Pub Date : 2022-01-01Epub Date: 2022-01-03DOI: 10.1007/s10058-021-00270-7
Eric Maskin
Under normal circumstances, competitive markets do an excellent job of supplying the goods that members of society want and need. But in an emergency like a pandemic, unassisted markets may not suffice. Imagine, for example, that society suddenly needs to obtain tens (or even hundreds) of millions of COVID-19 virus test kits a week. Test kits for this virus are a new product, and so it may not even be clear who the relevant set of manufacturers are. If we had the luxury of time, a laissez-faire market might identify these manufacturers: the price of test kits would adjust until supply matched demand. But getting a new market of this size to equilibrate quickly is unrealistic. Furthermore, markets don't work well when there are concentrations of power on either the buying or selling side, as there might well be here. Finally, a test is, in part, a public good (its benefits go not just to the person being tested, but everyone he might come in contact with), and markets do not usually provide public goods adequately. Fortunately, mechanism design can be enlisted to help.
{"title":"Mechanism design for pandemics.","authors":"Eric Maskin","doi":"10.1007/s10058-021-00270-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-021-00270-7","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Under normal circumstances, competitive markets do an excellent job of supplying the goods that members of society want and need. But in an emergency like a pandemic, unassisted markets may not suffice. Imagine, for example, that society suddenly needs to obtain tens (or even hundreds) of millions of COVID-19 virus test kits a week. Test kits for this virus are a new product, and so it may not even be clear who the relevant set of manufacturers are. If we had the luxury of time, a laissez-faire market might identify these manufacturers: the price of test kits would adjust until supply matched demand. But getting a new market of this size to equilibrate quickly is unrealistic. Furthermore, markets don't work well when there are concentrations of power on either the buying or selling side, as there might well be here. Finally, a test is, in part, a <i>public</i> good (its benefits go not just to the person being tested, but everyone he might come in contact with), and markets do not usually provide public goods adequately. Fortunately, mechanism design can be enlisted to help.</p>","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"26 3","pages":"255-259"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8720544/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140869847","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-11DOI: 10.1007/s10058-021-00284-1
Claus-Jochen Haake, W. Trockel
{"title":"Correction to: Socio-legal systems and implementation of the Nash solution in Debreu–Hurwicz equilibrium","authors":"Claus-Jochen Haake, W. Trockel","doi":"10.1007/s10058-021-00284-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-021-00284-1","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"27 1","pages":"471 - 471"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-12-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43305806","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-30DOI: 10.1007/s10058-021-00277-0
D. Gupta
{"title":"Correction to: Prize sharing rules in collective contests: when do social norms matter?","authors":"D. Gupta","doi":"10.1007/s10058-021-00277-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-021-00277-0","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"27 1","pages":"245 - 245"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-11-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46313275","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-27DOI: 10.1007/s10058-021-00276-1
Zhuo Chen, Bo Yan, Han-Gyoun Kang, Liyu Liu
{"title":"Asymmetric price adjustment and price discovery in spot and futures markets of agricultural commodities","authors":"Zhuo Chen, Bo Yan, Han-Gyoun Kang, Liyu Liu","doi":"10.1007/s10058-021-00276-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-021-00276-1","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"27 1","pages":"139 - 162"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-11-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48129998","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-17DOI: 10.1007/s10058-021-00272-5
Jac C. Heckelman
{"title":"Negative voting social welfare functions: a characterization","authors":"Jac C. Heckelman","doi":"10.1007/s10058-021-00272-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-021-00272-5","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"27 1","pages":"125 - 132"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45595454","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-11DOI: 10.1007/s10058-021-00273-4
D. Gupta
{"title":"Prize sharing rules in collective contests: when do social norms matter?","authors":"D. Gupta","doi":"10.1007/s10058-021-00273-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-021-00273-4","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"27 1","pages":"221 - 244"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-11-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44421498","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-09DOI: 10.1007/s10058-021-00271-6
Hidekazu Anno, Sui Takahashi
{"title":"A unified approach to strategy-proofness of the deferred-acceptance rule and the top-trading cycles rule","authors":"Hidekazu Anno, Sui Takahashi","doi":"10.1007/s10058-021-00271-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-021-00271-6","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"27 1","pages":"133 - 137"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-11-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"52123016","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-03DOI: 10.1007/s10058-021-00267-2
A. Rubinstein, Kemal Yildiz
{"title":"An étude in modeling the definability of equilibrium","authors":"A. Rubinstein, Kemal Yildiz","doi":"10.1007/s10058-021-00267-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-021-00267-2","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-10-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44243645","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-09-17DOI: 10.1007/s10058-021-00264-5
Chenghong Luo, A. Mauleon, Vincent Vannetelbosch
{"title":"Coalition-proof stable networks","authors":"Chenghong Luo, A. Mauleon, Vincent Vannetelbosch","doi":"10.1007/s10058-021-00264-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-021-00264-5","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"26 1","pages":"185 - 209"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-09-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47014605","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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