This paper examines the conceptions of logic from Leibniz, Hume, Kant, Frege, Wittgenstein and Ayer, and regards the six philosophers as the representatives of logical exceptionalism. From their standpoints, this paper refines the tenets of logical exceptionalism as follows: logic is exceptional to all other sciences because of four reasons: (i) logic is formal, neutral to any domain and any entities, and general; (ii) logical truths are made true by the meanings of logical constants they contain or by logicians' rational insight to consequence relations; (iii) logical truths are analytical, a prior and necessary, so not‐revisable; and (iv) logical laws are normative for how to correctly think. However, logical exceptionalism has encountered difficult open problems: What are logical constants? How to justify basic laws of logic? How are logical laws accessible to us? How to explain the reasonability of rival logics and select from them? How to explain the universal applicability of logical laws? How to explain the normativity of logical laws for correct thinking? This paper concludes that logical anti‐exceptionalism is more hopeful to successfully answer these questions than logical exceptionalism.
{"title":"Logical exceptionalism: Development and predicaments","authors":"Bo Chen","doi":"10.1111/theo.12533","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12533","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the conceptions of logic from Leibniz, Hume, Kant, Frege, Wittgenstein and Ayer, and regards the six philosophers as the representatives of logical exceptionalism. From their standpoints, this paper refines the tenets of logical exceptionalism as follows: logic is exceptional to all other sciences because of four reasons: (i) logic is formal, neutral to any domain and any entities, and general; (ii) logical truths are made true by the meanings of logical constants they contain or by logicians' rational insight to consequence relations; (iii) logical truths are analytical, <jats:italic>a prior</jats:italic> and necessary, so not‐revisable; and (iv) logical laws are normative for how to correctly think. However, logical exceptionalism has encountered difficult open problems: What are logical constants? How to justify basic laws of logic? How are logical laws accessible to us? How to explain the reasonability of rival logics and select from them? How to explain the universal applicability of logical laws? How to explain the normativity of logical laws for correct thinking? This paper concludes that logical anti‐exceptionalism is more hopeful to successfully answer these questions than logical exceptionalism.","PeriodicalId":44638,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA","volume":"34 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141195289","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper analyses the abstractionist account of quantity championed by Leibniz, especially in the 1680s. Leibniz introduced the notion of quantity in an indirect way, via an abstraction principle. In the first part of the paper, I identify the context in which this approach arose in light of Leibniz's criticism of his earlier dream of an ‘alphabet of human thought’. Recognising the impossibility of such a project led him to realise that, when dealing with terms referring to abstract objects, we should always consider them within the true sentences in which they occur. In the second part, I describe this approach in detail. This allows us to look at some key concepts of Leibniz's theory of quantity. In particular, I raise the problem of the relationship between the two sides of the abstraction principle: how should we think of the relation between the claim that a and b are equal, and the claim that the quantity of a is identical to the quantity of b? I argue that we can find a positive answer to this problem in Leibniz.
