Pub Date : 2022-01-02DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2022.2075687
R. Kent
ABSTRACT In 1966, Paul Feyerabend published a short essay on the relation between dialectical materialist philosophy and Niels Bohr’s quantum theory, in which he develops several provocative ideas about the relations between science, ideology and society. I use Feyerabend’s essay to construct an account of his ‘Dadaist’ philosophical methodology. I argue that Dadaism is an ironic form of intellectual seriousness, such that the Dadaist is prepared to take any idea or practice seriously as a potentially valuable contribution to collective human thought and action (despite any diverging personal convictions), especially if they find such engagement to be lacking in their local culture. I identify a weakness in Feyerabend’s formulation of Dadaism, so far as it is conceived as a matter of individual epistemic character and thus fails to account for the role of the social structure of intellectual activity. This weakness can be remedied by supplementing philosophical Dadaism with descriptions of the kinds of institutions and incentive structures that might cultivate its constitutive epistemic dispositions.
{"title":"Paul Feyerabend and the Dialectical Character of Quantum Mechanics: A Lesson in Philosophical Dadaism","authors":"R. Kent","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2022.2075687","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2022.2075687","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In 1966, Paul Feyerabend published a short essay on the relation between dialectical materialist philosophy and Niels Bohr’s quantum theory, in which he develops several provocative ideas about the relations between science, ideology and society. I use Feyerabend’s essay to construct an account of his ‘Dadaist’ philosophical methodology. I argue that Dadaism is an ironic form of intellectual seriousness, such that the Dadaist is prepared to take any idea or practice seriously as a potentially valuable contribution to collective human thought and action (despite any diverging personal convictions), especially if they find such engagement to be lacking in their local culture. I identify a weakness in Feyerabend’s formulation of Dadaism, so far as it is conceived as a matter of individual epistemic character and thus fails to account for the role of the social structure of intellectual activity. This weakness can be remedied by supplementing philosophical Dadaism with descriptions of the kinds of institutions and incentive structures that might cultivate its constitutive epistemic dispositions.","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44617026","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-02DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2022.2158430
P. Feyerabend
The following lectures contain a report onnewexperimentalwork in thefieldofmagnetism. In the year 1942, after many years of research Ehrenhaft could finally make the following pronouncement: the universe contains not only electric currents but also magnetic currents. What, now, is a magnetic current? The idea of a current is taken from electricity and so are other concepts which we shall use in these lectures.
{"title":"Single Magnetic Northpoles and Southpoles and Their Importance for Science","authors":"P. Feyerabend","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2022.2158430","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2022.2158430","url":null,"abstract":"The following lectures contain a report onnewexperimentalwork in thefieldofmagnetism. In the year 1942, after many years of research Ehrenhaft could finally make the following pronouncement: the universe contains not only electric currents but also magnetic currents. What, now, is a magnetic current? The idea of a current is taken from electricity and so are other concepts which we shall use in these lectures.","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47582253","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-02DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2022.2084705
J. Díez, Albert Solé
ABSTRACT In this paper, we examine possible formalisations of the riskiness condition for hypothesis testing. First, we informally introduce derivability and riskiness as testing conditions together with the corresponding arguments for refutation and confirmation. Then, we distinguish two different senses of confirmation and focus our discussion on one of them with the aid of a historical example. In the remaining sections, we offer a brief overview of the main references to the risky condition in the literature and scrutinise different options for formally capturing riskiness; we show why none of them works. We conclude with some remarks about the relation between derivability and riskiness and claim that riskiness essentially involves a contextual, pragmatic component that eludes a complete formal reconstruction.
{"title":"On the Elusive Formalisation of the Risky Condition for Hypothesis Testing","authors":"J. Díez, Albert Solé","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2022.2084705","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2022.2084705","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In this paper, we examine possible formalisations of the riskiness condition for hypothesis testing. First, we informally introduce derivability and riskiness as testing conditions together with the corresponding arguments for refutation and confirmation. Then, we distinguish two different senses of confirmation and focus our discussion on one of them with the aid of a historical example. In the remaining sections, we offer a brief overview of the main references to the risky condition in the literature and scrutinise different options for formally capturing riskiness; we show why none of them works. We conclude with some remarks about the relation between derivability and riskiness and claim that riskiness essentially involves a contextual, pragmatic component that eludes a complete formal reconstruction.","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41612712","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-02DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2022.2113627
K. Wray
ABSTRACT Shech (2022) offers a critical assessment of my defense of anti-realism, developed in Resisting Scientific Realism. Induction and inductive inferences play a central role in Shech’s critical analysis of my defense of realism. I argue that Shech’s criticisms that relate to induction and inductive inference are problematic, and do not constitute a threat to my defense of anti-realism. Contrary to what Shech claims, the anti-realist does not need to explain why inductive inferences are successful. That is not part of contemporary realism/anti-realism debate. Further, such a demand fails to recognise that some anti-realists do not put much stock in induction.
