Pub Date : 2023-03-21DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2023.2187206
M. Carrier
{"title":"Fake Research: How Can We Recognise it and Respond to it?","authors":"M. Carrier","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2023.2187206","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2023.2187206","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-03-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47964664","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-02-19DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2023.2178838
Inmaculada de Melo-Martín
{"title":"On the Harms of Agnotological Practices and How to Address Them","authors":"Inmaculada de Melo-Martín","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2023.2178838","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2023.2178838","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-02-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46187687","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-02DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2023.2251676
Uwe Peters
ABSTRACT The English language now dominates scientific communications. Yet, many scientists have English as their second language. Their English proficiency may therefore often be more limited than that of a ‘native speaker’, and their scientific contributions (e.g. manuscripts) in English may frequently contain linguistic features that disrupt the fluency of a reader’s, or listener’s information processing even when the contributions are understandable. Scientific gatekeepers (e.g. journal reviewers) sometimes cite these features to justify negative decisions on manuscripts. Such justifications may rest on the prima facie plausible assumption that linguistic characteristics that hinder fast and easy understandability of scientific contributions are epistemically undesirable in science. I shall raise some doubts about this assumption by drawing on empirical research on processing fluency and its biasing effects. I also argue that directing scientists with English as a foreign language toward approaching ‘native-level’ English can have the negative consequence of reducing their potential to make scientific belief formation more reliable. These points suggest that one seemingly compelling justification for linguistically discriminating against scientific contributions in ‘non-native’ English is questionable and that the common insistence by scientific gatekeepers on ‘native-like’ English may be epistemically harmful to science.
{"title":"Linguistic Discrimination in Science: Can English Disfluency Help Debias Scientific Research?","authors":"Uwe Peters","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2023.2251676","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2023.2251676","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The English language now dominates scientific communications. Yet, many scientists have English as their second language. Their English proficiency may therefore often be more limited than that of a ‘native speaker’, and their scientific contributions (e.g. manuscripts) in English may frequently contain linguistic features that disrupt the fluency of a reader’s, or listener’s information processing even when the contributions are understandable. Scientific gatekeepers (e.g. journal reviewers) sometimes cite these features to justify negative decisions on manuscripts. Such justifications may rest on the prima facie plausible assumption that linguistic characteristics that hinder fast and easy understandability of scientific contributions are epistemically undesirable in science. I shall raise some doubts about this assumption by drawing on empirical research on processing fluency and its biasing effects. I also argue that directing scientists with English as a foreign language toward approaching ‘native-level’ English can have the negative consequence of reducing their potential to make scientific belief formation more reliable. These points suggest that one seemingly compelling justification for linguistically discriminating against scientific contributions in ‘non-native’ English is questionable and that the common insistence by scientific gatekeepers on ‘native-like’ English may be epistemically harmful to science.","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":"36 1","pages":"61 - 79"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48067481","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-02DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2023.2204792
Bohang Chen
ABSTRACT A longstanding criticism of Ernest Nagel's model of reduction is that it fails to take theory change into account. This criticism builds on the received view that Nagelian reductions are incompatible with theory change. This article challenges the received view by showing that Nagel's model can easily accommodate theory change. Indeed, Nagel's model is essentially static as it only gives unchanging formal and nonformal conditions for reduction; in contrast, theory change belongs to the dynamic history of science; as a result, the application of Nagel's model to scientific knowledge from different historical periods yields a series of Nagelian reductions of different degrees of reductive success. This Nagelian treatment of theory change is illustrated by considering the enterprise of reducing thermodynamics to statistical mechanics in the late nineteenth century. It is also contended that, in handling theory change Nagel's model has greater merits than subsequent models (exemplified by Kenneth Schaffner's general reduction-replacement model). This article concludes by suggesting that Nagel's model of reduction deals with theory change exactly in the same way as logical empiricism does with historicism.
{"title":"Ernest Nagel's Model of Reduction and Theory Change","authors":"Bohang Chen","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2023.2204792","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2023.2204792","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT A longstanding criticism of Ernest Nagel's model of reduction is that it fails to take theory change into account. This criticism builds on the received view that Nagelian reductions are incompatible with theory change. This article challenges the received view by showing that Nagel's model can easily accommodate theory change. Indeed, Nagel's model is essentially static as it only gives unchanging formal and nonformal conditions for reduction; in contrast, theory change belongs to the dynamic history of science; as a result, the application of Nagel's model to scientific knowledge from different historical periods yields a series of Nagelian reductions of different degrees of reductive success. This Nagelian treatment of theory change is illustrated by considering the enterprise of reducing thermodynamics to statistical mechanics in the late nineteenth century. It is also contended that, in handling theory change Nagel's model has greater merits than subsequent models (exemplified by Kenneth Schaffner's general reduction-replacement model). This article concludes by suggesting that Nagel's model of reduction deals with theory change exactly in the same way as logical empiricism does with historicism.","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":"36 1","pages":"19 - 37"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46521790","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-12-06DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2022.2152632
H. Thorén, Johannes Persson
ABSTRACT Philosophers of science have in recent years become increasingly interested in the notion of interdisciplinarity. One important form interdisciplinarity can take is that of a dynamic exchange of problems and solutions between disciplines—what has recently been called problem-feeding. On this model problems arising within specific disciplines are sometimes solved more effectively by, or in collaboration with, other disciplines. In this paper we explore this model as a framework for thinking about, and actively structuring, interdisciplinary research. We point to the applicability of the problem-feeding model, and to some of the prerequisites of problem-feeding interdisciplinarity, highlighting in particular the harmonisation of goals and the establishment of mutual trust between disciplines.
