Abstract Ontic structural realism constitutes a promising take on scientific realism, one that avoids the well‐known issues that realist stances have with underdetermination and theory change. In its most radical versions, ontic structural realism proposes a type of eliminativism about theoretical entities, ascribing ontological commitment only to the structures, and not to the objects appearing in our theories. More moderate versions of ontic structural realism have also been proposed, allowing for ‘thin’ objects in the ontology. This work connects these takes on structural realism with the independent notion that there are two categorically different kinds of scientific theories, namely those that deal with interactions and those that deal with structural constraints – what are known as interaction and framework theories, respectively. By taking this classification seriously, one can arrive at a selective version of ontic structural realism which is better adapted to our scientific knowledge, in which eliminativist ontic structural realism constitutes a natural fit to framework theories, whereas the moderate version is connected to interaction theories.
{"title":"Structural realism and theory classification","authors":"Federico Benitez","doi":"10.1111/theo.12491","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12491","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Ontic structural realism constitutes a promising take on scientific realism, one that avoids the well‐known issues that realist stances have with underdetermination and theory change. In its most radical versions, ontic structural realism proposes a type of eliminativism about theoretical entities, ascribing ontological commitment only to the structures, and not to the objects appearing in our theories. More moderate versions of ontic structural realism have also been proposed, allowing for ‘thin’ objects in the ontology. This work connects these takes on structural realism with the independent notion that there are two categorically different kinds of scientific theories, namely those that deal with interactions and those that deal with structural constraints – what are known as interaction and framework theories, respectively. By taking this classification seriously, one can arrive at a selective version of ontic structural realism which is better adapted to our scientific knowledge, in which eliminativist ontic structural realism constitutes a natural fit to framework theories, whereas the moderate version is connected to interaction theories.","PeriodicalId":44638,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134910642","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The method of phenomenal contrast (in perception) invokes the phenomenal character of perceptual experience as a means to discover its contents. The method implicitly takes for granted that ‘what it is like’ to have a perceptual experience e is the same as ‘what it is like’ to imagine or recall it; accordingly, in its various proposed implementations, the method treats imaginations and/or recollections as interchangeable with real experiences. The method thus always contrasts a pair of experiences, at least one of which is imagined or remembered rather than occurrent. Surveying all eighteen forms of implementing the method, I argue that in all of the proposed pairings, the substitution of imagination or recollection for perceptual experience in the method, is either inconceivable or impermissible. I identify four reasons why I think imagination cannot be substituted for real experience, and three reasons why recollection cannot be substituted for real experience. If my argument works, there is no form of implementing the method that is useful for discovering the contents of experience, and thus the method is not a well‐functioning tool to study the contents of perception.
{"title":"The role of imagination and recollection in the method of phenomenal contrast","authors":"Hamid Nourbakhshi","doi":"10.1111/theo.12489","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12489","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The method of phenomenal contrast (in perception) invokes the phenomenal character of perceptual experience as a means to discover its contents. The method implicitly takes for granted that ‘what it is like’ to have a perceptual experience e is the same as ‘what it is like’ to imagine or recall it; accordingly, in its various proposed implementations, the method treats imaginations and/or recollections as interchangeable with real experiences. The method thus always contrasts a pair of experiences, at least one of which is imagined or remembered rather than occurrent. Surveying all eighteen forms of implementing the method, I argue that in all of the proposed pairings, the substitution of imagination or recollection for perceptual experience in the method, is either inconceivable or impermissible. I identify four reasons why I think imagination cannot be substituted for real experience, and three reasons why recollection cannot be substituted for real experience. If my argument works, there is no form of implementing the method that is useful for discovering the contents of experience, and thus the method is not a well‐functioning tool to study the contents of perception.","PeriodicalId":44638,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135741590","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper critically examines Mitchell’s integrative pluralism. Integrative pluralism is the view that scientific explanations should primarily aim to integrate descriptions from different ontological levels. We contend that, while integrative pluralism is a fundamental strategy in contemporary science, there are specific reasons why one should not expect integration in the sense developed by Mitchell to be the optimal strategy and the one that scientists should always aim for. Drawing on some examples from contemporary biology, we argue that integration is sometimes neither epistemically desirable, nor ontologically achievable. We conclude that integrative pluralism should thus be limited to a specific class of complex systems but cannot be generalised as the preferable research strategy without further information about the epistemic practices of the scientific community or the ontology of the system under investigation.
