quite clearly scientific progress is not a matter of adding true disjuncts to theories, the argument goes, the view of progress as approximation to the truth is untenable. We show that the key premise of Mizrahi’s argument is false: according to verisimilitude-based accounts of progress, adding arbitrary true disjuncts to existing theories is just not enough to get closer to the truth.","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2019-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/02698595.2019.1623502","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43262237","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-04-03DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2019.1682773
María Caamaño-Alegre, J. Caamaño-Alegre
ABSTRACT This article examines how problems of validity in empirical social research differ from those in natural science. Specifically, we focus on how some ontological peculiarities of the object of study in social science bear on validity requirements. We consider these issues in experimental validity as well as in test validity because, while both fields hold large intellectual traditions, research tests or questionnaires are less closely connected to natural science methodology than experiments.
{"title":"From Ontological Traits to Validity Challenges in Social Science: The Cases of Economic Experiments and Research Questionnaires","authors":"María Caamaño-Alegre, J. Caamaño-Alegre","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2019.1682773","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2019.1682773","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article examines how problems of validity in empirical social research differ from those in natural science. Specifically, we focus on how some ontological peculiarities of the object of study in social science bear on validity requirements. We consider these issues in experimental validity as well as in test validity because, while both fields hold large intellectual traditions, research tests or questionnaires are less closely connected to natural science methodology than experiments.","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2019-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/02698595.2019.1682773","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43508130","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-04-03DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2019.1704616
Andrew Buskell
{"title":"What’s Left of Human Nature? A Post-Essentialist, Pluralist, and Interactive Account of a C","authors":"Andrew Buskell","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2019.1704616","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2019.1704616","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2019-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/02698595.2019.1704616","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47146633","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-02DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2019.1615663
Mohammad Reza Haghighi Fard
Carrara, M., D. Chiffi, and C. De Florio. 2017. “Assertions and Hypotheses: A Logical Framework for Their Opposition Relations.” Logic Journal of the IGPL 25: 131–144. Peirce, C. S. 1931–1958. Collected Papers of Charles S. Peirce. Edited by P. Weiss and A. Burks. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. References are to CP by volume and paragraph number. Rescher, N. 1976. “Peirce and the Economy of Research.” Philosophy of Science 43: 71–98. Woods, J. 2013. Errors of Reasoning: Naturalizing the Logic of Inference. London: College Publications.
Carrara, M.， D. Chiffi和C. De Florio. 2017。断言与假设:它们对立关系的逻辑框架逻辑学报，25(2):131-144。皮尔斯1931-1958。查尔斯S.皮尔斯文集。P. Weiss和A. Burks编辑。剑桥，马萨诸塞州:哈佛大学出版社。参考文献是按卷和段落编号的CP。雷彻，N. 1976。"皮尔斯与研究经济"科学哲学43:71-98。伍兹J. 2013。推理错误:推理逻辑的自然化。伦敦:大学出版社。
{"title":"In Praise of Natural Philosophy: A Revolution for Thought and Life","authors":"Mohammad Reza Haghighi Fard","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2019.1615663","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2019.1615663","url":null,"abstract":"Carrara, M., D. Chiffi, and C. De Florio. 2017. “Assertions and Hypotheses: A Logical Framework for Their Opposition Relations.” Logic Journal of the IGPL 25: 131–144. Peirce, C. S. 1931–1958. Collected Papers of Charles S. Peirce. Edited by P. Weiss and A. Burks. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. References are to CP by volume and paragraph number. Rescher, N. 1976. “Peirce and the Economy of Research.” Philosophy of Science 43: 71–98. Woods, J. 2013. Errors of Reasoning: Naturalizing the Logic of Inference. London: College Publications.","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2019-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/02698595.2019.1615663","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47335724","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-02DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2019.1623485
Pierrick Bourrat
ABSTRACT In Darwinian Population and Natural Selection, Peter Godfrey-Smith brought the topic of natural selection back to the forefront of philosophy of biology, highlighting different issues surrounding this concept. One such issue is whether the perfect transmission of characters from parent(s) to offspring is necessary for evolution by natural selection (ENS). Drawing on the classical summaries for ENS, Godfrey-Smith's answer is that it is not, and opposes his view to the replicator framework. In this paper, I show that Godfrey-Smith's approach to ENS is only one of two legitimate perspective on ENS. One focuses on natural selection in the context of other evolutionary processes, while the other assumes their absence. After having presented these two perspectives, which I call the ‘contextual’ and the ‘pure’ perspective respectively, I draw on a framework which conceptualises the difference between natural selection, drift, and mutation in a causal rather than statistical fashion developed elsewhere. From there, I show that following the pure rather than the contextual perspective, perfect inheritance of characters is a necessary condition for ENS. This is because, I argue, imperfect inheritance is inevitably associated with an evolutionary process conceptually distinct from natural selection, namely mutation. I conclude by proposing that the classical summaries for ENS correspond more to the contextual perspective and the replicator framework more to the pure perspective.
{"title":"In What Sense Can There Be Evolution by Natural Selection Without Perfect Inheritance?","authors":"Pierrick Bourrat","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2019.1623485","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2019.1623485","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In Darwinian Population and Natural Selection, Peter Godfrey-Smith brought the topic of natural selection back to the forefront of philosophy of biology, highlighting different issues surrounding this concept. One such issue is whether the perfect transmission of characters from parent(s) to offspring is necessary for evolution by natural selection (ENS). Drawing on the classical summaries for ENS, Godfrey-Smith's answer is that it is not, and opposes his view to the replicator framework. In this paper, I show that Godfrey-Smith's approach to ENS is only one of two legitimate perspective on ENS. One focuses on natural selection in the context of other evolutionary processes, while the other assumes their absence. After having presented these two perspectives, which I call the ‘contextual’ and the ‘pure’ perspective respectively, I draw on a framework which conceptualises the difference between natural selection, drift, and mutation in a causal rather than statistical fashion developed elsewhere. From there, I show that following the pure rather than the contextual perspective, perfect inheritance of characters is a necessary condition for ENS. This is because, I argue, imperfect inheritance is inevitably associated with an evolutionary process conceptually distinct from natural selection, namely mutation. I conclude by proposing that the classical summaries for ENS correspond more to the contextual perspective and the replicator framework more to the pure perspective.","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2019-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/02698595.2019.1623485","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44768924","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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