Pub Date : 2022-10-16DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2022.2133418
Raimund Pils
ABSTRACT My target is the epistemological dimension of the realism debate. After establishing a stance voluntarist framework with a Jamesian background, drawing mostly on Wylie, Chakravarty, and van Fraassen, I argue that current voluntarists are too permissive. I show that especially various anti-realist stances but also some realist and selective realist stances block themselves from refutation by the history of science. I argue that such stances should be rejected. Finally, I propose that any disagreement that cannot be resolved by this strategy frequently boils down to an epistemic value disagreement about balancing the truth-goal.
{"title":"Scientific Realism and Blocking Strategies*","authors":"Raimund Pils","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2022.2133418","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2022.2133418","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT My target is the epistemological dimension of the realism debate. After establishing a stance voluntarist framework with a Jamesian background, drawing mostly on Wylie, Chakravarty, and van Fraassen, I argue that current voluntarists are too permissive. I show that especially various anti-realist stances but also some realist and selective realist stances block themselves from refutation by the history of science. I argue that such stances should be rejected. Finally, I propose that any disagreement that cannot be resolved by this strategy frequently boils down to an epistemic value disagreement about balancing the truth-goal.","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-10-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48299820","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-02DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2023.2196930
Juho Lindholm
ABSTRACT Practice-based philosophy of science has gradually arisen in the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) and science and technology studies (STS) during the past decades. It studies science as an ensemble of practices and theorising as one of these practices. A recent study has shown how the practice-based approach can be methodologically justified with reference to Peirce and Dewey. In this article, I will explore one consequence of that notion: science, as practice, is necessarily social. I will disambiguate five different senses in which science is social. First, science presupposes language, which is essentially social. Second, practices, including science, are adaptations of the behaviour of an organism to an environment, of which other organisms are a part. Third, practices, including science, are public and hence shareable. Fourth, scientific knowledge can serve as a vehicle of social and moral reform. Fifth, scientific knowledge can be applied to improve the human condition. This fivefold result bears on the problem of realism.
{"title":"Scientific Practices as Social Knowledge","authors":"Juho Lindholm","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2023.2196930","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2023.2196930","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Practice-based philosophy of science has gradually arisen in the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) and science and technology studies (STS) during the past decades. It studies science as an ensemble of practices and theorising as one of these practices. A recent study has shown how the practice-based approach can be methodologically justified with reference to Peirce and Dewey. In this article, I will explore one consequence of that notion: science, as practice, is necessarily social. I will disambiguate five different senses in which science is social. First, science presupposes language, which is essentially social. Second, practices, including science, are adaptations of the behaviour of an organism to an environment, of which other organisms are a part. Third, practices, including science, are public and hence shareable. Fourth, scientific knowledge can serve as a vehicle of social and moral reform. Fifth, scientific knowledge can be applied to improve the human condition. This fivefold result bears on the problem of realism.","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44835275","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-02DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2022.2163134
Juan V. Mayoral
{"title":"Travelling Around Kuhn’s Worlds","authors":"Juan V. Mayoral","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2022.2163134","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2022.2163134","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41958334","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-02DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2022.2153215
M. D. Beni
ABSTRACT This is a short discussion of Janko Nešić’s [2022. “Towards a Neutral-Structuralist Theory of Consciousness and Selfhood.” International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 1–17], which conveys a critical review of Beni’s Structural Realist theory of the Self (SRS). Nešić’s critique indicates that there is an incongruity between the structuralist tendency of SRS and its commitment to panpsychism. He argues that Beni can use the notion of internal information to develop a more congenial account of consciousness than panpsychism. In this paper, I defend the panpsychist component of Beni’s theory and explain why I think it’s preferable to Nešić’s proposal.