本文分析了莱布尼茨，尤其是 16 世纪 80 年代所倡导的抽象主义的量论。莱布尼茨通过抽象原则，以间接的方式引入了量的概念。在论文的第一部分，我根据莱布尼茨对他早先梦想的 "人类思想字母表 "的批评，指出了这种方法产生的背景。认识到这一计划的不可能性后，他意识到，在处理指涉抽象对象的术语时，我们应始终在它们出现的真实句子中考虑它们。在第二部分，我将详细介绍这种方法。这样，我们就可以研究莱布尼茨量论的一些关键概念。特别是，我提出了抽象原则两边的关系问题：我们应该如何看待 a 和 b 相等的说法与 a 的量与 b 的量相同的说法之间的关系？我认为，我们可以在莱布尼茨那里找到这个问题的正面答案。
{"title":"Definitions by abstraction and Leibniz's notion of quantity","authors":"Filippo Costantini","doi":"10.1111/theo.12523","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12523","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyses the abstractionist account of quantity championed by Leibniz, especially in the 1680s. Leibniz introduced the notion of quantity in an indirect way, via an abstraction principle. In the first part of the paper, I identify the context in which this approach arose in light of Leibniz's criticism of his earlier dream of an ‘alphabet of human thought’. Recognising the impossibility of such a project led him to realise that, when dealing with terms referring to abstract objects, we should always consider them within the true sentences in which they occur. In the second part, I describe this approach in detail. This allows us to look at some key concepts of Leibniz's theory of quantity. In particular, I raise the problem of the relationship between the two sides of the abstraction principle: how should we think of the relation between the claim that <i>a</i> and <i>b</i> are equal, and the claim that the quantity of <i>a</i> is identical to the quantity of <i>b</i>? I argue that we can find a positive answer to this problem in Leibniz.","PeriodicalId":44638,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA","volume":"17 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-04-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140581988","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article examines the anxiety expressed by von Wright over the status of the deontic permission, P, as an independent normative category, given the interdefinability between P and O at the foundation of deontic logic. Two concerns are noted: the reducibility of P to O, and the inadequacy of P to convey a full permission in a social setting. Drawing on resources from the Hohfeldian analytical framework, the relational and aggregate features of permission are explored, and an aggregate conception of permission, P, is recognized. With the assistance of insights from Demey and Smessaert on duals, Hansson on formalization, and Soames on interdefinability, it is concluded that the interdefinability thesis can be defended without threatening the independent status of P. Additional grounds for reaching this conclusion are provided from a detailed analysis of the relationship between P and P. Some implications of the more expansive notion of permission, P, are considered with regard to the resources of deontic logic and their application.
本文探讨了冯-赖特对作为一个独立规范范畴的 "允准"（P）的地位所表达的焦虑，因为 "允准"（P）与 "允准"（O）之间的互定性是 "允准 "逻辑的基础。冯-赖特指出了两个值得关注的问题：P 与 O 之间的可还原性，以及 P 不足以在社会环境中传达完整的许可。借助霍菲尔德分析框架的资源，我们探讨了许可的关系特征和集合特征，并确认了许可的集合概念 P。在德米和斯梅萨特关于二元性、汉森关于形式化以及索姆斯关于可定义性的见解的帮助下，我们得出结论，可定义性论题可以在不威胁 P 的独立地位的情况下得到辩护。
{"title":"Overcoming von Wright's anxiety","authors":"Andrew Halpin","doi":"10.1111/theo.12519","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12519","url":null,"abstract":"This article examines the anxiety expressed by von Wright over the status of the deontic permission, <jats:italic>P</jats:italic>, as an independent normative category, given the interdefinability between <jats:italic>P</jats:italic> and <jats:italic>O</jats:italic> at the foundation of deontic logic. Two concerns are noted: the reducibility of <jats:italic>P</jats:italic> to <jats:italic>O</jats:italic>, and the inadequacy of <jats:italic>P</jats:italic> to convey a full permission in a social setting. Drawing on resources from the Hohfeldian analytical framework, the relational and aggregate features of permission are explored, and an aggregate conception of permission, P, is recognized. With the assistance of insights from Demey and Smessaert on duals, Hansson on formalization, and Soames on interdefinability, it is concluded that the interdefinability thesis can be defended without threatening the independent status of <jats:italic>P</jats:italic>. Additional grounds for reaching this conclusion are provided from a detailed analysis of the relationship between <jats:italic>P</jats:italic> and P. Some implications of the more expansive notion of permission, P, are considered with regard to the resources of deontic logic and their application.","PeriodicalId":44638,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA","volume":"97 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-04-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140602183","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Meno problem, asking for the surplus value of knowledge beyond the value of true justified belief, was recently much treated within reliabilist and virtue epistemologies. The answers from formal epistemology, by contrast, are quite poor. This paper attempts to improve the score of formal epistemology by precisely explicating Timothy Williamson's suggestion that ‘present knowledge is less vulnerable than mere present true belief to rational undermining by future evidence’. It does so by combining Nozick's sensitivity analysis of knowledge with Spohn's fact‐asserting epistemic interpretation of conditionals. Accordingly, the surplus value of knowledge lies in a specific kind of stability of knowledge, which differs, though, from that claimed by other so‐called stability analyses of knowledge.