{"title":"Problem-Feeding as a Model for Interdisciplinary Research","authors":"H. Thorén, Johannes Persson","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2022.2152632","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2022.2152632","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Philosophers of science have in recent years become increasingly interested in the notion of interdisciplinarity. One important form interdisciplinarity can take is that of a dynamic exchange of problems and solutions between disciplines—what has recently been called problem-feeding. On this model problems arising within specific disciplines are sometimes solved more effectively by, or in collaboration with, other disciplines. In this paper we explore this model as a framework for thinking about, and actively structuring, interdisciplinary research. We point to the applicability of the problem-feeding model, and to some of the prerequisites of problem-feeding interdisciplinarity, highlighting in particular the harmonisation of goals and the establishment of mutual trust between disciplines.","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":"36 1","pages":"39 - 59"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-12-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48919341","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-16DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2022.2133418
Raimund Pils
ABSTRACT My target is the epistemological dimension of the realism debate. After establishing a stance voluntarist framework with a Jamesian background, drawing mostly on Wylie, Chakravarty, and van Fraassen, I argue that current voluntarists are too permissive. I show that especially various anti-realist stances but also some realist and selective realist stances block themselves from refutation by the history of science. I argue that such stances should be rejected. Finally, I propose that any disagreement that cannot be resolved by this strategy frequently boils down to an epistemic value disagreement about balancing the truth-goal.
{"title":"Scientific Realism and Blocking Strategies*","authors":"Raimund Pils","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2022.2133418","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2022.2133418","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT My target is the epistemological dimension of the realism debate. After establishing a stance voluntarist framework with a Jamesian background, drawing mostly on Wylie, Chakravarty, and van Fraassen, I argue that current voluntarists are too permissive. I show that especially various anti-realist stances but also some realist and selective realist stances block themselves from refutation by the history of science. I argue that such stances should be rejected. Finally, I propose that any disagreement that cannot be resolved by this strategy frequently boils down to an epistemic value disagreement about balancing the truth-goal.","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":"36 1","pages":"1 - 17"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-10-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48299820","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-02DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2022.2163134
Juan V. Mayoral
{"title":"Travelling Around Kuhn’s Worlds","authors":"Juan V. Mayoral","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2022.2163134","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2022.2163134","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":"35 1","pages":"279 - 286"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41958334","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-02DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2023.2196930
Juho Lindholm
ABSTRACT Practice-based philosophy of science has gradually arisen in the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) and science and technology studies (STS) during the past decades. It studies science as an ensemble of practices and theorising as one of these practices. A recent study has shown how the practice-based approach can be methodologically justified with reference to Peirce and Dewey. In this article, I will explore one consequence of that notion: science, as practice, is necessarily social. I will disambiguate five different senses in which science is social. First, science presupposes language, which is essentially social. Second, practices, including science, are adaptations of the behaviour of an organism to an environment, of which other organisms are a part. Third, practices, including science, are public and hence shareable. Fourth, scientific knowledge can serve as a vehicle of social and moral reform. Fifth, scientific knowledge can be applied to improve the human condition. This fivefold result bears on the problem of realism.
{"title":"Scientific Practices as Social Knowledge","authors":"Juho Lindholm","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2023.2196930","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2023.2196930","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Practice-based philosophy of science has gradually arisen in the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) and science and technology studies (STS) during the past decades. It studies science as an ensemble of practices and theorising as one of these practices. A recent study has shown how the practice-based approach can be methodologically justified with reference to Peirce and Dewey. In this article, I will explore one consequence of that notion: science, as practice, is necessarily social. I will disambiguate five different senses in which science is social. First, science presupposes language, which is essentially social. Second, practices, including science, are adaptations of the behaviour of an organism to an environment, of which other organisms are a part. Third, practices, including science, are public and hence shareable. Fourth, scientific knowledge can serve as a vehicle of social and moral reform. Fifth, scientific knowledge can be applied to improve the human condition. This fivefold result bears on the problem of realism.","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":"35 1","pages":"223 - 242"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44835275","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-02DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2022.2153215
M. D. Beni
ABSTRACT This is a short discussion of Janko Nešić’s [2022. “Towards a Neutral-Structuralist Theory of Consciousness and Selfhood.” International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 1–17], which conveys a critical review of Beni’s Structural Realist theory of the Self (SRS). Nešić’s critique indicates that there is an incongruity between the structuralist tendency of SRS and its commitment to panpsychism. He argues that Beni can use the notion of internal information to develop a more congenial account of consciousness than panpsychism. In this paper, I defend the panpsychist component of Beni’s theory and explain why I think it’s preferable to Nešić’s proposal.