{"title":"Induction, Rationality, and the Realism/Anti-realism Debate: A Reply to Shech","authors":"K. Wray","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2022.2113627","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2022.2113627","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Shech (2022) offers a critical assessment of my defense of anti-realism, developed in Resisting Scientific Realism. Induction and inductive inferences play a central role in Shech’s critical analysis of my defense of realism. I argue that Shech’s criticisms that relate to induction and inductive inference are problematic, and do not constitute a threat to my defense of anti-realism. Contrary to what Shech claims, the anti-realist does not need to explain why inductive inferences are successful. That is not part of contemporary realism/anti-realism debate. Further, such a demand fails to recognise that some anti-realists do not put much stock in induction.","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49274246","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-02DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2022.2092824
E. Shech
ABSTRACT In his recent 2018 book, Resisting Scientific Realism, K. Brad Wray provides a detailed, full-fledged defense of anti-realism about science. In this paper, I argue against the two main claims that constitute Wray’s positive and novel argument for his position, viz., his suggested Darwinian-selectionist explanation of the success of science and his skepticism about unobservables based on radical theory change. My goal is not wholly negative though. Instead, I aim to identify the type of work that an anti-realist like Wray would need to undertake in order to further substantiate their position, viz., taking a stance on inductive inference and support, and the type of realist and anti-realist positions that seem viable.
{"title":"Darwinian-Selectionist Explanation, Radical Theory Change, and the Observable-Unobservable Dichotomy","authors":"E. Shech","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2022.2092824","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2022.2092824","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In his recent 2018 book, Resisting Scientific Realism, K. Brad Wray provides a detailed, full-fledged defense of anti-realism about science. In this paper, I argue against the two main claims that constitute Wray’s positive and novel argument for his position, viz., his suggested Darwinian-selectionist explanation of the success of science and his skepticism about unobservables based on radical theory change. My goal is not wholly negative though. Instead, I aim to identify the type of work that an anti-realist like Wray would need to undertake in order to further substantiate their position, viz., taking a stance on inductive inference and support, and the type of realist and anti-realist positions that seem viable.","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45613301","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-02DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2022.2098463
Vassilis Livanios
{"title":"The Tools of Metaphysics and the Metaphysics of Science","authors":"Vassilis Livanios","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2022.2098463","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2022.2098463","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43834375","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-03DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2021.2002676
A. Krauss
ABSTRACT In the biomedical, behavioural and social sciences, the leading method used to estimate causal effects is commonly randomised controlled trials (RCTs) that are generally viewed as both the source and justification of the most valid evidence. In studying the foundation and theory behind RCTs, the existing literature analyses important single issues and biases in isolation that influence causal outcomes in trials (such as randomisation, statistical probabilities and placebos). The common account of biased causal inference is described in a general way in terms of probabilistic imbalances between trial groups. This paper expands the common account of causal bias by distinguishing between the range of biases arising between trial groups but also within one of the groups or across the entire sample during trial design, implementation and analysis. This is done by providing concrete examples from highly influential RCT studies. In going beyond the existing RCT literature, the paper provides a broader, practice-based account of causal bias that specifies the between-group, within-group and across-group biases that affect the estimated causal results of trials – impacting both the effect size and statistical significance. Within this expanded framework, we can better identify the range of different types of biases we face in practice and address the central question about the overall validity of the RCT method and its causal claims. A study can face several smaller biases (related simultaneously to a smaller sample, smaller estimated effect, greater unblinding etc.) that generally add up to greater aggregate bias. Though difficult to measure precisely, it is important to assess and provide information in studies on how much different sources of bias, combined, can explain the estimated causal effect. The RCT method is thereby often the best we have to inform our policy decisions – and the evidence is strengthened when combined with multiple studies and other methods. Yet there is room for continually improving trials and identifying ways to reduce biases they face and to increase their overall validity. Implications are discussed.