{"title":"The Curious Incident of Indistinguishable Selves A Reply to Nešić","authors":"M. D. Beni","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2022.2153215","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2022.2153215","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This is a short discussion of Janko Nešić’s [2022. “Towards a Neutral-Structuralist Theory of Consciousness and Selfhood.” International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 1–17], which conveys a critical review of Beni’s Structural Realist theory of the Self (SRS). Nešić’s critique indicates that there is an incongruity between the structuralist tendency of SRS and its commitment to panpsychism. He argues that Beni can use the notion of internal information to develop a more congenial account of consciousness than panpsychism. In this paper, I defend the panpsychist component of Beni’s theory and explain why I think it’s preferable to Nešić’s proposal.","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48494157","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-02DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2023.2191168
Daian Bica
ABSTRACT In this review article, I situate Michela Massimi’s 2022 Perspectival Realism book in the broader state of the art of the contemporary philosophy of science by examining critically its contribution to the perspectival realism debate. Setting up a new agenda of philosophical problems for the perspectival realist, Massimi’s book is the most comprehensive assessment of perspectival realism since the publication of Giere’s 2006 Scientific Perspectivism (the starting point of the debate). The author carries out a scrupulous analysis of the historical, epistemological, and metaphysical foundations of perspectival realism—while she engages critically with the existing literature, she does so by giving a generous homage to the previous contributions to the state of the art (the works of Giere, Morrison, van Fraassen and others). However, I raise a batterie of questions about Massimi’s (perspectival) commitments, to bring into question the reach and the ambitions of her global project, specifically the rising tension between her modest epistemological beliefs in a plurality of culturally and historically situated perspectives and her ambitious metaphysical commitments towards a primitivist view about laws of nature.
{"title":"Navigating Massimi’s Perspectival Garden with Inferential Forking Paths","authors":"Daian Bica","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2023.2191168","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2023.2191168","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In this review article, I situate Michela Massimi’s 2022 Perspectival Realism book in the broader state of the art of the contemporary philosophy of science by examining critically its contribution to the perspectival realism debate. Setting up a new agenda of philosophical problems for the perspectival realist, Massimi’s book is the most comprehensive assessment of perspectival realism since the publication of Giere’s 2006 Scientific Perspectivism (the starting point of the debate). The author carries out a scrupulous analysis of the historical, epistemological, and metaphysical foundations of perspectival realism—while she engages critically with the existing literature, she does so by giving a generous homage to the previous contributions to the state of the art (the works of Giere, Morrison, van Fraassen and others). However, I raise a batterie of questions about Massimi’s (perspectival) commitments, to bring into question the reach and the ambitions of her global project, specifically the rising tension between her modest epistemological beliefs in a plurality of culturally and historically situated perspectives and her ambitious metaphysical commitments towards a primitivist view about laws of nature.","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47205225","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-02DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2023.2218190
Borut Trpin, Barbara Osimani
The East European Network for Philosophy of Science (EENPS) is a network of philosophers of science and researchers from related disciplines educated, affiliated, or working at the academic institutions in the broadly understood region of Eastern Europe. The 3 Conference of the EENPS that took place in Belgrade, Serbia in 2021 was a well-attended event with contributions from scholars from diverse backgrounds. Trpin’s (2021) report on the conference noted that the conference had many sections, including general philosophy of science, philosophy of medicine, philosophy of cognitive science, philosophy of biology, history of logic, philosophy of economics, philosophy of social sciences, philosophy of physics, psychology and philosophy of science and formal philosophy of science. The diversity of topics presented at the conference is also reflected in the four papers included in the Topical Collection for this year’s EENPS conference. These papers address a range of issues related to science and philosophy, including social knowledge, the nature of truth and understanding, consciousness and selfhood, and the hard problem of consciousness. Lilia Gurova’s paper, ‘The Uses of Truth: Is There Room for Reconciliation of Factivist and Non-Factivist Accounts of Scientific Understanding?’ is an important contribution to the ongoing debate on scientific understanding. The argument between those who subscribe to factivism and those who do not revolves around the relationship between understanding and truth. According to Gurova, the line between factivism and non-factivism is not as straightforward as it appears, and there is a coming together of viewpoints between the two sides. Specifically, Gurova highlights how both factivists and non-factivists utilise the concept of ‘effectiveness’ as a replacement for truth, indicating a deeper similarity between the two positions. In his paper, ‘Scientific Practices as Social Knowledge’, Juho Lindholm explores the idea that science is inherently a social practice. Lindholm outlines five distinct ways in which science is social, including the fact that language, which is fundamentally social, underpins science. Other ways in which scientific practice is socially informed are related to the fact of being shaped by the presence of other organisms in the environment; of being public and publicly shared. Furthermore, scientific knowledge can be used to effect social and ethical change and can be employed to enhance human welfare.