{"title":"The Curious Incident of Indistinguishable Selves A Reply to Nešić","authors":"M. D. Beni","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2022.2153215","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2022.2153215","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This is a short discussion of Janko Nešić’s [2022. “Towards a Neutral-Structuralist Theory of Consciousness and Selfhood.” International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 1–17], which conveys a critical review of Beni’s Structural Realist theory of the Self (SRS). Nešić’s critique indicates that there is an incongruity between the structuralist tendency of SRS and its commitment to panpsychism. He argues that Beni can use the notion of internal information to develop a more congenial account of consciousness than panpsychism. In this paper, I defend the panpsychist component of Beni’s theory and explain why I think it’s preferable to Nešić’s proposal.","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":"35 1","pages":"261 - 268"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48494157","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-02DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2023.2218190
Borut Trpin, Barbara Osimani
The East European Network for Philosophy of Science (EENPS) is a network of philosophers of science and researchers from related disciplines educated, affiliated, or working at the academic institutions in the broadly understood region of Eastern Europe. The 3 Conference of the EENPS that took place in Belgrade, Serbia in 2021 was a well-attended event with contributions from scholars from diverse backgrounds. Trpin’s (2021) report on the conference noted that the conference had many sections, including general philosophy of science, philosophy of medicine, philosophy of cognitive science, philosophy of biology, history of logic, philosophy of economics, philosophy of social sciences, philosophy of physics, psychology and philosophy of science and formal philosophy of science. The diversity of topics presented at the conference is also reflected in the four papers included in the Topical Collection for this year’s EENPS conference. These papers address a range of issues related to science and philosophy, including social knowledge, the nature of truth and understanding, consciousness and selfhood, and the hard problem of consciousness. Lilia Gurova’s paper, ‘The Uses of Truth: Is There Room for Reconciliation of Factivist and Non-Factivist Accounts of Scientific Understanding?’ is an important contribution to the ongoing debate on scientific understanding. The argument between those who subscribe to factivism and those who do not revolves around the relationship between understanding and truth. According to Gurova, the line between factivism and non-factivism is not as straightforward as it appears, and there is a coming together of viewpoints between the two sides. Specifically, Gurova highlights how both factivists and non-factivists utilise the concept of ‘effectiveness’ as a replacement for truth, indicating a deeper similarity between the two positions. In his paper, ‘Scientific Practices as Social Knowledge’, Juho Lindholm explores the idea that science is inherently a social practice. Lindholm outlines five distinct ways in which science is social, including the fact that language, which is fundamentally social, underpins science. Other ways in which scientific practice is socially informed are related to the fact of being shaped by the presence of other organisms in the environment; of being public and publicly shared. Furthermore, scientific knowledge can be used to effect social and ethical change and can be employed to enhance human welfare.
{"title":"Introduction","authors":"Borut Trpin, Barbara Osimani","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2023.2218190","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2023.2218190","url":null,"abstract":"The East European Network for Philosophy of Science (EENPS) is a network of philosophers of science and researchers from related disciplines educated, affiliated, or working at the academic institutions in the broadly understood region of Eastern Europe. The 3 Conference of the EENPS that took place in Belgrade, Serbia in 2021 was a well-attended event with contributions from scholars from diverse backgrounds. Trpin’s (2021) report on the conference noted that the conference had many sections, including general philosophy of science, philosophy of medicine, philosophy of cognitive science, philosophy of biology, history of logic, philosophy of economics, philosophy of social sciences, philosophy of physics, psychology and philosophy of science and formal philosophy of science. The diversity of topics presented at the conference is also reflected in the four papers included in the Topical Collection for this year’s EENPS conference. These papers address a range of issues related to science and philosophy, including social knowledge, the nature of truth and understanding, consciousness and selfhood, and the hard problem of consciousness. Lilia Gurova’s paper, ‘The Uses of Truth: Is There Room for Reconciliation of Factivist and Non-Factivist Accounts of Scientific Understanding?’ is an important contribution to the ongoing debate on scientific understanding. The argument between those who subscribe to factivism and those who do not revolves around the relationship between understanding and truth. According to Gurova, the line between factivism and non-factivism is not as straightforward as it appears, and there is a coming together of viewpoints between the two sides. Specifically, Gurova highlights how both factivists and non-factivists utilise the concept of ‘effectiveness’ as a replacement for truth, indicating a deeper similarity between the two positions. In his paper, ‘Scientific Practices as Social Knowledge’, Juho Lindholm explores the idea that science is inherently a social practice. Lindholm outlines five distinct ways in which science is social, including the fact that language, which is fundamentally social, underpins science. Other ways in which scientific practice is socially informed are related to the fact of being shaped by the presence of other organisms in the environment; of being public and publicly shared. Furthermore, scientific knowledge can be used to effect social and ethical change and can be employed to enhance human welfare.","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":"35 1","pages":"209 - 210"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44455464","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：