{"title":"Assessing the Overall Validity of Randomised Controlled Trials","authors":"A. Krauss","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2021.2002676","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2021.2002676","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In the biomedical, behavioural and social sciences, the leading method used to estimate causal effects is commonly randomised controlled trials (RCTs) that are generally viewed as both the source and justification of the most valid evidence. In studying the foundation and theory behind RCTs, the existing literature analyses important single issues and biases in isolation that influence causal outcomes in trials (such as randomisation, statistical probabilities and placebos). The common account of biased causal inference is described in a general way in terms of probabilistic imbalances between trial groups. This paper expands the common account of causal bias by distinguishing between the range of biases arising between trial groups but also within one of the groups or across the entire sample during trial design, implementation and analysis. This is done by providing concrete examples from highly influential RCT studies. In going beyond the existing RCT literature, the paper provides a broader, practice-based account of causal bias that specifies the between-group, within-group and across-group biases that affect the estimated causal results of trials – impacting both the effect size and statistical significance. Within this expanded framework, we can better identify the range of different types of biases we face in practice and address the central question about the overall validity of the RCT method and its causal claims. A study can face several smaller biases (related simultaneously to a smaller sample, smaller estimated effect, greater unblinding etc.) that generally add up to greater aggregate bias. Though difficult to measure precisely, it is important to assess and provide information in studies on how much different sources of bias, combined, can explain the estimated causal effect. The RCT method is thereby often the best we have to inform our policy decisions – and the evidence is strengthened when combined with multiple studies and other methods. Yet there is room for continually improving trials and identifying ways to reduce biases they face and to increase their overall validity. Implications are discussed.","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45850665","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-03DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2022.2054396
S. Tresker
ABSTRACT Establishing the effectiveness of medical treatments is one of the most important aspects of medical practice. Bradford Hill's viewpoints play an important role in inferring causality in medicine, and EBM+ seeks to improve evidence-based medicine, which is influential in establishing treatment effectiveness. At EBM+'s foundations lies the Russo–Williamson thesis (RWT), which can be seen as providing a reduction of Hill's viewpoints into those involving difference-making and mechanistic evidence, both of which are claimed by the RWT's proponents to be typically required for establishing causal claims in medicine. Yet little has been written on whether and how the RWT, EBM+, and Hill's viewpoints establish treatment effectiveness. This could be because of uncertainty over what treatment effectiveness is. I provide an account of treatment effectiveness, analysing the role of the RWT, EBM+, and Hill's viewpoints in this regard. I argue that Hill's viewpoints and EBM+ can be useful in helping to evaluate evidence, but cannot directly establish or confirm treatment effectiveness. This is partly because effectiveness, I claim, is subject to inductive risk and therefore determined by non-epistemic values, neither of which Hill's viewpoints nor EBM+ offer guidance on. I conclude by reinterpreting Hill's viewpoints in light of establishing treatment effectiveness.