{"title":"Introduction","authors":"Borut Trpin, Barbara Osimani","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2023.2218190","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2023.2218190","url":null,"abstract":"The East European Network for Philosophy of Science (EENPS) is a network of philosophers of science and researchers from related disciplines educated, affiliated, or working at the academic institutions in the broadly understood region of Eastern Europe. The 3 Conference of the EENPS that took place in Belgrade, Serbia in 2021 was a well-attended event with contributions from scholars from diverse backgrounds. Trpin’s (2021) report on the conference noted that the conference had many sections, including general philosophy of science, philosophy of medicine, philosophy of cognitive science, philosophy of biology, history of logic, philosophy of economics, philosophy of social sciences, philosophy of physics, psychology and philosophy of science and formal philosophy of science. The diversity of topics presented at the conference is also reflected in the four papers included in the Topical Collection for this year’s EENPS conference. These papers address a range of issues related to science and philosophy, including social knowledge, the nature of truth and understanding, consciousness and selfhood, and the hard problem of consciousness. Lilia Gurova’s paper, ‘The Uses of Truth: Is There Room for Reconciliation of Factivist and Non-Factivist Accounts of Scientific Understanding?’ is an important contribution to the ongoing debate on scientific understanding. The argument between those who subscribe to factivism and those who do not revolves around the relationship between understanding and truth. According to Gurova, the line between factivism and non-factivism is not as straightforward as it appears, and there is a coming together of viewpoints between the two sides. Specifically, Gurova highlights how both factivists and non-factivists utilise the concept of ‘effectiveness’ as a replacement for truth, indicating a deeper similarity between the two positions. In his paper, ‘Scientific Practices as Social Knowledge’, Juho Lindholm explores the idea that science is inherently a social practice. Lindholm outlines five distinct ways in which science is social, including the fact that language, which is fundamentally social, underpins science. Other ways in which scientific practice is socially informed are related to the fact of being shaped by the presence of other organisms in the environment; of being public and publicly shared. Furthermore, scientific knowledge can be used to effect social and ethical change and can be employed to enhance human welfare.","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44455464","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-02DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2023.2218264
Kåre Letrud
ABSTRACT I respond to Sven Ove Hansson’s [2020. "Disciplines, Doctrines, and Deviant Science." International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 33 (1): 43-52. doi:10.1080/02698595.2020.1831258] discussion note on my (Letrud 2019) critique of his (2013) pseudoscience definition. My critique addressed what I considered to be issues with his choice of definiendum, the efficiency of the definition for debunking pseudoscience, and a problematic extensional overlap with bad science. I attempted to solve these issues by proposing some modifications to his definition. I shall address the four main points of the discussion: whether the primary definiendum ought to be ‘pseudoscience’ or ‘pseudoscientific statement’ (I make a moderate case for ‘pseudoscience’), whether ‘discipline’ is an apt category for the definiens (it is, extensionally), and how to go about debunking pseudoscience (it is complicated). And, perhaps most importantly, whether Hansson’s definition of pseudoscientific statement subsumes examples of bad science, and thus science. I present a case study of efforts at correcting unreliable models proliferating in the research literature. This case demonstrates how bad science can satisfy Hansson’s criteria for pseudoscientific statement, including the criterion of deviant doctrine.