{"title":"The surplus value of knowledge","authors":"Wolfgang Spohn","doi":"10.1111/theo.12521","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12521","url":null,"abstract":"The <jats:italic>Meno</jats:italic> problem, asking for the surplus value of knowledge beyond the value of true justified belief, was recently much treated within reliabilist and virtue epistemologies. The answers from formal epistemology, by contrast, are quite poor. This paper attempts to improve the score of formal epistemology by precisely explicating Timothy Williamson's suggestion that ‘present knowledge is less vulnerable than mere present true belief to rational undermining by future evidence’. It does so by combining Nozick's sensitivity analysis of knowledge with Spohn's fact‐asserting epistemic interpretation of conditionals. Accordingly, the surplus value of knowledge lies in a specific kind of stability of knowledge, which differs, though, from that claimed by other so‐called stability analyses of knowledge.","PeriodicalId":44638,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA","volume":"16 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-04-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140602360","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Correction to: Ethics and democracy","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/theo.12520","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12520","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44638,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA","volume":"97 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140166718","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Rumfitt has given two arguments that in unilateralist verificationist theories of meaning, truth collapses into correct assertibility. In the present paper I give similar arguments that show that in unilateral falsificationist theories of meaning, falsehood collapses into correct deniability. According to bilateralism, meanings are determined by assertion and denial conditions, so the question arises whether it succumbs to similar arguments. I show that this is not the case. The final section considers the question whether a principle central to Rumfitt's first argument, ‘It is assertible that if and only if it is assertible that it is assertible that ’, is one that bilateralists can reject, and concludes that they cannot. It follows that the logic of assertibility and deniability, according to a result by Williamson, is the little known modal logic K4 studied by Sobociński. The paper ends with a plaidoyer for bilateralists to adopt this logic.
拉姆菲特提出了两个论点，说明在单边主义的意义验证论中，真理会归结为正确的可断言性。在本文中，我给出了类似的论证，表明在单边意义证伪主义理论中，谬误会归结为正确的可否认性。根据双边主义，意义是由断言和否认条件决定的，因此问题在于它是否会屈从于类似的论证。我证明情况并非如此。最后一节探讨了一个问题，即朗菲特第一个论证的核心原则 "当且仅当可断言 A$$ A $$$是可断言的A$$ A $$$"是否是双边主义者可以拒绝的原则，结论是他们不能拒绝。由此可见，根据威廉姆森的一个结果，可断言性和可否认性逻辑就是索博辛斯基研究的鲜为人知的模态逻辑 K4。本文最后提出了双边主义者采用这一逻辑的建议。
{"title":"Bilateralism, collapsing modalities, and the logic of assertion and denial","authors":"Nils Kürbis","doi":"10.1111/theo.12516","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12516","url":null,"abstract":"Rumfitt has given two arguments that in unilateralist verificationist theories of meaning, truth collapses into correct assertibility. In the present paper I give similar arguments that show that in unilateral falsificationist theories of meaning, falsehood collapses into correct deniability. According to bilateralism, meanings are determined by assertion and denial conditions, so the question arises whether it succumbs to similar arguments. I show that this is not the case. The final section considers the question whether a principle central to Rumfitt's first argument, ‘It is assertible that <mjx-container aria-label=\"upper