{"title":"Treatment Effectiveness and the Russo–Williamson Thesis, EBM+, and Bradford Hill's Viewpoints","authors":"S. Tresker","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2022.2054396","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2022.2054396","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Establishing the effectiveness of medical treatments is one of the most important aspects of medical practice. Bradford Hill's viewpoints play an important role in inferring causality in medicine, and EBM+ seeks to improve evidence-based medicine, which is influential in establishing treatment effectiveness. At EBM+'s foundations lies the Russo–Williamson thesis (RWT), which can be seen as providing a reduction of Hill's viewpoints into those involving difference-making and mechanistic evidence, both of which are claimed by the RWT's proponents to be typically required for establishing causal claims in medicine. Yet little has been written on whether and how the RWT, EBM+, and Hill's viewpoints establish treatment effectiveness. This could be because of uncertainty over what treatment effectiveness is. I provide an account of treatment effectiveness, analysing the role of the RWT, EBM+, and Hill's viewpoints in this regard. I argue that Hill's viewpoints and EBM+ can be useful in helping to evaluate evidence, but cannot directly establish or confirm treatment effectiveness. This is partly because effectiveness, I claim, is subject to inductive risk and therefore determined by non-epistemic values, neither of which Hill's viewpoints nor EBM+ offer guidance on. I conclude by reinterpreting Hill's viewpoints in light of establishing treatment effectiveness.","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42238984","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-03DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2022.2057777
Stefaan Blancke, M. Boudry
ABSTRACT The demarcation between science and pseudoscience is a long-standing problem in philosophy of science. Although philosophers have been hesitant to engage in this project since Larry Laudan announced its demise in the 1980s, pseudoscience as a societal phenomenon did not disappear, and many policy makers and scientists continue to use the concept. Therefore, the philosophical challenge of explaining what pseudoscience is and how it differs from genuine science still stands. Even though it might well be impossible to identify all pseudosciences by means of a set of necessary and sufficient conditions, we can nonetheless, in a naturalistic fashion, establish that pseudoscience is a real phenomenon, diagnose recurring features and symptoms, and explain how these emerge. In this paper we argue that science builds on and emerges from interactive reasoning, a process that, under particular conditions, weeds out beliefs and practices that are not (sufficiently) justified. When people nevertheless think of these beliefs and practices as equivalent to or even better than the ones accepted by the scientific community, they are rightfully regarded as pseudoscience. We explain the processes by which beliefs and practices may degenerate into pseudoscience and discuss the implications of our demarcation approach for the understanding of pseudoscience.
{"title":"Pseudoscience as a Negative Outcome of Scientific Dialogue: A Pragmatic-Naturalistic Approach to the Demarcation Problem","authors":"Stefaan Blancke, M. Boudry","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2022.2057777","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2022.2057777","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The demarcation between science and pseudoscience is a long-standing problem in philosophy of science. Although philosophers have been hesitant to engage in this project since Larry Laudan announced its demise in the 1980s, pseudoscience as a societal phenomenon did not disappear, and many policy makers and scientists continue to use the concept. Therefore, the philosophical challenge of explaining what pseudoscience is and how it differs from genuine science still stands. Even though it might well be impossible to identify all pseudosciences by means of a set of necessary and sufficient conditions, we can nonetheless, in a naturalistic fashion, establish that pseudoscience is a real phenomenon, diagnose recurring features and symptoms, and explain how these emerge. In this paper we argue that science builds on and emerges from interactive reasoning, a process that, under particular conditions, weeds out beliefs and practices that are not (sufficiently) justified. When people nevertheless think of these beliefs and practices as equivalent to or even better than the ones accepted by the scientific community, they are rightfully regarded as pseudoscience. We explain the processes by which beliefs and practices may degenerate into pseudoscience and discuss the implications of our demarcation approach for the understanding of pseudoscience.","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46903288","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-03DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2021.2015678
T. Baetu
ABSTRACT According to the hypothesis-generator account, valid extrapolations from a source to a target system are circular, since they rely on knowledge of relevant similarities and differences that can only be obtained by investigating the target, thus removing the need to extrapolate; hence, extrapolative reasoning can only be useful as a method for generating hypotheses. I reject this view in favour of an inferential account, focused on extrapolations underpinning the aggregation of experimental results, and explore two lines of argumentation supporting the conclusion that these extrapolations can be validated in a noncircular manner. The first argument relies on formal proofs of inferential validity demonstrating that it is possible to reason from prior knowledge of causal structures in order to determine whether a claim can be extrapolated. The second argument builds on the fact that the hypothesis-generator account overlooks key inferential and experimental practices resulting in progressively better-informed extrapolations.
{"title":"In Defence of an Inferential Account of Extrapolation","authors":"T. Baetu","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2021.2015678","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2021.2015678","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT According to the hypothesis-generator account, valid extrapolations from a source to a target system are circular, since they rely on knowledge of relevant similarities and differences that can only be obtained by investigating the target, thus removing the need to extrapolate; hence, extrapolative reasoning can only be useful as a method for generating hypotheses. I reject this view in favour of an inferential account, focused on extrapolations underpinning the aggregation of experimental results, and explore two lines of argumentation supporting the conclusion that these extrapolations can be validated in a noncircular manner. The first argument relies on formal proofs of inferential validity demonstrating that it is possible to reason from prior knowledge of causal structures in order to determine whether a claim can be extrapolated. The second argument builds on the fact that the hypothesis-generator account overlooks key inferential and experimental practices resulting in progressively better-informed extrapolations.","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41733816","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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