摘要我回应Sven Ove Hansson的【2020】。《学科、教义和偏差科学》，《国际科学哲学研究》33（1）：43-52。doi:10.1080/02698595.2020.1831258]关于我（Letrud 2019）对他（2013）伪科学定义的批评的讨论笔记。我的批评解决了我认为与他对定义的选择有关的问题，揭穿伪科学的定义的效率，以及与坏科学有问题的外延重叠。我试图通过对他的定义提出一些修改来解决这些问题。我将阐述讨论的四个要点：主要的定义应该是“伪科学”还是“伪科学声明”（我对“伪科学“提出了适度的理由），“学科”是否是定义的合适类别（从广义上讲），以及如何揭穿伪科学（它很复杂）。也许最重要的是，汉森对伪科学陈述的定义是否包含了糟糕科学的例子，从而也包含了科学的例子。我提出了一个案例研究，旨在纠正研究文献中激增的不可靠模型。这个案例证明了糟糕的科学是如何满足汉森关于伪科学陈述的标准的，包括越轨主义的标准。
{"title":"Incorrigible Science and Doctrinal Pseudoscience","authors":"Kåre Letrud","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2023.2218264","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2023.2218264","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT I respond to Sven Ove Hansson’s [2020. \"Disciplines, Doctrines, and Deviant Science.\" International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 33 (1): 43-52. doi:10.1080/02698595.2020.1831258] discussion note on my (Letrud 2019) critique of his (2013) pseudoscience definition. My critique addressed what I considered to be issues with his choice of definiendum, the efficiency of the definition for debunking pseudoscience, and a problematic extensional overlap with bad science. I attempted to solve these issues by proposing some modifications to his definition. I shall address the four main points of the discussion: whether the primary definiendum ought to be ‘pseudoscience’ or ‘pseudoscientific statement’ (I make a moderate case for ‘pseudoscience’), whether ‘discipline’ is an apt category for the definiens (it is, extensionally), and how to go about debunking pseudoscience (it is complicated). And, perhaps most importantly, whether Hansson’s definition of pseudoscientific statement subsumes examples of bad science, and thus science. I present a case study of efforts at correcting unreliable models proliferating in the research literature. This case demonstrates how bad science can satisfy Hansson’s criteria for pseudoscientific statement, including the criterion of deviant doctrine.","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48214471","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-02DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2023.2195306
Pieter Thyssen
{"title":"What is a Chemical Element? A Collection of Essays by Chemists, Philosophers, Historians, and Educators","authors":"Pieter Thyssen","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2023.2195306","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2023.2195306","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45705751","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-27DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2022.2123491
Published in International Studies in the Philosophy of Science (Vol. 34, No. 4, 2021)
发表于《科学哲学国际研究》(2021年第34卷第4期)
{"title":"Reviewers Acknowledgement","authors":"","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2022.2123491","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2022.2123491","url":null,"abstract":"Published in International Studies in the Philosophy of Science (Vol. 34, No. 4, 2021)","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138517283","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-08DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2022.2092825
Janko Nešić
ABSTRACT Recently, an information-theoretic structural realist theory of the self and consciousness has been put forward (Beni, M. D. 2019. Structuring the Self, Series New Directions in Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Palgrave Macmillan). The theory is presented as a form of panpsychism. I argue against this interpretation and show that Beni’s structuralist theory runs into the hard problem of consciousness, in a similar way as the Integrated Information theory of consciousness. Since both of these theories are structuralist and based on the notion of information, I propose to use a solution that has been employed for Integrated Information Theory, namely introducing the distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic structure and dynamics (intrinsic information and intrinsic structure). Making these metaphysical enhancements to Beni’s structuralist theory of consciousness will give the theory a better chance of overcoming the hard problem. In terms of the metaphysics of consciousness, it takes us beyond physicalism. I then suggest that the information-theoretic structuralist theory of consciousness should, instead of panpsychism and physicalism, be combined with neutral monist ontology which is a better fit. These reworkings could lead to an improved naturalistic account of consciousness – the neutral-structuralist theory of consciousness and the self.
{"title":"Towards a Neutral-Structuralist Theory of Consciousness and Selfhood","authors":"Janko Nešić","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2022.2092825","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2022.2092825","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Recently, an information-theoretic structural realist theory of the self and consciousness has been put forward (Beni, M. D. 2019. Structuring the Self, Series New Directions in Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Palgrave Macmillan). The theory is presented as a form of panpsychism. I argue against this interpretation and show that Beni’s structuralist theory runs into the hard problem of consciousness, in a similar way as the Integrated Information theory of consciousness. Since both of these theories are structuralist and based on the notion of information, I propose to use a solution that has been employed for Integrated Information Theory, namely introducing the distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic structure and dynamics (intrinsic information and intrinsic structure). Making these metaphysical enhancements to Beni’s structuralist theory of consciousness will give the theory a better chance of overcoming the hard problem. In terms of the metaphysics of consciousness, it takes us beyond physicalism. I then suggest that the information-theoretic structuralist theory of consciousness should, instead of panpsychism and physicalism, be combined with neutral monist ontology which is a better fit. These reworkings could lead to an improved naturalistic account of consciousness – the neutral-structuralist theory of consciousness and the self.","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-07-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45516524","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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