{"title":"Pluralism and complexity without integration? A critical appraisal of Mitchell’s integrative pluralism","authors":"Roger Deulofeu, Javier Suárez","doi":"10.1387/theoria.23871","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.23871","url":null,"abstract":"This paper critically examines Mitchell’s integrative pluralism. Integrative pluralism is the view that scientific explanations should primarily aim to integrate descriptions from different ontological levels. We contend that, while integrative pluralism is a fundamental strategy in contemporary science, there are specific reasons why one should not expect integration in the sense developed by Mitchell to be the optimal strategy and the one that scientists should always aim for. Drawing on some examples from contemporary biology, we argue that integration is sometimes neither epistemically desirable, nor ontologically achievable. We conclude that integrative pluralism should thus be limited to a specific class of complex systems but cannot be generalised as the preferable research strategy without further information about the epistemic practices of the scientific community or the ontology of the system under investigation.","PeriodicalId":44638,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134971251","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper advocates for the normative role of logic in reasoning. I offer a response, anchored in an externalist perspective, to two fronts of attack against the normativity thesis, namely Harman’s sceptical challenge and the accusation of naturalistic fallacy. On the one hand, I rework dialogical bridge principles and show that such principles satisfy adequacy criteria to deal with Harman’s challenge. On the other hand, I argue that it is possible to derive normative consequences from logical facts. This is because argumentative interactions among agents involve the acceptance of constitutive rules that entail obligations. Hence, since logical rules can be seen as constitutive of the social practice of reasoning, they create prescriptions for reasoning. Bridge principles make those obligations and prohibitions explicit.
{"title":"The normative role of logic for reasoning","authors":"Alba Massolo","doi":"10.1387/theoria.24374","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.24374","url":null,"abstract":"This paper advocates for the normative role of logic in reasoning. I offer a response, anchored in an externalist perspective, to two fronts of attack against the normativity thesis, namely Harman’s sceptical challenge and the accusation of naturalistic fallacy. On the one hand, I rework dialogical bridge principles and show that such principles satisfy adequacy criteria to deal with Harman’s challenge. On the other hand, I argue that it is possible to derive normative consequences from logical facts. This is because argumentative interactions among agents involve the acceptance of constitutive rules that entail obligations. Hence, since logical rules can be seen as constitutive of the social practice of reasoning, they create prescriptions for reasoning. Bridge principles make those obligations and prohibitions explicit.","PeriodicalId":44638,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134971252","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Sustained dialogue between people and the authenticity of relationships are dependent on the existence of an epistemic distance between the interlocutors – there needs to be a difference between the patterns of thought salient among the subjects involved. A lack thereof must lead to the collapse of the conditions requisite for continued engagement. This is the case because we can only sustain dialogue based on difference of opinion among agents. In short, similar constitutions of the ego must lead to a breakdown in communication. The consumer industry populates the world with objects of a similar ilk and thereby renders the environment homogeneous. The egos constructed under its rule must thus be similar in nature, hence the claim that dialogue must collapse under its rule. However, should we focus on the sundered duties implied by a community, as we intend to do with this article, we may recover the conditions of epistemic distance and thereby also the conditions of sustained and authentic relationships.
{"title":"Identity and Relation","authors":"Ettienne Smook","doi":"10.3167/th.2023.7017603","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3167/th.2023.7017603","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Sustained dialogue between people and the authenticity of relationships are dependent on the existence of an epistemic distance between the interlocutors – there needs to be a difference between the patterns of thought salient among the subjects involved. A lack thereof must lead to the collapse of the conditions requisite for continued engagement. This is the case because we can only sustain dialogue based on difference of opinion among agents. In short, similar constitutions of the ego must lead to a breakdown in communication. The consumer industry populates the world with objects of a similar ilk and thereby renders the environment homogeneous. The egos constructed under its rule must thus be similar in nature, hence the claim that dialogue must collapse under its rule. However, should we focus on the sundered duties implied by a community, as we intend to do with this article, we may recover the conditions of epistemic distance and thereby also the conditions of sustained and authentic relationships.","PeriodicalId":44638,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135735142","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract While critical utopias sought to rescue the political import of utopia, recently scholars have questioned their overemphasis on literary forms and a disempowering pluralism. Challenging the applicability of these claims to one of the instigators of critical utopias, I provide a political reading of Miguel Abensour's understanding of utopia and connect this to councils as a concrete institutional infrastructure. This begins with a re-reading of his influential conception of the ‘education of desire’ in relation to the simulacrum as a utopian ‘model’ that, in rejecting identity-thinking, refuses to reduce utopias to a blueprint. I then turn to conceptualising the utopia of councils through the simulacrum on two fronts: first, as a form subject to innovation in the context of the dialectic of emancipation; second, as a content that aims to both ‘democratise utopia’ by embracing plurality and ‘utopianize democracy’ by expanding the realm of democratic space.