A\" ctxtmenu_counter=\"0\" ctxtmenu_oldtabindex=\"1\" jax=\"CHTML\" role=\"application\" sre-explorer- style=\"font-size: 103%; position: relative;\" tabindex=\"0\"><mjx-math aria-hidden=\"true\"><mjx-semantics><mjx-mrow><mjx-mi data-semantic-annotation=\"clearspeak:simple\" data-semantic-font=\"italic\" data-semantic- data-semantic-role=\"latinletter\" data-semantic-speech=\"upper A\" data-semantic-type=\"identifier\"><mjx-c></mjx-c></mjx-mi></mjx-mrow></mjx-semantics></mjx-math><mjx-assistive-mml aria-hidden=\"true\" display=\"inline\" unselectable=\"on\"><math altimg=\"/cms/asset/b9f1cf52-d732-424a-be82-cd61386f4221/theo12516-math-0001.png\" xmlns=\"http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML\"><semantics><mrow><mi data-semantic-=\"\" data-semantic-annotation=\"clearspeak:simple\" data-semantic-font=\"italic\" data-semantic-role=\"latinletter\" data-semantic-speech=\"upper A\" data-semantic-type=\"identifier\">A</mi></mrow>$$ A $$</annotation></semantics></math></mjx-assistive-mml></mjx-container> if and only if it is assertible that it is assertible that <mjx-container aria-label=\"upper A\" ctxtmenu_counter=\"1\" ctxtmenu_oldtabindex=\"1\" jax=\"CHTML\" role=\"application\" sre-explorer- style=\"font-size: 103%; position: relative;\" tabindex=\"0\"><mjx-math aria-hidden=\"true\"><mjx-semantics><mjx-mrow><mjx-mi data-semantic-annotation=\"clearspeak:simple\" data-semantic-font=\"italic\" data-semantic- data-semantic-role=\"latinletter\" data-semantic-speech=\"upper A\" data-semantic-type=\"identifier\"><mjx-c></mjx-c></mjx-mi></mjx-mrow></mjx-semantics></mjx-math><mjx-assistive-mml aria-hidden=\"true\" display=\"inline\" unselectable=\"on\"><math altimg=\"/cms/asset/39fd4d93-311c-4f8c-b2e5-da8117ff21cf/theo12516-math-0002.png\" xmlns=\"http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML\"><semantics><mrow><mi data-semantic-=\"\" data-semantic-annotation=\"clearspeak:simple\" data-semantic-font=\"italic\" data-semantic-role=\"latinletter\" data-semantic-speech=\"upper A\" data-semantic-type=\"identifier\">A</mi></mrow>$$ A $$</annotation></semantics></math></mjx-assistive-mml></mjx-container>’, is one that bilateralists can reject, and concludes that they cannot. It follows that the logic of assertibility and deniability, according to a result by Williamson, is the little known modal logic K4 studied by Sobociński. The paper ends with a <i>plaidoyer</i> for bilateralists to adopt this logic.","PeriodicalId":44638,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA","volume":"62 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-03-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140146909","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In “Sidgwick on Bentham: the ‘Double Aspect’ of Utilitarianism”, Schofield argued that Bentham did not regard his psychological theory as part of his utilitarianism and that natural benevolence is at his disposal to mitigate the problem of the “double aspect” of utilitarianism. This paper argues that Bentham regarded his psychological theory as part of his utilitarianism and that, in a manner quite distinct from an internal, benevolence approach, he took advantage of self-preference and thus adopted a self-preference and artificial means-based approach, thereby still maintaining an internal approach supported by external, institutional contrivance. In so doing, he argued first that self-preference could add to the greatest happiness; second, that benevolence would tend to facilitate the achievement of the greatest happiness, with the consequence that he endorsed the artificial cultivation of benevolence; and third, that the artificial means of the junction-of-interests-prescribing principle should be adopted to bridge the gap between self-preference and the greatest happiness. Sidgwick failed to appreciate the depth and sophistication of Bentham's logic.
