Pub Date : 2022-01-27DOI: 10.1007/s10058-021-00279-y
Tomás Rodríguez Barraquer, Xu Tan
{"title":"A model of competitive signaling with rich message spaces","authors":"Tomás Rodríguez Barraquer, Xu Tan","doi":"10.1007/s10058-021-00279-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-021-00279-y","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"1 1","pages":"1-43"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45200076","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-20DOI: 10.1007/s10058-022-00287-6
C. Chou
{"title":"Correction to: An analysis of managerial delegation in a market with vertically-integrated producer owning an essential input monopolistically","authors":"C. Chou","doi":"10.1007/s10058-022-00287-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-022-00287-6","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"27 1","pages":"267 - 268"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47915241","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-12DOI: 10.1007/s10058-021-00280-5
Murat Yılmaz, Özgür Yılmaz
{"title":"Stability of an allocation of objects","authors":"Murat Yılmaz, Özgür Yılmaz","doi":"10.1007/s10058-021-00280-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-021-00280-5","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45255096","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-08DOI: 10.1007/s10058-021-00282-3
Barlo, Mehmet, Dalkıran, Nuh Aygün
Following a theoretical analysis of the scope of Nash implementation for a given mechanism, we study the formal framework for computational identification of Nash implementability. We provide computational tools for Nash implementation in finite environments. In particular, we supply Python codes that identify (i) the domain of preferences that allows Nash implementation by a given mechanism, (ii) the maximal domain of preferences that a given mechanism Nash implements Pareto efficiency, (iii) all consistent collections of sets of a given social choice correspondence (SCC), the existence of which is a necessary condition for Nash implementation of this SCC, and (iv) check whether some of the well-known sufficient conditions for Nash implementation hold for a given SCC. Our results exhibit that the computational identification of all collections consistent with an SCC enables the planner to design appealing mechanisms.
{"title":"Computational implementation","authors":"Barlo, Mehmet, Dalkıran, Nuh Aygün","doi":"10.1007/s10058-021-00282-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-021-00282-3","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Following a theoretical analysis of the scope of Nash implementation for a given mechanism, we study the formal framework for computational identification of Nash implementability. We provide computational tools for Nash implementation in finite environments. In particular, we supply Python codes that identify (<i>i</i>) the domain of preferences that allows Nash implementation by a given mechanism, (<i>ii</i>) the maximal domain of preferences that a given mechanism Nash implements Pareto efficiency, (<i>iii</i>) all consistent collections of sets of a given social choice correspondence (SCC), the existence of which is a necessary condition for Nash implementation of this SCC, and (<i>iv</i>) check whether some of the well-known sufficient conditions for Nash implementation hold for a given SCC. Our results exhibit that the computational identification of all collections consistent with an SCC enables the planner to design appealing mechanisms.</p>","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"10 6","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138496067","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-06DOI: 10.1007/s10058-021-00283-2
Christian Basteck, M. Mantovani
{"title":"Aiding applicants: leveling the playing field within the immediate acceptance mechanism","authors":"Christian Basteck, M. Mantovani","doi":"10.1007/s10058-021-00283-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-021-00283-2","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"27 1","pages":"187 - 220"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41711292","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-03DOI: 10.1007/s10058-021-00274-3
C. Chou
{"title":"An analysis of managerial delegation in a market with vertically-integrated producer owning an essential input monopolistically","authors":"C. Chou","doi":"10.1007/s10058-021-00274-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-021-00274-3","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"1 1","pages":"1-19"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47824278","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-01Epub Date: 2022-03-01DOI: 10.1007/s10058-022-00295-6
Rahul Deb, Mallesh Pai, Akhil Vohra, Rakesh Vohra
The fear of contracting a serious illness caused by a contagious disease limits economic activity even after reopening. Widespread testing alone will not alleviate this problem. We argue that targeted testing in concert with targeted transfers is essential. We propose a model with these features to determine where agents should be tested and how they should be incentivized. Agents with a low wage, a high risk of infection, and who bear a large cost of falling ill should be tested at work. When testing is very costly, agents with high wages and low expected costs associated with falling ill should be tested at home.
{"title":"Testing alone is insufficient.","authors":"Rahul Deb, Mallesh Pai, Akhil Vohra, Rakesh Vohra","doi":"10.1007/s10058-022-00295-6","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s10058-022-00295-6","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>The fear of contracting a serious illness caused by a contagious disease limits economic activity even after reopening. Widespread testing alone will not alleviate this problem. We argue that targeted testing in concert with targeted transfers is essential. We propose a model with these features to determine where agents should be tested and how they should be incentivized. Agents with a low wage, a high risk of infection, and who bear a large cost of falling ill should be tested at work. When testing is very costly, agents with high wages and low expected costs associated with falling ill should be tested at home.</p>","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"26 1","pages":"1-21"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8886876/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44907584","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-01Epub Date: 2022-08-04DOI: 10.1007/s10058-022-00305-7
Simon Loertscher, Leslie M Marx
Traditional analysis takes the public or private nature of goods as given. However, technological advances, particularly related to digital goods such as non-fungible tokens, increasingly make rivalry a choice variable of the designer. This paper addresses the question of when a profit-maximizing seller prefers to provide an asset as a private good or as a public good. While the public good is subject to a free-rider problem, a profit-maximizing seller or designer faces a nontrivial quantity-exclusivity tradeoff, and so profits from collecting small payments from multiple agents can exceed the large payment from a single agent. We provide conditions under which the profit from the public good exceeds that from a private good. If the cost of production is sufficiently, but not excessively, large, then production is profitable only for the public good. Moreover, if the lower bound of the support of the buyers' value distribution is positive, then the profit from the public good is unbounded in the number of buyers, whereas the profit from selling the private good is never more than the upper bound of the support minus the cost. As the variance of the agents' distribution becomes smaller, public goods eventually outperform private goods, reflecting intuition based on complete information models, in which public goods always outperform private goods in terms of revenue.
{"title":"To sell public or private goods.","authors":"Simon Loertscher, Leslie M Marx","doi":"10.1007/s10058-022-00305-7","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s10058-022-00305-7","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Traditional analysis takes the public or private nature of goods as given. However, technological advances, particularly related to digital goods such as non-fungible tokens, increasingly make rivalry a choice variable of the designer. This paper addresses the question of when a profit-maximizing seller prefers to provide an asset as a private good or as a public good. While the public good is subject to a free-rider problem, a profit-maximizing seller or designer faces a nontrivial quantity-exclusivity tradeoff, and so profits from collecting small payments from multiple agents can exceed the large payment from a single agent. We provide conditions under which the profit from the public good exceeds that from a private good. If the cost of production is sufficiently, but not excessively, large, then production is profitable only for the public good. Moreover, if the lower bound of the support of the buyers' value distribution is positive, then the profit from the public good is unbounded in the number of buyers, whereas the profit from selling the private good is never more than the upper bound of the support minus the cost. As the variance of the agents' distribution becomes smaller, public goods eventually outperform private goods, reflecting intuition based on complete information models, in which public goods always outperform private goods in terms of revenue.</p>","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"26 1","pages":"385-415"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9362552/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"52123101","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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