{"title":"Beyond the Education of Desire","authors":"Paul Mazzocchi","doi":"10.3167/th.2023.7017604","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3167/th.2023.7017604","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract While critical utopias sought to rescue the political import of utopia, recently scholars have questioned their overemphasis on literary forms and a disempowering pluralism. Challenging the applicability of these claims to one of the instigators of critical utopias, I provide a political reading of Miguel Abensour's understanding of utopia and connect this to councils as a concrete institutional infrastructure. This begins with a re-reading of his influential conception of the ‘education of desire’ in relation to the simulacrum as a utopian ‘model’ that, in rejecting identity-thinking, refuses to reduce utopias to a blueprint. I then turn to conceptualising the utopia of councils through the simulacrum on two fronts: first, as a form subject to innovation in the context of the dialectic of emancipation; second, as a content that aims to both ‘democratise utopia’ by embracing plurality and ‘utopianize democracy’ by expanding the realm of democratic space.","PeriodicalId":44638,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135735145","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Hans Asenbaum, Reece Chenault, Christopher Harris, Akram Hassan, Curtis Hierro, Stephen Houldsworth, Brandon Mack, Shauntrice Martin, Chivona Newsome, Kayla Reed, Tony Rice, Shevone Torres, Terry J. Wilson II
Abstract In response to its current crisis, scholars call for the revitalisation of democracy through democratic innovations. While they make ample use of life metaphors describing democracy as a living organism, no comprehensive understanding of ‘life’ has been established within democratic theory. The Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement articulates the urgency of refocusing on life and its meaning through radical democratic practice. This article employs a grounded theory approach, enriched with participatory methods, to develop a radical democratic concept of life in conversation with BLM. It conceptualises life as the existence of a perspective that constantly transforms through its fundamental interconnectedness. Building on this concept, the article outlines four principles of a living democracy that go beyond the revitalisation discourse. A living democracy (1) safeguards the existence of all humans and nonhumans, (2) nurtures a diversity of perspectives, (3) fosters social and planetary connectivity, and (4) enables self- and collective transformation.
{"title":"A Democratic Theory of Life","authors":"Hans Asenbaum, Reece Chenault, Christopher Harris, Akram Hassan, Curtis Hierro, Stephen Houldsworth, Brandon Mack, Shauntrice Martin, Chivona Newsome, Kayla Reed, Tony Rice, Shevone Torres, Terry J. Wilson II","doi":"10.3167/th.2023.7017601","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3167/th.2023.7017601","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In response to its current crisis, scholars call for the revitalisation of democracy through democratic innovations. While they make ample use of life metaphors describing democracy as a living organism, no comprehensive understanding of ‘life’ has been established within democratic theory. The Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement articulates the urgency of refocusing on life and its meaning through radical democratic practice. This article employs a grounded theory approach, enriched with participatory methods, to develop a radical democratic concept of life in conversation with BLM. It conceptualises life as the existence of a perspective that constantly transforms through its fundamental interconnectedness. Building on this concept, the article outlines four principles of a living democracy that go beyond the revitalisation discourse. A living democracy (1) safeguards the existence of all humans and nonhumans, (2) nurtures a diversity of perspectives, (3) fosters social and planetary connectivity, and (4) enables self- and collective transformation.","PeriodicalId":44638,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135735148","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Digitality is increasingly central to individuals’ existence, which has political implications. The article maps the political implications of digitalisation, focusing on African political thought. The latter is marked by Afro-communitarianism ideas, which foster solidarity, relationality, and communalism as foundational values of the polity. However, African communitarianism has granted little attention to contemporary phenomena such as digitalisation. Also, political theory discussions on digitality have looked mainly at (neo)liberal contexts. How the digital age is reshaping the tenets of communitarian political theories represents an underdiscussed issue. This article outlines a research agenda on digitality and African political thought. New digitality-enabled relational modes change human and political interactions. The issue at stake is how these new modes challenge or strengthen the Afro-communitarian political outlook. This article recognises digital-humanism, political community, relations of power as central matters of inquiry. The analysis relies on bibliographic sources from African philosophy and comparative political theory.