{"title":"Sidgwick and Bentham's “double aspect” of utilitarianism revisited","authors":"Yanxiang Zhang","doi":"10.1111/theo.12517","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12517","url":null,"abstract":"In “Sidgwick on Bentham: the ‘Double Aspect’ of Utilitarianism”, Schofield argued that Bentham did not regard his psychological theory as part of his utilitarianism and that natural benevolence is at his disposal to mitigate the problem of the “double aspect” of utilitarianism. This paper argues that Bentham regarded his psychological theory as part of his utilitarianism and that, in a manner quite distinct from an internal, benevolence approach, he took advantage of self-preference and thus adopted a self-preference and artificial means-based approach, thereby still maintaining an internal approach supported by external, institutional contrivance. In so doing, he argued first that self-preference could add to the greatest happiness; second, that benevolence would tend to facilitate the achievement of the greatest happiness, with the consequence that he endorsed the artificial cultivation of benevolence; and third, that the artificial means of the junction-of-interests-prescribing principle should be adopted to bridge the gap between self-preference and the greatest happiness. Sidgwick failed to appreciate the depth and sophistication of Bentham's logic.","PeriodicalId":44638,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA","volume":"48 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-03-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140075755","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Many contemporary metaphysicians believe that the existence of a contingent object such as Socrates metaphysically explains the existence of the corresponding set {Socrates}. This paper argues that this belief is mistaken. The argument proposed takes the form of a dilemma. The expression “{Socrates}” is a shorthand either for the expression “the set that contains all and only those objects that are identical to Socrates” or for the expression “the set that contains Socrates and nothing else”. However, Socrates' existence does not explain the existence of the set that contains all and only those objects that are identical to Socrates, because there is such a set no matter whether or not Socrates exists. And although Socrates' existence does explain that of the set that contains Socrates and nothing else, this explanation is a conceptual rather than a metaphysical one. Both these claims rely on a deflationary account of the use of set theoretic vocabulary that is explained, though not properly justified, in the paper.
{"title":"Metaphysical explanations: The case of singleton sets revisited","authors":"Kai Michael Büttner","doi":"10.1111/theo.12511","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12511","url":null,"abstract":"Many contemporary metaphysicians believe that the existence of a contingent object such as Socrates metaphysically explains the existence of the corresponding set {Socrates}. This paper argues that this belief is mistaken. The argument proposed takes the form of a dilemma. The expression “{Socrates}” is a shorthand either for the expression “the set that contains all and only those objects that are identical to Socrates” or for the expression “the set that contains Socrates and nothing else”. However, Socrates' existence does not explain the existence of the set that contains all and only those objects that are identical to Socrates, because there is such a set no matter whether or not Socrates exists. And although Socrates' existence does explain that of the set that contains Socrates and nothing else, this explanation is a conceptual rather than a metaphysical one. Both these claims rely on a deflationary account of the use of set theoretic vocabulary that is explained, though not properly justified, in the paper.","PeriodicalId":44638,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA","volume":"15 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-02-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140019834","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
It has been claimed that friendship not only involves partial treatment of one's friends but that it also involves some degree of doxastic partiality towards them. Taking these claims as their starting points, some philosophers have argued that friendship not only involves such partiality but that this is also what is normatively required. This gives rise to the possibility of conflict between the demands of friendship on the one hand and the demands of epistemic norms on the other. In this paper, I consider some of the responses to this claim and show why they fail. I distinguish between different grades of doxastic partiality and explain why, although low grades of doxastic partiality fall within the bounds of the standard epistemic norm, the higher grades might infringe such norms. I conclude with an explanation of a fundamental intuition that seems to lie at the heart of the thesis of epistemic partiality.
{"title":"Friendship and the grades of doxastic partiality","authors":"Hamid Vahid","doi":"10.1111/theo.12514","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12514","url":null,"abstract":"It has been claimed that friendship not only involves partial treatment of one's friends but that it also involves some degree of doxastic partiality towards them. Taking these claims as their starting points, some philosophers have argued that friendship not only involves such partiality but that this is also what is normatively required. This gives rise to the possibility of conflict between the demands of friendship on the one hand and the demands of epistemic norms on the other. In this paper, I consider some of the responses to this claim and show why they fail. I distinguish between different grades of doxastic partiality and explain why, although low grades of doxastic partiality fall within the bounds of the standard epistemic norm, the higher grades might infringe such norms. I conclude with an explanation of a fundamental intuition that seems to lie at the heart of the thesis of epistemic partiality.","PeriodicalId":44638,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-02-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139956189","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：