{"title":"Digitality and Political Theory","authors":"Claudia Favarato","doi":"10.3167/th.2023.7017602","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3167/th.2023.7017602","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Digitality is increasingly central to individuals’ existence, which has political implications. The article maps the political implications of digitalisation, focusing on African political thought. The latter is marked by Afro-communitarianism ideas, which foster solidarity, relationality, and communalism as foundational values of the polity. However, African communitarianism has granted little attention to contemporary phenomena such as digitalisation. Also, political theory discussions on digitality have looked mainly at (neo)liberal contexts. How the digital age is reshaping the tenets of communitarian political theories represents an underdiscussed issue. This article outlines a research agenda on digitality and African political thought. New digitality-enabled relational modes change human and political interactions. The issue at stake is how these new modes challenge or strengthen the Afro-communitarian political outlook. This article recognises digital-humanism, political community, relations of power as central matters of inquiry. The analysis relies on bibliographic sources from African philosophy and comparative political theory.","PeriodicalId":44638,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135735144","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Correction to ‘A new bridge principle for the normativity of logic’","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/theo.12458","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12458","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44638,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136292065","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The paper focuses on emotional subjectivity (a sense of own identity based on an emotional reception of values) on the one hand, and the constitution of an organic community (one characterized by immediacy, as opposed to a formal community, which is permeated by institutional relations that mediate intersubjective relations between the community?s members). The argument rests on the idea, supported by modern experimental neuroscience, that emotions are the key dynamic factors of decision-making, quite contrary to the asumption of a rational deliberation. This idea generates significant consequences for the understanding of virtue, individual and collective identity, and the way in which informal communities are formed, even within larger institutionalized societies. One of the implications of the idea that emotional subjectivity is at the core of decision-making is that any therapeutic intervention, including philotherapy, must take as its starting assumption the fundamental emotional foundations of all decisions and actions taken in society. When this therapeutic approach is applied to issues that reach beyond the individual concerns or interests, it becomes activist, and takes on the shape of social engagement. The paper argues that the emotionality of intersubjective dynamism in society necessitates a social role for philosophical practice, both as a therapeutic activity (in the form of individual or group socialization or resocialization with regard to values), and as a shaping influence on social discourse on values, specifically focusing on developing a particular collective sensibility for key values that contribute to ideas such as the good life, a cohesive community or common fate, all of which characterize organicism in community-building that has proven as a form of social healing in cases of collective distress.
{"title":"Philotherapy as a social engagement","authors":"Aleksandar Fatic","doi":"10.2298/theo2303125f","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2298/theo2303125f","url":null,"abstract":"The paper focuses on emotional subjectivity (a sense of own identity based on an emotional reception of values) on the one hand, and the constitution of an organic community (one characterized by immediacy, as opposed to a formal community, which is permeated by institutional relations that mediate intersubjective relations between the community?s members). The argument rests on the idea, supported by modern experimental neuroscience, that emotions are the key dynamic factors of decision-making, quite contrary to the asumption of a rational deliberation. This idea generates significant consequences for the understanding of virtue, individual and collective identity, and the way in which informal communities are formed, even within larger institutionalized societies. One of the implications of the idea that emotional subjectivity is at the core of decision-making is that any therapeutic intervention, including philotherapy, must take as its starting assumption the fundamental emotional foundations of all decisions and actions taken in society. When this therapeutic approach is applied to issues that reach beyond the individual concerns or interests, it becomes activist, and takes on the shape of social engagement. The paper argues that the emotionality of intersubjective dynamism in society necessitates a social role for philosophical practice, both as a therapeutic activity (in the form of individual or group socialization or resocialization with regard to values), and as a shaping influence on social discourse on values, specifically focusing on developing a particular collective sensibility for key values that contribute to ideas such as the good life, a cohesive community or common fate, all of which characterize organicism in community-building that has proven as a form of social healing in cases of collective distress.","PeriodicalId":44638,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135649750","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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